S_2015_801_EA
Correct misalignment Change languages order
S/2015/801 1516012E.docx (English)S/2015/801 1516012A.docx (Arabic)
S/2015/801S/2015/801
United Nationsالأمــم المتحـدة
S/2015/801S/2015/801
Security Councilمجلس الأمن
Distr.: GeneralDistr.: General
19 October 201519 October 2015
Original: EnglishArabic Original: English
S/2015/801S/2015/801
/4915-16012
15-16012/343
15-16012 (E) 201015201015 201015 15-16012 (A)
*1516012**1516012*
15-16012/343
/215-16012
Letter dated 9 October 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Councilرسالة مؤرخة 9 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2015 موجهة إلى رئيس مجلس الأمن من رئيس لجنة مجلس الأمن المنبثقة عن القرارين 751 (1992) و 1907 (2009) بشأن الصومال وإريتريا
On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with paragraph 47 of Security Council resolution 2182 (2014), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.باسم لجنة مجلس الأمن المنبثقة عن القرارين 751 (1992) و 1907 (2009) بشأن الصومال وإريتريا، ووفقا للفقرة 47 من قرار مجلس الأمن 2182 (2014)، أتشرف بأن أحيل طي هذه الرسالة تقرير فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا عن الصومال.
In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter, together with the enclosed report, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.وفي هذا الصدد، ترجو اللجنة ممتنة عرض هذه الرسالة والتقرير المرفق بها، على أعضاء مجلس الأمن، وإصدارهما باعتبارهما وثيقة من وثائق المجلس.
(Signed) Rafael Darío Ramírez Carreño Chair Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea(توقيع) رافاييل داريو راميريس كارينيو رئيس لجنة مجلس الأمن المنبثقة عن القرارين 751 (1992) و 1907 (2009) بشأن الصومال وإريتريا
Letter dated 22 September 2015 from the members of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritreaرسالة مؤرخة 22 أيلول/سبتمبر 2015 موجهة إلى رئيس لجنة مجلس الأمن المنبثقة عن القرارين 751 (1992) و 1907 (2009) بشأن الصومال وإريتريا من أعضاء فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا
We have the honour to transmit herewith the report focusing on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea in accordance with paragraph 47 of Security Council resolution 2182 (2014).عملا بالفقرة 47 من قرار مجلس الأمن 2182 (2014)، نتشرف بأن نحيل طي هذه الرسالة تقرير فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا الذي يركز على الصومال.
(Signed) Christophe Trajber Coordinator Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea(توقيع) كريستوف تراجبير منسق فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا
(Signed) Nicholas Argeros Finance expert(توقيع) نيكولاس أرغيروس الخبير المالي
(Signed) Zeina Awad Transport expert(توقيع) زينة عوض خبيرة شؤون النقل
(Signed) Jay Bahadur Armed groups expert(توقيع) جاي باهادور خبير شؤون الجماعات المسلحة
(Signed) Bogdan Chetreanu Finance expert(توقيع) بوغدان تشيتريانو الخبير المالي
(Signed) Déirdre Clancy Humanitarian expert(توقيع) ديردر كلانسي خبير الشؤون الإنسانية
(Signed) James Smith Regional expert(توقيع) جيمس سميث الخبير الإقليمي
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2182 (2014): Somaliaتقرير فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا المقدم عملا بقرار مجلس الأمن 2182 (2014): الصومال
Contentsالمحتويات
Pageالصفحة
Summaryموجز
67
1.أولا -
Introductionمقدمة
912
A.ألف -
Mandateالولاية
912
B.بــاء -
Methodologyالمنهجية
912
2.ثانيا -
Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somaliaالأعمال التي تهدد السلام والأمن والاستقرار في الصومال
1014
A.ألف -
Spoiler politics and the capture of State resourcesسياسة التعطيل ووضع اليد على موارد الدولة
1014
B.بــاء -
Natural resourcesالموارد الطبيعية
1520
C.جيم -
Public financial management and misappropriationالإدارة المالية العامة والاختلاس
2231
D.هاء -
Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiinالقرصنة والاختطاف طلبا للفدية
2647
E.ثالثا -
Piracy and kidnap for ransomعرقلة المساعدات الإنسانية
3248
3.ألف -
Obstruction of humanitarian assistance 33منع وصول المساعدات الإنسانية
A.48
Denial of humanitarian accessبــاء -
34 B. Attacks on humanitarian workersالهجمات على العاملين في المجال الإنساني
3550
C.جيم -
Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistanceصرف المساعدة الإنسانية عن وجهتها واختلاسها
3652
4.رابعا -
Violations of international law involving the targeting of civiliansانتهاكات القانون الدولي التي تنطوي على استهداف المدنيين
3753
A.ألف -
Targeting of civiliansاستهداف المدنيين
3753
B.بــاء -
Sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of children in armed conflict and forced displacementالعنف الجنسي والجنساني وتجنيد الأطفال واستخدامهم في النزاعات المسلحة والتشريد القسري
3855
5.خامسا -
Arms embargo regimeنظام حظر الأسلحة
3856
A.ألف -
Compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia with the conditions of the partial lifting of the arms embargoامتثال حكومة الصومال الاتحادية لشروط الرفع الجزئي لحظر الأسلحة
3856
B.بــاء -
Obligations of Member States and regional and international organizationsالتزامات الدول الأعضاء والمنظمات الإقليمية والدولية
4057
C.جيم -
Standing exemptions from the arms embargoالاستثناءات الدائمة من حظر الأسلحة
4058
D.دال -
Documentation of captured weaponry and military equipmentتوثيق الأسلحة والمعدات العسكرية المصادرة
4058
E.هاء -
Implementation of paragraphs 10 and 15 of resolution 2182 (2014)تنفيذ الفقرتين 10 و 15 من القرار 2182 (2014)
4159
F.واو -
Violations of the arms embargoانتهاكات حظر الأسلحة
4159
6.سادسا -
Violations of the ban on charcoalانتهاكات حظر الفحم
4160
A.ألف -
Production and export of charcoal in southern Somaliaإنتاج وتصدير الفحم في جنوب الصومال
4260
B.بــاء -
Maritime interdiction and vessel trackingالاعتراض البحري وتتبع السفن
4362
C.جيم -
Falsified documentationاستخدام وثائق مزيفة
4463
7.سابعا -
State and non-State cooperation with the Monitoring Groupتعاون الدول والجهات من غير الدول مع فريق الرصد
4564
8.ثامنا -
Sanctions listقائمة الخاضعين للجزاءات
4665
9.تاسعا -
Recommendationsالتوصيات
4666
A.ألف -
Threats to peace and securityالتهديدات المحدقة بالسلام والأمن
4666
B.بـاء -
Piracyالقرصنة
4767
C.جيم -
Arms embargo regimeنظام حظر توريد الأسلحة
4767
D.دال -
Obstruction of humanitarian assistanceعرقلة المساعدة الإنسانية
4869
E.هاء -
Violations of international law involving the targeting of civiliansانتهاكات القانون الدولي الإنساني التي تنطوي على استهداف المدنيين
4970
F.واو -
Violations of the ban on charcoalانتهاكات حظر تصدير الفحم
5071
G.زاي -
Sanctions listقائمة الخاضعين للجزاءات
5072
Annexesالمرفقات*
SomaliaSomalia
1.1 -
Spoiler politics and the capture of State resourcesSpoiler politics and the capture of State resources
5173
1.1.1-1
Formation of Interim Galmudug AdministrationFormation of Interim Galmudug Administration
5274
1.2.تعمم المرفقات باللغة التي قدمت بها فقط ودون تحرير رسمي.
Bribery of Federal Members of Parliamentلم تُضمّ المرفقات 1-2 و 2-4 و 3-1 و 4-2 هـ و 4-3 و 6-1 أ و 6-2 ب و 6-3 ب إلى هذه الوثيقة نظرا لطابعها السري للغاية 1-2 Bribery of Federal Members of Parliament
5981
2.2 -
Natural resourcesNatural resources
6082
2.1.2-1
Sale of fishing licencesSale of fishing licences
6183
2.2.2-2
The Al Amal and Poseidon, and the assault on the Auditor GeneralThe Al Amal and Poseidon, and the assault on the Auditor General
7294
2.3.2-3
Continuing privatization of Somalia’s maritime spaceContinuing privatization of Somalia’s maritime space
84106
2.4.2-4
Hijackings of the Iranian dhows FV Siraj and FV Jaber by pirates linked to Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje”**Hijackings of the Iranian dhows FV Siraj and FV Jaber by pirates **linked to Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje”
92114
2.5.2-5
Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd.Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd.
93115
3.3 -
Public financial management and misappropriationPublic financial management and misappropriation
149171
3.1.3-1
Somali National Army financial management and misappropriation****Somali National Army financial management and misappropriation
150172
3.2.3-2
Misappropriation of funds at the Somali Embassy in NairobiMisappropriation of funds at the Somali Embassy in Nairobi
151173
3.3.3-3
Misappropriation of funds for Mogadishu port rehabilitationMisappropriation of funds for Mogadishu port rehabilitation
164186
3.4.3-4
Illegal agreement relating to the taxation of khat importsIllegal agreement relating to the taxation of khat imports
177199
4.4 -
Harakaat al-Shabaab al-MujaahidiinHarakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin
184206
4.1.4-1
Mogadishu hotel attacksMogadishu hotel attacks
185207
4.2.4-2
Garissa University College attack****Garissa University College attack
189211
4.3.4-3
Failed January 2015 Al-Shabaab plot in Djibouti****Failed January 2015 Al-Shabaab plot in Djibouti
202224
4.4.4-4
Al-Shabaab and heroin traffickingAl-Shabaab and heroin trafficking
203225
5.5 -
Obstruction of humanitarian assistanceObstruction of humanitarian assistance
205227
5.1.5-1
Denial of humanitarian accessDenial of humanitarian access
206228
5.2.5-2
Bureaucratic impediments and misuse of official power to obstruct accessBureaucratic impediments and misuse of official power to obstruct access
212234
5.3.5-3
Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistanceDiversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance
218240
6.6 -
Violations of international lawViolations of international law
225247
6.1.6-1
Violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians****Violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians
226248
6.2.6-2
The situation of the Wagosha/Bantu community in Al-Shabaab-held areas of Lower and Middle Jubba**The situation of the Wagosha/Bantu community in Al-Shabaab-held **areas of Lower and Middle Jubba
236262
6.3.6-3
Commission of violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians in the villages of Kabxanley and Defow, Hiran, December 2013-2015**Commission of violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians in the villages of Kabxanley and Defow, Hiran, **December 2013-2015
241263
6.4.6-4
Sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of children in armed conflict and forced displacementSexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of children in armed conflict and forced displacement
244266
7.7 -
Arms embargo regimeArms embargo regime
249271
7.1.7-1
Management of weapons, ammunition and military equipmentManagement of weapons, ammunition and military equipment
250272
7.2.7-2
Compliance with the exemption framework and with notification requirements under the arms embargoCompliance with the exemption framework and with notification requirements under the arms embargo
262284
7.3.7-3
Federal Government of Somalia compliance with reporting requirements under the arms embargo partial liftFederal Government of Somalia compliance with reporting requirements under the arms embargo partial lift
276298
7.4.7-4
Military equipment captured during offensive operations by AMISOM and Federal Government of Somalia security forces: implementation of paragraph 6 of resolution 2182 (2014)Military equipment captured during offensive operations by AMISOM and Federal Government of Somalia security forces: implementation of paragraph 6 of resolution 2182 (2014)
283305
7.5.7-5
Enhancing compliance: international assistance to the Federal Government of SomaliaEnhancing compliance: international assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia
289311
7.6.7-6
Implementation of, and recommendations related to, modifications of the arms embargo stipulated in resolution 2182 (2014)Implementation of, and recommendations related to, modifications of the arms embargo stipulated in resolution 2182 (2014)
293315
8.8 -
Violations of the charcoal banViolations of the charcoal ban
299320
8.1.8-1
Charcoal stockpilesCharcoal stockpiles
300321
8.2.8-2
Kismayo charcoal operationsKismayo charcoal operations
314335
8.3.8-3
MSV Raj MilanMSV Raj Milan
316337
Summaryموجز
Much has changed since President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected President of the Federal Government of Somalia late in 2012.لقد تغير الكثير منذ انتخاب الرئيس حسن شيخ محمود رئيسا لحكومة الصومال الاتحادية في أواخر عام 2012.
Support from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) enabled significant territorial gains to be made against Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab).وأمكن من خلال الدعم المقدم من بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال اكتساب مساحات كبيرة من الأراضي من حركة شباب المجاهدين (حركة الشباب).
Three new interim regional administrations have been established, leaving a new federal map of Somalia almost complete.وأُنشئت ثلاث إدارات إقليمية مؤقتة جديدة فأشرفت بذلك الخريطة الاتحادية الجديدة للصومال على الاكتمال.
As new lines are drawn on the map, however, new opportunities for clan, business and political networks to capture State resources have emerged.ومع ذلك فقد لاحت مع رسم خطوط جديدة على الخريطة فرص جديدة لاستيلاء شبكات عشائرية وتجارية وسياسية على موارد الدولة.
The rush for these resources by spoiler networks is preventing the development of an inclusive political arrangement, and threatens to undermine the military gains made against Al-Shabaab.ويحول تهافت تلك الشبكات المخربة على تلك الموارد دون التوصل إلى ترتيب سياسي يشمل الجميع، كما يهدد بتقويض المكاسب العسكرية التي تحققت ضد حركة الشباب.
Capitalizing on these gains requires Somalia’s political elite to prioritize the long-term goals of State-building over the short-term capture of State resources.وتتطلب الاستفادة من تلك المكاسب أن تجعل النخبة السياسية الصومالية الأهداف الطويلة الأجل المتمثلة في بناء الدولة في منزلة أسبق في سلم الأولويات من الاقتناص القصير الأجل لموارد الدولة.
The failure to do so, as Somalia enters the next phase of transition in 2016, presents a significant threat to the long-term peace, security and stability of Somalia.ودون أن يتحقق ذلك في الوقت الذي تدخل فيه الصومال المرحلة التالية من عملية الانتقال في عام 2016، سيتعرض سلام الصومال وأمنها واستقرارها في الأجل الطويل لتهديد كبير.
A resurgent Al-Shabaab appears increasingly able to exploit the failures of its opponents to consolidate control, establish local administrations, provide security and build public trust.ويبدو أن حركة الشباب التي استعادت نشاطها تزداد حاليا قدرتها على استغلال فشل مناوئيها في توطيد سيطرتهم وإنشاء إدارات محلية وتوفير الأمن وبناء الثقة لدى الجمهور.
Control over and access to Somalia’s land and water resources were contested long before the collapse of the State in 1991.ولقد كانت السيطرة على الأراضي والموارد المائية في الصومال وإمكانية الاستفادة منها محل نزاع قبل انهيار الدولة بوقت طويل في عام 1991.
Al-Shabaab’s administrative rule over much of southern and central Somalia, though ruthless, subdued many deeply rooted intercommunal conflicts over land and water resources.وأخمد الحكم الإداري لكثير من المناطق الشمالية والوسطى للصومال من جانب حركة الشباب، رغم شدة قسوته، كثيرا من الصراعات العشائرية المتجذرة على الأراضي والموارد المائية.
Al-Shabaab’s loss of territory in the face of military defeats, and the absence of viable alternative civilian administrations in its place, have resulted in the re-emergence of intercommunal conflicts in parts of southern and central Somalia.وأدى فقدان أراض من جانب حركة الشباب بسبب هزائمها العسكرية وعدم وجود إدارات مدنية بديلة قابلة للاستمرار تحل محلها إلى تجدد الصراعات العشائرية في أجزاء من جنوب ووسط الصومال.
Al-Shabaab has leveraged this conflict to its advantage.وقد استفادت الحركة من هذه الصراعات.
The prevalence of potentially deepening intercommunal conflicts over land, water and other natural resources in the relatively more stable regions of Somaliland and Puntland underlines the need for comprehensive approaches to local-level resource-sharing agreements.ويؤكد تفشي الصراعات العشائرية - المحتمل أن تزداد عمقا - على الأراضي والمياه وغيرهما من الموارد الطبيعية في إقليمي صوماليلاند وبونتلاند المستقرين نسبيا الحاجة إلى اتباع نُهُج شاملة في اتفاقات تقاسم الموارد على الصعيد المحلي.
The 2012 Provisional Constitution and ongoing federalization process have highlighted the urgent need for national resource-sharing agreements.وقد أبرز الدستور الانتقالي لعام 2012 وعملية إنشاء نظام اتحادي الجارية حاليا الحاجة الملحة لاتفاقات وطنية لتقاسم الموارد.
The pursuit of Somalia’s mineral and maritime wealth by private companies presents a significant threat in a fragile environment.ويسبب سعي الشركات الخاصة إلى استغلال الثروة المعدنية والبحرية للصومال تهديدا كبيرا في بيئة هشة.
Managed effectively by responsible and effective institutions, the nation’s resource wealth should contribute to the strengthening of Somalia’s economy and to its prosperity.ويُفترض أن تسهم ثروة البلد من الموارد، إذا ما أدارتها على نحو فعال مؤسسات مسؤولة وفعالة، في تعزيز اقتصاد الصومال وازدهاره.
The Monitoring Group’s investigation into Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd., which revealed that Somali Government officials accepted payments from the company under the guise of a “capacity-building” programme, has demonstrated that such institutions do not yet exist.وقـد أظهر التحقيــق الذي أجراه فريــق الرصد في شركة Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd، والذي كشف عن قبول مسؤولين حكوميين صوماليين مبالغ من الشركة تحت قناع برنامج لـ ”بناء القدرات“، أن هذه المؤسسات لا وجود لها حتى الآن.
The successful implementation of genuine capacity-building programmes should be a prerequisite for the development of the extractives sector in Somalia.ويجب أن يكون التنفيذ الناجح لبرامج حقيقية لبناء القدرات شرطا مسبقا لتنمية قطاع الاستخراج في الصومال.
The rapid decline in piracy off the coast of Somalia since 2012 has been the result of external efforts and measures.وقد كان التقلص السريع للقرصنة قبالة سواحل الصومال منذ عام 2012 نتيجة لجهود وتدابير خارجية.
The reported involvement of known pirate leaders in the recent capture of two Iranian fishing dhows serves as a reminder, however, that the conditions on land that allowed the rise of piracy largely remain.إلا أن ما أُبلغ عنه من ضلوع قادة قراصنة معروفين في الاستيلاء على اثنين من مراكب الصيد الشراعية الإيرانية مؤخرا يذكرنا بأن الظروف البرية التي أتاحت انتشار القرصنة لا تزال قائمة إلى حد كبير.
While the threat posed by piracy to merchant vessels remains low, the Monitoring Group is concerned that illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by foreign vessels may re-establish the conflict dynamic with local fishing communities that contributed to the rise of piracy a decade ago.ومع أن تهديد القرصنة للسفن التجارية لا يزال محدودا، فإن فريق الرصد يساوره القلق من أن الصيد غير المشروع وغير المبلغ عنه وغير المنظم الذي تقوم به سفن الصيد الأجنبية قد يؤدي إلى تجدد دينامية النزاع مع جماعات صيد الأسماك المحلية، التي أسهمت في انتشار القرصنة منذ عقد مضى.
The decline in piracy was followed by a commensurate rise in external private interests seeking to exploit the fisheries sector and provide maritime security services.وقد حدث بعد تراجع القرصنة ازديادٌ بنفس المقدار في المصالح الخاصة الخارجية الساعية إلى استغلال قطاع صيد الأسماك وتقديم خدمات أمنية بحرية.
As domestic and international awareness of Somalia’s maritime resources has grown, the lack of regulation and oversight in the sector creates a new source of “rent” for federal and regional officials — particularly through the sale of fishing licences — thereby fuelling corruption.ومع نمو الوعي محليا ودوليا بموارد الصومال البحرية، يؤدي عدم تنظيم القطاع والرقابة عليه إلى إيجاد مصدر جديد للتربح أمام المسؤولين الاتحاديين والإقليميين - وخاصة من خلال بيع رخص الصيد، الأمر الذي يغذي الفساد.
More broadly, corruption continues to undermine efforts to rebuild effective institutions throughout Somalia.وبشكل أعم، فلا زال الفساد يقوض الجهود الرامية إلى إعادة بناء مؤسسات فعالة في جميع أنحاء الصومال.
The fact that the outcome of important debates by the highest decision-making body of the Federal Government of Somalia — the House of the People — may be influenced through cash payments to its members demonstrates the extent to which corruption impedes the fragile process of State-building.ويدل احتمال أن تتأثر نتائج المناقشات الهامة التي يجريها مجلس الشعب، وهو أعلى هيئة لاتخاذ القرار في حكومة الصومال الاتحادية، من خلال دفع مبالغ نقدية لأعضاء المجلس، على مدى عرقلة الفساد لعملية بناء الدولة علما بأنها عملية هشة.
Commendable efforts have been made over the course of the mandate to strengthen financial regulation and implement new instruments.وقد بُذلت في أثناء فترة ولاية الفريق جهود جديرة بالثناء لتحسين تنظيم الشؤون المالية وتفعيل أدوات مالية جديدة.
While the Monitoring Group is optimistic that this trend will continue, effectively addressing the extent of misappropriation in Somalia requires systematic reform extending beyond Somalia’s financial institutions.ومع تفاؤل فريق الرصد باستمرار هذا الاتجاه، فإنه يرى أن التصدي بفعالية لنطاق الاستيلاء على المال العام في الصومال يتطلب إصلاحا ممنهجا يمتد إلى ما هو أبعد من المؤسسات المالية للصومال.
The lack of effective civilian oversight over the budget of the Somali National Army has enabled opportunities for systemic misappropriation, including of soldiers’ wages.وقد أتاح غياب رقابة مدنية فعلية على ميزانية الجيش الوطني الصومالي فرصا للاستيلاء المنهجي على الموارد، بما في ذلك الاستيلاء على مرتبات الجنود.
The obvious security ramifications of such misappropriation highlight the need for a comprehensive approach to implementing reform.وتُبرز التداعيات الأمنية الواضحة لهذا الاستيلاء الحاجة إلى اتباع نهج شامل في تنفيذ الإصلاح.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s announcement on 9 September 2015 of sweeping financial reforms within the security sector is a welcome first step in this process.ويشكل إعلان الرئيس حسن شيخ محمود في 9 أيلول/سبتمبر 2015 عن إدخال إصلاحات مالية شاملة في قطاع الأمن خطوة إيجابية أولى في هذا الاتجاه.
The ability of the security forces to defend the Somali people from Al-Shabaab has been tested during this mandate.وقد وضعت قدرة قوات الأمن على الدفاع عن الشعب الصومالي ضد حركة الشباب رهن الاختبار خلال فترة هذه الولاية.
The successful elimination of several prominent leaders appears to have done little to dent Al-Shabaab’s commitment and capacity to destabilize the region.ويبدو أن النجاح في القضاء على عدة قادة بارزين للحركة لم يسهم بشيء يُذكر في إضعاف تصميم الحركة على زعزعة استقرار المنطقة وقدرتها على ذلك.
Al-Shabaab’s shift of tactics, including the return to conventional attacks on military targets — both AMISOM and the Somali National Army — is cause for deep concern, particularly given the cuts to the AMISOM budget and ongoing challenges of Somali National Army troop payments.ويشكل التحول التكتيكي لعمليات الحركة، بما في ذلك العودة إلى شن هجمات تقليدية على أهداف عسكرية تخص كلا من بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال والجيش الوطني الصومالي، مصدر قلق بالغ، خصوصا بالنظر إلى تخفيض ميزانية بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي والتحديات المستمرة التي تحفّ بدفع مرتبات أفراد الجيش.
Al-Shabaab maintains an ability to adapt to changing circumstances and exploit weaknesses in the security and governance architecture.وما زالت حركة الشباب قادرة على التكيف مع الظروف المتغيرة واستغلال نقاط الضعف في بنية الأمن والحكم.
In the face of allied advances against the towns and villages it holds, the group can withdraw, blockade essential supplies from reaching the “liberated” populations, and simply wait until the security presence is sufficiently weakened or demoralized before striking again.وباستطاعة الجماعة، في مواجهة تقدم القوات المتحالفة في اتجاه البلدات والقرى التي في حوزتها، أن تنسحب وتمنع وصول الإمدادات الأساسية إلى سكان المناطق ’’المحررة‘‘ وأن تلجأ، ببساطة، إلى الانتظار حتى يطرأ ما يكفي من الضعف أو انخفاض الروح المعنوية على الوجود الأمني قبل شن ضرباتها من جديد.
As military advances continue, AMISOM, the Somali National Army and allied forces are stretched thin, leaving their bases increasingly vulnerable to attack.ومع استمرار التقدم العسكري، تتسع الأعباء الملقاة على عاتق بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي والجيش الوطني الصومالي والقوات المتحالفة إلى الحد الذي يفوق طاقتها، مما يجعل قواعدها مكشوفة بشكل متزايد أمام هجمات الحركة.
The longer-term impact of the major attacks on AMISOM troops, such as those in Leego (26 June 2015) and Janale (1 September 2015), may not yet be fully appreciated.وربما لم يتم بعدُ الاستيعاب الكامل لحجم الأثر الطويل الأجل للهجمات الضخمة التي تعرضت لها قوات بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي، من قبيل الهجوم الذي وقع في منطقة ليغـو (26 حـــزيران/يونيــه 2015) والهجــوم الـذي وقع في جنالي (1 أيلول/سبتمبر 2015).
Rather than weakening Al-Shabaab, the territorial displacement of the group from major urban centres in Somalia has prompted its further spread into the broader Horn of Africa region.وبدلا من أن تؤدي إزاحة قوات حركة الشباب عن المراكز الحضرية الرئيسية في الصومال إلى إضعاف الحركة، فقد دفعتها إلى مزيد من الانتشار في منطقة القرن الأفريقي الأوسع.
North-eastern Kenya has witnessed an alarming surge in attacks over the course of the mandate.فقد شهدت منطقة شمال شرق كينيا طفرة مفزعة في الهجمات خلال فترة ولاية الفريق.
Al-Shabaab continues to be able to employ relatively simple tactics with devastating impact, as demonstrated in its attack on Garissa University in April 2015.ولا تزال الحركة قادرة على استخدام تكتيكات بسيطة نسبيا ولكنها ذات تأثير مدمر، وفق ما يدلل عليه الهجوم الذي شنته على جامعة غاريسا في نيسان/أبريل 2015.
There is growing need for a regionally coordinated approach to the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other fundamentalist militant outfits throughout the Horn of Africa.وثمة حاجة متزايدة إلى اتباع نهج منسق إقليميا للتعامل مع التهديد الذي تشكله حركة الشباب وغيرها من الجماعات الأصولية المحاربة في كامل منطقة القرن الأفريقي.
The partial lifting of the arms embargo introduced through Security Council resolution 2093 (2013) was prompted, inter alia, by the need to strengthen the capacity of Somali domestic forces to confront the military threat posed by Al-Shabaab.ويُذكر أن الرفع الجزئي لحظر الأسلحة بموجب قرار مجلس الأمن 2093 (2013) قد جاء نتيجة عوامل من بينها الحاجة إلى تعزيز قدرة القوات المحلية الصومالية على مواجهة التهديد العسكري الذي تشكله حركة الشباب.
The Monitoring Group continues to receive reports that such forces remain ill-equipped to do so.وما زالت ترد إلى فريق الرصد تقارير تفيد بأن تلك القوات ما زالت غير مجهزة بالصورة المناسبة للقيام بذلك.
While the Group can now more effectively monitor the volume of military material entering Somalia legitimately, it remains unable to accurately assess whether such military material is being distributed appropriately or, indeed, how much is still required.ومع أن بوسع الفريق الآن أن يرصد بمزيد من الفعالية حجم المواد العسكرية التي تدخل الصومال بشكل مشروع، فإنه ما زال عاجزا عن أن يقيّم على نحو صحيح ما إذا كانت تلك المواد العسكرية توزع توزيعا ملائما أو مقدار ما لا تزال هناك حاجة إليه منها.
In particular, the standard of reporting on the composition, strength and structure of Federal Government security forces continues to fall far short of the Council’s requirements.وعلى وجه الخصوص، ما زال مستوى الإبلاغ عن تشكيل قوات الأمن التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية وقوامها وهيكلها أقل كثيرا مما فرضه المجلس.
With the emergence of new regional administrations, and an increasing number of both national and foreign security forces present in Somalia, it is increasingly important to identify which security forces are eligible to import military material under the Security Council’s arms embargo, and which reporting obligations they consequently incur.ومع ظهور إدارات إقليمية جديدة وتزايد عدد قوات الأمن الوطنية والأجنبية الموجودة في الصومال، بات من المهم بشكل متزايد تحديد قوات الأمن المستوفية لشروط استيراد المواد العسكرية بموجب حظر الأسلحة المفروض من مجلس الأمن والتزامات الإبلاغ التي تقع على عاتقها نتيجة لذلك.
That all of the security forces present in Somalia are believed to have targeted civilians — whether as a deliberate tactic of war, in service of political or economic aims or through disproportionate use of force — further increases the need for more transparent reporting.ومما يزيد من الحاجة إلى توخي مزيد من الشفافية في الإبلاغ الاعتقاد بأن جميع قــوات الأمــن الموجودة فــي الصومــال قــد استهدفت مدنيين، سواء كتكتيك حربي متعمد أو خدمةً لأهــداف سياسيـــة أو اقتصاديـــة أو مـــن خــلال الاستخدام غيــر المتناسب للقوة.
Politically, economically and culturally excluded communities continue to experience disproportionate violations of international humanitarian law, reflecting the deep-rooted stratification of Somali society.ولا تزال الفئات المستبعدة سياسيا واقتصاديا وثقافيا تتعرض لانتهاكات جائرة للقانون الدولي الإنساني، مما يعكس الانقسام الطبقي المتجذّر للمجتمع الصومالي.
Al-Shabaab committed the most egregious violations against civilian populations during the course of the mandate — particularly with regard to the forced recruitment of children.وقد ارتكبت حركة الشباب أفظع الانتهاكات ضد السكان المدنيين خلال فترة ولاية الفريق، وخاصة فيما يتعلق بالتجنيد القسري للأطفال.
At the same time, the abuse of marginalized communities by anti-Al-Shabaab forces provides an effective recruitment tool for the group and alienates those communities from the emerging State.وفي الوقت نفسه، يوفر سوء معاملة القوات المناهضة لحركة الشباب للفئات المهمشة أداة تجنيد فعالة في يد الجماعة ويؤدي إلى عزوف تلك الفئات عن المشاركة في الدولة الوليدة.
The largest displacements of people during the mandate were caused by the forced eviction of huge numbers of internally displaced and poor communities from urban centres in Somalia.وقد نجمت أكبر حالات نزوح السكان أثناء فترة الولاية عن الإخلاء القسري لأعداد هائلة من المشردين داخليا والتجمعات الفقيرة من المراكز الحضرية في الصومال.
Humanitarian access remained extremely fragile, particularly as Al-Shabaab blockaded key towns and supply routes.وظلت إمكانية إيصال المساعدات الإنسانية هشة للغاية، وخاصة مع محاصرة حركة الشباب لبلدات وطرق إمداد رئيسية.
Efforts by competing authorities to co-opt and extract benefits from humanitarian operations compromised not just the viability of operations but also the ability to work safely across different zones of control.وقد قوضت جهود السلطات المتنافسة لاستمالة العمليــات الإنسانيــة واستخلاص منافع منها ليس قابلية تلك العمليات للاستمرار فحسب، بل أيضا القدرة على العمل بأمان في مختلف المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة تلك السلطات.
The number of threats against and attacks on humanitarian workers rose, with 10 humanitarian workers being killed and 17 injured from January to July 2015 alone.وزاد عدد التهديدات المحدقة بالعاملين في مجال الأنشطة الإنسانية والهجمات التي يتعرضون لها، حيث لقي عشرة منهم مصرعهم وجرح 17 آخرون في الفترة بين كانون الثاني/يناير وتموز/يوليه 2015 وحدها.
Reduced budgets, the rising costs of operations as a result of access constraints, the need to mitigate heightened security and diversion risks all added to the pressure on scarce resources.وازداد الضغط على الموارد الشحيحة بسبب تخفيض الميزانيات وارتفاع تكاليف العمليات الناجم عن تقييد حركتها والحاجة إلى تخفيف حدة المخاطر الأمنية الشديدة ومخاطر التسريب الحادة.
The international trade in Somali charcoal continues although the political economy on land has changed.ولا تزال التجارة الدولية في الفحم الصومالي مستمرة رغم تغير الاقتصاد السياسي على الأرض.
Since the recovery of the port city of Barawe in Lower Shabelle in October 2014, Al-Shabaab no longer controls any major export sites.ومنذ استعادة مدينة براوه المرفئية في محافظة شبيلي السفلى في تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2014، لم تعد حركة الشباب تسيطر على أي موقع من مواقع التصدير الرئيسية.
Following the arrest of various officials exporting charcoal immediately following the capture of Barawe, the Monitoring Group believes that the trade in Barawe has ceased.ويعتقد فريق الرصد أن تجارة الفحم في مدينة براوه قد توقفت بعد أن تم عقب الاستيلاء على المدينة مباشرة القبض على عدة مسؤولين ممن كانوا يقومون بتصديره.
Although the trade continues further south, Al-Shabaab’s overall share of income derived from it has been significantly reduced.ورغم أن تجارة الفحم ما زالت مستمرة في مناطق أبعد ناحية الجنوب، فإن حصة حركة الشباب الكلية من الإيرادات المستمدة منها قد تقلصت كثيرا.
Early in 2015, falling revenues from charcoal prompted attempts by Al-Shabaab to actively obstruct and deny profit from the trade to its opponents.وفي مطلع عام 2015، أدى تراجع إيرادات الفحم إلى قيام الحركة بمحاولات نشطة لعرقلة تجارة مناهضيها في الفحم وحصولهم على أي أرباح منها.
Although support from Member States and multinational naval partnerships has increased the visibility of the trade, countermeasures employed by charcoal-exporting vessels to avoid identification and tracking, combined with the continuing use of false documentation, have added to the challenges of ensuring that Somali charcoal is not imported by Member States.ورغم أن الدعم المقدم من الدول الأعضاء والشراكات العسكرية البحرية المتعددة الجنسيات قد قلص من الطابع الخفي لهذه التجارة، فقد أدت التدابير المضادة التي تتخذها السفن المصدرة للفحم لتجنب اكتشافها وتعقبها إضافة إلى استخدامها لوثائق مزيفة إلى زيادة صعوبات ضمان عدم استيراد الدول الأعضاء للفحم الصومالي.
Engagement with the Federal Government of Somalia improved markedly during the course of this mandate.وقد تحسن كثيرا التواصل مع حكومة الصومال الاتحادية أثناء فترة ولاية الفريق.
The Monitoring Group received support with some investigations from its two designated focal points for security and financial matters.وتلقى الفريق دعما في إجراء بعض التحقيقات من المنسق المكلف بشؤون الأمن والمنسق المكلف بالمسائل المالية التابعين له.
The Group looks forward to continuing and strengthening relations with the Government.ويتطلع الفريق إلى مواصلة وتعزيز العلاقات مع الحكومة.
I.أولا -
Introductionمقدمة
A.ألف -
Mandateالولاية
1.١ -
The mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea is contained in paragraph 46 of Security Council resolution 2182 (2014), adopted on 24 October 2014, and paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012).يرد تعريف ولاية فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا في الفقرة 46 من القرار 2182 (2014)، الذي اتخذه مجلس الأمن في 24 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2014 وفي الفقرة 13 من القرار 2060 (2012).
Additional tasks were assigned to the Group under resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2142 (2014).وكُلف فريق الرصد بمهام إضافية بموجب القرارين 2093 (2013) و 2142 (2014).
2.٢ -
Pursuant to paragraph 46 of resolution 2182 (2014) and paragraph 13 (l) of resolution 2060 (2012), the Monitoring Group provided the Security Council, through the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, with a midterm briefing on 8 April 2015.وعملا بالفقرة 46 من القرار 2182 (2014)، والفقرة 13 (ل) من القرار 2060 (2012)، زوّد فريق الرصد مجلس الأمن، عن طريق اللجنة المنبثقة عن القرارين 751 (1992) و 1907 (2009) بشأن الصومال وإريتريا، بإحاطة منتصف المدة في 8 نيسان/أبريل 2015.
The Group also submitted monthly progress reports to the Committee throughout its mandate.وقدم الفريق أيضا تقارير مرحلية شهرية إلى اللجنة طوال فترة ولايته.
3.٣ -
In the course of their investigations, members of the Monitoring Group travelled to Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Djibouti, Ethiopia, France, Lebanon, Malaysia, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.وسافر أعضاء فريق الرصد، في سياق التحقيقات التي أجروها، إلى البلدان التالية: إثيوبيا، والإمارات العربية المتحدة، والبحرين، وبلجيكا، وتركيا، وجنوب أفريقيا، وجيبوتي، وسنغافورة، والسويد، وسويسرا، وسيشيل، والصومال، وعمان، وفرنسا، وقطر، وكندا، ولبنان، وماليزيا، والمملكة المتحدة لبريطانيا العظمى وأيرلندا الشمالية، والنرويج، والولايات المتحدة الأمريكية.
In Somalia, members of the Group were able to undertake regular visits to Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Garowe, and once to Kismayo.وفي الصومال، تمكن أعضاء الفريق من القيام بزيارات منتظمة إلى مقديشو وهرجيسة وغاروي، وفي مناسبة واحدة إلى كيسمايو.
4.٤ -
The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi and comprised the following experts: Christophe Trajber (Coordinator), Nicholas Argeros (finance), Zeina Awad (transport), Déirdre Clancy (humanitarian), James Smith (regional), Bogdan Chetreanu (finance) and Jay Bahadur (armed groups).وكان مقر فريق الرصد في نيروبي، وكان يتألف من الخبراء التالية أسماؤهم: كريستوف تراجبيه (منسق)، ونيكولاس أرجيروس (خبير مالي)، وزينة عوض (خبيرة شؤون النقل)، ودييدري كلانسي (خبيرة الشؤون الإنسانية)، ودجايمس سميث (خبير الشؤون الإقليمية)، وبوغدان شيرترينو (خبير مالي)، ودجاي باهادور (خبير شؤون الجماعات المسلحة).
B.باء -
Methodologyالمنهجية
5.٥ -
The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the previous reports of the Monitoring Group apply to work conducted during the mandate under review.تنطبق معايير الإثبات وعمليات التحقق المبينة في التقارير السابقة لفريق الرصد على الأعمال المنفذة خلال الولاية قيد الاستعراض.
The Group reaffirmed its methodology pursuant to its previous reports.فقد أكد الفريق من جديد منهجيته عملا بتقاريره السابقة.
The methodology used for the present report is as follows:والمنهجية المتبعة في إعداد هذا التقرير هي كما يلي:
(a)(أ)
Collecting information on events and topics from multiple sources, where possible;جمع المعلومات عن الأحداث والمواضيع من مصادر متعددة قدر الإمكان؛
(b)(ب)
Collecting information from sources with first-hand knowledge of events, where possible;جمع المعلومات من مصادر لديها معرفة مباشرة بالأحداث، قدر الإمكان؛
(c)(ج)
Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing existing knowledge with new information and emerging trends;تحديد أوجه الاتساق في أنساق المعلومات ومقارنة المعلومات الموجودة بالمعلومات الجديدة والاتجاهات الناشئة؛
(d)(د)
Continuously factoring in the expertise and judgement of the relevant expert of the Monitoring Group and the collective assessment of the Group with regard to the credibility of information and the reliability of sources;المداومة على أخذ خبرات وآراء الخبير المختص في فريق الرصد في الحسبان، وكذلك مراعاة التقييم الجماعي للفريق فيما يتعلق بمصداقية المعلومات وموثوقية المصادر؛
(e)(هـ)
Obtaining physical, photographic, audio, video and/or documentary evidence in support of the information collected.جمع الأدلة المادية والفوتوغرافية والسمعية والمرئية و/أو المستندية دعما للمعلومات التي تم جمعها.
6.٦ -
The Monitoring Group made a deliberate and systematic effort to gain access to those involved in violations by way of individuals with direct knowledge or who know people with direct knowledge about details of violations.وبذل فريق الرصد جهداً متأنياً ومنهجياً للوصول إلى الضالعين في الانتهاكات بواسطة الأفراد الذين لديهم معرفة مباشرة، أو يعرفون من لديهم معرفة مباشرة، بتفاصيل الانتهاكات.
On some occasions, the Group was able to witness first-hand active violations.وفي بعض المناسبات، تسنى للفريق أن يقف شاهدا على انتهاكات قيد الارتكاب.
7.٧ -
The Monitoring Group interviewed a wide range of sources with relevant information, including government officials and representatives of diplomatic missions, civil society organizations and aid agencies.وأجرى فريق الرصد مقابلات مع طائفة واسعة من المصادر التي لديها معلومات مهمة، بما في ذلك مسؤولون حكوميون وممثلو البعثات الدبلوماسية ومنظمات المجتمع المدني ووكالات المعونة.
Members of the Group met various government officials, including the President and ministers, and representatives of security agencies.واجتمع أعضاء الفريق مع عدد من المسؤولين الحكوميين، من بينهم الرئيس ووزراء وممثلون لوكالات الأمن.
The Group also met or communicated with officials from the Puntland and Somaliland administrations, representatives of political and armed groups, defectors and members of business communities and Somali civil society.واجتمع الفريق أيضا أو تواصل مع مسؤولين من إدارتي بونتلاند وصوماليلاند، ومع ممثلين للجماعات السياسية والجماعات المسلحة ومنشقين ورجال أعمال وأعضاء من المجتمع المدني الصومالي.
8.٨ -
In conformity with guidance provided by the Committee, the Monitoring Group endeavoured to include as much of the testimony and evidence as possible in its final report.ووفقا للتوجيهات المقدمة من اللجنة، سعى فريق الرصد إلى إدراج أكبر قدر ممكن من الشهادات والأدلة في تقريره النهائي.
However, General Assembly resolutions on the control and limitation of documentation, in particular resolutions 52/214, 53/208 and 59/265, necessitated the extensive use of annexes, preventing much of the substance from being translated.بيد أن قرارات الجمعية العامة بشأن الحد من الوثائق، ولا سيما القرارات 52/214 و 53/208 و 59/265، حتّمت اللجوء إلى استخدام المرفقات بكثرة، مما حال دون ترجمة قدر كبير من المحتوى.
In addition, regulations exclude the insertion of maps, photographs and charts in the main report.وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، تمنع القواعد المطبقة إدراج الخرائط والصور الفوتوغرافية والرسوم البيانية في متن التقرير.
The Group provided relevant material to the Committee on an ongoing basis throughout its mandate.وقدم الفريق المواد ذات الصلة إلى اللجنة على أساس مستمر طوال فترة ولايته.
9.٩ -
In accordance with the Secretary-General’s bulletin on information sensitivity, classification and handling (ST/SGB/2007/6), the Monitoring Group has submitted to the Committee, together with the present report, several strictly confidential annexes containing information whose disclosure may be detrimental to the proper functioning of the United Nations or to the welfare and safety of its staff or third parties or may violate the Organization’s legal obligations.ووفقا لنشرة الأمين العام المعنونة ”حساسية المعلومات وسريتها وكيفية التعامل معها“ (ST/SGB/2007/6)، قدم فريق الرصد إلى اللجنة، مع هذا التقرير، عدة مرفقات سرية للغاية تحتوي على معلومات قد يؤثر كشفها سلبا على حسن سير العمل في الأمم المتحدة أو رفاه موظفيها أو أطراف ثالثة وسلامتهم أو قد يؤدي إلى انتهاك الالتزامات القانونية للمنظمة.
Those annexes will not be issued as a document of the Security Council.ولن تصدر هذه المرفقات بوصفها من وثائق مجلس الأمن.
II.ثانيا -
Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somaliaالأعمال التي تهدد السلام والأمن والاستقرار في الصومال
A.ألف -
Spoiler politics and the capture of State resourcesسياسة التعطيل ووضع اليد على موارد الدولة
10.١٠ -
Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab) continues to present a severe threat to peace and security in Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa.ظلت حركة الشباب المجاهدين (حركة الشباب) تشكل التهديد الرئيسي للسلام والأمن في الصومال وفي جميع أنحاء منطقة القرن الأفريقي.
The resurgent threat posed by Al-Shabaab throughout the region, and the re-emergence of intercommunal conflict in southern and central Somalia, however, is increasingly tied to the inability of the Federal Government of Somalia, the Federal Parliament of Somalia and the interim regional administrations to foster reconciliation through inclusive and transparent political processes and effectively address endemic corruption.وأصبحت المخاطر المتجددة التي تشكلها الحركة في جميع أنحاء المنطقة، وكذا عودة النزاعات الأهلية إلى الظهور في جنوب الصومال ووسطه، ترتبط أكثر فأكثر بعدم قدرة حكومة الصومال الاتحادية وبرلمان الصومال الاتحادي والإدارات الإقليمية المؤقتة على توطيد المصالحة من خلال العمليات السياسية الشاملة والشفافة وعلى التصدي بفعالية لانتشار الفساد.
11.11 -
Significant territorial advances against Al-Shabaab by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Somali National Army and other loosely aligned forces since the end of the transition have not been matched by the expansion of the capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia or the interim regional administrations to maintain security and offer an alternative form of governance.أمّا أوجه التّقدم الميداني الكبير التي أحرزتها نسبيا، منذ نهاية المرحلة الانتقالية، بعثةُ الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال والجيشُ الوطني الصومالي وسائرُ القوات المتحالفة فهي لم مشفوعة بتوسيع لقدرة حكومة الصومال الاتحادية أو قدرة الإدارات الإقليمية المؤقتة على حفظ الأمن وتوفير شكل بديل للحوكمة.
Without this capacity to maintain security, deeply rooted intercommunal conflicts are re-emerging.وفي غياب هذه القدرات على حفظ الأمن، بدأت النزاعات الطائفية المتجذرة تعود للظهور.
As Al-Shabaab cedes territory, the group has continued to exploit the re-emergence of intercommunal conflict to recruit among historically marginalized populations.لذلك استمرت حركة الشباب، التي ما فتئت تفقد سيطرتها على الأراضي، في استغلال عودة هذه النزاعات من أجل تجنيد الأفراد من الأوساط السكانية المهمشة.
12.12 -
For many among Somalia’s political and business elite, the capture and securing of State resources in urban centres of power takes precedence over the consolidation of an effective form of governance and the expansion of public services.ويرى العديد من أفراد النخبة السياسية والتجارية في الصومال أنّ وضع اليد على موارد الدولة وحيازتها في مراكز السلطة الحضرية هو أمرٌ مقدّمٌ على مسألة إرساء شكل فعال للحوكمة وتوسيع نطاق الخدمات العامة.
The current focus on short-term gains threatens the long-term success of a fragile political process.وهم يرون أيضا أنّ التركيز الحالي على المكاسب القصيرة الأجل يهدد النجاح الطويل الأجل للعملية السياسية الهشة.
Without greater commitment among Somalia’s power brokers to the political process, progress made since the end of the transition may be reversed, resulting in increased intercommunal conflict and creating a space for militant fundamentalist outfits to continue to offer alternative paths to stability.لذلك، وفي غياب المزيد من الالتزام بالعملية السياسية من جانب أصحاب النفوذ، فإنّه من المحتمل أن ينعكس مسار التقدم المحرز منذ نهاية المرحلة الانتقالية، بما قد يفضي إلى تفاقم النزاعات بين المجتمعات المحلية وإلى وجود حيز للجماعات الأصولية المتشددة لكي تواصل عرض مسارات بديلة للاستقرار.
Federalizationإضفاء الطابع الاتحادي
13.13 -
The federalization process arguably represents the most significant political development in southern and central Somalia since the collapse of the State in 1991.يمكن القول بأنّ عملية إضفاء الطابع الاتحادي قد شكلت أهمّ تطوّر سياسي في جنوب ووسط الصومال منذ انهيار الدولة في عام 1991.
Following more than two decades of collapse, implementing a federal system was bound to be a formidable challenge, and one that would necessarily, and rightly, prompt contestation.فبعد أكثر من عقدين من هذا الانهيار، كان لا بد لعملية إرساء النظام الاتحادي أن تكون من بين التحديات الكبرى التي ستفضي، بالضرورة وعن حق، إلى ظهور خلاف.
The capability of the individuals leading the process of federalization and their commitment to the principles agreed upon following the end of the transition were imperative if such contestation was to be effectively managed and conflict minimized.وكان لا بد أيضا للأفراد القائمين على هذه العملية من أن تتوفر فيهم القدرة والالتزام بالمبادئ التي اتُّفق عليها بعد نهاية المرحلة الانتقالية وذلك حتى يتسنى التعامل بفعالية مع هذا الخلاف والتقليص من مخاطر نشوب النزاعات.
Interim Jubba Administrationالإدارة المؤقتة لجوبا
14.14 -
In August 2013, the Federal Government of Somalia had little choice but to accept the formation of the Interim Jubba Administration, which claims authority over Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba Regions under the leadership of Ahmed “Madobe” (Mohamed Zubeyr/Ogaden/Darod).في آب/أغسطس 2013، لم يكن أمام حكومة الصومال الاتحادية من خيار سوى القبول بتشكيل الإدارة المؤقتة لجوبا التي تطالب، بقيادة أحمد ”مذوبيه“ (محمد زبير/أوغادين/دارود)، بالسلطة على مناطق غِدو وجوبا الوسطى وجوبا السفلى.
The neighbouring countries Kenya and Ethiopia played a greater role in the process than the Federal Government of Somalia, with Ethiopia hosting a conference of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development that resulted in the Addis Ababa Agreement of September 2013, which succeeded in opening lines of communication between the Interim Jubba Administration and the Federal Government of Somalia.وقاما البلدان المجاوران، كينيا وإثيوبيا، بدور أكبر في هذه العملية من الدور الذي قامت به حكومة الصومال الاتحادية، حيث استضافت إثيوبيا مؤتمر الهيئة الحكومية الدولية المعنية بالتنمية (إيغاد) الذي أفضى إلى إبرام اتفاق أديس أبابا في شهر أيلول/سبتمبر 2013. ونجح هذا الاتفاق في فتح قنوات الاتصال بين الإدارة المؤقتة لجوبا وحكومة الصومال الاتحادية.
Marehan (Darod) communities in the north of the aspiring federal member State, particularly in Gedo Region, were largely excluded from its formation process and as such have largely opposed the interim regional administration.أما عشائر الماريحان (دارود)، الموجودة في شمال الولاية المتطلّعة إلى الانضمام إلى الاتحاد، ولا سيما في منطقة غِدو، فقد تم استبعادها إلى حد كبير من عملية تشكيل هذه الولاية. لذلك، تعارض هذه العشائر في معظمها هذه الإدارة الإقليمية المؤقتة.
As competition for political dominance continues between the Ogaden and Marehan clans, militarily weaker groups present in the region — including the Digil and Mirifle clans, as well as Somali Bantu communities — have effectively been sidelined from the process.وفيما تتواصل المنافسة بين قبيلتي الماريحان والأوغادين من أجل السيطرة السياسية، تم فعليا استبعاد الفئات الأضعف عسكريا الموجودة في المنطقة، ومنها عشائر ديجيل وميريفلي وكذلك مجتمعات البانتو الصومالية، من المشاركة في هذه العملية.
15.15 -
In May 2015 the Interim Jubba Administration established a Regional Assembly of 75 representatives.وفي أيار/مايو 2015، أنشأت الإدارة الإقليمية المؤقتة لجوبالاند جمعية إقليمية قوامها 75 ممثلا.
Ahmed “Madobe’s” administration, which led the process, was immediately accused of marginalizing the Digil and Mirifle clans by attempting to appease the Marehan while maintaining Ogaden dominance.ومباشرة، اتهمت إدارة أحمد ”مذوبيه“، التي قادت العملية، بتهميش عشائر ديجيل وميريفلي ومحاولة إرضاء عشائر الماريحان والمحافظة في الوقت نفسه على هيمنة عشيرة أوغادين.
Federal Government of Somalia Members of Parliament declared their opposition to the process by adopting a vote of no confidence against the Regional Assembly, resulting in another fallout, this time between administrations in Kismayo, Mogadishu, Baidoa and Garowe.وقد أعرب أعضاء البرلمان بالحكومة الاتحادية الصومالية عن معارضتهم لهذه العملية وصوتوا لسحب الثقة من الجمعية الإقليمية، وهو ما أفضى إلى تداعيات أخرى، وهذه المرة بين الإدارات في مقديشو وبيدوا وكيسمايو وغاروي().
In August 2015, two years after the Addis Ababa Agreement and in line with its terms, the Jubba Regional Assembly voted for the re-appointment of Ahmed “Madobe”.وفي آب/أغسطس 2015، وبعد مرور سنتين على اتفاق أديس أبابا وتمشيا مع أحكام هذا الاتفاق، صوتت الجمعية الإقليمية لجوبا على إعادة تعيين أحمد ”مذوبيه“.
Having secured another term, early in September 2015 Ahmed “Madobe” agreed to review and reconstitute the Regional Assembly.ووافق هذا الأخير في مطلع شهر أيلول/سبتمبر 2015، بعد أن ضمن ولاية أخرى، على معاودة النظر في الجمعية الإقليمية وتشكيلها من جديد.
16.16 -
In August and September 2015, efforts were under way by an assortment of allied forces with support from AMISOM to recover towns throughout the region from the control of Al-Shabaab.وفي آب/أغسطس وأيلول/سبتمبر 2015، كان لفيف من القوات المتحالفة، المدعوم من قبل بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال، يبذل جهوده من أجل استرداد بلدات في جميع أنحاء المنطقة من سيطرة حركة الشباب.
In strategically important urban centres such as Bardhere, following the removal of Al-Shabaab, competing forces have contested administrative control.بيد أن القوات المتنافسة، وبعد إزاحة حركة الشباب من المراكز الحضرية الاستراتيجية الهامة كمدينة بارطيري، أصبحت تتنازع على السيطرة الإدارية.
Further north, in Garbaharey, a day after apparently reconciling differences with the local Marehan-dominated administration in Gedo Region, on 8 August 2015 the Interim Jubba Administration fired the governor and the local leader of Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama‘a, Mohamed Abdi Khalil, prompting demonstrations and the imposition of a curfew by local contingents of the Ethiopian National Defence Force.وإلى الشمال من ذلك، وفي غربهاري، عمدت الإدارة المؤقتة لجوبا في 8 آب/أغسطس 2015، أي يوم واحد بعد تسوية الخلافات على ما يبدو مع إدارة منطقة غِدو التي يهيمن عليها الماريحان، إلى عزل المحافظ والزعيم المحلي لأهل السنة الجماعة، محمد عبدي خليل. وقد تسبب ذلك في اندلاع مظاهرات دفعت بالوحدات المحلية لقوات الدفاع الوطنية الإثيوبية أدت إلى فرض حظر التجوّل.
Interim South-West Administrationالإدارة المؤقتة للجنوب الغربي
17.17 -
The formation of the Interim South-West Administration in 2014 similarly occurred without significant input from the Federal Government of Somalia.في عام 2014، تم أيضا تشكيل الإدارة الإقليمية المؤقتة لولاية الجنوب الغربي دون أن يكون لحكومة الصومال الاتحادية أي مساهمة تذكر في هذا العمل.
The process was well under way before senior officials began to openly support particular actors and parties, divided principally between those aiming to incorporate Bakool, Bay and Lower Shabelle Regions, and those hoping to include Gedo, Middle Jubba and Lower Jubba as well.وقد كانت العملية تسير بشكل جيد قبل أن يشرع مسؤولون كبار في الإعراب علنا عن دعمهم لأطراف وأحزاب دون أخرى. وقد انقسم هؤلاء أساسا إلى من يسعى إلى دمج مناطق بكول وباي وشبيلي السفلى، وإلى من يأمل في دمج مناطق غِدو وجوبا الوسطى وجوبا السفلى أيضا.
With assistance from the Federal Government of Somalia, supporters of the former option eventually emerged victorious under the leadership of the former Finance Minister and Speaker of Parliament of the Transitional Federal Government, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, in November 2014.وبمساعدة من حكومة الصومال الاتحادية، خرج مؤيدو الخيار الأول تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2014 منتصرين بقيادة شريف حسن شيخ عدن، وزير المالية ورئيس البرلمان بالحكومة الاتحادية الانتقالية السابقة.
Sharif Hassan has been accused of nepotism in his fledgling administration, appointing his brother, Mohamed Abdinur “Madeer” as his senior adviser, and his nephew, Mohamed Abdullahi Mursal, as “State Minister of Presidency”.واتُّهم شريف حسن بالمحاباة في الحكومة الوليدة بعد أن عيّن أخاه، محمد عبدينور ”مادير“، في منصب مستشاره الأول، وابن أخيه، محمد عبد الله مرسل، ”وزير دولة لدى الرئاسة“().
Interim Galmudug Administrationالإدارة المؤقتة لغالمدق
18.18 -
Having failed to lead the processes in Kismayo and Baidoa, the Federal Government of Somalia played a far more active role in the establishment of the Interim Galmudug Administration, which claims to incorporate Galgadud and Mudug Regions.بعد فشلها في قيادة عمليتي إنشاء الإدارتين المؤقتين في كيسمايو وبايدوا، قامت حكومة الصومال الاتحادية بدور نشط أكثر في عملية إنشاء الإدارة المؤقتة لغالمدق، التي تزعم بأنها تضم منطقتي غلمدق ومدق().
In August 2014, the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Federalism established a technical committee and tasked it with selecting clan representatives to participate in a reconciliation conference and State formation process, and later selecting members of a Regional Assembly.وفي آب/أغسطس 2014، أنشأت وزارة الداخلية والنظام الاتحادي لجنة فنية أوكلت إليها مهمة اختيار ممثلي العشائر للمشاركة في مؤتمر المصالحة وعملية تكوين الولاية، ثم بعد ذلك مهمة اختيار أعضاء الجمعية الإقليمية.
The Group received multiple reports of interference in the selection of the Chair of the technical committee by the two leading political associations, Damul Jadiid and Ala Sheikh, with the former securing the selection of its preferred candidate, Halimo Ismail Ibrahim “Yarey”.وتلقى الفريق تقارير متعددة بشأن وجود تدخّلات في اختيار رئيس للجنة الفنية من جانب جمعيتين سياستين رائدتين، هما جمعية الدم الجديد وجمعية آل الشيخ، حيث تمكّنت الأولى من أن تنجح في اختيار مرشّحها المفضّل حليمو إسماعيل إبراهيم ”ياري“.
The selection of the clan representatives and subsequently the members of the Regional Assembly was similarly tarnished by allegations of interference by the primary stakeholders in the process.أما عملية اختيار ممثلي العشائر، ثم اختيار أعضاء الجمعية الإقليمية فيما بعد، فقد شابتها هي أيضا ادعاءات بوجود تدخلات في سيرها من جانب أصحاب المصلحة الرئيسيين().
19.19 -
A militarily powerful faction of the local contingent of Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama‘a opposed the State formation process from the outset, claiming that the group’s signatory on the initial Central Regions State Formation Agreement was not the legitimate representative of Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama‘a.ومن البداية، عارض فصيل عسكري قوي تابع الوحدة المحلية التابعة لأهل السنة والجماعة عمليةَ تشكيل الولاية، وذكر أنّ الشخص الذي وقّع باسم الجماعة على الاتفاق الأولي لتشكيل ولاية المناطق الوسطى ليس ممثلا شرعيا لها.
Conflict between Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama‘a and the Somali National Army erupted in and around the town of Guriel in northern Galgadud Region late in 2014.ومع نهاية سنة 2014، اندلع نزاع بين أهل السنة والجماعة والجيش الوطني الصومالي داخل مدينة غوريل، بمنطقة غلغدود، وفي أطرافها.
The State formation process subsequently continued without the involvement of Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama‘a and, in July 2014, following a process marred by allegations of vote buying and promises of political appointments to rivals, resulted in the selection of Abdikarim Guled — a key ally of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud — as president of the interim regional administration.بيد أن عملية تشكيل الولاية استمرت بعد ذلك من دون مشاركة أهل السنة والجماعة. وفي تموز/يوليه 2014، وعلى إثر عملية مشوبة بادعاءات مفادها وجود شراء للأصوات ووعود بإسناد تعيينات سياسية للخصوم، تم اختيار عبد الكريم غولد، أحد كبار مناصري الرئيس حسن شيخ محمّد الرئيسيين، في منصب رئيس الإدارة الإقليمية المؤقتة.
The debate over the northern extent of the aspiring Galmudug federal member State has fuelled tensions with Puntland and threatened to re-ignite conflict in one of Somalia’s most fragile regions.أمّا النقاش الدائر بشأن الحدود الشمالية لولاية غلمدق المتطلِّعة إلى الانضمام إلى الاتّحاد فقد زاد من حدة التوتّر مع بونتلاند، وهدّد باستئناف النّزاع في واحدة من مناطق الصومال الأكثر هشاشة.
Moreover, as of September 2015, a faction of Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama‘a remains in control of northern Galgadud, including the interim regional administration’s declared capital, Dhusamareb.وعلاوة على ذلك، لا يزال أحد فصائل حركة أهل السنة والجماعة يسيطر، حتى أيلول/سبتمبر 2015، على شمال غلغدود، بما في ذلك العاصمة التي أعلنتها الإدارة الإقليمية المؤقتة، وهي طوسمريب().
20.20 -
Annex 1.1 provides details on the formation of the Interim Galmudug Administration.ويتضمّن المرفق 1-1 تفاصيل عن تشكيل الإدارة المؤقتة لغالمدق.
Federal Parliament votes for cashبيع الأصوات في البرلمان الاتحادي
21.٢١ -
Members of the House of the People of the Federal Parliament are tasked with representing their constituencies, reviewing and challenging the work of the Federal Government of Somalia, and reviewing and adopting legislation.إن أعضاء مجلس الشعب في البرلمان الاتحادي مكلفون بمهمة تمثيل دوائرهم الانتخابية، واستعراض عمل حكومة الصومال الاتحادية والتحقق منه، واستعراض التشريعات وإقرارها.
The Federal Parliament’s role in ensuring that progress in Somalia’s political development is sustained is entirely dependent upon the integrity and independence of its members.ويعتمد الدور الذي يضطلع به البرلمان الاتحادي لكفالة استمرار التقدم المحرز على صعيد التنمية السياسية للصومال اعتمادا كليا على نزاهة أعضاء البرلمان واستقلالهم.
The Monitoring Group has documented the extensive abuse of the voting privileges of Members of the Federal Parliament.وقد قام فريق الرصد بتوثيق انتهاكات واسعة النطاق لامتيازات التصويت التي يتمتع بها أعضاء البرلمان الاتحادي.
When important motions are tabled in Parliament, particularly votes of no confidence against a sitting Prime Minister, significant numbers of Members of Parliament will sell their vote to the highest bidder.وعندما تُقدم مقترحات هامة إلى البرلمان، لا سيما في حالة التصويت بعدم منح الثقة لرئيس وزراء حالي، يقوم عدد كبير من أعضاء البرلمان ببيع أصواتهم إلى من يدفع لهم السعر الأعلى.
The practice of “votes for cash” is so engrained that a network of brokers has emerged since the end of the transition, tasked with purchasing the allegiance of willing Members of Parliament and threatening those that refuse.وممارسة ”بيع الأصوات“ مترسخة لدرجة أن شبكة من السماسرة قد ظهرت منذ نهاية المرحلة الانتقالية، لشراء ولاء أعضاء البرلمان المستعدين لذلك ولتهديد أولئك الذين يرفضون.
Brokers will tend to serve the interests of either President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud or his opponents.وينحو السماسرة إلى خدمة مصالح الرئيس حسن شيخ محمود أو خصومه.
More broadly, battles for influence are fought in Parliament between the two leading political-religious associations: Damul Jadiid, aligned with the President, and Ala Sheikh, in opposition.وعلى نطاق أوسع، تجري معارك للحصول على النفوذ في البرلمان بين الحركتين السياسيتين الدينيتين الرئيسيتين وهما: حركة ”الدم الجديد“ الموالية للرئيس وحركة ”آل الشيخ“ المعارضة.
22.٢٢ -
Strictly confidential annex 1.2 provides details on the prevalence of bribery of Members of Parliament.ويتضمن المرفق 1-2 السري للغاية تفاصيل عن مدى انتشار الرشوة في صفوف أعضاء البرلمان.
Independent commissionsاللجان المستقلة
23.٢٣ -
The independent commissions mandated by the 2012 Provisional Constitution were designed to guide the process of federalization and support the consolidation of post-transition political arrangements.أنشئت اللجان المستقلة الصادر بها تكليف بموجب الدستور المؤقت لعام 2012 من أجل توجيه عملية بناء نظام اتحادي ودعم تعزيز الترتيبات السياسية لما بعد المرحلة الانتقالية.
If established promptly and according to the principles of the Provisional Constitution, the commissions would have added legitimacy to the political process following the end of the transition, and ensured a smoother handover of authority to the next federal administration in 2016.ولو كانت اللجان قد أنشئت على وجه السرعة ووفقا لمبادئ الدستور المؤقت، لكانت أضافت شرعية إلى العملية السياسية بعد نهاية المرحلة الانتقالية، ولكانت كفلت مزيدا من السلاسة في نقل السلطة إلى الإدارة الاتحادية المقبلة في عام 2016.
24.٢٤ -
In three years, and over the course of six parliamentary sessions, Members of Parliament have successfully established just four of the nine independent commissions mandated by the 2012 Provisional Constitution.غير أن أعضاء البرلمان، خلال ثلاث سنوات، وعلى مدى ست دورات برلمانية، لم ينجحوا سوى في إنشاء أربع لجان مستقلة من أصل اللجان المستقلة التسع التي ينص على إنشائها الدستور المؤقت لعام 2012.
The Provisional Constitution Review and Implementation Commission, consisting of five members, was established in May 2014, almost 20 months into the Federal Government of Somalia’s term.وأنشئت لجنة استعراض الدستور المؤقت وتنفيذه، التي تتألف من خمسة أعضاء، في أيار/مايو 2014، بعد نحو 20 شهرا من بدء ولاية حكومة الصومال الاتحادية.
While it was initially praised for being broadly representative and composed of competent individuals, the challenges of achieving its goals were quickly made apparent.ولئن كان قد أشيد باللجنة بداية لاتساع نطاق تمثيلها ولكونها تتألف من أفراد مؤهلين، فقد تم بسرعة إبراز التحديات التي يتعين عليها التغلب عليها لتحقيق أهدافها.
On 5 May 2015, the Commission’s Chair, Asha Gelle Diriye, resigned from the Commission, citing a general lack of prioritization given to the completion of the constitution and a lack of funding for the Commission.وفي 5 أيار/مايو 2015، استقالت رئيسة اللجنة، آشا جيلي ديريي، من عضوية اللجنة، معللة ذلك بعدم إعطاء الأولوية عموما إلى إنجاز الدستور وعدم توفير التمويل للجنة().
25.٢٥ -
The Boundaries and Federation Commission was finally established on 6 July 2015, two days after the establishment of the third interim regional administration in Galmudug, as tensions between administrations in Adado and Garowe over the northern border of the aspiring federal member State were mounting.وأخيرا أُنشئت لجنة الحدود والاتحاد في 6 تموز/يوليه 2015، أي بعد يومين من إنشاء الإدارة الإقليمية المؤقتة الثالثة في غالمودوغ، بينما كانت التوترات تتنامى بين الإدارات في أدادو وغاروي على الحدود الشمالية للولاية التي تتطلع إلى عضوية الاتحاد.
The National Independent Electoral Commission was established on the same day.وأنشئت اللجنة الانتخابية الوطنية المستقلة في اليوم نفسه.
Three weeks later, a parliamentary committee announced that the Parliament and the Federal Government of Somalia had agreed that general elections based on universal suffrage would not be held in 2016, citing the “upsurge of violence” and “political turmoil”.وبعد مرور ثلاثة أسابيع، أعلنت لجنة برلمانية أن البرلمان وحكومة الصومال الاتحادية قد اتفقا على عدم إجراء انتخابات عامة على أساس الاقتراع في عام 2016، معللين ذلك بـ ”تصاعد العنف“ و ”الاضطراب السياسي“().
26.٢٦ -
The limited efforts made by both the Federal Government and the Federal Parliament of Somalia to establish and support these important independent bodies suggest a lack of interest in instigating dialogue and listening to the views of the Somali people, undermining the legitimacy of the current institutions and raising concerns about the process by which the next federal government will be established in 2016.وتدل محدودية الجهود المبذولة من جانب حكومة الصومال الاتحادية والبرلمان الاتحادي للصومال من أجل إنشاء ودعم هذه الهيئات المستقلة الهامة على عدم الاهتمام بالحث على الحوار والاستماع إلى وجهات نظر الشعب الصومالي، مما يقوض شرعية المؤسسات الحالية، ويثير شواغل بشأن العملية التي سيتم في إطارها إنشاء الحكومة الاتحادية المقبلة في عام 2016.
Conclusionsالاستنتاجات
27.٢٧ -
The Monitoring Group has previously warned of the potential threat to peace, security and stability posed by “spoiler networks in Somalia” (S/2013/413).كان فريق الرصد قد حذّر في السابق من التهديد الذي يُحتمل أن تشكله ”شبكات المخرّبين في الصومال“ على السلام والأمن والاستقرار (S/2013/413).
The Group has described how the attempts by the political and business elite to capture State resources in the federalization process have either delayed or actively obstructed reconciliation efforts.ووصف الفريق كيف أن المحاولات التي قامت بها النخبة السياسية والتجارية للاستيلاء على موارد الدولة في إطار عملية إنشاء النظام الاتحادي قد أدت إما إلى تأخير جهود المصالحة أو عرقلتها عرقلة فعلية.
Instead of seeking to fill the void left by Al-Shabaab following territorial victories against the group, efforts remain focused on securing authority in urban centres.وبدلا من السعي إلى سد الفراغ الذي خلّفته حركة الشباب عقب الانتصارات الإقليمية التي تحققت ضد تلك الجماعة، لا تزال الجهود منصبة على تأمين السلطة في المراكز الحضرية.
The failure of both the Federal Government and the Federal Parliament of Somalia to establish much-needed institutions ahead of the next transition phase in 2016 is also symptomatic of a system in which the interests of the few override those of the many.ويدل فشل كل من حكومة الصومال الاتحادية والبرلمان الاتحادي للصومال في إنشاء المؤسسات التي تمس الحاجة إليها قبل المرحلة الانتقالية التالية في عام 2016 أيضا على وجود نظام يتم فيه تغليب مصلحة عدد قليل على حساب الكثيرين.
A resurgent Al-Shabaab will exploit any opportunities to recruit among populations abandoned by the federalization and State-building process.وستستغل حركة الشباب، إذا ما عادت إلى الظهور، أي فرص للتجنيد في صفوف السكان الذين تم التخلي عنهم في إطار عملية إنشاء النظام الاتحادي وبناء الدولة.
Efforts to prevent the engagement of more stakeholders in the ongoing political process in the run-up to the 2016 election are spoiling the political process, and by doing so threaten both the fragile gains made in recent years and the long-term peace, security and stability of Somalia.وتؤدي الجهود الرامية إلى منع إشراك المزيد من أصحاب المصلحة في العملية السياسية الجارية في الفترة السابقة لانتخابات عام 2016 إلى إفساد العملية السياسية، مما يهدد بتقويض المكاسب الهشة التي تحققت في السنوات الأخيرة وكذلك السلام والأمن والاستقرار على المدى الطويل في الصومال.
B.باء -
Natural resourcesالموارد الطبيعية
28.٢٨ -
Conflict throughout the Somali region — particularly in southern and central Somalia — has long revolved around access to fertile land and water resources.تمحور النـزاع في جميع أنحاء المنطقة الصومالية - لا سيما في جنوب ووسط الصومال - لوقت طويل حول إمكانية الوصول إلى الأراضي الخصبة والموارد المائية.
Historically, such conflicts have tended to pit the dominant, traditionally pastoralist and militarily stronger clans against weaker, often unarmed agriculturalist and agro-pastoralist communities.ومن الناحية التاريخية، تنحو هذه النـزاعات إلى تأليب العشائر المسيطرة الرعوية تقليديا والأقوى عسكريا ضد الجماعات الزراعية والجماعات الزراعية الرعوية التي غالبا ما تكون غير مسلحة.
The presence of a strong, if ruthless, administration under Al-Shabaab in southern and central Somalia largely subdued intercommunal conflict over land and water resources.وأدى وجود إدارة قوية، وإن كانت همجية، في إطار حركة الشباب في جنوب ووسط الصومال إلى حد كبير إلى كبح جماح النـزاعات بين العشائر على الأراضي والموارد المائية.
The removal of Al-Shabaab as a governing authority in many regions has created a power vacuum, with neither the Federal Government of Somalia nor the fledgling interim regional administrations sufficiently able to fill it, or help to rebuild effective local administrations capable of maintaining security.وخلف القضاء على حركة الشباب كسلطة حاكمة في العديد من المناطق فراغا في السلطة، لم تستطع حكومة الصومال الاتحادية ولا الإدارات الإقليمية المؤقتة الناشئة سده بالشكل الكافي، أو المساعدة في إعادة بناء إدارات محلية فعالة قادرة على حفظ الأمن.
There has been a marked increase in intercommunal conflict since the end of the transition in 2012, reminding both local and international actors that the removal of Al-Shabaab alone is not a panacea for the peace and security of Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region.وسُجلت زيادة ملحوظة في النزاعات العشائرية منذ نهاية الفترة الانتقالية في عام 2012 مما يذكّر الجهات الفاعلة المحلية والدولية على السواء أن اجتثاث حركة الشباب وحده ليس حلا سحريا لإحلال السلام والأمن في الصومال ومنطقة القرن الأفريقي بنطاقها الأوسع.
29.٢٩ -
Concurrently, there has been a significant increase in international interest in natural resources in Somalia.وفي الوقت نفسه، كانت هناك زيادة كبيرة في الاهتمام الدولي بالموارد الطبيعية في الصومال.
Private companies have been eager to announce the demise of Al-Shabaab and thus the start of a new era of relative calm, in order to usher in a new phase of exploitation of Somalia’s mineral and maritime resources.فقد حرصت الشركات الخاصة على الإعلان عن القضاء على حركة الشباب مما يؤذن بحقبة جديدة من الهدوء النسبي، من أجل بدء مرحلة جديدة من استغلال الموارد المعدنية والبحرية في الصومال.
A seismic option agreement signed with Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd. in August 2013 brought an end to two decades of force majeure conditions declared by oil companies in southern and central Somalia.وتم توقيع اتفاق لمنح خيارات استغلال الموارد على ضوء المسوحات السيزمية مع شركة Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd. في آب/أغسطس 2013 أدى إلى إنهاء عقدين من إعلان ظروف القوة القاهرة من جانب شركات النفط في جنوب ووسط الصومال.
The contract signed with Somalia-Fishguard Ltd. similarly marked the start of a renewed expansion in the fisheries sector.كما شكل العقد الموقع مع شركة Somalia-Fishguard Ltd. بداية توسع متجدد في قطاع مصائد الأسماك.
The growth of interest in Somalia’s mineral and maritime resources has not been matched by efforts to establish effective legislation for the management and sharing of resource wealth with existing and future federal member States, raising serious concerns over the prospects of a new phase of resource conflict in the Horn of Africa.غير أن تزايد الاهتمام بالموارد المعدنية والبحرية للصومال لم يقابله بذل جهود من أجل وضع تشريعات فعالة لإدارة الثروة في الموارد وتقاسمها مع الولايات الأعضاء الحالية والمستقبلية في الاتحاد، مما يثير شواغل جدية إزاء احتمالات ظهور مرحلة جديدة من النـزاع على الموارد في منطقة القرن الأفريقي.
Intercommunal conflict over land and water resourcesالنزاعات العشائرية على الأراضي والموارد المائية
30.٣٠ -
In Somaliland, although it remained relatively unscathed by Al-Shabaab and has secured a degree of stability since the mid-1990s, land disputes now represent the leading cause of conflict.رغم أن صوماليلاند ظلت نسبيا في مأمن من حركة الشباب وأمنت درجة من الاستقرار منذ منتصف التسعينات من القرن الماضي، فإن المنازاعات على الأراضي تمثل الآن السبب الرئيسي للنـزاع فيها.
The Group recorded at least 45 incidents related to land disputes between September 2014 and August 2015 in the territory claimed by Somaliland.وسجل الفريق ما لا يقل عن 45 من الحوادث المتعلقة بالمنازعات على الأراضي بين أيلول/سبتمبر عام 2014 وآب/أغسطس 2015 في الأراضي التي تطالب بها صوماليلاند.
Land-related conflicts extend well beyond the troubled Sool and Sanaag Regions, prompting the Somaliland authorities to implement a series of measures to address the problem.وتتجاوز النزاعات المتصلة بالأراضي منطقتي سول وسناغ المضطربتين، مما دفع بسلطات صوماليلاند إلى تنفيذ سلسلة من التدابير لمعالجة المشكلة.
The increasing trend of illegal enclosures on common areas, prompted by growing appreciation of the commercial value of land, indicates the potential problems that may be faced in southern and central Somalia when current conflict patterns are overcome.ويعتبر الاتجاه المتزايد لضم مناطق عامة بشكل غير قانوني، وهو ما دفعت إليه زيادة القيمة التجارية للأراضي، مؤشرا على المشاكل المحتملة التي قد تظهر في جنوب ووسط الصومال عندما يتم التغلب على أنماط النـزاع الحالي.
31.٣١ -
Sporadic inter-Majeerteen (Harti/Darod) clashes have continued in Puntland over both urban and grazing land.وتواصلت الاشتباكات المتفرقة في إطار قبيلة الماجرتين (هارتي/دارود) في بونتلاند على الأراضي الحضرية وعلى أراضي المراعي.
In southern Mudug Region — now nominally under the control of the Interim Galmudug Administration — tensions between Marehan (Darod) and Haber Gedir (Hawiye) sub-clans over land ownership erupted into conflict late in 2014 and again early in 2015 in and around the town of Saaxo near the Ethiopian border.وفي جنوب إقليم مدق - الذي بات الآن يخضع اسميا لمراقبة الإدارة الإقليمية المؤقتة لغالمودوغ - تصعدت التوترات بين العشيرتين الفرعيتين مريحان (دارود) وحبر جدير (الحوية) على ملكية الأراضي فتحولت إلى نزاع في أواخر عام 2014 ومرة أخرى في أوائل عام 2015 في بلدة ساكيو قرب الحدود الإثيوبية وفي محيطها.
Land-related conflict in Middle Shabelle Region between the dominant Abgaal (Hawiye) clan and minority Shidle (Bantu) communities appear to have been superseded by intra-Abgaal clashes in 2015.ويبدو أن النـزاع المتصل بالأراضي في منطقة شبيلي الوسطى بين عشيرة أبغال (الحوية) المسيطرة وأهالي شيدلي (بانتو) من الأقليات قد حلت محله اشتباكات داخل عشيرة أبغال في عام 2015.
Since the Group’s previous report (S/2014/726) intercommunal conflict in Lower Shabelle Region, now nominally part of the Interim South-West Administration, has continued and shows few signs of abating despite various reconciliation efforts.ومنذ التقرير السابق للفريق (S/2014/726)، استمرت النزاعات العشائرية في إقيلم شبيلي السفلى، الذي يشكل الآن اسميا جزءا من الإدارة المؤقتة في الجنوب الغربي، ولا تظهر سوى القليل من الأدلة على انحسار موجة هذه النـزاعات رغم مختلف جهود المصالحة المبذولة.
In Hiran, Hawadle militia, supported by the Somali National Army, have launched fierce attacks on the villages of Kabxanley and Defow outside Belet Weyne in an attempt to permanently displace the Surre farming community from their lands along the fertile banks of the Shabelle River (see annex 6.3.a and strictly confidential annex 6.3.b).وفي هيران، شنت ميليشيا هودلي، بدعم من الجيش الوطني الصومالي، هجمات عنيفة على قرى كبحبلي وديفو خارج بلدوين في محاولة لتشريد أهالي سُري المزارعين من أراضيهم عند الضفاف الخصبة لنهر شبيلي تشريدا دائما (انظر المرفق 6-٣-أ والمرفق السري للغاية 6-٣-ب).
32.٣٢ -
In Middle Juba — mostly still held by Al-Shabaab — inter-clan conflict between Dhulbahante (Harti/Darod), Awliahan (Ogaden/Darod) and Sheikhal (Hawiye) clans over pasturelands broke out early in 2015.وفي جوبا الوسطى - التي لا تزال حركة الشباب تسيطر على معظمها - اندلع نزاع بين عشائر دولباهنتا (هرتي/داورد) وأولياهان (أوغادين/دارود) وشيخال (الحوية) على المراعي في أوائل عام 2015.
Al-Shabaab attempts to reconcile the competing groups in Bu’ale were ultimately unsuccessful, suggesting its weakening grip on intercommunal relations in the area ahead of the “Juba Corridor” offensive led by AMISOM and allied anti-Al-Shabaab forces.وفشلت محاولات حركة الشباب الرامية إلى تحقيق المصالحة بين الجماعات المتنافسة في بواله في نهاية المطاف مما يدل على إضعاف قبضتها على العلاقات العشائرية في المنطقة قبل هجوم ”ممر جوبا“ الذي قادته بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال والقوات المتحالفة معه المناهضة لحركة الشباب.
The Juba Valley, like the lower reaches of the Shabelle River, has been the scene of fierce contestation over land rights since before collapse of the Somali State in 1991.وكان وادي جوبا، مثل المناطق السفلى لنهر شبيلي، مسرحا لتنافس شديد على الحقوق في الأراضي منذ انهيار الدولة الصومالية في عام 1991().
The Monitoring Group is concerned that, following the removal of Al-Shabaab from the region, historically marginalized communities will suffer at the hand of militarily stronger communities vying for fertile agricultural land for commercial exploitation along the lower reaches of the Juba River.ويساور فريق الرصد قلق من أن يتسبب اجتثثاث حركة الشباب من المنطقة في معاناة الجماعات المهمشة تاريخيا على يد الجماعات العسكرية الأقوى التي تتنافس على الأراضي الزراعية الخصبة من أجل استغلالها تجاريا على طول المناطق السفلى لنهر جوبا.
The re-emergence of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishingعودة ظهور صيد الأسماك غير القانوني وغير المبلغ عنه وغير المنظم
33.٣٣ -
The Monitoring Group is indebted to Jorge Torrens of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations — who died near Hargeisa, Somaliland, on 29 April 2015 while carrying out his duty — for first bringing the renewed problem of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in Somalia to its attention.يَدين فريق الرصد لخورخي تورينس من منظمة الأغذية والزراعة للأمم المتحدة - الذي توفي بالقرب من هرجيسة، في صوماليلاند، في 29 نيسان/أبريل 2015 بينما كان يؤدي عمله - لكونه أول من وجّه اهتمام الفريق إلى مشكلة متجددة هي صيد الأسماك غير المشروع وغير المنظم وغير المبلغ عنه في الصومال.
34.٣٤ -
At 3,300 km, the coastline of Somalia is the longest in continental Africa.وخط الساحل في الصومال، الذي يمتد على طول 300 3 كيلومتر، هو الأطول في قارة أفريقيا.
The country’s 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone hosts productive and largely unexploited fishing grounds, containing both migratory fish species, such as tuna, and several demersal fish and crustacean species.وتتضمن المنطقة الاقتصادية الخالصة الممتدة على طول 200 ميل بحري في البلد مناطق لصيد الأسماك تتسم بثروتها السمكية وبأنها غير مستغلة إلى حد كبير، وتحتوي على أنواع من الأسماك المرتحلة مثل سمك التونة، وكذلك على العديد من أنواع الأسماك القاعية والقشريات.
Taking advantage of the limited maritime surveillance capability of the Federal Government of Somalia, many foreign vessels fish in Somali waters in contravention of international law and the Federal Government of Somalia Fisheries Law, either without licences or with forged documents, and without reporting data to any Somali authority.ويستغل العديد من السفن الأجنبية محدودية قدرة حكومة الصومال الاتحادية في مجال الرقابة البحرية، فيقوم بالصيد في المياه الصومالية في انتهاك للقانون الدولي ولقانون مصائد الأسماك لحكومة الصومال الاتحادية، إما من دون تراخيص أو باستخدام وثائق مزورة، وبدون إبلاغ السلطات الصومالية بأي بيانات().
35.٣٥ -
Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing represents a significant threat to peace and security in Somalia.ويشكل صيد الأسماك غير القانوني وغير المبلغ عنه وغير المنظم خطرا جسيما يهدد السلام والأمن في الصومال.
Illegal fishing is frequently cited as a contributing factor in the emergence of piracy in Somalia as early as the mid-1990s, as foreign vessels came into conflict with local fishermen, who in turn began to resort to hijackings at sea.واعتُبر الصيد غير المشروع في كثير من الأحيان عاملا مساهما في ظهور القرصنة في الصومال منذ منتصف التسعينات، إذ كانت تحصل نزاعات بين السفن الأجنبية والصيادين المحليين، الذين بدأوا بدورهم باللجوء إلى الاختطاف في البحر().
The drastic surge in Somali piracy in 2007 led to a corresponding decrease in foreign fishing vessels operating within Somalia’s exclusive economic zone.وأدت الزيادة الهائلة في القرصنة الصومالية في عام 2007 إلى انخفاض مقابل في عدد سفن الصيد الأجنبية التي تمارس أنشطتها في المنطقة الاقتصادية الخالصة للصومال().
However, the sharp drop in pirate activity along the coast of Somalia since 2012 has resulted in foreign fleets resuming fishing in the Somali basin.غير أن الانخفاض الحاد في نشاط القرصنة على طول ساحل الصومال منذ عام 2012 دفع بالأساطيل الأجنبية إلى استئناف صيد الأسماك في حوض الصومال().
The previous dynamic of conflict between illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing vessels and local fishermen and militias has consequently re-emerged, particularly in central Somalia.ونتيجة لذلك، فإن الدينامية السابقة للنـزاع على صيد الأسماك غير المشروع وغير المبلغ عنه وغير المنظم بين سفن الصيد والصيادين المحليين والميليشيات قد ظهرت من جديد، لا سيما في وسط الصومال.
36.٣٦ -
In the case of the fishing dhow Aresh, the Galmudug Coast Guard arrested it 120 km north of Hobyo on 1 April 2015.وفيما يتعلق بمركب الصيد الشراعي Aresh، فقد أوقفه حرس السواحل لغالمودوغ على مسافة 120 كيلومترا شمال هوبيو في 1 نيسان/أبريل 2015().
After their arrest, the crewmembers and a captain acknowledged that they had been fishing illegally.واعترف أفراد الطاقم والربان بعد إلقاء القبض عليهم أنهم كانوا يصطادون الأسماك بصورة غير مشروعة.
Galmudug authorities assessed the vessel a $100,000 fine which was paid and the vessel released by 16 April 2015.وفرضت سلطات غالمودوغ على المركب غرامة قدرها 000 100 دولار تم دفعها ثم أُفرج عن السفينة في 16 نيسان/أبريل 2015().
On 23 April 2015 the Iranian-flagged dhow Al Momen was seized off Qandala, Puntland, possibly by its own Somali security detachment, and subsequently released without incident.وفي 23 نيسان/أبريل 2015، تم اعتراض المركب الشراعي Al Momen الذي كان يرفع العلم الإيراني قبالة قندالا، بونتلاند، ربما على يد المفرزة الأمنية الصومالية الخاصة بها، ثم أفرج عنه دون وقوع حوادث.
On 13 May 2015, the Iranian dhow Sudis experienced mechanical failure and ran aground near Mareg in central Somalia.وفي 13 أيار/ مايو 2015، حصل خلل ميكانيكي في المركب الشراعي الإيراني Sudis فارتطم بالقاع قرب مارغ في وسط الصومال.
The dhow’s 14 crewmembers were reportedly captured by Al-Shabaab;وتفيد التقارير بأن أفراد طاقم المركب الشراعي البالغ عددهم 14 قد تم اختطافهم من جانب حركة الشباب؛
their fate remains unknown at the time of writing.وكان مصيرهم لا يزال مجهولا عند كتابة التقرير().
37.٣٧ -
The Monitoring Group is concerned that the return of foreign fleets to Somali waters, fishing close to the shoreline and equipped with armed security detachments, represents a threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia.ويساور فريق الرصد قلق من أن تشكل عودة الأساطيل الأجنبية التي تصطاد بالقرب من الخط الساحلي والمجهزة بمفرزات أمنية مسلحة إلى المياه الصومالية تهديدا للسلام والأمن والاستقرار في الصومال.
Such practices threaten to lead not only to conflict with local fishermen and concomitant loss of life, but may also provoke a vigilante response from local communities similar to that which contributed to the rise of Somali piracy more than a decade ago.فهذه الممارسات تهدد بأن تتسبب ليس فقط بنزاع مع الصيادين المحليين وما يترافق مع ذلك من خسائر في الأرواح، بل إنها قد تثير ردا انتقاميا من جانب المجتمعات المحلية على غرار الرد الذي ساهم في تزايد القرصنة الصومالية قبل أكثر من عقد من الزمن.
Continuing privatization of Somalia’s maritime spaceاستمرار خصخصة المجال البحري للصومال
38.٣٨ -
The Monitoring Group is concerned about the continuing prevalence of private maritime security firms in Somalia entering partnerships with local authorities to provide Coast Guard and/or policing services.يساور فريق الرصد قلق إزاء استمرار انتشار شركات الأمن البحري الخاصة في الصومال التي تدخل في شراكات مع السلطات المحلية لتوفير حرس السواحل و/أو الخدمات الشرطية.
In a number of cases, such private security companies have also been tasked by local authorities with selling fishing licences and managing Somalia’s marine resources, which constitutes, at a minimum, a conflict of interest.وفي عدد من الحالات، كُلفت شركات الأمن الخاصة هذه من جانب السلطات المحلية ببيع التراخيص بصيد الأسماك وإدارة الموارد البحرية للصومال، مما ينطوي أقلّه على تضارب في المصالح.
One such company, Somalia Fishguard Ltd., was highlighted in the Monitoring Group’s previous report (S/2014/726, annex 5.1).وتم تسليط الضوء على إحدى هذه الشركات، ألا وهي شركة Somalia Fishguard Ltd، في التقرير السابق لفريق الرصد (S/2014/726، المرفق 5-1).
The Monitoring Group notes with concern that Somalia’s past practice of entrusting private companies with the dual role of selling fishing licences and managing maritime security posed a threat to peace and stability.ويلاحظ الفريق مع القلق أن الممارسة السابقة التي كانت تتبعها الصومال والمتمثلة بتكليف شركات خاصة بأداء دور مزدوج ينطوي على بيع التراخيص بصيد الأسماك وإدارة الأمن البحري تشكل تهديدا للسلام والاستقرار.
Such companies have privileged foreign clients, even to the point of providing foreign fishing vessels with armed guards, again leading to potential conflict with local fishermen and coastal communities.فلهذه الشركات عملاؤها الأجانب من ذوي الامتيازات، التي تصل إلى حد تزويد سفن الصيد الأجنبية بحراس مسلحين، مما يؤدي مرة أخرى إلى نـزاع محتمل مع الصيادين المحليين والمجتمعات المحلية الساحلية.
39.٣٩ -
During the mandate, two private companies — Somali Security Services Ltd. and Anglo Somaliland Resources Ltd.وخلال فترة الولاية، قامت شركتان خاصتان، هما شركة Somali Security Services Ltd.
— have entered into agreements in Puntland and Somaliland, respectively, to provide services relating to the fisheries sector.وشركة Anglo Somaliland Resources Ltd، بإبرام اتفاقات في بونتلاند وصوماليلاند على التوالي لتقديم خدمات متعلقة بقطاع مصائد الأسماك.
These two contracts are discussed in annex 2.3.ويتضمن المرفق 2-3 مناقشة لهذين العقدين.
Potential corruption in the sale of fishing licencesشبهة فساد في بيع التراخيص بصيد الأسماك
40.٤٠ -
In its report of 2014, the Monitoring Group continued to investigate acts of corruption that undermined public institutions “through the diversion of national financial flows”, while noting “the perpetuation of conventional patterns of diversion by holders of public office and civil servants with access to national resources or by gatekeepers of government offices” (S/2014/726, para. 62).واصل فريق الرصد في تقريره لعام 2014 التحقيق في أفعال الفساد التي تقوض المؤسسات العامة ”عن طريق تحويل التدفقات المالية الوطنية“، ولاحظ في الوقت نفسه ”استمرار الأنماط التقليدية لتحويل الأموال من جانب أصحاب المناصب العامة والموظفين المدنيين ممن يتحكمون في الموارد الوطنية أو من جانب المؤتَمنين على المكاتب الحكومية“ (S/2014/726، الفقرة 62).
In this light, the Group has identified the illicit sale of fishing licences to foreign clients as an avenue for Federal Government of Somalia and other Somali officials to misappropriate public resources.وفي ضوء ذلك، رأى الفريق أن البيع غير المشروع للتراخيص بصيد الأسماك إلى عملاء أجانب يُعتبر أداة تستخدمها حكومة الصومال الاتحادية والمسؤولين الصوماليين الآخرين لاختلاس الموارد العامة.
41.٤١ -
The Group has found evidence of the sale of fishing licences, both by Federal Government of Somalia and Puntland officials, conducted outside the revenue-gathering apparatus of the State.ووجد الفريق أدلة على عمليات بيع للتراخيص بصيد الأسماك، سواء من جانب حكومة الصومال الاتحادية أو من جانب مسؤولين في بونتلاند، تتم خارج جهاز الدولة لجمع الإيرادات.
For instance, since May 2015 the Federal Government of Somalia Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources has been issuing licences to Chinese longliners and routing the proceeds into a private ministerial bank account in Djibouti, in contravention of the ministerial order of February 2014 requiring all Federal Government of Somalia agencies to channel revenues through the Treasury Single Account at the Central Bank of Somalia (S/2014/726, para. 64).فعلى سبيل المثال، منذ أيار/مايو 2015، تقوم وزارة مصائد الأسماك والموارد البحرية التابعة لحكومة الصومال الاتحادية بإصدار تراخيص إلى السفن الصينية للصيد بالخيوط الصنارية الطويلة وبتوجيه العائدات إلى حساب مصرفي وزاري خاص في جيبوتي()، في انتهاك للأمر الوزاري الصادر في شباط/فبراير 2014 الذي يلزم جميع وكالات حكومة الصومال الاتحادية أن توجه الإيرادات عن طريق استخدام حساب موحد لدى الخزانة في المصرف المركزي للصومال (S/2014/726، الفقرة 64).
The Group supplied the details of this bank account to the Federal Government of Somalia Ministry of Finance on 18 July 2015.وقدمت المجموعة تفاصيل هذا الحساب المصرفي إلى وزارة المالية في حكومة الصومال الاتحادية في 18 تموز/يوليه 2015().
42.٤٢ -
The Group has obtained a draft agreement between the Federal Government of Somalia Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and Doggang Daping Enterprises Group, a multinational fishing company based in Liaoning, China.وحصل الفريق على مشروع اتفاق بين حكومة الصومال الاتحادية وزارة مصائد الأسماك والموارد البحرية وشركة Doggang Daping Enterprises Group وهي شركة متعددة الجنسيات لصيد الأسماك مقرها في لياونينغ، الصين.
The agreement grants Doggang Daping a seven-year exclusive authorization to fish within Somalia’s exclusive economic zone, and allows the company to bring its own armed security on board its fishing vessels and in its future offices in Somalia, which would likely constitute a violation of the arms embargo.ويمنح الاتفاق الشركة ترخيصا حصريا بالصيد لمدة سبع سنوات في المنطقة الاقتصادية الخالصة للصومال، ويسمح لها بأن تجلب عناصرها الأمنية المسلحة الخاصة على متن سفنها للصيد وفي جميع مكاتبها المستقبلية في الصومال، الأمر الذي من المرجح أن يشكل انتهاكا للحظر المفروض على الأسلحة.
The draft agreement with the Doggang Daping Enterprises Group is set out in annex 2.1.e.ويرد مشروع الاتفاق مع شركة Doggang Daping Enterprises Group في المرفق 2-1-هـ.
Fishing vessel Al Amal and the assault on the Federal Government of Somalia Auditor Generalسفينة ”الأمل“ للصيد والاعتداء على المراجع العام لحكومة الصومال الاتحادية
43.٤٣ -
On 15 January 2015, the Yemen-registered fishing carrier vessel Al Amal entered Mogadishu port flying the Somali flag, reportedly in order to refuel.في 15 كانون الثاني/يناير 2015، دخلت سفينة ”الأمل“ للصيد المسجلة في اليمن ميناء مقديشو رافعة العلم الصومالي، من أجل التزود بالوقود حسبما أفيد.
The Auditor General of the Federal Government of Somalia, Nur Jimale Farah, conducted an inspection of the Al Amal, and determined that it was fishing illegally.وأجرى المراجع العام في حكومة الصومال الاتحادية، نور جمال فرح، تفتيشا لسفينة ”الأمل“ ووجد أنها تقوم بصيد الأسماك بصورة غير مشروعة.
Although Farah attempted to hold the vessel, it was released on 15 January 2015 under suspicious circumstances and departed Mogadishu port.وعلى الرغم من أن فرح حاول احتجاز السفينة، فقد أفرج عنها في 15 كانون الثاني/يناير 2015 في ظروف مشبوهة وغادرت ميناء مقديشو.
44.٤٤ -
In an event much publicized in local media, on 18 January 2015 the Auditor General was prevented from entering his office at Villa Somalia and reportedly assaulted by the compound’s guards.وفي حالة لقيت الكثير من التغطية الإعلامية في وسائط الإعلام المحلية، في 18 كانون الثاني/يناير 2015، مُنع المراجع العام من الدخول إلى مكتبه في ”فيلا صوماليا“ وتعرض للاعتداء من جانب حراس المجمع حسبما أفيد.
Farah told the Monitoring Group that he believed his actions related to the Al Amal had brought on the attack, and that he had since stopped investigating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing because he feared for his safety.وأخبر فرح فريق الرصد أنه يعتقد أن الإجراءات المتصلة بسفينة ”الأمل“ كان وراء الاعتداء، وأنه منذ ذلك الحين توقف عن التحقيق في صيد الأسماك غير المشروع وغير المبلغ عنه وغير المنظم لأنه بات يخشى على سلامته().
45.٤٥ -
A complete account of the Al Amal’s activities, as well as the assault on the Auditor General, is presented in annex 2.2.ويرد سرد كامل لأنشطة سفينة ”الأمل“، وكذلك الاعتداء على المراجع العام في المرفق 2-2.
The extractives sectorقطاع الصناعات الاستخراجية
46.٤٦ -
In its 2013 report (S/2013/413) the Group discussed the threat to peace and security posed by the extractives sector in Somalia.ناقش الفريق في تقريره لعام 2013 (S/2013/413) ما يطرحه قطاع الصناعات الاستخراجية في الصومال من تهديد للأمن والسلام.
The Group highlighted the risk of corruption in the sector, drawing particular attention to the shortcomings of the Somalia Petroleum Corporation and the Somali Petroleum Authority — two independent bodies mandated by the Somali Government’s 2008 Petroleum Law but yet to be established as viably functioning institutions.وسلط الفريق الضوء على مخاطر الفساد في القطاع، ووجه اهتماما خاصا إلى أوجه القصور في شركة الصومال للنفط والهيئة الصومالية للنفط، وهما هيئتان مستقلتان صادر بهما تكليف بموجب قانون الحكومة الصومالية للنفط لعام 2008 ولكنهما لم تصبحا بعد مؤسستين تؤديان وظائفهما عل نحو قابل للاستمرار.
In its 2014 report, the Group again highlighted the lack of transparency in the oil and gas sector, drawing particular attention to an exploration contract obtained by Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd.وقام الفريق مرة أخرى في تقريره لعام 2014 بتسليط الضوء على عدم الشفافية في قطاع النفط والغاز، ووجه اهتماما خاصا إلى عقد للاستكشاف حصلت عليه شركة Soma Oil and Gas Holdings Ltd.
(Soma), a London-based extractives exploration company incorporated on 26 April 2013 and chaired by the former leader of the United Kingdom Conservative Party, Michael Howard (S/2014/726, annex 5.1).(Soma) وهي شركة للاستكشاف الاستخراجي مقرها في لندن تم إنشاؤها في 26 نيسان/أبريل 2013، برئاسة القائد السابق لحزب المحافظين في المملكة المتحدة مايكل هوارد (S/2014/726، المرفق 5-1).
47.٤٧ -
In May 2013, the then-Minister for National Resources, Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, stated that the Federal Government of Somalia “should wait until we have the right laws in place” before entering into agreements with oil and gas companies.وفي أيار/مايو 2013، أعلن وزير الموارد الوطنية حينئذٍ()، عبد الرزاق عمر محمد، أن حكومة الصومال الاتحادية ”ينبغي أن تنتظر إلى أن نضع القوانين المناسبة“ قبل الدخول في اتفاقات مع شركات النفط والغاز().
Three months later, on 6 August 2013, Soma signed a seismic option agreement with the Federal Government of Somalia Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, giving the company the right to conduct a seismic survey off Somalia’s southern and central coast.وبعد ثلاثة أشهر، في 6 آب/أغسطس 2013، وقعت شركة Soma اتفاقا لمنح خيارات استغلال الموارد على ضوء المسوحات السيزمية مع وزارة النفط والموارد المعدنية في حكومة الصومال الاتحادية، مما أعطى الشركة الحق في إجراء مسح سيزمي قبالة سواحل الصومال الجنوبية والوسطى.
The contract also gave the company the subsequent right to exploit 12 offshore oil and gas blocks of its own choosing, totalling 60,000 km2.كذلك منح العقد الشركة ما يستتبعه ذلك من حق في استغلال 12 موقعا بحريا للنفط والغاز من اختيارها، يبلغ مجموع مسافتها 000 60 كيلومتر مربع.
The sudden announcement of the agreement came as a shock to both the oil and gas industry and the Somalia diplomatic community.وجاء الإعلان المفاجئ للاتفاق بمثابة صدمة بالنسبة لصناعة النفط والغاز والسلك الدبلوماسي في الصومال().
Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd.شركة Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd.
48.٤٨ -
On 28 July 2015, the Monitoring Group submitted a confidential communication to the Committee detailing how Soma’s activities in Somalia constituted violations of paragraph 2 of resolution 2002 (2011) and paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 2060 (2012), by undermining Somali public institutions through corruption.في 28 تموز/يوليه 2015، قدم فريق الرصد رسالة سرية() إلى اللجنة تبين بالتفصيل كيف أن أنشطة شركة Soma في الصومال تشكل انتهاكا للفقرة 2 من القرار 2002 (2011) والفقرة 2 (ج) من القرار 2060 (2012)، وذلك بتقويض المؤسسات العامة الصومالية من خلال الفساد.
The communication described how beginning in June 2014 Soma has made systematic payoffs to officials within the Federal Government of Somalia Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources — including the Director General, Deputy Director General, and other senior civil servants — under the auspices of a so-called “capacity-building agreement”.ووصفت الرسالة كيف أن شركة Soma كانت تقوم ابتداء من حزيران/يونيه 2014 بشكل منهجي بدفع مبالغ إلى مسؤولين في وزارة النفط والموارد المعدنية في حكومة الصومال الاتحادية - بما في ذلك المدير العام، ونائب المدير العام، وغيرهم من كبار موظفي الخدمة المدنية - في إطار ما سُمّي ”اتفاقا لبناء القدرات“.
49.٤٩ -
The Group has determined that these “capacity-building” funds, which had totalled $490,000 by 28 May 2015, were likely part of a quid pro quo arrangement designed to protect the seismic option agreement from the scrutiny of the Financial Governance Committee.وتأكد لدى الفريق أن ”أموال بناء القدرات“ هذه التي كان مجموعها قد بلغ 000 490 دولار بحلول 28 أيار/مايو 2015()، هي على الأرجح جزء من ترتيب قائم على دفع أموال مقابل الحصول على امتيازات وُضع لحماية اتفاق منح خيارات استغلال الموارد على ضوء المسوحات السيزمية من التمحيص من جانب لجنة الإدارة المالية.
Furthermore, officials on Soma’s payroll were directly involved in subsequent negotiations over the draft production-sharing agreement between Soma and the Ministry, representing a conflict of interest.وعلاوة على ذلك، ثمة مسؤولون يقبضون مرتبات من شركة Soma كانوا مشاركين مباشرة في المفاوضات اللاحقة بشأن مشروع اتفاق لتقاسم الإنتاج بين شركة Soma والوزارة، مما يمثل تضاربا في المصالح.
50.٥٠ -
Under the capacity-building agreement, the company also made payments to a Federal Government of Somalia presidential oil and gas adviser, Abdullahi Haider Mohamed, who the company acknowledged had “represented the Federal Government … in the negotiations around the seismic option agreement that was signed in August 2013”.وبموجب اتفاق بناء القدرات، قامت الشركة أيضا بدفع مبالغ إلى المستشار الرئاسي لشؤون النفط والغاز في حكومة الصومال الاتحادية، عبد الله حيدر محمد، التي اعترفت الشركة بأنه كان ”يمثل الحكومة الاتحادية […] في المفاوضات حول اتفاق منح خيارات استغلال الموارد على ضوء المسوحات السيزمية الذي تم توقيعه في آب/أغسطس 2013“().
Yet following the transmission of the Group’s communication to the Committee, Soma issued a press release claiming that no individual paid by the company “was, or is, in a position to influence the decision to grant any commercial agreements for the benefit of Soma”.غير أنه عقب إحالة رسالة الفريق إلى اللجنة، أصدرت شركة Soma بيانا صحفيا تدعي فيه أنه لا يوجد أي فرد تلقى مدفوعات من الشركة ”ممن كان، أو هو، في وضع يسمح له بالتأثير في القرار بمنح أي اتفاقات تجارية لصالح شركة Soma“().
The company, therefore, sought to mislead the Monitoring Group during its investigation, and made inaccurate public statements relating to the capacity-building agreement once the Group’s findings had become known.وبالتالي، تكون الشركة قد سعت، بمجرد أن أصبحت النتائج التي توصل إليها الفريق معروفة، إلى تضليل فريق الرصد خلال التحقيق الذي يجريه، وتكون قد أصدرت بيانات عامة غير دقيقة تتعلق باتفاق بناء القدرات.
51.٥١ -
The Monitoring Group’s full case study of Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd., based largely on the material presented in the Group’s communication of 28 July 2015 to the Committee, appears in annex 2.5.وترد في المرفق 2-5 دراسة الحالة الكاملة التي أجراها فريق الرصد لشركة Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd، والتي تستند إلى حد كبير إلى المواد التي عُرضت في رسالة الفريق المؤرخة 28 تموز/يوليه 2015 الموجهة إلى اللجنة.
Circumvention of the Federal Government of Somalia Treasury Single Accountالالتفاف على حساب حكومة الصومال الاتحادية الموحد لدى الخزانة
52.٥٢ -
Like other ministries highlighted in the Group’s current report, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources has made routine attempts to undermine public financial management in Somalia by channelling revenues outside the Treasury Single Account at the Central Bank.على غرار الوزارات الأخرى التي سلط عليها الضوء التقرير الحالي للفريق، قامت وزارة النفط والموارد المعدنية بمحاولات روتينية من أجل تقويض الإدارة المالية العامة في الصومال عن طريق توجيه الإيرادات خارج الحساب الموحد في المصرف المركزي.
For instance, the Director General, Farah Abdi Hassan, directed Soma to transfer its “capacity-building” funds into a private account held by the Ministry at the International Bank of Somalia (IBS), which Hassan referred to in an e-mail to Soma as “more efficient than the central bank”.فعلى سبيل المثال، أشار المدير العام، فرح عبدي حسن، على شركة Soma بنقل أموالها المخصصة ”لبناء القدرات“ إلى حساب خاص تملكه الوزارة في البنك الدولي للصومال (International Bank of Somalia)، الذي أشار حسن في رسالة بالبريد الإلكتروني موجهة إلى شركة Soma بأنه ”أكثر كفاءة من المصرف المركزي“().
Soma elected instead to transfer the funds to the Ministry’s account at the Central Bank.غير أن شركة Soma اختارت بدلا من ذلك تحويل الأموال إلى حساب الوزارة في المصرف المركزي.
53.٥٣ -
However, the Group has learned of at least one instance in which the Ministry successfully diverted public revenues to its IBS account.غير أن الفريق علم بأن الوزارة قامت، مرة واحدة على الأقل، بتحويل إيرادات عامة إلى حسابها المصرفي في البنك الدولي للصومال.
On 16 May 2015, CGG — a company responsible for paying royalties on the sale of Somalia’s seismic data to the Federal Government of Somalia — transferred a $633,866.69 payment into the Ministry’s IBS account (a confirmation certificate for the Ministry’s IBS account is provided in annex 2.5.q).وفي 16 أيار/مايو 2015، قامت شركة CGG - وهي شركة مسؤولة عن دفع إتاوات على بيع البيانات السيزمية للصومال إلى حكومة الصومال الاتحادية - بتحويل مبلغ 866.69 633 دولارا إلى الحساب المصرفي للوزارة في البنك الدولي للصومال (وترد شهادة إثبات لحساب الوزارة في البنك الدولي للصومال في المرفق 2-٥-ف).
54.٥٤ -
Directing revenues around the Treasury Single Account — a centralized account over which the Federal Government of Somalia Ministry of Finance has oversight — has the effect of turning Federal Government of Somalia ministries into rent-seeking institutions capable of being captured by individual members of the Government, thereby fuelling corruption and conflict.ويمكن لتوجيه الإيرادات خارج الحساب الموحد للخزانة - وهو حساب مركزي خاضع لإشراف وزارة المالية في حكومة الصومال الاتحادية - أن يجعل من وزرات حكومة الصومال الاتحادية مؤسسات ساعية وراء الأموال يمكن لأفراد من أعضاء الحكومة السيطرة عليها، مما يغذي الفساد والنـزاع.
Absence of a resource-sharing frameworkعدم وجود إطار لتقاسم الموارد
55.٥٥ -
In its 2013 report (S/2013/413, para. 79), the Monitoring Group highlighted the lack of “constitutional agreements” on resource-sharing between the Federal Government of Somalia and Somalia’s regional administrations as a threat to peace and security.سلط فريق الرصد في تقريره لعام 2013 (S/2013/413، الفقرة 79) الضوء على عدم وجود ”اتفاقات دستورية“ لتقاسم الموارد بين حكومة الصومال الاتحادية والإدارات الإقليمية في الصومال باعتبار ذلك يشكل تهديدا للسلام والأمن.
The Group observed a “growing hostility” between the Federal Government of Somalia and regional administrations that had signed oil and gas deals independently of the Federal Government (ibid., para. 77).ولاحظ الفريق وجود ”عداء متصاعد“ بين حكومة الصومال الاتحادية وإدارات الحكم الإقليمية التي وقعت على صفقات نفطية بصورة مستقلة عن الحكومة (المرجع نفسه، الفقرة 77).
Despite the continuing absence of a constitutional resource-sharing framework, both the Federal Government of Somalia and the regional administrations continue to enter contract discussions, and sign agreements, with international oil and gas companies.وعلى الرغم من استمرار عدم وجود إطار دستوري لتقاسم الموارد، فإن حكومة الصومال الاتحادية والإدارات الإقليمية ما زالت تدخل في مناقشات بشأن عقود وتوقع على اتفاقات مع شركات النفط والغاز الدولية().
56.٥٦ -
Most recently, on 5 September 2015 the Federal Government of Somalia signed an agreement with the Norwegian company Spectrum ASA, granting it the right to conduct a seismic data survey encompassing 28,000 km2 of offshore territory in central and southern Somalia.وفي الآونة الأخيرة، في 5 أيلول/سبتمبر 2015، وقعت حكومة الصومال الاتحادية اتفاقا مع شركة Spectrum ASA النرويجية، منحتها بموجبه الحق بإجراء مسح للبيانات السيزمية على مساحة 000 28 كيلومتر مربع من المناطق البحرية في وسط وجنوب الصومال.
On 1 September 2015, the Puntland Petroleum Minerals Agency and the Houston-based ION Geophysical Corporation similarly announced they had signed an agreement allowing the company to acquire 8,000 km2 of seismic data “covering the entire Somalia Puntland offshore margin”.وفي 1 أيلول/سبتمبر 2015، أعلنت وكالة النفط والمعادن في بونتلاند وشركة ION Geophysical Corporation ومقرها في هيوستن، أنهما وقعتا اتفاقا يسمح للشركة بالحصول على البيانات السيزمية لمنطقة تبلغ مساحتها 000 8 كيلومتر مربع ”تغطي كامل الهامش البحري للصومال وبونتلاند“().
Federal Government of Somalia licensing of oil blocks in Somaliland and Puntlandحكومة الصومال الاتحادية تصدر تراخيص لاستغلال مناطق نفطية في صوماليلاند وبونتلاند
57.٥٧ -
The Monitoring Group is seriously concerned that, in the current context of peace and security, the Federal Government of Somalia Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources is attempting to recommence negotiations with the oil major ConocoPhillips Co. over its pre-civil war concessions now located in Somaliland and Puntland.يساور فريق الرصد قلق بالغ لأن وزارة النفط والموارد المعدنية في حكومة الصومال الاتحادية تحاول، في السياق الحالي للسلام والأمن، استئناف المفاوضات مع شركة النفط الكبرى ConocoPhillips Co. بشأن المناطق التي كانت تتمتع فيها بامتيازات قبل الحرب الأهلية والموجودة حاليا في صوماليلاند وبونتلاند().
ConocoPhillips’ pre-1991 concession includes blocks spanning Sool and Sanaag, two administrative regions that are actively disputed between Somaliland and Puntland, as well as with the self-declared regional State of Khatumo.وتشمل المناطق التي كانت شركة ConocoPhillips تتمتع فيها بامتيازات قبل عام 1991 سول وسناج، وهما منطقتان إداريتان لا تزالان موضع نزاع بين صوماليلاند وبونتلاند، وكذلك مع ولاية خاتومو الإقليمية المعلنة ذاتيا.
58.٥٨ -
The Group has seen an e-mail dated 25 August 2014 from the Director of Exploration at the Ministry, Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein, to Kay Larcom, a manager at ConocoPhillips.واطلع الفريق على رسالة بالبريد الإلكتروني مؤرخة 25 آب/أغسطس 2014 موجهة من مدير التنقيب في الوزارة، عبد القادر أبيكار حسين()، إلى كاي لاركوم، وهي مديرة في شركة ConocoPhillips.
The e-mail refers to a meeting held in Washington, D.C., on 8 August 2014 involving the Ministry and Larcom, and assures her that the Ministry is “determined” to work on “pre-1991 contracts in North and North-east Somalia [emphasis added]”.وتشير الرسالة إلى اجتماع عقد في واشنطن العاصمة، في 8 آب/أغسطس 2014، شاركت فيه الوزارة ولاركوم، وتتضمن تأكيدا من مدير التنقيب في الوزارة إلى لاركوم بأن الوزارة ”مصممة“ على العمل بموجب ”اتفاقات ما قبل عام 1991 في شمال وشمال شرق الصومال [استُخدم الخط المائل للتأكيد]“.
The use of the term “North Somalia” to refer to Somaliland, and “North-east Somalia” to refer to Puntland, reveals a worrying disregard for Federal relations with regional bodies.واستخدام مصطلح ”شمال الصومال“ للإشارة إلى صوماليلاند ومصطلح ”شمال شرق الصومال“ للإشارة إلى بونتلاند ينمّان عن استخفاف يدعو للقلق بالعلاقات الاتحادية مع الهيئات الإقليمية.
The Ministry’s interaction with ConocoPhillips also illustrates the Group’s concern that in the absence of a resource-sharing agreement — clearly delineating the roles of the Federal Government and the regional administrations when engaging with international oil companies — Somalia’s untapped hydrocarbons wealth is likely only to fuel political tension and conflict.وتبرر تعاملات الوزارة مع شركة ConocoPhillips أيضا قلق الفريق من ألا يسهم ما تتمتع به الصومال من ثروة لم تستغل بعد من المواد الهيدروكربونية، في ظل غياب اتفاق لتقاسم الموارد - يحدد بوضوح أدوار الحكومة الاتحادية والإدارات الإقليمية عند التعامل مع شركات النفط الدولية - سوى في تأجيج التوتر والنـزاع السياسيين.
Until such a constitutional arrangement is reached, international oil companies — such as Soma — will continue to take advantage of an environment lacking in strong institutions, striking favourable deals with individual brokers in Government rather than independent contracting bodies.وإلى أن يتم التوصل إلى مثل هذا الترتيب الدستوري، فإن شركات النفط الدولية - مثل شركة Soma - ستواصل استغلال بيئة تفتقر إلى المؤسسات القوية، فتبرم صفقات مربحة مع وسطاء أفراد في الحكومة بدلا من هيئات متعاقدة مستقلة.
59.٥٩ -
In this context, the Monitoring Group will continue to urge the Security Council to impose a moratorium on oil and gas agreements within Somalia, until such time as the Federal Government of Somalia has established viable institutions to regulate the sector, as stipulated in the country’s 2008 Petroleum Law.وفي هذا السياق، سيواصل فريق الرصد حث مجلس الأمن على فرض وقف اختياري للعمل باتفاقات النفط والغاز داخل الصومال، إلى أن تقوم حكومة الصومال الاتحادية بإنشاء مؤسسات تتمتع بمقومات البقاء لتنظيم القطاع، على النحو المنصوص عليه بموجب قانون النفط في البلد لعام 2008.
C.جيم -
Public financial management and misappropriationالإدارة المالية العامة والاختلاس
60.٦٠ -
The Monitoring Group has noticed modest improvements in public financial management.لاحظ فريق الرصد أوجه تحسن بسيطة في الإدارة المالية العامة.
Ambitious initiatives have been introduced, but the implementation of these initiatives remains slow.فقد تم وضع مبادرات طموحة، ولكن تنفيذها لا يزال بطيئا.
Disruption caused by the removal of two prime ministers and their cabinets within the span of two years has delayed reform.وقد أدى التعطل الناجم عن إقالة رئيسي وزراء مع مجلسيهما الوزاريين في غضون السنتين الماضيتين إلى تأخير الإصلاح.
The apparent impunity enjoyed by those who have engaged in misappropriation of public finances perpetuates a culture of corruption in Somali politics.ويبدو أن الإفلات من العقاب الذي تمتع به أولئك الذين شاركوا في اختلاس الأموال العامة يؤدي إلى إدامة ثقافة الفساد في الحياة السياسية الصومالية().
Budgetالميزانية
61.٦١ -
By the 2015 Budget Appropriation Act the Somali Government pledged to “rely on [its] own resources”.بموجب قانون الاعتمادات المرصودة في الميزانية لعام 2015، تعهدت الحكومة الصومالية بأن ”تعتمد على مواردها“.
Despite this ambitious declaration, the 2015 budget prepared under the previous Minister of Finance, Hussein Abdi Halane, was heavily dependent on pledges of budgetary support from various countries members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).وعلى الرغم من هذا الإعلان الطموح، فإن ميزانية عام 2015 التي أعدت في إطار ولاية وزير المالية السابق، حسين عبدي حلني، كانت تعتمد اعتمادا شديدا على التبرعات المعلنة لدعم الميزانية من مختلف البلدان الأعضاء في منظمة التعاون الإسلامي().
The Monitoring Group has determined that the under-delivery of external support left Somali National Army troops unpaid for several months.ووجد فريق الرصد أنه نتيجة عدم تقديم الدعم الخارجي بالشكل الكافي، لم تحصل قوات الجيش الوطني الصومالي على مرتباتها على مدى عدة أشهر.
62.٦٢ -
When forced to revise the budget in mid-2015 owing to the lack of delivery of OIC member country pledges, a more realistic budget was prepared prompting greater discipline in Government expenditure.وعندما اضطرت إلى تنقيح الميزانية في منتصف عام 2015 بسبب عدم الوفاء بالتعهدات من جانب البلدان الأعضاء في منظمة المؤتمر الإسلامي، أُعدت ميزانية أكثر واقعية مما أدى إلى زيادة الانضباط في الإنفاق الحكومي.
The 2015 budgetary crisis also prompted the formation of an interministerial budget strategy committee tasked with the preparation of the 2016 federal budget.كذلك دفعت أزمة الميزانية لعام 2015 إلى تشكيل لجنة مشتركة بين الوزارات معنية باستراتيجيات الميزانية تم تكليفها بإعداد الميزانية الاتحادية لعام 2016.
However, as the Federal Government of Somalia enters a year of transition and pressures on public finances grow, adhering to a prepared plan for revenue collection and government expenditure is likely to become increasingly difficult.ومع ذلك، بينما تبدأ حكومة الصومال الاتحادية سنة انتقالية وفي ظل تنامي الضغوط على المالية العامة، فإن الالتزام بخطة جاهزة لتحصيل الإيرادات والنفقات الحكومية من المرجح أن يزداد صعوبة.
Federal institutions and instrumentsالمؤسسات والصكوك الاتحادية
63.٦٣ -
While the Monitoring Group notes that the Central Bank of Somalia has made significant efforts to improve accountability and transparency, it remains ineffective as Somalia’s main financial regulatory and supervisory body.في حين أن فريق الرصد يلاحظ ما بذله المصرف المركزي الصومالي من جهود كبيرة من أجل تحسين المساءلة والشفافية، فإن هذا المصرف لا يزال غير فعال باعتباره الهيئة التنظيمية والإشرافية المالية الرئيسية للصومال.
A significant proportion of Government revenue continues to bypass the Treasury Single Account.فنسبة كبيرة من عائدات الحكومة ما زالت لا تودع في الحساب الموحد للخزانة.
Funding allocated to government ministries, departments and agencies continues to be withdrawn from the Central Bank in cash, with little to no accountability thereafter.كما أن التمويل المخصص للوزارات والإدارات والوكالات الحكومية لا يزال يُسحب من المصرف المركزي نقدا، دون أن يخضع ذلك لأي مساءلة تُذكر.
The multitude of hawala transfer companies remain unregulated by the Central Bank, rendering remittance flows vulnerable to external fears about their use in money-laundering and the financing of terrorism.وما زال العدد الكبير من شركات الحوالة غير خاضع للتنظيم من جانب المصرف المركزي، مما يجعل تدفقات التحويلات المالية شديدة التأثر بالمخاوف الخارجية من استخدامها في غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب().
Out-dated financial legislation from the 1960s remains in force but is poorly implemented.ولا تزال تشريعات مالية قديمة وُضعت منذ ستينيات القرن الماضي سارية، غير أنها لا تُنفذ بشكل جيد.
A draft bill that would have regulated foreign investment in Somalia was withdrawn by the Government in December 2014 after a second reading in Parliament.وسحبت الحكومة في كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2014 مشروع قانون كان من شأنه أن ينظم الاستثمارات الأجنبية في الصومال بعد قراءة ثانية في البرلمان.
Draft legislation to establish the Office of the Ombudsman was voted down by Parliament in July 2013 and has not been revisited since.وتم التصويت ضد مشروع قانون لإنشاء مكتب لأمين المظالم في تموز/يوليه 2013، ولم تتم إعادة النظر في الأمر().
The Public Procurement, Concessions and Disposal Act was passed by the Cabinet of Ministers in May 2014 but at the time of writing still awaits approval by Parliament.ووافق مجلس الوزراء على قانون المشتريات العامة والامتيازات والتصرف في الأصول في أيار/مايو 2014 ولكن حتى وقت كتابة هذا التقرير، كان لا يزال ينتظر موافقة البرلمان.
At the time of writing, legislation to establish the Anti-Corruption Commission had yet to be tabled.وفي وقت كتابة هذا التقرير، لم يكن التشريع المتعلق بإنشاء لجنة مكافحة الفساد قد عُرض على البرلمان بعد.
64.٦٤ -
The Financial Governance Committee was established in mid-2014 with an oversight role in relation to State asset recovery and public concessions.وأنشئت لجنة الإدارة المالية في منتصف عام 2014 وأنيط بها دور الإشراف فيما يتعلق باسترداد أصول الدولة والامتيازات العامة.
The Security Council in resolution 2182 (2014) encouraged the Federal Government of Somalia to use the Committee effectively.وشجع مجلس الأمن في قراره 2182 (2014) حكومة الصومال الاتحادية على استخدام اللجنة بفعالية.
While the Financial Governance Committee has proved to be a useful advisory body it has yet to demonstrate effective oversight.وفي حين أن لجنة الإدارة المالية قد أثبتت أنها هيئة استشارية مفيدة، فإنها لم تثبت بعد فعاليتها في مجال الرقابة.
At the time of writing, no discernible action had been taken on most of the contracts reviewed in 2014.وفي وقت كتابة هذا التقرير، لم يكن قد اتخذ أي إجراء بشأن معظم العقود التي استُعرضت في عام 2014().
Although compliance among government ministries, departments and agencies with the Financial Governance Committee is improving, some ministries have continued to bypass the Committee when negotiating important public contracts.وعلى الرغم من أن الامتثال فيما بين الوزارات والإدارات والوكالات للجنة الإدارة المالية يشهد تحسنا، فقد واصلت بعض الوزارات الالتفاف على اللجنة عند التفاوض بشأن العقود العامة المهمة().
In disingenuous attempts to demonstrate transparency, public officials have made references to the Financial Governance Committee when discussing agreements which have not in fact been reviewed by the Committee.وفي محاولات مخادعة لإظهار الشفافية، أشار موظفون حكوميون إلى لجنة الإدارة المالية لدى مناقشة الاتفاقات التي لم تكن اللجنة قد استعرضتها بالفعل().
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In November 2014, the Ministry of Finance officially launched the Somali Financial Management Information System designed to register Government income and expenditure in real time.وفي تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2014، أطلقت وزارة المالية العمل رسميا بنظام المعلومات الإدارية المالية الصومالية الذي صمم لتسجيل إيرادات الحكومة ونفقاتها في الوقت الحقيقي.
Implementation of the system within Government ministries, departments and agencies is ongoing.ويجري تنفيذ النظام داخل الوزارات والإدارات والوكالات الحكومية.
If effectively utilized by Government ministries, the system will represent an important development.وسيمثل هذا النظام، إذا استخدمته الوزارات الحكومية بفعالية، تطورا هاما.
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The re-engagement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after more than 25 years is also an important development for Somalia.كما تشكل إعادة مشاركة صندوق النقد الدولي بعد أكثر من 25 عاما تطورا مهما بالنسبة للصومال.
The IMF Trust Fund for Capacity Development is a welcome initiative given the pressing need for effective capacity-building programmes, particularly in the institutions tasked with managing the Federal Government’s finances and developing the extractives sectors.ويشكل الصندوق الاستئماني لتنمية القدرات التابع لصندوق النقد الدولي مبادرة جديرة بالترحيب نظرا إلى الحاجة الملحة لبرامج بناء القدرات الفعالة، ولا سيما في المؤسسات المكلفة بإدارة الشؤون المالية للحكومة الاتحادية وتطوير الصناعات الاستخراجية.
Misappropriation in the security sectorالاختلاس في القطاع الأمني()
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Few cases illustrate the threat posed by financial mismanagement and misappropriation to peace, security and stability in Somalia more than corruption within the Federal Government security institutions.قلة هي القضايا التي تبين الخطر الذي يمثله سوء الإدارة المالية والاختلاس بالنسبة للسلام والأمن والاستقرار في الصومال كما يبيّنها الفساد داخل المؤسسات الأمنية التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية.
The Somali National Army is by far the largest security institution in Somalia.فالجيش الوطني الصومالي هو بدون شك أكبر المؤسسات الأمنية في الصومال.
Effective management of its forces and finances is vital if the territorial gains against Al-Shabaab are to be preserved and if possible collapse of the State following the departure of AMISOM forces at some point in the future is to be prevented.والإدارة الفعالة لقواته وشؤونه المالية حيوية للحفاظ على المكاسب الإقليمية التي تحققت ضد حركة الشباب ومن أجل الحؤول دون انهيار الدولة بعد مغادرة قوات بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال في وقت ما في المستقبل.
Owing to severe budget limitations, the Federal Government of Somalia has struggled to pay the salaries of Somali National Army troops throughout 2015.وبسبب القيود الشديدة المفروضة على الميزانية، فإن حكومة الصومال الاتحادية قد عانت من أجل دفع رواتب قوات الجيش الوطني الصومالي على مدار عام 2015().
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Evidence collected by the Monitoring Group demonstrates a lack of understanding within and coordination between institutions of the Federal Government of Somalia regarding its single greatest expense, the payment of the Somali National Army.وتنم الأدلة التي جمعها فريق الرصد عن عدم فهم داخل مؤسسات حكومة الصومال الاتحادية وعدم تنسيق فيما بينها فيما يتعلق ببند مصروفاتها الأكبر، ألا وهو دفع مرتبات الجيش الوطني الصومالي.
The current strength, structure and composition of the army also remain unclear.ولا يزال قوام الجيش وهيكله وتشكيله في الوقت الحالي أمورا غير واضحة.
Evidence collected by the Group indicates that the army hierarchy has systematically inflated the troop numbers in order to secure greater funding for salaries and rations.وتشير الأدلة التي جمعها الفريق إلى أن هرمية الجيش تقوم بشكل منهجي بتضخيم عدد الأفراد بهدف الحصول على أموال أكثر من أجل المرتبات وحصص الإعاشة.
Family and business ties between those responsible for ensuring that the Somali National Army is provisioned, and the company providing its dry food rations — amounting to upwards of $8 million each year — also suggest a serious conflict of interest.كما أن الروابط الأسرية والتجارية بين المسؤولين عن ضمان تخصيص حصص الإعاشة للجيش الوطني الصومالي وبين الشركة التي توفر حصصها الغذائية الجافة، والتي يتجاوز مجموعها 8 ملايين دولار كل سنة، توحي أيضا بتضارب جدي في المصالح.
The almost exclusive use of cash for payments, distinct lack of accountability measures, and absence of any independent oversight has left the army leadership free to exploit Government revenue at the expense of its soldiers’ and citizens’ security.ونظرا لاستخدام المدفوعات النقدية بشكل حصري تقريبا والافتقار الواضح لتدابير المساءلة وعدم وجود أي رقابة مستقلة، أصبحت قيادة الجيش حرة في استغلال الإيرادات الحكومية على حساب أمن جنودها والمواطنين.
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The extent of misappropriation and impunity within the Somali National Army has dented donor confidence in the Federal Government of Somalia, which has acknowledged the gravity of the situation.وقد قوض مدى الاختلاس والإفلات من العقاب داخل الجيش الوطني الصومالي ثقة الجهات المانحة في حكومة الصومال الاتحادية، التي سلّمت بخطورة الوضع.
The Group’s investigations into Somali National Army misappropriation were supported by the National Security Adviser’s Office, as well as the Ministry of Finance in August and September 2015.وساهم في دعم تحقيقات الفريق في الاختلاس في إطار الجيش الوطني الصومالي مكتبُ مستشار الأمن القومي ووزارة المالية في آب/أغسطس وأيلول/سبتمبر 2015.
The replacement of General Dahir Adan Elmi as the Chief of the Armed Forces on 3 September 2015 represented a positive step towards reform.وشكل استبدال الجنرال ضاهر عدن العلمي قائد القوات المسلحة في 3 أيلول/سبتمبر 2015 خطوة إيجابية في اتجاه الإصلاح.
The announcement by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on 9 September 2015 committing the Federal Government of Somalia to comprehensive reform within the security sector is an encouraging and commendable development.ويشكل إعلان الرئيس حسن شيخ محمود في 9 أيلول/سبتمبر 2015 التزام حكومة الصومال الاتحادية بإجراء إصلاح شامل لقطاع الأمن تطورا مشجعا وجديرا بالثناء().
The Nairobi Embassyسفارة نيروبي
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Previous reports have detailed misappropriation within Somalia’s foreign embassies (see, for example, S/2012/544, paras. 18-21 and S/2013/413, paras. 72-73).وردت في التقارير السابقة تفاصيل عن عمليات الاختلاس داخل سفارات الصومال في الخارج (انظر مثلا الوثيقة S/2012/544، الفقرات من 18 إلى 21، والوثيقة S/2013/413، الفقرتان 72 و 73).
The Monitoring Group is concerned by evidence of serious irregularities occurring at the Somali Embassy in Nairobi, under former Ambassador Mohamed Ali Nur “Americo”.لذلك، يشعر فريق الرصد بالقلق إزاء الأدلة التي تثبت حدوث مخالفات جسيمة في السفارة الصومالية في نيروبي خلال فترة السفير السابق محمد علي نور، ”أميريكو“().
Between January 2014 and April 2015, the Embassy collected $960,836 in fees for over 7,500 Somali passports and emergency travel documents.وكانت السفارة قد جمعت في الفترة من كانون الثاني/يناير 2014 إلى نيسان/أبريل 2015 مبلغ 836 960 دولار كرسوم لإصدار 500 7 من جوازات السفر ووثائق السفر الطارئة الصومالية().
During the same period, only $486,258 was remitted to the Ministry of the Interior account at the Central Bank in Mogadishu, leaving $474,578 unaccounted for.وخلال نفس الفترة، لم يُحوَّل إلى حساب وزارة الداخلية بالمصرف المركزي في مقديشو سوى مبلغ 258 486 دولار، ليظلّ مصير المبلغ 578 474 دولار مجهولا().
The Group is also concerned about a donation of $1 million from the Government of China in 2013, of which $479,314 was remitted to the Central Bank, and the remaining $517,686 allegedly paid in legal fees to the Nairobi-based law firm Ibrahim, Issack & Company (see annex 3.2).ويشعر الفريق بالقلق أيضا إزاء مصير المليون دولار التي قدمتها حكومة الصين كهبة في عام 2013، والتي لم يتلق منها البنك المركزي سوى 314 479 دولار، فيما قيل إنّ المبلغ المتبقى وقدره 686 517 دولار قد دُفع كرسوم قانونية لقاء خدمات شركة المحاماة Ibrahim, Issack & Company التي يوجد مقرها في نيروبي (انظر المرفق 3-2).
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According to a former Somali diplomat, 10 days prior to the Ambassador’s departure from the Embassy, a team of information technology specialists were called in to remove sensitive information from the office computers, while hard copies of documentation were systematically destroyed.ووفقا لأحد الدبلوماسيين الصوماليين السابقين، دُعي فريق من أخصائي تكنولوجيا المعلومات، قبل عشرة أيام من مغادرة السفير، إلى إزالة المعلومات الحساسة من حواسيب المكتب، فيما تم بصورة منهجية إتلاف النسخ الورقية().
The Monitoring Group is encouraged by the decision of the new Somali Ambassador to Kenya, Jamal Hassan, who took office on 4 August 2015, to conduct an independent audit of the Embassy’s accounts and also to install tight financial discipline (see annex 3.2).وفريق الرصد يشعر بالتشجيع إزاء ما قرره السفير الصومالي الجديد في كينيا، السيد جمال حسن، الذي تولى منصبه في 4 آب/أغسطس عام 2015، من إجراء مراجعة مستقلة لحسابات السفارة، وكذلك استحداث ضوابط مالية صارمة (انظر المرفق 3-2).
Mogadishu port rehabilitation fundsالأموال المخصّصة لاستصلاح ميناء مقديشو
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In 1993, United Nations peacekeepers assumed control over Mogadishu port in order to ensure humanitarian access to Somalia.في عام 1993، سيطر حفظة السلام التابعين للأمم المتحدة على ميناء مقديشو من أجل ضمان وصول المساعدات الإنسانية إلى الصومال.
Peacekeeping forces of UNITAF (United Task Force) managed the collection of port fees on behalf of the Somali Government until 1995, when they turned the funds over to a trust fund managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Somalia and the World Food Programme (WFP).وتولى حفظة السلام التابعين لفرقة العمل الموحدة إدارة عملية جمع رسوم الميناء نيابة عن الحكومة الصومالية، وذلك إلى غاية سنة 1995 عندما قاموا بتسليم هذه الأموال إلى صندوق استئماني يديره برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإنمائي في الصومال وبرنامج الأغذية العالمي.
In July 1997, the funds, totalling $1,003,930, were transferred into a trust managed solely by UNDP Somalia, which the agency designated towards a Mogadishu Port rehabilitation project.وفي تموز/يوليه 1997، تم تحويل هذه الأموال، البالغ مجموعها 930 003 1 دولار، إلى صندوق استئماني ينفرد بإدارته برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإنمائي بالصومال. وقد خصص البرنامج الإنمائي هذه الأموال ”لمشروع استصلاح ميناء مقديشو“.
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On 17 March 2014, the then-Minister of Ports and Marine Transport, Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow”, requested that UNDP Somalia turn over the port funds to the Ministry.وفي 17 آذار/مارس 2014، طلب وزير الموانئ والنقل البحري حينها، يوسف معلّم أمين ”بعدوا“، إلى البرنامج الإنمائي تسليم أموال الميناء إلى وزارته.
After internal consultations, UNDP Somalia agreed to transfer the funds on the condition that that they be routed through the Federal Government of Somalia’s Treasury Single Account.وبعد مشاورات داخلية، وافق البرنامج الإنمائي بالصومال على نقل الأموال بشرط تسليمها عن طريق حساب الخزانة الموحد التابع لحكومة الصومال الاتحادية().
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In September 2014, UNDP Somalia transferred port rehabilitation funds, which by this time amounted to over $1.8 million, with accrued interest.وفي أيلول/سبتمبر 2014، قام البرنامج الإنمائي بتحويل الأموال المخصصة لاستصلاح الميناء، والتي بلغت حينها أزيد من 1.8 مليون دولار بعد تراكم الفوائد.
However, instead of using the Treasury Single Account, as agreed, the funds were transferred to a Mogadishu Port account at the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS), account No. 1035.غير أنّ هذه الأموال أودعت في حساب ميناء مقديشو رقم 1035 بالمصرف المركزي الصومالي بدلا من إيداعها في حساب الخزينة الموحد، على نحو ما تم الاتفاق عليه.
From 13 to 20 September 2014, Amin authorized the withdrawal of almost $1.7 million in cash from CBS account No. 1035 — almost the entirety of the port rehabilitation funds.وفي الفترة الفاصلة بين 13 أيلول/سبتمبر و 20 أيلول/سبتمبر 2014، أذن يوسف أمين بسحب ما يقرب من 1.7 مليون دولار نقدا من الحساب رقم 1035، أي مجمل أموال استصلاح الميناء تقريبا.
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The Monitoring Group has since obtained evidence suggesting that Amin and the then-Director General of the Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport, Abdullahi Ali Nur, likely misappropriated the funds.ومنذ ذلك الحين، حصل فريق الرصد على أدلة تفيد باحتمال أن يكون أمين والمدير العام لوزارة الموانئ والنقل البحري حينها، عبد الله علي نور، قد اختلسا هذه الأموال().
A detailed account of this misappropriation of public financial resources is presented in annex 3.3.ويرد في المرفق 3-3 بيان مفصل بهذا الاختلاس للموارد المالية العامة.
Khat taxationالضرائب على القات
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The Monitoring Group is concerned by the existence until June 2015 of an illegal agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the Somali company ADCO governing the taxation of the narcotic substance khat.يشعر فريق الرصد بالقلق إزاء وجود اتفاق غير قانوني حتى حزيران/يونيه 2015 بين وزارة المالية والشركة الصومالية ADC بشأن إدارة الضرائب على مادة القات المخدّرة.
The agreement resulted in a substantial shortfall in taxes collected by the Federal Government of Somalia on the import of khat to Somalia, and thus can be interpreted as non-compliance with paragraph 38 of resolution 2182 (2014), in which the Security Council called for transparent and accountable public financial management, as well as for Federal Government of Somalia revenue to be channelled through the national budget.وقد تسبب الاتفاق في نقص كبير للضرائب التي تجمعها حكومة الصومال الاتحادية على توريد القات إلى الصومال، ويمكن بالتالي تفسيره على أنّه مخالف لأحكام الفقرة 38 من قرار مجلس الأمن 2182 (2014) التي دعا فيها المجلس إلى الشفافية والمساءلة في إدارة المالية العامة، وإلى توجيه إيرادات حكومة الصومال الاتحادية عبر قنوات الميزانية الوطنية.
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The Monitoring Group is encouraged by the decision of the Attorney General of Somalia to investigate the illegal amendments and lowering of taxes around the khat tariff regime (see annex 3.4). D.ويشعر فريق الرصد بالتفاؤل بعد أن قرّر النائب العام في الصومال التحقيق في التعديلات غير القانونية وفي مسألة خفض الضرائب التي تندرج ضمن نظام التعريفات المفروضة على مادة القات (انظر المرفق 3-4).
Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiinحركة الشباب المجاهدين
Current statusالوضع الراهن
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As noted in the Monitoring Group’s previous report, Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin remains a major threat to peace and security within Somalia, as well as a major destabilizing force in the East Africa region (S/2014/726, para. 10).مثلما لوحظ في التقرير السابق لفريق الرصد، ما تزال حركة الشباب المجاهدين تشكل تهديدا كبيرا للسلام والأمن داخل الصومال، وقوةً رئيسية تزعزع الاستقرار في منطقة شرق أفريقيا (انظر S/2014/726، الفقرة10).
As in past years, the group continues to cede territory in the face of military advances by joint AMISOM-Somali National Army forces and their strategic partners, preferring to retreat into the countryside and subsequently cut off supply routes to the reclaimed areas.وكما هو الشأن في السنوات الأخيرة، ظلت الحركة تتراجع في وجه التقدّم العسكري الذي حققته القوات المشتركة بين بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال والقوات المسلحة الوطنية الصومالية وشركاؤها الاستراتيجيين، مفضلةً الانكفاء داخل المناطق الريفية والعمل لاحقا على قطع طرق الإمدادات إلى المناطق التي تم انتزاعها منها.
The group also continues its expansion as a transnational organization, particularly focusing its terror operations against neighbouring Kenya.وتواصل الحركة أيضا توسّعها كتنظيم عابر للحدود، وتعمل بالأخص على تركيز عملياتها الإرهابية ضد كينيا المجاورة.
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Following the death of Al-Shabaab’s emir, Muktar Ali al-Zubayr (Ahmed Godane) in a drone strike by the United States on 1 September 2014, Al-Shabaab promptly selected as his successor Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah (a.k.a. Ahmed Diriye;وعلى إثر وفاة أمير حركة الشباب، مختار علي الزبير (أحمد غودني)، خلال غارة شنتها الولايات المتحدة في 1 أيلول/سبتمبر 2014 بواسطة طائرة بدون طيار، عمدت الحركة فورا إلى اختيار أحمد عمر أبو عبيدة (المعروف أيضا باسم أحمد ديريه وباسم مهاد عمر عبد الكريم) خليفةً له.
a.k.a. Mahad Omar Abdikarim), whom the Committee designated for targeted sanctions on 24 September 2014.وكانت اللجنة قد عيّنت في 24 أيلول/سبتمبر 2014 إدراج أبو عبيدة في قائمة الجزاءات المحددة الأهداف.
Abu Ubaidah was widely seen to have been a compromise candidate, less autocratic than Godane and more acceptable to relatively moderate elements of Al-Shabaab, allowing him to prevail over more obvious successors.ويرى الكثيرون أنّ أبا عبيدة كان مرشحا توافقيا وهو رجلٌ أقل استبدادا من سلفه غودني وأكثر تقبُّلاً لعناصر الحركة المعتدلين، الأمر الذي جعله يتقدّم على غيره من الوجوه التي كانت مرشحة أكثر للخلافة().
Abu Ubaidah has continued the trend of decentralizing Al-Shabaab, empowering local leaders and commanders to operate independently, even in the areas of revenue raising and administration.وقد استمر أبو عبيدة في العمل على إحلال اللامركزية بالحركة وتمكين الزعماء والقادة المحليين من العمل باستقلال حتى فيما يتعلق بمسائل جمع الإيرادات والإدارة().
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The continuing use of lethal action by Member States has led to the assassination of several of Al-Shabaab’s key leaders during the current mandate.وخلال الولاية الحالية، أفضى استخدام الضربات القاتلة من قبل الدول الأعضاء إلى اغتيال الكثير من كبار زعماء حركة الشباب.
Most notable among those are the killings on 29 December 2014 and 31 January 2015 of Abdishakur Tahlil, an Amniyat operative, and Yusuf Dheeq “Ishmaaciil”, described in the Monitoring Group’s previous report as Al-Shabaab’s chief Amniyat in charge of external operations (S/2014/726, footnote 15).ومن أبرز هذه العمليات تلك التي جدت في 29 كانون الأوّل/ديسمبر 2014 وأودت بحياة عبد الشكور تهليل، أحد أعوان الأمنيات، والأخرى التي جدت في 31 كانون الثاني/يناير 2015 وأودت بحياة يوسف دهيق ”اسماعيل“ الذي ورد ذكره في التقرير السابق لفريق الرصد باعتباره ”رئيس الأمنيات بحركة الشباب المكلّف بالعمليات الخارجية“ (S/2014/726، الحاشية 15).
The Group has received information that Dheeq’s killing was likely based on a mobile phone selector passed on by Somaliland security services.وتلقى فريق الرصد معلومات مفادها أن مقتل دهيق تم على الأغلب بواسطة معلومات نقلتها الدوائر الأمنية التابعة لصوماليلاند عن هاتفه المحمول().
A third high-ranking member of Al-Shabaab, Aden Garar, was killed in a drone strike on 13 March 2015.كما قُتل عنصر بارز ثالث في الحركة، هو عدنان جرار، في غارة نُفذت في 13 آذار/مارس 2015 بواسطة طائرة بدون طيار.
Garar had been linked to the Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi (“Badru Nairobi Operation”) on 21 September 2013 and, more recently, a failed terror plot in Addis Ababa in October 2014.وقد تم ربط صلة بين جرار والهجوم الذي استهدف في 21 أيلول/سبتمبر 2013 مركز واست غايت للتسوّق في نيروبي (”عملية بدر نيروبي“)، وبينه وبين مؤامرة إرهابية فاشلة كانت ستستهدف أديس أبابا في تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2014().
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However, as noted in the Monitoring Group’s previous report, those targeted killings may have resulted in short-term gains but have not degraded or destroyed Al-Shabaab’s operational capacity to carry out asymmetric attacks and, increasingly, conventional assaults on military targets.بيد أنّ عمليات القتل المستهدفة هذه ربما تكون قد حقّقت مكاسب قصيرة الأجل، مثلما جاء في التقرير السابق لفريق الرصد، لكنّها لم تُنهك أو تُدمّر القدرة التشغيلية للحركة على القيام بهجمات غير متكافئة، وعلى القيام أكثر فأكثر بهجمات تقليدية على الأهداف العسكرية.
A senior regional intelligence source told the Monitoring Group that the ranks of Al-Shabaab’s virtually unknown “middle management” were so numerous and ideologically committed that the group was able to replace assassinated leaders with ease.50وأبلغ مصدر استخباراتي رفيع المستوى فريقَ الرصد بأنّ صفوف الحركة من ”الإدارة المتوسطة“، التي لا يُعرف عنها أي شيء تقريبا، كثيرة العدد وملتزمة من الناحية الإيديولوجية بحيث من اليسير على الحركة استبدال من يُغتال من قادتها(55).
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Al-Shabaab continues to carry out frequent complex attacks within Mogadishu, typically employing a combination of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices followed by the deployment of suicide gunmen.وتواصل الحركة شن هجمات معقّدة ومتكرّرة داخل مقديشو، وهي عادة ما تقوم بهجمات بالأجهزة المتفجرة المرتجلة المحمولة على مركبات ثم تتبعها بهجمات يشنها مسلحون انتحاريون.
During the current mandate, Al-Shabaab has displayed a preference for targeting hotels, especially those frequented by Federal Government of Somalia and foreign government officials.وخلال الولاية الحالية، أبدت حركة الشباب ميلا نحو استهداف الفنادق، ولا سيما تلك التي يتردّد عليها المسؤولون بحكومة الصومال الاتحادية والمسؤولون الأجانب.
The most notable of those hotel attacks include: Jazeera Hotel (26 July 2015); Makka al-Mukarama (27 March 2015); Central Hotel (20 February 2015);وكان أبرز هذه الهجمات الفندقية تلك التي استهدفت فندق الجزيرة (في 26 تموز/يوليه 2015) ()، وفندق مكة المكرّمة (في 27 آذار/مارس 2015)، والفندق المركزي (في 20 شباط/فبراير 2015)؛
and SYL Hotel (22 January 2015).وفندق سيل (SYL) (في 22 كانون الثاني/يناير 2015).
Annex 4.1 examines the targeting of Mogadishu hotels by Al-Shabaab.ويتناول المرفق 4-1 بالدرس عمليات الحركة في استهداف الفنادق في مقديشو.
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Al-Shabaab terror operatives, both within and outside Mogadishu, frequently carry out their attacks while disguised in Somali National Army or other government military uniforms.وفي داخل مقديشو وخارجها، كثيرا ما يُنفّذُ عُملاء الحركة الإرهابيون هجماتهم وهم متنكّرون بأزياء الجيش الوطني الصومالي أو بأزياء عسكرية حكومية أخرى.
The Group believes the wide availability and low cost of military uniforms, due partly to a lack of oversight of imports, to be an underreported threat to peace and security in Somalia (see annex 7.1).ويعتقد فريق الرصد أنّ الانتشار الواسع للأزياء العسكرية بأسعار رخيصة، الذي يعود سببه جزئيا إلى انعدام الرقابة على الواردات، هو من المخاطر التي تتهدد السلام والأمن في الصومال والتي لا يتمّ الإبلاغ عنها بالقدر الكافي (انظر المرفق 7-1).
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The Federal Government of Somalia continues to point to defections of Al-Shabaab members as evidence of the group’s diminishing appeal and capabilities, in particular the high-level defection in January 2015 of Zakariye Ahmed Ismail Hersi, Al-Shabaab’s putative head of military intelligence.وما فتئت حكومة الصومال الاتحادية تشير إلى وجود انشقاقات في صفوف حركة الشباب تؤشر إلى تضاؤل جاذبية الحركة وتدهور قدراتها، ومنها بالأخص انشقاق أحد المسؤولين السامين وهو زكريا أحمد إسماعيل هرسي، الرئيس المفترض للمخابرات العسكرية بالحركة، في شهر كانون الثاني/يناير 2015.
The value of actionable intelligence obtained from his debriefing is doubtful, however.بيد أن المعلومات الاستخباراتية العملية التي استُخلصت منه لا يمكن الوثوق بها.
The Group believes that Hersi was sidelined within Al-Shabaab for a year prior to his defection, and a senior Federal Government of Somalia intelligence official told the Group that Hersi had provided only “outdated” and “background” information.ويعتقد فريق الرصد أنّ هرسي قد تم تهميشه داخل الحركة لمدة سنة قبل انشقاقه. وقد أبلغ أحد مسؤولي الاستخبارات بحكومة الصومال الاتحادية الفريقَ بأنّ هرسي لم يقدّم سوى معلومات ”أساسية“ ”تجاوزها الزمن“().
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The Group has closely followed the prospect of an Al-Shabaab ideological or operational realignment towards the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).وتابع فريق الرصد عن كثب مسألة احتمال أن يكون هناك انحياز إيديولوجي أو عملياتي من الحركة نحو تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام.
Indeed, in February 2015 an “emissary” for ISIL, Hamil al-Bushra, publicly invited Abu Ubaidah to declare Al-Shabaab’s loyalty to the organization.وبالفعل، فقد وجّه أحد مبعوثي التنظيم، وهو حامل البُشرى، دعوةً في شباط/فبراير 2015 إلى أبي عبيدة من أجل أن يُعلن ولاء حركته للتنظيم().
There is some evidence that Al-Shabaab is beginning to mimic ISIL tactics, perhaps with the aim of competing for the media spotlight.وهناك بعض الدلائل على أنّ الحركة قد بدأت بمحاكاة الأساليب التّكتيكية للتنظيم، وذلك ربما من أجل المنافسة على استقطاب أضواء وسائل الإعلام.
For instance, a video released by Al-Shabaab’s media wing in March 2015, depicting individuals being forced into the ocean prior to being gunned down, bears disturbing resemblance to ISIL execution videos.فعلى سبيل المثال، نشر الجناح الإعلامي بالحركة في شهر آذار/ مارس 2015 شريط فيديو يصوّر أفرادا وهم يُدفَعُون إلى داخل البحر قبل أن يتم رميهم بالرصاص. وهذا العمل يحمل في طياته شبها مخيفا بما جاء في أشرطة تصوير الإعدامات التي نشرها التنظيم().
However, the Monitoring Group has not found evidence of operational or financial links between ISIL and Al-Shabaab.غير أنّ فريق الرصد لم يعثر على ما يُثبت وجود علاقات عملياتية أو مالية بين التنظيم والحركة.
Tacticsلمحة عامة عن الأساليب التّكتيكية
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On 19 July 2015, contingents of AMISOM, as well as Ethiopian National Defence Force, Kenya Defence Forces and Somali National Army troops began the latest phase in their military offensive against Al-Shabaab in Operation Jubba Corridor.في 19 تموز/يوليه 2015، شرعت وحدات بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي وقوات الدفاع الوطني الإثيوبية وقوات الدفاع الكينية والوحدات التابعة للجيش الوطني الصومالي في تنفيذ المرحلة الأخيرة من عملية ممرّ جوبا للهجوم العسكري على حركة الشباب.
The allied forces scored immediate gains, capturing two major remaining Al-Shabaab strongholds, Bardhere and Dinsor.وقد حققت قوات التحالف مكاسب فورية حيث سيطرت على اثنين من المعاقل الرئيسية المتبقية للحركة، وهما بارطيري ودنسور.
Al-Shabaab did not directly challenge the renewed offensive, preferring, as in the past, to tactically withdraw into the countryside and subsequently cut off supply routes to the reclaimed areas.ولم ترد الحركة على الهجوم مباشرة، بل فضّلت، كان في السابق، أن تنسحب بصورة تكتيكية إلى المناطق الريفية لتقوم لاحقا بقطع طرق الإمدادات إلى المناطق التي انتُزعت منها.
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The Monitoring Group notes with concern that those recaptured areas have been reduced to isolated islands, with the threat of Al-Shabaab ambushes and improvised explosive devices rendering resupply by road highly perilous (see annex 5.1 for an account of humanitarian obstruction by Al-Shabaab).ويلاحظ فريق الرّصد بقلق أنّ المناطق التي استعادتها قوات التّحالف قد أضحت بمثابة جُزر معزولةٍ لأنّ عمليات إمدادها بواسطة الطرق قد أصبحت تنطوي على مخاطر الكمائن والعبوات الناسفة التي تنصبها الحركة (انظر المرفق 5-1 للاطلاع على سرد للكيفية التي تتوخاها الحركة في إعاقة وصول المساعدات الإنسانية).
The supply routes also continue to provide revenue to Al-Shabaab, as the group establishes checkpoints to extract “tolls” from passing vehicles.هذا، وما تزال طرق الإمدادات تشكّل أيضا مصدر دخل للحركة التي أصبحت تنصب نقاط تفتيش من أجل انتزاع ”رسوم العبور“ من المركبات التي تمرّ من هذه الطرق.
Attacks on military targetsالهجمات على الأهداف العسكرية
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Despite Al-Shabaab’s lack of military resistance to Operation Jubba Corridor, the group has demonstrated a marked shift in its tactics, techniques and procedures by resuming full-scale attacks on military targets, from which it has largely abstained since withdrawing from Mogadishu in 2011.رغم أن الحركة لم تُبد أيّ مقاومة عسكرية لعملية ممر جوبا، فإنّها أبانت عن تحوّل بارز في تكتيكاتها وتقنياتها وإجراءاتها واستأنفت العمل بالهجمات الواسعة النطاق على الأهداف العسكرية، بعد أن كانت قد توقفت عن مثل هذه العمليات إلى حد كبير بعد انسحابها من مقديشو في عام 2011.
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Al-Shabaab’s success in penetrating the heavily fortified Mogadishu International Airport compound on 25 December 2014 had been foreshadowed in the Monitoring Group’s previous report (S/2014/726, annex 1.3), which highlighted Al-Shabaab’s infiltration of the Mogadishu International Airport.أما نجاح الحركة في 25 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2014 في اقتحام مركب مطار مقديشو الدولي ذي الدفاعات القوية، فقد كان من الأمور التي تنبّأ بها فريق الرصد في تقريره السابق (S/2014/726، المرفق 1-3) حين أبرز اختراق الحركة لدواليب هذا المطار.
While eight AMISOM soldiers, two civilians and a contractor were killed, casualties could have been considerably higher had the attackers reached their primary target, the officers’ mess.ولئن سقط في هذه العملية ثمانية من جنود بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي واثنين من المدنيين وأحد المتعاقدين، فإنّ الخسائر في الأرواح كانت ستصل إلى أفدح من ذلك لو تمكّن المهاجمون من الوصول إلى هدفهم الأوّلي وهو مطعم الضباط.
The Monitoring Group has obtained evidence showing that a wide range of forged identification badges facilitating access to the Mogadishu International Airport can be purchased at Bakara Market for $20 to $40.وقد حصل فريق الرصد على أدلة تظهر مجموعة كبيرة من شارات الهوية المزوّرة التي تسهّل الوصول إلى مطار مقديشو الدولي ويمكن شراؤها في سوق بكارا بأسعار تتراوح بين 20 إلى 40 دولارا.
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On 11 June 2015, more than 100 Al-Shabaab fighters ambushed an Ethiopian National Defence Force convoy escorting civilian contractors to deliver supplies for AMISOM from Mogadishu to Baidoa in the area of Jameeco, 90 km north-west of Mogadishu.وفي 11 حزيران/يونيه 2015، وفي منطقة جاميكو على بعد 90 كيلومترا إلى الشمال الغربي من مقديشو، نصب أكثر من 100 من مقاتلي الحركة كمينا لقافلة من قوات الدفاع الوطني الإثيوبية كانت ترافق، من مقديشو إلى بيدوا، متعاقدين مدنيين يحملون إمدادات إلى بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي.
Following the Ethiopian National Defence Force ambush, Al-Shabaab announced the existence of a special brigade tasked with attacking AMISOM forces, dubbed the “Sheikh Abu Zubeyr” unit, in honour of its former emir.وعقب هذا الكمين، أعلنت الحركة أنّها تتوفر على لواء خاص مهمته الهجوم على قوات البعثة، وهو يحمل اسم وحدة ”الشيخ أبو الزبير“ تخليدا لذكرى أميرها السابق.
The Monitoring Group presently considers that unit to be a propaganda-related, rather than operationally active, military unit.ويرى فريق الرصد حاليا أنّ هذه الوحدة هي من باب الدعاية وليست من الوحدات العسكرية النشطة.
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On 26 June 2015, following an initial breach of the perimeter by suicide bombers, more than 100 Al-Shabaab fighters overran an AMISOM base in Leego, resulting in the deaths of more than 50 Burundian soldiers.وفي 26 حزيران/يونيه 2015، قام أزيد من 100 من مقاتلي الحركة، بعد اختراق أولي لمحيط قاعد البعثة في ليغو، باكتساح القاعدة مما أدى إلى مقتل أزيد من 50 من الجنود البورونديين.
More recently, on 1 September 2015, Al-Shabaab militants carried out a similar assault on an AMISOM base in Janale, on that occasion disabling a bridge before their assault in order to cut off an avenue of retreat.وفي الآونة الأخيرة، نفّذ المقاتلون يوم 1 أيلول/سبتمبر 2015 هجوما مماثلا على قاعدة للبعثة في جانال، وقاموا قبل ذلك بتعطيل أحد الجسور من أجل قطع طريق التراجع().
An accurate death toll of AMISOM soldiers has yet to be established, although media sources have reported it to be in the dozens.ولم يتم بعد حصر عدد القتلى من جنود البعثة رغم أنّ وسائل الإعلام أوردت أنّ أعدادهم بالعشرات.
Sources of revenueمصادر الدخل
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With taxes on charcoal production and movement declining as a source of revenue for Al-Shabaab, the group has become increasingly reliant on other means of raising funds.أصبحت الحركة تعتمد أكثر فأكثر على وسائل أخرى لجمع الأموال وذلك بعد تقلّص الضرائب المفروضة على إنتاج الفحم ونقله، التي تشكّل أحد مصادر دخلها.
In particular, the group relies on the taxation (zakat) of farms in the Jubba valley, one of the last remaining areas over which it maintains territorial control.وتعتمد الحركة بالأخص على الضرائب (الزكاة) التي تفرضها على المزارع في وادي جوبا الذي يعد من آخر المعاقل التي ما زالت الحركة تسيطر عليها().
Extortion of business owners, whether their businesses are large or small and whether located in areas physically controlled by Al-Shabaab or not, also constitutes a significant component of the group’s revenue.وتشكل أعمال الابتزاز التي يتعرض لها أيضا أصحاب الأعمال، كبارهم وصغارهم الموجودين أو غير الموجودين في المناطق التي تسيطر عليها الحركة بالفعل، مصدرا كبيرا من مصادر الدخل().
Even in Mogadishu, businesses continue to pay “taxes” to Al-Shabaab and not to the Federal Government.وما زالت الأعمال التجارية، حتى في مقديشو، تدفع ”الضرائب“ للحركة من دون الحكومة الاتحادية().
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The strict tariff regime of the Government of Kenya encourages a vibrant illicit trade in sugar and other basic foodstuffs imported duty-free through the port of Kismayo.ويعمل نظام التعريفات الصارم الذي تأخذ به حكومة كينيا على تشجيع وجود تجارة غير مشروعة ونابضة بالحياة في مادة السّكر وغيره من المواد الغذائية الأساسية الموردة من دون رسوم جمركية عبر ميناء كيسمايو.
From Kismayo, sugar is transported into Kenya through multiple border points, including the Dhobley-Liboi crossing.إذ يتم نقل السكر من كيسمايو إلى داخل كينيا عبر جملة من النقاط الحدودية مثل معبر دهوبلي - ليبوي().
Al-Shabaab mans checkpoints on all roads out of Kismayo, with passing trucks charged a toll of about $1,000 each.وعلى طول الطرق المؤدية من كيسمايو، تُقيم حركة الشباب نقاط تفتيش وتفرض على الشاحنات رسوم عبور بنحو 000 1 دولار عن كل شاحنة().
From the Dhobley-Liboi border crossing, much of the sugar passes through the Dadaab refugee camps before making its way to the regional hub of Garissa, then onward to wholesale markets in Nairobi.وبعد الدخول من معبر دهوبلي - ليبوي، يمر معظم السُّكر عن طريق مخيمات اللاجئين في داداب قبل الذهاب إلى مركز غاريسا الإقليمي ثم بعد ذلك إلى أسواق الجملة في نيروبي.
Once it has entered Kenya, much of the sugar is purchased by local businesses and repackaged under their own brands.وبعد وصول السكر إلى كينيا، يتولى التجار المحليون شراء معظم الكميات وتعليبها بعلاماتهم التجارية الخاصة.
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In the Monitoring Group’s report issued in 2011, it was estimated that Al-Shabaab generated between $400,000 and $800,000 in revenue off the sugar trade (S/2011/433, annex 3.1).وقدّر فريق الرصد في تقريره الصادر في عام 2011 أنّ حركة الشباب قد حصدت ما بين 400 ألف دولار و 800 ألف دولار كإيرادات من تجارة السكر (S/2011/433، المرفق 3-1).
According to preliminary investigations conducted in 2015, the Monitoring Group estimates the figure to be substantially higher.ووفقا للتحقيقات الأولية التي أُجريت في عام 2015، تُشير تقديرات فريق الرصد إلى أنّ هذا الرقم قد شهد ارتفاعا كبيرا.
As the centrality of revenue stream from charcoal declines, Al-Shabaab’s taxation of the illicit sugar trade is gaining relevance.فبعد أن تقلصت أهمية الإيرادات المتأتية من الفحم، أصبحت الضرائب التي تفرضها الحركة على تجارة السكر غير المشروعة تكتسي أهمية أكبر فأكبر.
The connection between Al-Shabaab and sugar smuggling came to the fore in Kenya during the Group’s current mandate.أما علاقة الحركة بتهريب هذه المادة فقد برزت إلى الواجهة في كينيا خلال ولاية الفريق الحالية.
Following Al-Shabaab’s attack at Garissa University College, the Government of Kenya issued a confidential list of 30 individuals who the Government claimed were “engaged in sugar smuggling” and whose accounts had accordingly been frozen (see strictly confidential annex 4.2.e).فقد وضعت حكومة كينيا، على إثر الهجمة التي نفذتها الحركة على الكلية التابعة لجامعة غاريسا، قائمةً سرية بأسماء 30 فردا ممن تزعم أنهم ”ضالعون في تهريب السكر“، ثم قامت بعد ذلك بتجميد حسابات هؤلاء الأفراد (انظر الوثيقة السرية للغاية الواردة في المرفق 4-2 هـ).
The Kenyan security forces in turn launched a crackdown on the sugar trade in the Dadaab refugee camps, and the Monitoring Group has become aware of a “sugar unit” created within the Kenya National Intelligence Service for that purpose;وعمدت قوات الأمن الكينية من ناحيتها إلى شنّ حملة ضدّ تجارة السّكر في مخيمات اللاجئين في داداب، وبلغ إلى علم فريق الرصد أنّ ”وحدةً لشؤون السكر“ قد تم إنشاؤها لهذا الغرض داخل دوائر الاستعلامات الوطنية الكينية؛
in mid-April 2015, the unit arrested six mid-level smugglers in the Dadaab camps.وفي منتصف شهر نيسان/أبريل 2015، اعتقلت هذه الوحدة ستةً من متوسطي المهرّبين داخل مخيمات داداب().
The Monitoring Group is continuing to investigate Al-Shabaab’s revenue stream from the sugar trade.وما زال فريق الرصد يقوم بالتحريات فيما يتعلق بمصادر الإيرادات المتأتية للحركة من تجارة السُّكر.
95.95 -
The outbreak of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2011, as well as improved law enforcement measures along traditional heroin smuggling routes, has prompted East Africa to take on new importance in heroin trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe.أما اندلاع النزاع في الجمهورية العربية السورية في عام 2011، وكذا تحسّن التدابير الأمنية المتخذة على طول الطرق التقليدية لتهريب الهروين، فقد دفع بشرق أفريقيا إلى اكتساب أهمية جديدة ضمن سياق الاتجار بهذه المادة من أفغانستان إلى أوروبا().
The Monitoring Group has become aware of a possible connection between Al-Shabaab and the East Africa drug trade, through the MV Amin Darya, a vessel carrying upward of 800 kg of heroin intercepted on 15 July 2014 by Kenyan authorities and subsequently destroyed as a public relations exercise.وقد نبأ إلى علم فريق الرصد وجود صلة محتملة بين حركة الشباب وتجارة المخدرات في شرق أفريقيا، وذلك على إثر حاثة المركب MV AMIN DARYA الذي كان يحمل على متنه أكثر من 800 كيلوغرام من الهروين، والذي اعترضته السلطات الكينية في 15 تموز/يوليه 2014 وقامت لاحقا بإتلافه ضمن إطار عملية من عمليات العلاقات العامة.
Through information obtained from a regional security agency, the Monitoring Group has established that the heroin traffickers on board MV Amin Darya were in contact with a Dubai-based businessman with possible links to Al-Shabaab.ووفقا لمعلومات مستقاة من إحدى وكالات الأمن الإقليمية، ثبت لدى فريق الرصد أنّ تُجّار الهروين الذين كانوا على متن القارب قد أجروا اتصالات برجل أعمال مقيم في دبي قد يكون على صلة محتملة بحركة الشباب.
The case of the MV Amin Darya is presented in annex 4.4.ويرد عرض لقضية هذا المركب في المرفق 4-4.
Al-Shabaab Northeastحركة الشباب في الشمال الشرقي
96.96 -
The Monitoring Group continues to follow with concern the Al-Shabaab Northeast insurgency in the Galgala mountains, roughly 30 km south-west of Bosaso, Puntland.ما زال فريق الرصد يتابع باهتمام التمرّد الذي تقوده حركة الشباب في الشمال الشرقي داخل جبال غلغلة الواقعة على بعد 30 كيلومترا تقريبا من الجنوب الغربي لبوساسو، بونتلاند.
In its previous report, the Monitoring Group noted “an increased presence and movement” among Al-Shabaab Northeast militants (S/2014/726, annex 1.4).وكان فريق الرصد قد لاحظ في تقريره السابق وجود ”حضور وتحرّكات متزايدة“ لمقاتلي حركة الشباب في الشمال الشرقي (S/2014/726، المرفق 1-4).
As Al-Shabaab continues to cede territory in southern and central Somalia, the Monitoring Group expects the intensity of the Galgala insurgency to increase as fleeing militants head north, seeking to keep a line of communication open to Yemen and Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.غير أن الحركة ما زالت سائرة في خط التخلّي عن الأراضي في جنوب ووسط الصومال، وفريق الرصد يتوقّع أن تتفاقم وتيرة التمرّد في غلغلة بعد أن أصبح المقاتلون الفارون يتجهون شمالا ويسعون إلى الحفاظ على خط اتصالات مفتوح باتجاه اليمن وتنظيم القاعدة في شبه الجزيرة العربية.
Consequently, the Monitoring Group views with extreme concern the progressive deterioration of the security environments in both Yemen and Puntland, which in the latter case has been fuelled partly by continually delayed or absent salary payments to the security forces.لذلك، ينظر الفريق بقلق بالغ إلى التدهور التدريجي في البيئات الأمنية في كلٍّ من اليمن وبونتلاند. وبالنسبة لبونتلاند، يعود سبب تفاقم الوضع في جزء منه إلى تأخّر دفع مرتبات قوات الأمن وإلى عدم دفعها بالمرّة.
In particular, the sacking in February 2015 by the President of Puntland, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, of two senior security forces officials, including the head of the Puntland Intelligence Service, has created an alarming rift between the President and his security forces.وعلى وجه الخصوص، ظهر تصدّع مثير للقلق في العلاقات بين رئيس بونتلاند، عبد الولي محمد علي، من جهة وقوات الأمن من جهة أخرى، وذلك بعد أن عمد الرئيس في شباط/فبراير 2015 إلى عزل اثنين من كبار المسؤولين الأمنيين، أحدهما رئيس دائرة الاستخبارات في بونتلاند.
97.97 -
Early in October 2014, Puntland forces launched a renewed offensive in the Galgala hills, supported by aerial reconnaissance from a Western Member State.وفي أوائل تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2014، شنّت قوات بونتلاند هجوما جديدا داخل تلال غلغلة، وكانت مدعومة في هذا الهجوم باستطلاع جوي قامت به إحدى الدول الأعضاء الغربية.
After initial gains, the offensive appears to have stalled.ويبدو أن هذا الهجوم قد توقّف بعد أن حقق مكاسب أولية.
According to information provided in October 2014 by a Puntland journalist on the ground, government forces controlled only Galgala town and not the villages in the surrounding hills.ووفقا للمعلومات التي أوردها في تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2014 أحد الصحافيين البونتلانديين الموجوديــن على عيــن المكان، فإنّ القــوات الحكوميــة قد فرضت سيطرتها على مدينة غلغلة ولكنها لم تبسطها على القرى الموجودة في التلال المحيطة بالمدينة().
The Monitoring Group has received unconfirmed but credible information that senior Al-Shabaab leader Fuad Mohamed Khalaf “Shongole” was present in the Galgala area in mid-March 2015 in order to “establish a new base” to carry out attacks in Puntland.وقد تلقى فريق الرصد معلومات موثوقة لكنها غير مؤكدة تُفيد بأنّ أحد كبار قادة حركة الشّباب، وهو فؤاد محمد خلف ”شنغول“، كان موجودا في منطقة غلغلة في منتصف آذار/مارس 2015 من أجل ”إنشاء قاعدة جديدة “وتنفيذ هجمات في بونتلاند().
Al-Shabaab as a regional threatحركة الشباب باعتبارها من التهديدات الإقليمية
98.98 -
During the present mandate, Al-Shabaab has continued to morph into a transnationally oriented terror organization.خلال الولاية الحالية، واصلت حركة الشباب تحوّلها إلى منظمة إرهابية تسعى إلى العمل عبر الحدود.
The group’s regional expansion reflects Al-Shabaab’s principal regional aim, namely to carry out attacks on the home fronts of AMISOM troop-contributing countries.وهذا التوسع على المستوى الإقليمي يعكس الهدف الرئيسي الذي تعمل الحركة على بلوغه إقليميا، وهو تنفيذ هجمات على الجبهات الداخلية للبلدان المساهمة بقوات في بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي.
Kenya, in particular, has proven to be especially vulnerable, owing largely to the long and porous border that it shares with Somalia.وقد كانت كينيا بالأخص أكثر هذه البلدان ضعفا حيال هذا التحوّل باعتبار طول الحدود التي تجمعها بالصومال وكثرة ثغرات هذه الحدود().
Since June 2014, Al-Shabaab terror operations have claimed the lives of more than 300 people in Kenya, greater than the number killed by the group in Mogadishu over the same period.ومنذ حزيران/يونيه 2014، أسفرت العمليات الإرهابية التي تشنّها الحركة عن سقوط أكثر من 300 شخص في كينيا، أي أكثر من عدد الذين قتلتهم في مقديشو خلال الفترة نفسها.
99.99 -
Al-Shabaab has launched a series of deadly attacks on Kenyan soil during the mandate.وخلال فترة الولاية، شنّت الحركة عدة هجمات قاتلة على التراب الكيني.
Within the span of 10 days, the group carried out two deadly attacks near Mandera, massacring 28 bus passengers on 23 November 2013, followed by 36 quarry workers on 2 December.ونفّذت، في غضون 10 أيام، هجمتين قاتلتين قرب مانديرا أودت الأولى المنفذة في 23 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2013 بحياة 28 من ركاب إحدى الحافلات، والثانية المنفذة في 2 كانون الأوّل/ديسمبر بحياة 36 عاملا من عمال إحدى المقالع الحجرية.
Al-Shabaab’s most significant attack in Kenya took place on 2 April 2015, when five gunmen stormed the campus of Garissa University College, located 150 km from the Kenya-Somalia border.أما أهمّ هجماتها فهي تلك التي جدّت في كينيا يوم 2 نيسان/أبريل 2015 عندما اقتحم مسلحون مُجمّع إحدى الكليات التابعة لجامعة غاريسا على بعد 150 كيلومترا من الحدود الكينية الصومالية.
After a stand-off lasting most of the day, Kenyan special forces stormed the dormitory where the attackers had taken students hostage, but not before 148 people, mostly students, had been killed.وقامت القوات الخاصة الكينية، بعد يوم كامل من التحصّن، باقتحام مبيت الكلية حيث كان المهاجمون يحتجزون رهائنهم من الطلبة. غير أنّ 148 شخصا، معظمهم من الطلاب، كانوا قد قتلوا في الأثناء.
In the aftermath of the massacre, the Government of Kenya announced the mastermind of the attack to be Mohamed Mohamud “Gamadheere” (a.k.a. “Kuno”), a Garissa native and former Quranic teacher.وفي أعقاب هذه المجزرة، أعلنت حكومة كينيا أنّ العقل المدبّر للهجوم هو محمد محمود ”غامادهيري“ (المعروف أيضا باسم ”كونو“)، أحد سكان غاريسا ومعلّم سابق بالمدارس القرآنية().
“Gamadheere” has emerged not only as a leader responsible for cross-border attacks into Kenya but also possibly as a key organizer in other regional plots involving networks in Somaliland, Djibouti and Ethiopia.وبذلك، ظهر ”غامادهيري“ ليس كقائد مسؤول عن شن الهجمات عبر الحدود إلى داخل كينيا، ولكن أيضا كعنصر رئيسي محتمل في تنظيم مؤامرات إقليمية أخرى تشارك فيها شبكات من صوماليلاند وجيبوتي وإثيوبيا.
For instance, unconfirmed information provided to the Monitoring Group suggests that “Gamadheere” acted as the coordinator of a failed plot in January 2015 to attack Menelik Square in Djibouti, the area of the city containing La Chaumière restaurant, which was the target of a successful Al-Shabaab suicide bombing in May 2014 (see S/2014/726, strictly confidential annex 2.3).وعلى سبيل المثال، تُشير معلومات غير مؤكدة تلقاها فريق الرّصد إلى أنّ ”غامادهيري“ كان قد عمل كمنسّق لأحد المؤامرات الفاشلة التي كانت ستستهدف في كانون الثاني/يناير 2015 ساحة منيليك في جيبوتي، حيث يوجد مطعم لاشوميار (La Chaumiere) الذي كان مسرحا لهجمة انتحاريـة نفذتهــا الحركة بنجاح فــي أيــار/مايو 2014 (انظــر S/2014/726، المرفــق السري للغاية 2-3).
100. An account of the Garissa University College terror attack is provided in annex 4.2.100 - ويرد في المرفق 4-2 سرد لوقائع الهجمة الإرهابية على الكلية التابعة لجامعة غاريسا.
101. Annex 4.3 (strictly confidential) describes the failed Al-Shabaab plot of January 2015 in Djibouti. 102.101 - ويتناول المرفق 4-3 (السري للغاية) بالوصف المؤامرة التي فشلت الحركة في تنفيذها في جيبوتي في كانون الثاني/يناير 2015.
In a worrying trend, Al-Shabaab has begun to openly occupy Kenyan border towns for extended periods.102 - وفي تطوّر يبعث على القلق، شرعت الحركة في العمل علنا على احتلال مدن كينية حدودية لفترات مطوّلة.
On 19 May 2015, Al-Shabaab militants entered two villages in Garissa County, addressing villagers for several hours and warning them not to support the Government of Kenya or Kenyan security services.وفي 19 أيار/مايو 2015، دخل مقاتلو الحركة قريتين في مقاطعة غاريسا وخطبوا في القرويين لعدّة ساعات وأنذروهم من مغبة تقديم الدعم لحكومة كينيا أو للدوائر الأمنية الكينية().
One week later, militants entered Yumbis village, near the Dadaab refugee camps, and repeated their message not to cooperate with Kenyan forces. 103.ثم بعد أسبوع من هذه الحادثة، دخل المقاتلون قرية يومبس بالقرب من مخيمات داداب للاجئين وأعادوا إبلاغ رسالتهم وتوصية الناس بعدم التعاون مع القوات الكينية().
Despite the failure of the “Bole Rwanda cell” to launch an attack during the World Cup qualifiers in Addis Ababa in 2013 (see S/2014/726, strictly confidential annex 2.2), Al-Shabaab has continued efforts to strike at the Ethiopian capital.103 - ورغم فشل ”خلية بولي رواندا“ في شنّ هجوم أثناء مباريات التأهيل لكأس العالم، التــي دارت فــي أديس أبابا فــي عام 2013 (انظر S/2014/726، المرفق السري للغاية 2-2)، فإنّ حركة الشباب واصلت جهودها من أجل تنفيذ ضربة داخل العاصمة الإثيوبية.
On 14 October 2014, the United States Embassy in Addis Ababa issued a warning of an imminent Al-Shabaab plot targeting the central Bole area of the city.وفي 14 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2014، أصدرت سفارة الولايات المتحدة في أديس أبابا تحذيرا من وجود مؤامرة وشيكة للحركة تستهدف منطقة بولي في المدينة.
According to information provided to the Monitoring Group, approximately 20 Al-Shabaab operatives had been sent to Addis Ababa in three distinct groups to carry out the plot but left Ethiopia after the warning from the United States;وأفادت بعض المعلومات التي حصل عليها فريق الرصد بأنّ 20 من عناصر الحركة كانوا قد أُرسلوا إلى أديس أبابا ضمن ثلاث مجموعات مختلفة لتنفيذ هذه المؤامرة. غير أنّ هذه العناصر غادرت إثيوبيا بعد إصدار الولايات المتحدة لهذا الإنذار.
one of the groups was killed attempting to re-enter Kenya.وقد قُتل أحدهم بعد محاولته دخول إثيوبيا مرة أخرى().
E.هاء -
Piracy and kidnap for ransomالقرصنة والاختطاف طلبا للفدية
Overviewلمحة عامة
104. Since 2012, piracy in Somalia has declined precipitously.104 - شهدت أعمال القرصنة في الصومال انخفاضا سريعا منذ العام 2012.
The last hijacking of a high-value merchant vessel, the Greek-managed oil tanker MT Smyrni, dates to May 2012.وتعود آخر حادثة اختطاف لإحدى البواخر العالية القيمة، هي ناقلة النفط MT Smyrni التي تديرها اليونان، إلى شهر أيار/مايو 2012.
The sharp reduction in piracy since its peak in 2010 has been due primarily to the deployment of private armed security teams on board commercial vessels, the implementation of best management practices by the maritime industry and the presence of international naval forces vessels in the region.أما السبب في هذا الانخفاض الحاد، بالمقارنة مع مستوى الذروة الذي بلغته هذه الأعمال في عام 2010، فهو يعزى بالأساس إلى نشر أفرقة أمنية خاصة مسلحة على متن السفن التجارية، وتنفيذ قطاع النقل البحري لأفضل الممارسات الإدارية، ووجود سفن تابعة للقوات البحرية الدولية في المنطقة.
105. During the mandate, pirate activity remained at an ebb.105 - وخلال فترة ولاية الفريق، ظلّت أنشطة القراصنة في تراجع.
The only two vessels to be hijacked since the Group’s previous mandate were the Iranian fishing dhows FV Siraj and FV Jaber, which were seized off the coast of central Somalia on 22 March 2015.ولم يتعرض للاختطاف منذ الولاية السابقة سوى مركبان شراعيان إيرانيان لصيد الأسماك، هما القارب سيراج والقارب جابر، تم الاستيلاء عليهما قبالة السواحل الصومالية الوسطى في 22 آذار/مارس 2015.
The Monitoring Group has ascertained the individual responsible to be Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje”, a well-known pirate leader whose activities have been described in detail in the Group’s previous two reports (S/2013/413 and S/2014/726).وقد تحقق فريق الرصد من أنّ الشخص المسؤول عن العملية هو محمد عثمان محمد ”غفانجي“، أحد زعماء القراصنة المعروف وقد كان فريق الرصد تطرّق إلى أنشطته بالتفصيل في تقريريْه السابقين (S/2013/413 و S/2013/413).
A detailed account of the hijackings of the FV Siraj and the FV Jaber is provided in annex 2.4 (strictly confidential).ويرد في المرفق 2-4 (السري للغاية) سرد لوقائع اختطاف القاربيْن الإيرانيين.
106. The Group notes with disappointment that the Federal Government of Somalia has yet to arrest and carry out prosecutions against pirate leaders, as the Group has recommended in past reports.106 - ويلاحظ فريق الرصد بأسف أنّ حكومة الصومال الاتحادية لم تقم بعد باعتقال ومحاكمة زعماء القراصنة، وهو ما أوصاها به في تقاريره السابقة.
In particular, the Group is concerned that “Gafanje” continues to carry out piracy operations with complete impunity, even seeming to enjoy access to high-level Federal Government of Somalia politicians in Mogadishu (see strictly confidential annex 2.4.b).وعلى وجه الخصوص، يشعر الفريق بقلق إزاء ”غفانجي“ الذي ما زال ينفّذ عمليات القرصنة ويفلت إفلاتا تاما من العقاب، ويتمتع فيما يبدو بالوصول إلى أطراف سياسية رفيعة المستوى بالحكومة الاتحادية في مقديشو (انظر المرفق 2-4 ب السري للغاية).
107. While the threat posed by piracy to merchant vessels remains low, the Group is concerned that illegal fishing by foreign vessels, which frequently deploy private armed security teams on board, may lead to the recreation of a dynamic of conflict with local Somali communities that contributed to the rise of piracy a decade ago.107 - ورغم أنّ مخاطر القرصنة على السفن التجارية ما زالت منخفضة، فإنّ الفريق يشعر بالقلق إزاء صيد الأسماك بصورة غير قانونية من قبل السفن الأجنبية، التي كثيرا ما تحمل على متنها أفرقة أمنية مسلحة خاصة. فهذا العمل من شأنه أن يؤدي إلى إعادة تهيئة أجواء النزاع مع المجتمعات المحلية الصومالية، التي كانت قد أسهمت قبل عقد من الزمن في ظهور القرصنة.
That threat is discussed in detail in the Group’s discussion of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and maritime security.ويرد نقاش مفصل لهذه المخاطر ضمن الجزء الذي يتناول فيه فريق الرصد مسألة صيد الأسماك بدون إبلاغ وبصورة غير قانونية وغير منظمة، وصلة هذا النوع من الصيد بالأمن البحري.
III.ثالثا -
Obstruction of humanitarian assistanceعرقلة المساعدات الإنسانية
108. In paragraph 31 of its resolution 2232 (2015), the Security Council reiterated its demand that all parties allow and facilitate full, safe and unhindered access for the timely delivery of aid to persons in need across Somalia.108 - كرر مجلس الأمن، في الفقرة 31 من قراره 2232 (2015)، مطالبته جميع الأطراف بإتاحة وتيسير إيصال المساعدات الإنسانية بشكل كامل وآمن ودون معوقات وفي الوقت المناسب إلى السكان المحتاجين في جميع أرجاء الصومال.
Although the humanitarian footprint was felt in almost all 15 administrative regions of Somalia, the quality of that access remained extremely fragile, particularly as a new anti-Al-Shabaab offensive began in July 2015.ورغم الأثر الذي خلفته العمليات الإنسانية في مناطق الصومال الإدارية الخمس عشرة كلها، فإنّ جودة سبل الوصول قد ظلت هشة للغاية، لا سيما وقد شُرع في شهر تموز/يوليه 2015 في تنفيذ هجوم جديد على حركة الشباب().
More broadly, the increase in the intensity and scale of conflicts in Somalia, whether in terms of the number of actors involved, the means and methods used or the strategies employed, affected all aspects of humanitarian access, from the safety and security of humanitarian workers to the ability to maintain the independence and neutrality of humanitarian action.وبصورة أعم، أفضى ارتفاع حدة النزاعات في الصومال واتساع رقعتها، سواء من حيث عدد الجهات الفاعلة الضالعة أو من حيث السبل والوسائل المستخدمة أو الاستراتيجيات المتبعة، إلى الـتأثير على عملية إيصال المساعدات الإنسانية من جميع جوانبها سواء المتصلة بسلامة وأمن أفراد المساعدة الإنسانية أو بالقدرة على الحفاظ على استقلال العمل الإنساني وحياده.
On 31 August 2015, following the biannual Food Security and Nutrition Assessment for Somalia of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, it was announced that the number of people who faced a food crisis or emergency in Somalia had increased by 17 per cent, from 731,000 to 855,000 in six months, two thirds of whom were internally displaced persons.وفي 31 آب/أغسطس 2015، وفي أعقاب التقييم الذي تجريه منظمة الأغذية والزراعة كل سنتين للأمن الغذائي والتغذية في الصومال، أُعلن أن عدد الأشخاص الذين يواجهون أزمة أو طوارئ غذائية في الصومال قد سَجَّل في غضون ستة أشهر ارتفاعًا بنسبة 17 في المائة، حيث انتقل من 000 731 شخص إلى 000 855 شخص، ثلثاهم من المشردين داخليا().
A.ألف -
Denial of humanitarian access 109.منع وصول المساعدات الإنسانية()
The key challenges to humanitarian access identified by the Monitoring Group in its previous report (S/2014/726) continued to impede humanitarian operations on an even larger scale, necessitating more complex negotiation by humanitarian partners.109 - ظلت الصعوبات في وصول المساعدات الإنسانية، والتي حددها فريق الرصد في تقريره السابق (S/2014/726)، تعيق العمليات الإنسانية على نطاق أوسع، مما استوجب من الشركاء الإنسانيين الدخول في مفاوضات تتسم بمزيد التعقيد.
They included blockades on main supply routes and strategic towns by Al-Shabaab, obstructive “regulation” and taxation by federal and regional government officials and the continued politicization of aid. 110.ومن بين هذه الصعوبات إغلاق حركة الشباب لطرق الإمداد الرئيسية وفرضها لحصار على المدن الاستراتيجية، وقيام المسؤولين في الحكومات الاتحادية والإقليمية بإصدار ”اللوائح“ والضرائب المعرقلة لسير العمليات، واستمرار السير في نهج تسييس المعونة.
With access to essential supplies perceived as a vehicle for parties to the conflict to assert authority, Al-Shabaab violently enforced blockades on both humanitarian supplies and commercial trade, killing and arresting civilians and destroying goods.110 - وبعد أن أدركت أن الوصول إلى المستلزمات الضرورية هو من وسائل بسط السيطرة التي تعتمدها أطراف النزاع، توخت الحركة العنف في فرض حصارها على الإمدادات الإنسانية وعلى المعاملات التجارية، وعمدت إلى قتل واعتقال المدنيين وإتلاف السلع.
Despite efforts to provide emergency humanitarian support by air where possible, acute food insecurity pervaded in many areas.وعلى الرغم من الجهود المبذولة لتقديم المساعدات الإنسانية الطارئة بالوسائل الجوية كلّما كان ذلك ممكنا، فإنّ حالة من انعدام الأمن الغذائي الحاد قد سادت في العديد من المناطق().
In its own area of authority, Al-Shabaab permitted only minimal humanitarian activities and severely restricted the extent to which the population could seek assistance outside.هذا، ولم تسمح الحركة في منطقة سيطرتها إلا بالحد الأدنى من الأنشطة الإنسانية وعمد إلى فرض قيود صارمة على الحدود التي يمكن في إطارها للسكان أن يلتمسوا المساعدة من الخارج().
In the context of the increased militarization and polarization of the environment, there was evidence of Al-Shabaab’s deepened suspicion of, and distance from, the humanitarian community.وفي سياق بيئة التسليح والاستقطاب المتزايدين، تشير الدلائل إلى أن الحركة أصبحت تتوجّس أكثر من الدوائر الإنسانية وتنأى بنفسها عنها.
In some areas this was reflected, inter alia, in efforts to sideline local leadership and centralize control of humanitarian relationships through the Amniyat, Al-Shabaab’s hard-line internal security apparatus, potentially affecting both the security of humanitarian workers and the ability to negotiate principled access. 111.وفي بعض المجالات، تجسد هذا التخوّف باتخاذ جملة من الإجراءات من بينها السعي إلى تحييد القيادات المحلية وتركيز عملية التّحكم في العلاقات مع هذه الدوائر بين يدي الأمنيات، جهاز الأمن الداخلي المتشدّد داخل الحركة. ومن المرجّح أن تكون هذه الإجراءات قد أثرت على أمن العاملين في المجال الإنساني وعلى قدرتهم في مجال التفاوض على شروط وصول المساعدات.
In its previous report, the Monitoring Group described how the expansion of the federal architecture had created new layers of bureaucratic impediments, revenue seeking and outright diversion.111 - وفي تقريره السابق، تناول فريق الرصد بالوصف الكيفية التي جعلت توسيع نطاق الهيكل الاتحادي ينتج طبقات جديدة من العوائق البيروقراطية، ويدفع إلى تحقيق المغانم والاختلاسات الصريحة.
Those impediments had complicated and sometimes completely prevented humanitarian access (S/2014/726, para. 93).وقد أسهمت هذه القيود في تعقيد فرص وصول المساعدات الإنسانية وأحيانا في منعها بالمرّة (الوثيقة (S/2014/726، الفقرة 93).
During the current mandate, not only did those practices intensify, but the number of authorities with which the humanitarian community was required to engage rose: in addition to two new interim regional administrations, rival administrations outside the formal federalization process attempted to assert administrative legitimacy.وخلال الولاية الحالية، تكثّفت هذه الممارسات وزاد عدد السلطات التي يتعين على دوائر المساعدة الإنسانية أن تتعامل معها. وعلاوة على استحداث إدارتين إقليميتين مؤقتتين جديدتين، سعت بعض الإدارات المتنافسة خارج عملية الإطار الاتحادي إلى فرض شرعيتها الإدارية().
Efforts by competing authorities to co-opt and extract benefits from humanitarian operations compromised not only the viability of operations, resulting in the temporary closure of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but also the ability to work safely across different zones of control.وقد شكلت جهود السلطات المنافسة على منافع من العمليات الإنسانية خطرا على استمرارية هذه العمليات وقدرتها على العمل بأمان عبر مختلف مناطق السيطرة، حيث تم مؤقتا إغلاق بعض المنظمات غير الحكومية().
112. The growing number of armed actors, both Somali and foreign, engaged in the conflict against Al-Shabaab contributed to the consolidation of a security rather than acceptance and negotiation approach to expanding humanitarian access.112 - وقد أسهم العدد المتزايد للجهات الفاعلة المسلّحة، الصومالية أو الأجنبية، المشاركة في النزاع ضد حركة الشباب في توطيد الأمن بدلا من العمل بنهج القبول بالأمر الواقع والتفاوض على توسيع نطاق الحصول على المساعدات الإنسانية.
This made challenging the politicization of aid and maintaining the principle of distinction more complicated.بيد أنّ هذا الأمر قد زاد من تعقيد عملية التصدي لتسييس المعونة والحفاظ على مبدأ التفريق بين الأشياء.
Incidents of obstruction of humanitarian aid by Somali and international military forces and armed groups were reported.وأفادت التقارير بوقوع حوادث عرقلة للمعونة الإنسانية من جانب القوات العسكرية والمجموعات المسلحة الصومالية والدولية().
113. See annex 5.1 for an overview of the main challenges to humanitarian access. 114.113 - ولإلقاء نظرة على التحديات الرئيسية التي تعترض وصول المساعدات الإنسانية، يُرجى الرجوع إلى المرفق 5-1.
See annex 5.2 on the use of bureaucratic impediments and misuse of official power to obstruct humanitarian access.114 - ويمكن الرجوع أيضا إلى المرفق 5-2 المتعلق باستخدام العراقيل البيروقراطية وبإساءة استخدام السلطة في إعاقة وصول المساعدات الإنسانية.
B.باء -
Attacks on humanitarian workers 115.الهجمات على العاملين في المجال الإنساني
Against the backdrop of a more volatile and insecure context overall, threats against and attacks on humanitarian workers rose during the current mandate.115 - ضمن أجواء تتسم بمزيد من التقلّب وانعدام الأمن، سجّلت وتيرة التّهديدات والهجمات على العاملين في المجال الإنساني زيادةً خلال الولاية الحالية.
Fourteen humanitarian aid workers were killed between January and August 2015 alone, with 80 security incidents related to humanitarian operations recorded in the same period.فقد لقي 14 من هؤلاء مصرعهم خلال الفترة من كانون الثاني/يناير إلى آب/أغسطس 2015 وحدها، فيما سُجل في الفتر نفسها وقوع 80 من الحوادث الأمنية المتصلة بالعمليات الإنسانية().
116. Al-Shabaab conducted a series of direct and indirect attacks on United Nations agencies, including a horrific suicide attack on a United Nations Children’s Fund staff bus in Garowe that killed six, including four United Nations staff, and injured five others on 20 April 2015.116 - وشنّت حركة الشباب سلسلة من الهجمات المباشرة وغير المباشرة على وكالات الأمم المتحدة، بما في ذلك هجوم انتحاري مروّع استهدف حافلة لموظفي منظمة الأمم المتحدة للطفولة في غروي وأسفر عن مقتل ستة أشخاص، منهم أربعة من موظفي الأمم المتحدة، وإصابة خمسة آخرين في 20 نيسان/أبريل 2015().
The attack in Garowe marked the culmination of escalating rhetoric by Al-Shabaab against both the United Nations and international organizations.ويُشكّل هجوم غروي ذروة خطاب التّصعيد الذي انتهجته الحركة ضدّ الأمم المتحدة والمنظمات الدولية().
A few months later, Abu Ubaidah’s Eid message described the work of “opening up secure corridors to allow the destructive international agencies and organizations to spread their vices and immortality [sic] among the Muslim youth” as “among the plots of the enemies of Allah”.فقد أعلن أبو عبيدة في خطبة العيد، أي بعد بضعة أشهر من هذه الحادثة، أنّ ”فتح ممرات آمنة لكي تنشر الوكالات والمنظمات الهدامة مفاسدها في أوساط الشباب المسلم“ هو بمثابة ”أحد مؤامرات أعداء الله“().
Even prior to the Garowe attack, rising internal tensions and accompanying militarization in both Puntland and Somaliland, coupled with the increased presence and activity of Al-Shabaab and reports of hostile surveillance of United Nations installations, had led to perceptions of greater insecurity for humanitarian operations in the north-east. 117.وحتى قبل هجوم غروي، كان ارتفاع حدة التوترات الداخلية التي واكبتها عمليات تجييش في كلّ من بونتلاند وصوماليلاند، وكذا تعزيز الحركة لتواجدها ونشاطها وما جاءت به التقارير من وجود لعمليات مراقبة معادية لمنشآت الأمم المتحدة، من الأمور التي دفعت إلى الاعتقاد بأن العمليات الإنسانية في الشمال الشرقي تواجه المزيد من انعدام الأمن().
In addition to the scaling up of direct military operations in the second half of 2015, the vulnerability of humanitarian agencies was exacerbated by the need to negotiate for access with a rising number of competing military and civilian authorities.117 - وبالإضافة إلى زيادة العمليات العسكرية المباشرة في النصف الثاني من عام 2015، تفاقم ضعف الوكالات الإنسانية بسبب حاجتها إلى التفاوض مع عدد متزايد من السلطات العسكرية والمدنية على فتح سبل وصول المساعدات.
Incidents involving the use of force to disrupt humanitarian operations or divert humanitarian inputs were recorded with respect to government forces, forces associated with regional authorities, local militia and international forces.وقد تم تسجيل حوادث استُخدمت فيها القوة لتعطيل عمليات الإنسانية أو لتحويل المواد الإنسانية. وتعلقت هذه الحوادث بالقوات الحكومية، والقوات المرتبطة بالسلطات الإقليمية، والمليشيات المحلية، والقوات الدولية.
C.جيم -
Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistanceصرف المساعدة الإنسانية عن وجهتها واختلاسها
118. Diversion continues to be an intrinsic element of the humanitarian business model in Somalia, conducted through a variety of mechanisms, including budget manipulation, extortion, the manufacture of receipts and outright theft.118 - ما زالت عمليات تحويل المساعدات عن وجهتها تشكل عنصرا متأصّلا في نموذج العمل الإنساني بالصومال. وتتم هذه العمليات بآليات مختلفة منها التلاعب بالميزانية والابتزاز وتزوير الإيصالات والاختلاس الصريح.
The Monitoring Group observed similar patterns and perpetrators of diversion to that identified in its previous report, involving a spectrum of actors ranging from staff at donor headquarters to local government officials, contractors and local NGOs.ولاحظ فريق الرصد وجود أنماط من التحويل ونماذج من الفاعلين مماثلة لما لاحظه التقرير السابق. وقد انخرطت في هذه الأنماط والنماذج طائفةُ من الأطراف الفاعلة التي تشمل الموظفين في مقرات الجهات المانحة والمسؤولين الحكوميين المحليين والمتعاقدين والمنظمات غير الحكومية المحلية.
Reflecting the trajectory described in that report, the overall amount of humanitarian aid available continued to shrink against the backdrop of an estimated 3 million people still in need of essential humanitarian support in Somalia.وفي غضون ذلك، ظل المبلغ الإجمالي المتوفر للمعونة الإنسانية يتقلّص ويسير في نفس الاتجاه الذي جاء في التقرير السابق، وذلك على الرغم من وجود نحو 3 ملايين من الأشخاص الذين لا يزالا بحاجة مستمرة إلى الدعم الإنساني الأساسي في الصومال().
The rising costs of humanitarian operations as a result of access restrictions and the need to mitigate heightened security risks all added to the pressure on scarce resources. 119.أما ارتفاع تكاليف العمليات الإنسانية نتيجة للقيود المفروضة على وصول المساعدات، وضرورة التخفيف من المخاطر الأمنية، فقد كانت من العوامل التي تظافرت على زيادة الضغط على الموارد الشحيحة.
As noted by the Monitoring Group in its previous report, the emergence of new layers in the architecture of the federal State also multiplied the venues in which, under a cloak of legitimacy, diversion could be practised (S/2014/726, annex 7.1).119 - وكما لاحظ فريق الرصد في تقريره السابق، أفرزت الطبقات الجديدة التي طرأت على هيكل الدولة الاتحادية تكاثرا في الأماكن التي أصبحت تسهّل ممارسة التحويلات تحت غطاء الشرعية (الوثيقة S/2014/726، المرفق 7-1).
Those challenges became more acute in 2015 as both new regional State entities and rival administrations emerging out of a highly contested federalization process took cues from successful past revenue-seeking practice, with almost no central oversight or assertion of control (see annex 5.2). 120.وقد تفاقمت حدة هذه الصعوبات في عام 2015 بعد أن تمخضت عملية إحلال النظام الاتحادي، التي كانت موضع خلاف شديد، عن ظهور كيانات حكومية إقليمية جديدة وإدارات متنافسة تأخذُ بممارسات ناجحة سابقة لتحصيل إيرادات، ولا تكاد تخضع لأي هيئة رقابية أو سلطة مركزية (انظر المرفق 5-2).
At the same time, aid was also vulnerable to not only theft but also misuse as a political tool and in support of conflict.120 - وفي نفس الوقت، ظلّت المعونة تشكو ضعفًا حيال السّرقات والاستغلال السياسي لدعم النزاعات.
The Group received credible information that some humanitarian actors abused humanitarian principles and misused humanitarian inputs in the pursuit of clan dominance, including through the use of violence.وقد تلقى فريق الرصد معلومات موثوقة تفيد بأنّ بعض الأطراف الفاعلة الإنسانية تنتهك المبادئ الإنسانية وتستغلّ مواد المساعدات في بسط سيطرة قبيلة دون أخرى، وذلك بوسائل منها استخدام العنف.
In some communities, the allegiance of certain NGOs with particular militia/Somali National Army units was an open secret in the humanitarian community and indeed accepted as the price of access. 121.أمّا ولاء بعض المنظمات غير الحكومية لمليشيا بعينها أو لوحدة من وحدات الجيش الوطني الصومالي فليس بالأمر الخفي داخل دوائر العمل الإنساني، بل ويُعدّ أمرا مقبولا كثمن لوصول المساعدات إلى بعض المجتمعات المحلية.
The inability of the humanitarian community to grapple with the pervasiveness of aid misappropriation, which reached its high point during the famine of 2011, facilitated the perpetuation of the system.121 - أما عدم قدرة الدوائر الإنسانية على ضبط انتشار اختلاسات المعونة، التي بلغت ذروتها أيام المجاعة في عام 2011، فقد ساعد على استمرار هذه المنظومة.
Nevertheless, during the current mandate the humanitarian community sustained the progress noted in 2014 by both continuing to acknowledge the scale of diversion and enhancing risk management and diversion response mechanisms.ومع ذلك، دأبت هذه الدوائر خلال فترة الولاية الحالية على مواصلة نسق التقدم الذي لوحظ في عام 2014، حيث واصلت الإقرار بنطاق عمليات التحويل وعززت آليات إدارة مخاطر هذه العمليات ومكافحتها.
In January 2015, for example, an NGO focal point was appointed to the Risk Management Unit of the United Nations country team, permitting enhanced cooperation between the NGO and the United Nations humanitarian communities.وفي كانون الثاني/يناير 2015، على سبيل المثال، تم تعيين مركز تنسيق للمنظمات غير الحكومية داخل وحدة إدارة المخاطر التابعة لفريق الأمم المتحدة القطري، مما أتاح تعزيز التعاون بين المنظمات غير الحكومية ودوائر الأمم المتحدة للعمل الإنساني.
The deep-rooted fundamentals of the system that perpetuate diversion, however, remain to be tackled. 122.ومع ذلك، ما زال يتعيّن العمل على مواجهة الأسباب الجذرية الكامنة وراء منظومة تسريب المساعدة الإنسانية وتحويلها عن وجهتها.
See annex 5.3 for a more detailed overview of diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance, including measures to reduce diversion.122 - وانظر المرفق 5-3 للاطلاع على عرض مفصل لعمليات تحويل المساعدة الإنسانية عن مقاصدها واختلاسها، وعلى تدابير للحدّ من هذه العمليات.
IV.رابعا -
Violations of international law involving the targeting of civiliansانتهاكات القانون الدولي التي تنطوي على استهداف المدنيين
123. With an increase in the number and variety of foreign and national forces, all armed actors continued to target civilians, whether as a deliberate tactic of war or through the disproportionate use of force.١٢3 - مع الزيادة في عدد وتنوع القوات الأجنبية والوطنية، واصلت جميع الجهات الفاعلة المسلحة استهداف المدنيين، سواء بوصف ذلك تكتيكا حربيا متعمدا أو من خلال الاستخدام غير المتناسب للقوة().
Politically, economically and culturally excluded communities continued to experience the majority of violations, which reflects a deep-rooted stratification of Somali society, accentuated by the rush to assert control over resources.وظل معظم الانتهاكات من حظ الفئات المستبعدة سياسيا واقتصاديا وثقافيا، الأمر الذي يعكس الانقسام الطبقي المتجذر للمجتمع الصومالي، وزادت من حدة هذه الانتهاكات المسارعة لتأكيد السيطرة على الموارد.
A.ألف -
Targeting of civiliansاستهداف المدنيين
124. The number and complexity of armed actors in Somalia, some allied loosely against Al-Shabaab, produced a profusion of command with varying control and very little accountability, thus undermining the protection of civilians.١٢4 - ترتب على عدد وتعقيد الجهات الفاعلة المسلحة في الصومال، وبعضها مندرج في تحالف فضفاض ضد حركة الشباب، كثرة جهات القيادة وتنوع جهات السيطرة دون أن تخضع لمساءلة تُذكر، مما عصف بحماية المدنيين().
The almost complete impunity enjoyed by those forces, save in the rare context of inter-clan negotiations or a small number of prosecutions of Somali National Army and AMISOM personnel, created a fertile ground for them to continue. 125.وأوجد الإفلات شبه الكامل من العقاب التي تتمتع به هذه القوات، باستثناء السياق النادر الذي تحدث فيه مفاوضات بين العشائر أو العدد المحدود من عمليات الملاحقة القضائية لأفراد من الجيش الوطني الصومالي وبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي، تربة خصبة لاستمرار هذه الانتهاكات.
As both the fight against Al-Shabaab and the group’s grip on populations still under its control intensified, violations against civilians rose, with both sides using weapons and tactics that resulted in large civilian and military casualties.١٢5 - وبسبب ازدياد كثافة القتال ضد حركة الشباب واشتداد قبضة الحركة على السكان الذين كانوا لا يزالون خاضعين لسيطرتها، ازدادت الانتهاكات ضد المدنيين مع استخدام الجانبين لأسلحة وتكتيكات أوقعت إصابات كبيرة في صفوف المدنيين والعسكريين().
Meanwhile, other non-State actors used armed violence to assert themselves within the expanding federal architecture.وفي الوقت نفسه، استخدمت جهات أخرى من غير الدول العنف المسلح لتأكيد وجودها ضمن الهيكل الاتحادي الآخذ في الاتساع.
Al-Shabaab used, and in turn was sometimes leveraged by, those actors, for mutual benefit. 126.واستخدمت حركة الشباب هذه الجهات، التي كانت بدورها تستفيد من الحركة في بعض الأحيان، في إطار تبادل المنفعة.
As described in document S/2014/726, the political and military leadership of the federal system was also usurped to progress clan interests with the deployment of Federal Government of Somalia security forces and assets in clan fighting.١٢6 - وعلى نحو ما جرى وصفه في الوثيقة S/2014/726، فقد اغتُصبت أيضا القيادة السياسية والعسكرية للنظام الاتحادي لخدمة مصالح عشائرية من خلال نشر قوات أمنية وعتاد تابعيْن لحكومة الصومال الاتحادية للمشاركة في قتال عشائري.
Violence against civilians by the forces of the regional administrations, such as the Interim Jubba Administration, in addition to other entities, such as Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jamaʽa, in attempting to assert control over territory was also documented.وجرى أيضا توثيق أعمال عنف ضد المدنيين من جانب قوات تابعة للإدارات الإقليمية، مثل الإدارة المؤقتة في جوبا إلى جانب كيانات أخرى، مثل حركة أهل السنة والجماعة في محاولة لتأكيد السيطرة على الأراضي().
127. International forces both within and beyond the authorized AMISOM troop number also committed violence against civilians.١٢7 - كما ارتكبت القوات الدولية من داخل وخارج القوام المأذون به لبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي أعمال عنف ضد المدنيين.
With respect to AMISOM, extrajudicial killings and killing of and injury to civilians in the context of response to improvised explosive device and grenade attacks were reported.ففيما يتعلق بالبعثة الأخيرة، أبلغ عن حدوث أعمال قتل خارج نطاق القضاء وإيقاع مدنيين بين قتيل وجريح في سياق الرد على الهجمات بالعبوات الناسفة اليدوية الصنع والقنابل().
Allegations of killing, sexual and gender-based violence and other violations against civilians by the Ethiopian Liyiu police were also received by the Group, in particular in Bay, Bakol, Galgadud and Hiran.ووصلت إلى الفريق أيضا ادعاءات بوقوع أعمال قتل وعنف جنسي وجنساني وانتهاكات أخرى ضد المدنيين من جانب شرطة ”ليو“ الإثيوبية، وخاصة في مناطق باي، وبكول، وغلغدود، وهيران.
128. See annex 6.1 for an overview of the commission of violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians. 129.١28 - انظر المرفق 6-1 للاطلاع على لمحة عامة عن ارتكاب انتهاكات للقانون الدولي تنطوي على استهداف المدنيين.
See annex 6.1.a (strictly confidential) for information on the circumstances of the arrest of members of the Salaax militia.١29 - انظر المرفق 6-1- أ (السري للغاية) للاطلاع على معلومات عن ظروف إلقاء القبض على أعضاء من ميليشيا ”سَلاح“.
130. See annex 6.2.a and strictly confidential annex 6.2.b for details of violations of international law and the situation of the Bantu/Wagosha community in areas of Lower and Middle Jubba held by Al-Shabaab. 131.١30 - انظر المرفق 6-2- أ والمرفق السري للغاية 6-2- ب للاطلاع على تفاصيل انتهاكات القانون الدولي وحالة عشيرة البانتو/الواغوشا في المناطق التي تسيطر عليها حركة الشباب في جوبا السفلى وجوبا الوسطى.
See annex 6.3.a and strictly confidential annex 6.3.b for details on attacks on the villages of Kabxanley and Defow in Hiran.١٣1 - انظر المرفق 6-3- أ والمرفق السري للغاية 6-3– ب للاطلاع على تفاصيل الهجمات على قريتي كابحانلي وديفو في هيران.
B.باء -
Sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of children in armed conflict and forced displacementالعنف الجنسي والجنساني وتجنيد الأطفال واستخدامهم في النزاعات المسلحة والتشريد القسري
132. Annex 6.4 contains short summaries of the main trends in the commission of violations relating to these three areas of the mandate, in addition to addressing developments in both practice and the legal framework that tend to prevent violations and enhance compliance with the sanctions regime.١٣2 - يتضمن المرفق 6-4 ملخصات وجيزة للاتجاهات الرئيسية في ارتكاب الانتهاكات التي تندرج ضمن هذه المجالات الثلاثة من ولاية الفريق، فضلا عن تناول التطورات المستجدة على كل من الممارسة والإطار القانوني والتي تتجه إلى منع الانتهاكات وتعزيز الامتثال لنظام الجزاءات.
V.خامسا -
Arms embargo regimeنظام حظر الأسلحة
A.ألف -
Compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia with the conditions of the partial lifting of the arms embargoامتثال حكومة الصومال الاتحادية لشروط الرفع الجزئي لحظر الأسلحة
133. The partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia, introduced in resolution 2093 (2013), was extended in resolution 2182 (2014) until 30 October 2015.١٣3 - قضى القرار 2182 (2014) بتمديد الرفع الجزئي لحظر توريد الأسلحة إلى الصومال بموجب القرار 2093 (2013) حتى 30 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2015.
It exempted the Federal Government of Somalia from seeking case-by-case approval from the Committee to import weapons for its security force.وقد استثنى هذا القرار حكومة الصومال الاتحادية من السعي للحصول على موافقة اللجنة على استيراد الأسلحة لقواتها الأمنية على أساس كل حالة على حدة.
Under the terms of the partial lifting of the arms embargo, the Federal Government of Somalia is required to submit to the Committee advance notifications of the delivery of weapons or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training to government security forces.وبموجب أحكام الرفع الجزئي لحظر الأسلحة، يتعين على حكومة الصومال الاتحادية أن تقدم إلى اللجنة إخطارات مسبقة عن إيصال الأسلحة أو المعدات العسكرية أو تقديم المشورة أو المساعدة أو التدريب لقوات الأمن الحكومية.
In addition, the Federal Government of Somalia is obliged to submit biannual reports to the Security Council detailing the structure of its security forces and the infrastructure and procedures in place to ensure safe management and distribution of weapons and military equipment.وحكومة الصومال الاتحادية ملزمة أيضا بتقديم تقارير نصف سنوية إلى مجلس الأمن متضمنةً تفاصيل هيكل قواتها الأمنية والبنية التحتية والإجراءات المستخدمة لضمان الإدارة والتوزيع المأمونين للأسلحة والمعدات العسكرية.
The Council has repeatedly stressed that continuation of the partial lifting is contingent on the Government’s implementation of those requirements (resolution 2182 (2014), sixteenth preambular paragraph).وأكد المجلس مرارا أن استمرار الرفع الجزئي يتوقف على قيام الحكومة بتنفيذ هذه الاشتراطات (القرار 2182 (2014)، الفقرة السادسة عشرة من الديباجة).
134. The Monitoring Group observed tangible progress with regard to the submission of notifications and weapons and ammunition management due considerably to the efforts and energy of the Office of the National Security Adviser.١٣4 - ولاحظ فريق الرصد إحراز تقدم ملموس فيما يتعلق بتقديم الإخطارات وإدارة الأسلحة والذخيرة وهو تقدم يعزى إلى حد كبير إلى جهود مكتب مستشار الأمن القومي وهمَّته.
The quality, quantity and timeliness of advance notifications improved steadily.وتحسنت بشكل مطّرد نوعية الإخطارات المسبقة وعددها وتوقيت تقديمها.
Fulfilment of post-delivery confirmation obligations, however, remained elusive.إلا أن الوفاء بالالتزامات المتعلقة بالتأكد مما تم بعد التسليم لا يزال بعيد المنال().
The commencement of the marking and registration of Federal Government of Somalia imports and of weapons held by private security companies represented the most significant development.ويمثل البدء في وسم وتسجيل واردات حكومة الصومال الاتحادية والأسلحة التي في حوزة شركات الأمن الخاصة، أهم تطور في مجال إدارة الأسلحة والذخيرة.
Significant gaps remain, however, in ensuring tracking of weaponry and equipment, particularly after their initial distribution to the security forces.ومع ذلك، لا تزال هناك ثغرات كبيرة في كفالة تتبع الأسلحة والمعدات، ولا سيما بعد توزيعها مبدئيا على قوات الأمن.
In this regard, international assistance is greatly needed to initiate the comprehensive weapons and ammunition management project developed by the Federal Government of Somalia.وفي هذا الصدد، توجد حاجة قوية إلى المساعدة الدولية من أجل بدء المشروع الشامل لإدارة الأسلحة والذخيرة الذي وضعته حكومة الصومال الاتحادية.
135. Reports of the Federal Government of Somalia pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) were transmitted on time.١٣5 - وقد أحيلت في الموعد المحدد تقارير حكومة الصومال الاتحادية المقدمة عملا بالفقرة 9 من القرار 2182 (2014).
However, the Group is concerned that, despite the efforts to outline the security structure of the Federal Government of Somalia in its previous report, the Government has not provided a clear picture of the composition and strength of security forces, including allied militia.ومع ذلك، يشعر الفريق بالقلق من أنه رغم الجهود المبذولة في تحديد الهيكل الأمني لحكومة الصومال الاتحادية في تقريرها السابق، فإن الحكومة لم تقدم صورة واضحة عن تكوين قوات الأمن وقوامها، بما في ذلك الميليشيات الموالية لها.
In particular, the Somali National Army leadership has systematically sought to inflate the number of serving troops.ويذكر من ذلك على وجه الخصوص أن قيادة الجيش الوطني الصومالي دأبت على السعي لتضخيم عدد أفراد القوات العاملة().
136. The partial lifting of the arms embargo was granted, inter alia, to help the Federal Government of Somalia to develop and equip its security forces to confront Al-Shabaab.١٣6 - وقد تمت الموافقة على الرفع الجزئي لحظر الأسلحة تحقيقا لأغراض منها مساعدة حكومة الصومال الاتحادية على تطوير قواتها الأمنية وتجهيزها لمواجهة حركة الشباب.
Data collected from advance notifications to the Committee indicates that Government security forces were expected to have received more than 17,500 weapons and almost 9 million rounds of ammunition since the partial lifting of the arms embargo.وتشير البيانات التي جمعت من الإخطارات المسبقة التي ووفيت بها اللجنة إلى أن قوات الأمن الحكومية يتوقع أن تكون قد تلقت أكثر من 500 17 قطعة سلاح وزهاء 9 ملايين طلقة من الذخيرة منذ الرفع الجزئي لحظر الأسلحة().
The Monitoring Group, however, continues to receive reports that Federal Government of Somalia security forces remain ill-equipped to confront Al-Shabaab effectively.ومع ذلك، ما برحت ترد إلى فريق الرصد تقارير تفيد بأن قوات الأمن التابعة لحكومة الصومال الاتحادية ما زالت غير مجهزة بالصورة الملائمة لمواجهة حركة الشباب بصورة فعالة.
The lack of information on the distribution of imported weapons limits the Group’s ability to assess whether they are being used appropriately and effectively.ويحدُّ نقص المعلومات المتعلقة بتوزيع الأسلحة المستوردة من قدرة الفريق على تقييم ما إذا كان يجري استخدامها على نحو مناسب وفعال.
B.باء -
Obligations of Member States and regional and international organizationsالتزامات الدول الأعضاء والمنظمات الإقليمية والدولية
137. On a number of occasions, Member States and international organizations providing support to security sector institutions not under the Federal Government of Somalia have failed to appropriately notify the Committee of supplies of weapons or military equipment and technical assistance or training pursuant to paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 2111 (2013).١٣7 - لم تقم، في عدد من الحالات، دولٌ أعضاء ومنظمات دولية تقدم الدعم لمؤسسات في قطاع الأمن غير تابعة لحكومة الصومال الاتحادية بإخطار اللجنة على النحو المناسب بإمدادات الأسلحة أو المعدات العسكرية والمساعدة التقنية أو التدريب عملا بالفقرة 11 (أ) من القرار 2111 (2013).
In some instances, this can be attributed to confusion regarding the scope of paragraph 11 (a), including to which security actors and in respect of which materiel and assistance it applies.ويمكن أن يعزى ذلك في بعض الحالات إلى الالتباس بشأن نطاق الفقرة 11 (أ)، بما في ذلك، على أي قطاعات الأمن وفيما يتعلق بأي عتاد ومساعدة تنطبق الفقرة.
The development of parallel regional security structures outside the command of the Federal Government of Somalia requires careful consideration and greater Committee oversight, and a more precise understanding of the scope of “Somali security sector institutions” will need to evolve.ويتطلب إنشاء هياكل أمنية إقليمية موازية خارج قيادة حكومة الصومال الاتحادية دراسة متأنية ورقابة أكبر من جانب اللجنة، وسيلزم بلورة فهم أدق لنطاق ”مؤسسات قطاع الأمن الصومالية“().
C.جيم -
Standing exemptions from the arms embargoالاستثناءات الدائمة من حظر الأسلحة
138. The Security Council granted several standing exemptions from the arms embargo that apply to the supply of certain materiel to specific entities and for particular purposes.١٣8 - وافق مجلس الأمن على عدة استثناءات دائمة من حظر الأسلحة تنطبق على توريد بعض العتاد إلى كيانات محددة ولأغراض معينة().
Although that system enables the smooth operation of AMISOM, the European Union Training Mission in Somalia, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), AMISOM “strategic partners” and others, it also creates a blind spot in the Committee’s oversight of arms flows.ورغم أن هذا النظام يتيح التشغيل السلس لبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي وبعثة التدريب التابعة للاتحاد الأوروبي في الصومال وبعثة الأمم المتحدة في الصومال والشركاء ”الاستراتيجيين“ لبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي وغيرهم، فإنه يوجِد أيضا مواضع تغيب عنها مراقبة اللجنة لتدفقات الأسلحة.
Indications that some of the armed forces involved in the most recent anti-Al-Shabaab offensive did not operate fully under the AMISOM concept of operations heightens that concern.ومما يزيد من حدة هذا القلق وجود دلائل على أن بعض القوات المسلحة التي شاركت في أحدث هجوم على حركة الشباب لم تكن تعمل بشكل كامل ضمن مفهوم عمليات بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي.
D.دال -
Documentation of captured weaponry and military equipmentتوثيق الأسلحة والمعدات العسكرية المصادرة
139. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 2182 (2014), Federal Government of Somalia security forces and AMISOM are required to document and register all military equipment captured during offensive operations and to facilitate inspection by the Group before its redistribution or destruction.١٣9 - توجِب الفقرة 6 من قرار مجلس الأمن 2182 (2014) على قوات الأمن التابعة لحكومة الصومال الاتحادية وبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي توثيق وتسجيل جميع المعدات العسكرية التي تصادَر أثناء العمليات الهجومية وتيسير فحص الفريق لها قبل إعادة توزيعها أو تدميرها.
The Federal Government of Somalia provided the Group with information on four caches of weapons and other military materiel seized and received training in the identification and tracking of captured weaponry.وقد زودت حكومة الصومال الاتحادية الفريق بمعلومات عن أربعة مخابئ للأسلحة والأعتدة العسكرية الأخرى المصادرة وتلقت تدريبا على تحديد الأسلحة المصادرة وتتبعها.
Despite the issuance of directives to sector commanders, AMISOM was unable to document and facilitate the transfer of information on seizures and has requested further advice and assistance from the Group.ولم تستطع بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي، رغم إصدارها أوامر توجيهية لقادة القطاعات، توثيق وتيسير نقل معلومات عن الأسلحة والأعتدة المصادرة وطلبت المزيد من المشورة والمساعدة من الفريق.
Effective implementation of paragraph 6 of the resolution will require the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM to agree on various responsibilities.وسيتطلب التنفيذ الفعال للفقرة 6 من القرار أن تتفق حكومة الصومال الاتحادية وبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي على مسؤوليات شتى().
Troop-contributing countries should direct their AMISOM contingents to comply with directives issued by force headquarters.وينبغي أن تصدر البلدان المساهمة بقوات تعليمات لوحداتها المشاركة في بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي بأن تمتثل للأوامر التوجيهية الصادرة عن مقر قيادة القوة.
The Council could consider expanding such reporting to the variety of other forces engaged in the conflict with Al-Shabaab in territories beyond the reach of AMISOM and Federal Government of Somalia security forces.ويمكن للمجلس أن ينظر في توسيع نطاق هذا النوع من الإبلاغ ليشمل تشكيلة القوات الأخرى المشاركة في مقاتلة حركة الشباب في المناطق الخارجة عن نطاق سيطرة بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي وقوات الأمن التابعة لحكومة الصومال الاتحادية.
E.هاء -
Implementation of paragraphs 10 and 15 of resolution 2182 (2014)تنفيذ الفقرتين 10 و 15 من القرار 2182 (2014)
140. In paragraph 10 of resolution 2182 (2014), the Council requested the Federal Government of Somalia and the Monitoring Group to work together to formulate a proposal to provide for an exemption to the arms embargo for weapons on board vessels engaged in commercial activity in Somali territorial waters and Somali ports.١40 - في الفقرة 10 من القرار 2182 (2014)، طلب المجلس إلى حكومة الصومال الاتحادية وفريق الرصد العمل معا من أجل صياغة مقترح ينص على أن تستثنى الأسلحة الموجودة على متن السفن التي تمارس نشاطا تجاريا في المياه الإقليمية والموانئ الصومالية من الحظر المفروض على توريد الأسلحة.
During the mandate, the Federal Government of Somalia and the Group shared preliminary views on the proposal and made submissions to the Council. 141.وفي أثناء فترة الولاية، أبدت حكومة الصومال الاتحادية والفريق آراءهما الأولية بشأن المقترح وقدم كل منهما بيانا بهذا الشأن إلى المجلس.
In paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014), the Council authorized Member States, under certain circumstances, to interdict vessels believed to be carrying weapons and military equipment in Somali territorial waters and on the high seas.١٤1 - وفي الفقرة 15 من القرار 2182 (2014)، أذن المجلس للدول الأعضاء بأن تقوم، في ظروف معينة، باعتراض السفن التي يعتقد أنها تنقل أسلحة ومعدات عسكرية في مياه الصومال الإقليمية وفي أعالي البحار.
The Monitoring Group was not informed of any arms-related interdictions during the mandate.ولم يبلَغ فريق الرصد بأي اعتراض متصل بالأسلحة تم أثناء فترة هذه الولاية.
F.واو -
Violations of the arms embargoانتهاكات حظر الأسلحة
142. Violations of the arms embargo continue to be committed in Somalia, whether through the illegal sale or unauthorized distribution of weapons from Federal Government of Somalia stocks or through illegal imports.١٤2 - لا تزال انتهاكات حظر الأسلحة ترتكب في الصومال، سواء من خلال البيع غير المشروع أو التوزيع غير المأذون به للأسلحة من مخزونات حكومة الصومال الاتحادية أو عن طريق الواردات غير المشروعة.
The environment for illegal weapons flows has been exacerbated by the market created by the conflict in Yemen and increased militarization in parts of Somalia over the course of the mandate.وتفاقمت أجواء تدفقات الأسلحة غير المشروعة بفعل السوق التي أوجدها النزاع في اليمن وبسبب زيادة عسكرة المجتمع في أنحاء من الصومال خلال فترة الولاية.
143. Annex 7.1 provides an overview of developments relating to weapons and ammunition management in Somalia, including as a condition of the partial lifting of the arms embargo. 144.143 - ويتضمن المرفق 7-1 لمحة عامة عن التطورات المتعلقة بإدارة الأسلحة والذخيرة في الصومال، بما في ذلك باعتبارها شرطا من شروط الرفع الجزئي للحظر.
Annex 7.2 provides an assessment of compliance with notification obligations by the Federal Government of Somalia, Member States and international organizations under the arms embargo and the partial lifting thereof. 145.١٤4 - ويحتوي المرفق 7-2 على تقييم لمدى امتثال حكومة الصومال الاتحادية والدول الأعضاء والمنظمات الدولية للالتزامات المتعلقة بالإخطار في إطار حظر الأسلحة والرفع الجزئي للحظر.
Annex 7.3 provides an analysis of compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia with its reporting requirements under the partial lifting of the arms embargo.١٤5 - ويعرض المرفق 7-3 تحليلا لامتثال حكومة الصومال الاتحادية لمتطلبات الإبلاغ الواقعة عليها بموجب الرفع الجزئي لحظر الأسلحة.
146. Annex 7.4 details compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM with obligations relating to captured weaponry and military equipment. 147.١٤6 - ويتناول المرفق 7-4 بالتفصيل امتثال حكومة الصومال الاتحادية وبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي للالتزامات المتعلقة بالأسلحة والمعدات العسكرية المصادرة.
Annex 7.5 provides an assessment of the implementation of paragraphs 10 and 15 of resolution 2182 (2014).١٤7 - ويرد في المرفق 7-5 تقييم لتنفيذ الفقرتين 10 و 15 من القرار 2182 (2014).
148. Annex 7.6 provides details on international assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia to enhance compliance.١٤8 - ويتضمن المرفق 7-6 تفاصيل عن المساعدة الدولية المقدمة إلى حكومة الصومال الاتحادية بشأن تعزيز الامتثال.
VI.سادسا -
Violations of the ban on charcoalانتهاكات حظر الفحم
149. During its mandate, the Monitoring Group has documented the continuing export of charcoal from southern Somalia.١٤9 - وثّق فريق الرصد خلال فترة ولايته استمرار تصدير الفحم من جنوب الصومال.
The implementation of the ban, the displacement of Al-Shabaab from export sites along the southern coast of Somalia from Barawe to Kamboni on the Kenyan border and the emergence of new political and business arrangements in the region have all affected the political economy of the trade.وقد تأثر الاقتصاد السياسي لهذه التجارة بفعل تطبيق الحظر وإزاحة حركة الشباب عن مواقع تصديره على الساحل الجنوبي للصومال - من براوه إلى كامبوني على الحدود الكينية - وظهور ترتيبات سياسية وتجارية جديدة في المنطقة.
The cumulative effect has been an overall reduction in exports of charcoal from southern Somalia and a decline in the revenue gained from the trade by Al-Shabaab.وتمثّل الأثر المتراكم لذلك في انخفاض عام لصادرات الفحم من جنوب الصومال وتقلُّص الإيرادات التي تجنيها الحركة من هذه التجارة.
A.ألف -
Production and export of charcoal in southern Somaliaإنتاج وتصدير الفحم في جنوب الصومال
150. In the immediate aftermath of the recovery of Barawe, Lower Shabelle, from Al-Shabaab early in October 2014, members of the caretaker administration, together with the Somali National Army and the Uganda People’s Defence Force contingent of AMISOM, permitted the commencement of exports of charcoal stockpiled in the city.١50 - فور استعادة مدينة براوه، بمحافظة شبيلي السفلى، من حركة الشباب في مطلع تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2014، أذن أعضاء حكومة تصريف الأعمال بالاشتراك مع الجيش الوطني الصومالي والوحدة التابعة لقوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية في بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي ببدء تصدير الفحم المكدس في المدينة.
Satellite imagery taken at the time shows the rapid depletion of stocks and the presence of multiple dhows docked and awaiting cargo until late November, when activity ceased.وتظهر الصور الساتلية الملتقطة آنذاك سرعة نفاد المخزونات ووجود مراكب شراعية متعددة راسية ظلت تنتظر الحمولة حتى توقُّف النشاط في أواخر تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر().
On 23 November, local government and security officials were arrested and taken to Mogadishu.وفي 23 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر، قُبض على مسؤولين حكوميين وأمنيين محليين ونُقلوا إلى مقديشيو.
Since late November, evidence collected by the Group, including regularly updated satellite imagery and aerial surveillance of the city’s port and stockpiles, suggests that charcoal trade in Barawe and the surrounding area has stopped. 151.إلا أن الأدلة التي جمعها الفريق منذ أواخر تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر، بما فيها الصور الساتلية المحدَّثة بانتظام والرصد الجوي لميناء المدينة ومخزوناتها، تشير إلى أن تجارة الفحم في براوه والمنطقة المحيطة بها قد توقفت.
Production continues in the Lower and Middle Jubba regions, with the former largely under the authority of the Interim Jubba Administration and the latter remaining largely under the control of Al-Shabaab.١51 - ولا يزال إنتاج الفحم مستمرا في منطقتي جوبا السفلى وجوبا الوسطى، علما بأن المنطقة الأولى تسيطر على معظمها إدارة جوبا المؤقتة ولا تزال المنطقة الأخرى تسيطر على معظمها حركة الشباب.
Although the actors controlling the trade and export in Kismayo remain largely unchanged since the Group’s previous report (see S/2014/726, annex 9.1), export procedures have changed.ورغم أن الجهات التي تسيطر على التجارة والتصدير في كيسمايو لا تزال على حالها إلى حد كبير منذ التقرير السابق للفريق (انظر S/2014/726، المرفق 9-1)، فقد تغيرت إجراءات التصدير.
The city’s central stockpile, situated adjacent to the road leading from the airport to the centre of the city and in clear view of all visiting delegations to the city, is no longer used.ولم يعد يُستخدم المخزون المركزي للمدينة المتاخم للطريق المؤدية من المطار إلى وسط المدينة والذي يظهر جليا أمام جميع الوفود التي تزور المدينة.
Satellite imagery suggests increasing use of the city’s southern stockpile and dwindling use of its northern stockpile.وتشير الصور الساتلية إلى تزايد استخدام المخزون الجنوبي للمدينة وتضاؤل استخدام مخزونها الشمالي().
Charcoal is now rarely loaded onto vessels at Kismayo port but instead loaded by hand at Alanley beach into small fishing boats and then unloaded onto awaiting larger dhows in the bay area.ونادرا ما يجري الآن تحميل الفحم على سفن راسية في ميناء كيسمايو ولكن يتم تحميله بدلا من ذلك يدويا في شاطئ ألانلي على مراكب صيد صغيرة تفرغ حمولتها بعد ذلك في مراكب شراعية أكبر تنتظرها في منطقة الثغر البحري().
The process is significantly less efficient but can be disrupted with immediate effect, leaving less evidence of the trade.وهي عملية أقل كفاءة بكثير ولكن يمكن تعطيلها فورا فتقل بذلك الأدلة على وجود تجارة في الفحم.
Satellite imagery suggests a significant expansion of export operations from the town of Buur Gaabo, approximately 125 km south-west of Kismayo, early in 2015, with considerable stockpiles and indeed cargo dhows still present in September 2015.وتشير الصور الساتلية إلى حدوث توسع كبير في عمليات التصدير من بلدة بور غابو الواقعة على بعد 125 كيلومترا تقريبا إلى الجنوب الغربي من كيسمايو في أوائل عام 2015، واستمرار وجود مخزونات ضخمة بل ومراكب نقل شراعية في أيلول/سبتمبر 2015.
The Monitoring Group has not yet been able to confirm who controls the trade and export in Buur Gaabo. 152.ولم يتمكن فريق الرصد حتى الآن من التأكد من الجهة أو الجهات التي تسيطر على التجارة والتصدير في بور غابو.
Al-Shabaab’s overall role in and revenue from the charcoal trade has reduced since its loss of all export sites.١٥2 - وقد تقلص دور حركة الشباب إجمالا في تجارة الفحم وما تجنيه من إيرادات منها منذ فقدانها جميع مواقع التصدير().
Businesses previously reported to have played a prominent role in the export of charcoal and maintained ties with Al-Shabaab, including Ali Naaji and Hassan Mohamed Yusuf “Awlibaax” (see S/2014/726, paras. 141-143), are reported to have maintained their dominance in the trade over the course of the mandate.ونقلت التقارير أن الجهات التجارية التي سبق الإبلاغ عن أنها أدت دورا بارزا في تصدير الفحم وظلت على صلاتها بحركة الشباب، بما فيها علي ناجي وحسن محمد يوسف ”أو - لباح“ (انظر S/2014/726، الفقرات 141-143)، ظلت هي المهيمنة على تجارة الفحم خلال فترة هذه الولاية.
Evidence collected by the Monitoring Group, however, suggests that the ties between those controlling the trade in Kismayo and elements of Al-Shabaab in Lower and Middle Jubba have been strained over the past year.إلا أن الأدلة التي جمعها فريق الرصد تشير إلى أن الصلات بين الجهات التي تهيمن على التجارة في كيسمايو وعناصر حركة الشباب في جوبا السفلى وجوبا الوسطى قد طرأ عليها توتر خلال العام الماضي.
In January 2015, senior Al-Shabaab officials are reported to have called for the closure of charcoal production sites in Lower and Middle Jubba.فقد نقلت التقارير أن مسؤولين كبارا بالحركة طالبوا في كانون الثاني/يناير 2015 بإغلاق مواقع إنتاج الفحم في جوبا السفلى وجوبا الوسطى.
In the following months, charcoal producers were arrested by the group, and many of those found carrying charcoal along the major supply routes were executed and their vehicles burned along with their cargo.وألقت الجماعة في الأشهر التالية القبض على منتجين للفحم وأُعدم كثير ممن ضبطوا يحملون الفحم على طرق الإمداد الرئيسية وأُحرقت مركباتهم وحمولتها.
During that period, suppliers were forced to use smaller minibus-type vehicles and back roads to avoid detection by Al-Shabaab on the major supply routes.واضطُر الموردون خلال هذه الفترة إلى استخدام مركبات أصغر حجما في شكل حافلات صغيرة وإلى سلك طرق خلفية لتجنب اكتشاف الحركة لهم على طرق الإمداد الرئيسية.
Unconfirmed reports indicate that an agreement on the distribution of taxation collected from charcoal at the export sites fell apart when Ahmed “Madobe” withheld Al-Shabaab’s shares of export proceeds early in 2015 in preparation for the formation of the Jubba Regional Assembly in April and May 2015.وتشير أنباء غير مؤكدة إلى أن اتفاقا على توزيع الضرائب المحصلة عن الفحم في مواقع التصدير قد انهار عندما حجب الرئيس أحمد مذوبيه نصيب حركة الشباب في حصيلة التصدير في أوائل عام 2015 استعدادا لتشكيل مجلس جوبا الإقليمي في نيسان/أبريل وأيار/مايو 2015.
The withholding of funds due to Al-Shabaab prompted the blockade on charcoal to the city, which may also partly explain the significant expansion of operations in Buur Gaabo.وأدى حجب نصيب الحركة من الأموال إلى فرض حصار على الفحم في المدينة وهو أمر ربما يعزى إليه جزئيا أيضا التوسع الكبير للعمليات في بور غابو().
153. While the Monitoring Group has received some support from the Federal Government of Somalia in its investigations into the charcoal trade in southern Somalia, no apparent efforts have been made by either the Interim Jubba Administration or local contingents of AMISOM to implement or report on the ban, supporting the Group’s assertion that both continue to be actively engaged in and profiting from the trade.١٥3 - ومع أن الفريق قد تلقى بعض الدعم من حكومة الصومال الاتحادية في التحقيقات التي أجراها في تجارة الفحم في جنوب الصومال، لا يبدو أن إدارة جوبا المؤقتة أو الوحدات المحلية في بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي قد بذلت جهودا لتنفيذ الحظر أو الإبلاغ عنه، الأمر الذي يؤيد تأكيد الفريق أن كليهما ما زالا يشاركان بنشاط في هذه التجارة ويجنيان أرباحا منها.
B.باء -
Maritime interdiction and vessel trackingالاعتراض البحري وتتبع السفن
154. On 7 May 2014, the Committee issued implementation assistance notice No. 1, which contained recommendations on interdiction of charcoal from Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolutions 2036 (2012), 2060 (2012) and 2111 (2013).١٥4 - في 7 أيار/مايو 2014، أصدرت اللجنة مذكرة المساعدة على التنفيذ رقم 1 التي تضمنت توصيات بشأن اعتراض الفحم الوارد من الصومال عملا بقرارات مجلس الأمن 2036 (2012) و 2060 (2012) و 2111 (2013).
In paragraph 15 of its resolution 2182 (2014), the Council authorized, for a period of 12 months, Member States, acting nationally or through voluntary multinational naval partnerships, to inspect vessels that they had reasonable grounds to believe were carrying charcoal from Somalia in violation of the ban.وقد أذن المجلس للدول الأعضاء، في الفقرة 15 من قراره 2182 (2014)، بأن تقوم لمدة 12 شهرا، متصرفةً بصفتها الوطنية أو من خلال شراكات بحرية طوعية متعددة الجنسيات، بتفتيش السفن التي تكون لديها أسباب معقولة للاعتقاد بأنها تحمل فحما من الصومال في انتهاك للحظر.
Uptake of action in line with the proposed interdiction of vessels believed to carry charcoal was slow but has, over the course of the mandate, resulted in a perceptible deterrent effect in the absence of any successful land-based approaches to the implementation of the ban on charcoal.ورغم أن الإجراءات المتخذة تمشيا مع الاعتراض المقترح للسفن التي يعتقد أنها تحمل فحما كانت بطيئة، فإنها خلفت خلال فترة هذه الولاية تأثيرا رادعا ملموسا في غيبة أي نُهج برية ناجحة لتطبيق حظر الفحم.
Intelligence shared by the Combined Maritime Forces with the Monitoring Group led to the successful interception of the MSV Raj Milan (MMSI 419956307) at Port Rashid in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, with support from United Arab Emirates authorities.وأدت المعلومات الاستخبارية التي أطلعت القوات البحرية المشتركة فريق الرصد عليها إلى النجاح في اعتراض السفينة MSV Raj Milan (MMSI 419956307) في ميناء راشد بدبي، الإمارات العربية المتحدة، بدعم من السلطات الإماراتية().
The issue of the disposal of seized charcoal, the absence of legal follow-through, and the difficulties in identifying a State willing to accept diverted ships have, however, hampered initial efforts to operationalize maritime interdiction.إلا أن الجهود الأولية الرامية إلى تطبيق الاعتراض البحري قد عرقلتها مسألة التصرف في الكميات المضبوطة من الفحم وعدم وجود متابعة قانونية حتى النهاية والصعوبات التي تكتنف تحديد دولة لديها استعداد لقبول السفن المحولة عن مسارها.
Minimizing the interaction between the naval forces and the vessels carrying charcoal remains critical for an effective implementation of the charcoal ban.وما زال تقليل التواصل بين القوات البحرية والسفن التي تحمل الفحم أمرا بالغ الأهمية للتطبيق الفعال لحظر الفحم.
155. The monitoring of vessels believed or known to be carrying charcoal has been complicated by growing efforts to avoid detection.١٥5 - وقد تعقدت مهمة رصد السفن المعتقد أو المعلوم أنها تحمل فحما بفعل الجهود المتزايدة المبذولة لتفادي اكتشافها.
Decreasing use of automatic identification system transmitters by the dhows carrying cargo to and from southern Somalia renders it impossible to monitor the movements of most vessels using dedicated tracking software.ويؤدي الاستخدام المتناقص لأجهزة إرسال النظام الأوتوماتي لتحديد هوية السفن من قِبل السفن الشراعية التي تحمل بضائع من جنوب الصومال وإليها إلى استحالة رصد تحركات معظم السفن باستخدام برامجيات التتبع الموضوعة خصيصا لذلك().
The inability of both local sources on land and intelligence sources at sea to identify vessel names suggests systematic attempts to mask physical identifying features as well.ويشير عجز كل من المصادر المحلية على البر والمصادر الاستخبارية في البحر عن تحديد أسماء السفن إلى وجود محاولات ممنهجة لإخفاء السمات المادية الكاشفة عن هوية السفن أيضا.
Without that information, it is not possible to intercept vessels known to be carrying charcoal from Somalia when they reach their port of unloading.ولا سبيل بغير هذه المعلومات إلى اعتراض السفن المعلوم أنها تحمل فحما من الصومال عندما تصل إلى ميناء التفريغ.
C.جيم -
Falsified documentationاستخدام وثائق مزيفة
156. Upon arrival at Port Rashid, the MSV Raj Milan was found to be in possession of documentation suggesting that its cargo had originated from the Comoros.١٥6 - عندما وصلت السفينة MSV Raj Milan إلى ميناء راشد، تبين أن بحوزتها وثائق تفيد بأن حمولتها آتية من اتحاد جزر القمر.
The prevalent use of falsified documents for charcoal cargo was detailed in the Monitoring Group’s previous report (see S/2014/726, annex 9.4).وقد تناول التقرير السابق لفريق الرصد بالتفصيل انتشار استخدام وثائق مزيفة لحمولات الفحم (انظر S/2014/726، المرفق 9-4).
With the growing challenges to identifying vessels both on land and at sea and tracking vessels by means of automatic identification system transmissions, during the current mandate the Monitoring Group sought to verify the extent of falsified documentation by cross-referencing Member State import and export data.وفي ضوء التحديات المتزايدة التي تحف بتحديد هوية السفن في كل من البر والبحر وتتبع السفن عن طريق إرسال إشارات النظام الأوتوماتي لتحديد هوية السفن، سعى فريق الرصد في فترة الولاية الحالية إلى أن يتحقق من مدى تزييف الوثائق عن طريق الرجوع إلى بيانات واردات وصادرات الدول الأعضاء().
157. According to data shared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, more than 142 million kg of charcoal were imported from Somalia in 2011 (96 per cent of total imports) and almost 122 million kg (79 per cent of total imports) the following year, when the ban was imposed.١٥7 - ووفقا لبيانات قدمتها وزارة خارجية الإمارات العربية المتحدة، فقد جرى استيراد ما يزيد على 142 مليون كيلوغرام من الفحم من الصومال في عام 2011 (بنسبة 96 في المائة من مجموع الواردات) و 122 مليون كيلوغرام تقريبا (79 في المائة من مجموع الواردات) في العام التالي الذي فُرض فيه الحظر().
In 2013 and 2014 the data show that no charcoal was imported from Somalia.وتشير البيانات إلى أنه لم يتم استيراد فحم من الصومال في عامي 2013 و 2014.
158. According to the same data, imports of charcoal from Kenya rose from 175,000 kg in 2012 to more than 80 million kg in 2013 and 12 million kg in 2014. 159.١٥8 - واستنادا إلى البيانات نفسها، زادت واردات الفحم من كينيا من 000 175 كيلوغرام في عام 2012، إلى أكثر من 80 مليون كيلوغرام في عام 2013، ثم تقلصت إلى 12 مليون كيلوغرام في عام 2014.
Imports of charcoal from the Comoros rose from zero in 2011, 2012 and 2013 to more than 12 million kg in 2014.١٥9 - وزادت واردات الفحم من اتحاد جزر القمر من لا شيء في الأعوام 2011 و 2012 و 2013 إلى أكثر من 12 مليون كيلوغرام في عام 2014.
The Monitoring Group requested confirmation of exports from the Comoros to the United Arab Emirates but did not receive a response.وطلب فريق الرصد تأكيدا لصادرات اتحاد جزر القمر إلى الإمارات العربية المتحدة ولكنه لم يتلق أي رد.
160. Imports of charcoal from Djibouti rose from zero in 2011 to almost 13 million kg in 2012, more than 22 million kg in 2013 and almost 41 million kg in 2014.١60 - وزادت واردات الفحم من جيبوتي من لا شيء في عام 2011 إلى 13 مليون كيلوغرام تقريبا في عام 2012، ثم إلى أكثر من 22 مليون كيلوغرام في عام 2013، وما يقرب من 41 مليون كيلوغرام في عام 2014.
The Monitoring Group met with Djibouti port authorities on 21 May 2014 and was informed categorically that charcoal was not exported from Djibouti to any country.واجتمع فريق الرصد مع سلطات الموانئ الجيبوتية في 21 أيار/مايو 2014 وأُبلغ بشكل قاطع أن الفحم لا يصدَّر من جيبوتي إلى أي بلد.
161. As identifying and tracking vessels transporting Somali charcoal grows increasingly difficult, cooperation with Member States grows increasingly imperative.١61 - وبالنظر إلى أن تزايد صعوبة تحديد وتتبع السفن التي تنقل الفحم الصومالي، فإن التعاون مع الدول الأعضاء يغدو بشكل متزايد أمرا لا بد منه.
The apparent endemic use of falsified documentation can be addressed only with support from Member States, which will enable cross-referencing of export and import data and permit the Monitoring Group to investigate significant discrepancies and the individuals and entities responsible for them.ولا يمكن إلا بدعم من الدول الأعضاء التصدي لاستخدام الوثائق المزيفة الذي صار كالوباء فيما يبدو، بحيث يتسنى الرجوع إلى بيانات الصادرات والواردات ويتاح لفريق الرصد أن يحقق في حالات التضارب الهامة ويتحرى عن الأفراد والكيانات المسؤولين عنها.
VII.سابعا -
State and non-State cooperation with the Monitoring Group 162.تعاون الدول والجهات من غير الدول مع فريق الرصد
In the course of its mandate, the Monitoring Group received encouraging support from the Federal Government of Somalia and representatives of its institutions.١٦2 - تلقى الفريق، خلال فترة ولايته، دعما مشجِّعا من حكومة الصومال الاتحادية وممثلي مؤسساتها.
The Group held regular and open discussions on a number of sensitive issues with its two focal points, the National Security Adviser to the President of Somalia, Abdirahman Sheik Issa, and the Minister of Finance, Mohamed Aden Ibrahim.وأجرى الفريق مناقشات منتظمة وصريحة بشأن عدد من القضايا الحساسة مع منسقي الحكومة، مستشار الأمن القومي للرئيس الصومالي، عبد الرحمن شيخ عيسى، ووزير المالية، محمد آدم إبراهيم.
The Minister of the Interior and Federal Affairs, Abdirahman Mohamed Hussein “Odowaa”, and the Central Bank Governor, Bashir Issa, also supported investigations providing the Group with substantive and detailed responses to its requests for information.ودعم التحقيقات أيضا وزير الداخلية والشؤون الاتحادية، عبد الرحمن محمد حسين ”أدواه“ ومحافظ البنك المركزي، بشير عيسى، اللذين استجابا لطلبات تقديم المعلومات المقدمة من الفريق بردود مفصلة وفي صُلب الموضوع.
163. In its investigations with regard to the Al-Shabaab threat, the Group received limited cooperation from the Government of Kenya and its security services.١٦3 - أما فيما يتعلق بتحقيقات الفريق بشأن التهديد الذي تشكله حركة الشباب، فقد تلقى تعاونا محدودا من حكومة كينيا وأجهزتها الأمنية.
The Monitoring Group hopes to strengthen these relations in its next mandate.ويأمل الفريق في تعزيز هذه العلاقات في فترة الولاية المقبلة.
164. The Monitoring Group has limited interaction with the Somaliland authorities.١٦4 - وهناك تواصل محدود بين فريق الرصد والسلطات في صوماليلاند.
Contacts were established with the Director of Intelligence in the light of investigations related to the Al-Shabaab threat.وأقيمت اتصالات مع مدير المخابرات في ضوء التحقيقات المتصلة بالتهديد الذي تشكله حركة الشباب.
The Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested the Group’s cooperation and had e-mail exchanges with the Group on the creation of an oil protection unit. 165.وطلبت وزارة خارجية صوماليلاند تعاون الفريق فيما يتعلق بإنشاء وحدة لحماية النفط وتبادلت معه رسائل بالبريد الإلكتروني بهذا الشأن.
United Arab Emirates authorities responded to official correspondence on a regular basis and facilitated the inspection of the MSV Raj Milan in Port Rashid.١٦5 - وكانت الإمارات العربية المتحدة ترد بانتظام على الرسائل الرسمية ويسرت تفتيش السفينة MSV Raj Milan في ميناء راشد.
However, repeated requests for import documentation, required to investigate the extent of false documentation used in the charcoal trade, were ignored.غير أن الطلبات المتكررة للحصول على وثائق استيراد مطلوبة للتحقيق في مدى استخدام وثائق مزيفة في تجارة الفحم قد قوبلت بالتجاهل.
The conclusions and findings from the official investigation of United Arab Emirates authorities into the MSV Raj Milan and its consignee have yet to be shared with the Group. 166.ولم يتم إطلاع الفريق بعدُ على الخلاصات والنتائج التي توصل إليها التحقيق الرسمي الذي أجرته سلطات الإمارات العربية المتحدة بشأن السفينة MSV Raj Milan والجهة المرسلة إليها حمولتُها.
The authorities of Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Republic of Tanzania have not responded to the Group’s official request for data on the importation of charcoal into their respective territories, making it difficult for the Group to assess the import/export volumes of charcoal transiting from Somalia to their countries and to identify patterns that vessels carrying illegal Somali charcoal take advantage of to avoid identification and tracking.١٦6 - ولم تردّ السلطات في البحرين وجمهورية تنزانيا المتحدة وعمان وقطر والكويت ولبنان ومصر والمملكة العربية السعودية على الطلب الرسمي المقدم من الفريق للحصول على بيانات بشأن استيراد الفحم إلى أراضيها، مما جعل من الصعب على الفريق أن يقيِّم أحجام واردات/صادرات الفحم العابرة من الصومال إلى بلدانها وتحديد الأنماط التي تستغلها السفن التي تحمل فحما صوماليا مخالفا لتفادي اكتشافها وتتبعها.
167. Following a visit to Muscat, the Omani authorities confirmed the continuation of the blockade of the import of Somali charcoal into ports under its jurisdiction yet have not responded to the Group’s official correspondence and did not provide the Group with customs documentation as agreed upon during the visit. 168.١٦7 - وبعد زيارة إلى مسقط، أكدت السلطات العمانية استمرار الحظر المفروض على استيراد الفحم الصومالي إلى الموانئ الواقعة تحت ولايتها؛ ولكنها لم تردّ على الرسائل الرسمية للفريق ولم تزوده بالوثائق الجمركية على النحو المتفق عليه في أثناء الزيارة.
During its mandate, the Monitoring Group benefited from positive cooperation with humanitarian agencies and United Nations entities, within the boundaries of their obligations of confidentiality to victims and the need to maintain the safety and security of interlocutors.١٦8 - واستفاد فريق الرصد في أثناء فترة ولايته من التعاون الإيجابي مع وكالات العمل الإنساني والكيانات التابعة للأمم المتحدة، في حدود ما يقع عليها من التزامات بصون خصوصية الضحايا، والحاجة إلى الحفاظ على سلامة وأمن المتعاملين معها.
VIII.ثامنا -
Sanctions list 169.قائمة الخاضعين للجزاءات
On 11 December 2014, the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations submitted a request to delist Mohamed Sa’id (also known as Atom), who had been listed on 12 April 2010 for engaging in acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia.١٦9 - في 11 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2014، قدم الممثل الدائم للصومال لدى الأمم المتحدة طلبا بشطب محمد سعيد (المعروف أيضا باسم ”أتوم“)، الذي كان قد أضيف إلى قائمة الخاضعين للجزاءات في 12 نيسان/أبريل 2010 لمشاركته في أعمال تهدد السلام أو الأمن أو الاستقرار في الصومال.
He had announced on 7 June 2014 that he was leaving Al-Shabaab in an effort to escape Godane’s control over the group and had surrendered to the Federal Government in Mogadishu.وكان قد أعلن في 7 حزيران/يونيه 2014 أنه مُقدِم على ترك حركة الشباب سعيا منه للهروب من سيطرة غوداني على الجماعة وسلم نفسه للحكومة الاتحادية في مقديشو.
On 19 December 2014, the Committee approved the delisting of Mohamed Sa’id “Atom” from the sanctions list. 170.وفي 19 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2014، وافقت اللجنة على شطب اسم محمد سعيد ”أتوم“ من قائمة الخاضعين للجزاءات.
Pursuant to paragraph 27 of resolution 2111 (2013) and paragraph 13 (g) of resolution 2060 (2012), the Monitoring Group continues to refine and update information on the draft list of those individuals and entities that engage in acts described in paragraph 1 of resolution 2111 (2013).170 - وعملا بالفقرتين 27 من القرار 2111 (2013) و 13 (ز) من القرار 2060 (2012)، يواصل فريق الرصد تنقيح وتحديث المعلومات الواردة في القائمة المبدئية بأسماء الكيانات والأفراد الضالعين في الأعمال المبينة في الفقرة 1 من القرار2111 (2013).
IX.تاسعا -
Recommendationsالتوصيات
A.ألف -
Threats to peace and security 171.التهديدات المحدقة بالسلام والأمن
The Monitoring Group recommends:١71 - يوصي فريق الرصد بما يلي:
(a)(أ)
That the Security Council consider for targeted measures all individuals attempting to exploit political, financial or military resources to manipulate or undermine the federalization process and/or the forthcoming electoral process in 2016 for self-gain, along with their facilitators and active supporters;أن ينظر مجلس الأمن في اتخاذ تدابير محددة المستهدفين ضد جميع الأفراد الذين يحاولون استغلال الموارد السياسية أو المالية أو العسكرية للتلاعب بعملية تشكيل نظام اتحادي و/أو العملية الانتخابية المقبلة المقرر إجراؤها في عام 2016 أو تقويضهما لغرض الحصول على كسب ذاتي، وضد من ييسرون أنشطتهم ويدعمونهم بنشاط؛
(b)(ب)
That, with regard to Somali public resources, the Security Council urge the Federal Government of Somalia:أن يحث مجلس الأمن حكومة الصومال الاتحادية، فيما يتعلق بالموارد العامة الصومالية، على القيام بما يلي:
(i)’1‘
To investigate and undertake prosecutions, where appropriate, of individuals and entities found to have been engaged in the misappropriation of financial resources in violation of the sanctions regime, where that conduct also constitutes a violation of applicable national laws;القيام بتحقيقات وملاحقات قضائية، حيثما يكون ذلك مناسبا، للأفراد والكيانات الذين يتبين أنهم ضالعون في الاستيلاء على موارد مالية على نحو يخل بنظام الجزاءات، في الحالات التي يشكل فيها هذا السلوك أيضا انتهاكا للقوانين الوطنية الواجبة التطبيق؛
(ii)’2‘
To share information generated by enquiries with the appropriate investigative bodies in other Member States, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that nationals of those States (or persons or entities with sufficient connection to those jurisdictions) have participated in the misappropriation of financial resources in Somalia;إطلاع هيئات التحقيق المناسبة في الدول الأعضاء الأخرى على المعلومات المستمدة من التحقيقات، حيثما يكون هناك أسباب معقولة للاعتقاد بأن أشخاصا من رعايا هذه الدول (أو أشخاصا أو كيانات لهم ارتباط كاف بتلك الدول) قد شاركوا في الاستيلاء على موارد مالية في الصومال؛
(c)(ج)
That the Security Council, in its next resolution on the Somalia sanctions regime, recognize illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by foreign vessels within the country’s exclusive economic zone as a threat to peace and security in Somalia and include such acts in the listing criteria for targeted measures;أن يسلم مجلس الأمن، في قراره المقبل بشأن نظام الجزاءات المتعلقة بالصومال، بأن الصيد غير المشروع وغير المبلغ عنه وغير المنظم الذي تقوم به السفن الأجنبية داخل المنطقة الاقتصادية الخالصة للصومال يشكل تهديدا للسلام والأمن في الصومال، وأن يدرج هذه الأعمال ضمن معايير الإدراج في قائمة الخاضعين لتدابير محددة المستهدفين؛
(d)(د)
That the Security Council consider encouraging the Federal Government of Somalia to strengthen its financial institutions by:أن ينظر مجلس الأمن في تشجيع حكومة الصومال الاتحادية على تعزيز مؤسساتها المالية من خلال ما يلي:
(i)’1‘
Enhancing the regulatory role of the Central Bank of Somalia;تعزيز الدور التنظيمي للمصرف المركزي الصومالي؛
(ii)’2‘
Urging the Federal Parliament to expedite the legislative process regarding the Public Procurement, Concession and Disposal Act;حث البرلماني الاتحادي على التعجيل بالعملية التشريعية المتعلقة بقانون المشتريات العامة والامتيازات والتصرف؛
(e)(هـ)
That the Security Council, in its next resolution on Somalia, impose a moratorium on oil and gas agreements in Somalia until the Federal Government of Somalia creates viable and independent licensing bodies, as stipulated in the 2008 Petroleum Law, and a constitutional resource-sharing framework between the federal and regional authorities is in place;أن يفرض مجلس الأمن، في قراره المقبل بشأن الصومال، وقفا مؤقتا لاتفاقات النفط والغاز في الصومال إلى أن تنشئ حكومة الصومال الاتحادية هيئات ترخيص قابلة للاستمرار ومستقلة، على النحو المنصوص عليه في قانون النفط لعام 2008، ويبدأ تطبيق إطار دستوري لتقاسم الموارد بين السلطات الاتحادية والسلطات الإقليمية؛
(f)(و)
That the Security Council urge Member States to support the comprehensive programme of security sector reform announced by the Office of the President of the Federal Government of Somalia on 9 September 2015, ensuring prompt delivery of financial and technical assistance to the security sector on the basis of strict adherence to the commitments undertaken in the announcement. B.أن يحث مجلس الأمن الدول الأعضاء على دعم البرنامج الشامل لإصلاح قطاع الأمن الذي أعلن عنه مكتب رئيس جمهورية الصومال الاتحادية في 9 أيلول/سبتمبر 2015، بما يضمن سرعة إيصال المساعدة المالية والتقنية إلى قطاع الأمن على أساس التقيد الصارم بالالتزامات المتعهد بتنفيذها في الإعلان.
Piracyباء -
172.القرصنة
The Monitoring Group recommends that the Security Council continue to encourage the Federal Government of Somalia to identify, arrest and prosecute all individuals who, for the past decade, have been involved in organizing and facilitating acts of piracy.١٧2 - يوصي فريق الرصد بأن يواصل مجلس الأمن تشجيع حكومة الصومال الاتحادية على تحديد وتوقيف ومقاضاة جميع الأشخاص الذين تورطوا على مدى العقد الماضي في تنظيم أعمال قرصنة وتيسيرها.
C.جيم -
Arms embargo regime 173.نظام حظر توريد الأسلحة
The Monitoring Group recommends:١٧3 - يوصي فريق الرصد بما يلي:
(a)(أ)
That the Security Council, in the context of its assessment of compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia with the terms of the partial lifting of the arms embargo:أن يقوم مجلس الأمن، في سياق تقييمه لمدى امتثال جمهورية الصومال الاتحادية لأحكام الرفع الجزئي لحظر توريد الأسلحة: بما يلي:
(i)’1‘
Urge the Federal Government of Somalia to improve compliance with its reporting obligations to the Council, in particular the provision of full and accurate information on the structure, composition, strength and disposition of its security forces, including the status of regional and militia forces;حث حكومة الصومال الاتحادية على تحسين الوفاء بالتزاماتها المتعلقة بتقديم التقارير إلى المجلس، وخاصة توفير معلومات كاملة ودقيقة بشأن هيكل قواتها الأمنية وتكوينها وقوامها وانتشارها، بما في ذلك وضعية القوات الإقليمية وقوات الميليشيات؛
(ii)’2‘
Request the Federal Government of Somalia, in the context of its compliance with notification obligations to the Committee relating to import of arms and ammunition, to improve the timeliness and content of post-delivery and post-distribution confirmations to the Committee, recalling that such communications may be submitted jointly if all relevant information is available;الطلب إلى حكومة الصومال الاتحادية أن تقوم، في سياق امتثالها للالتزامات المتعلقة بإخطار اللجنة بشأن استيراد الأسلحة والذخيرة، بتحسين توقيت ومحتوى التأكيدات المقدمة إلى اللجنة بعد توصيل الأسلحة والذخيرة وتوزيعها، مذكِّرا بأن تلك الإخطارات والتأكيدات يمكن تقديمها معاً حالَ توافر جميع المعلومات ذات الصلة؛
(iii)’3‘
Require the Federal Government of Somalia, with the support of international partners and within a fixed time frame, to conduct a baseline inventory of military equipment, arms and ammunition in the possession of the Federal Government of Somalia security forces, assessed against their respective strength, needs and missions, in order to assist Member States in providing more targeted assistance under the partial lifting of the arms embargo, building on the development of the Guulwade and draft Heegan plans, welcomed by the Council in its resolution 2232 (2015);إلزام حكومة الصومال الاتحادية بأن تقوم، مستعينة بشركاء دوليين وفي غضون إطار زمني محدد، بإجراء جرد أساسي للمعدات العسكرية الأساسية والأسلحة والذخيرة التي في حوزة قوات الأمن التابعة لحكومة الصومال الاتحادية ومضاهاته بقوام تلك القوات واحتياجاتها ومهامها، وذلك لمساعدة الدول الأعضاء على تقديم مساعدة موجهة بشكل أدق في إطار الرفع الجزئي لحظر توريد الأسلحة، بالاستناد إلى خطة ”النصر“ (Guulwade) ومشروع خطة ”الاستعداد“ (Heegan) اللتين رحب بهما مجلس الأمن في قراره 2232 (2015)؛
(iv)’4‘
Request Member States on an immediate basis to support efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia to establish a joint verification team, as previously requested by the Council;الطلب إلى الدول الأعضاء أن تقوم فورا بدعم الجهود التي تبذلها حكومة الصومال الاتحادية لإنشاء فريق تحقق مشترك، على نحو ما سبق أن طلبه مجلس الأمن؛
(b)(ب)
That the Security Council request Member States to assist the Federal Government of Somalia in improving the management and monitoring of weapons and ammunition flows to authorized personnel, including through urgent support for the development of a comprehensive weapons and ammunition management strategy building on current practices and initiatives and setting out realistic short-term priorities, including drawing on the extensive biometric registration of forces being conducted by the United Nations and the weapons card system already in use;أن يطلب مجلس الأمن من الدول الأعضاء مساعدة حكومة الصومال الاتحادية على تحسين إدارة ورصد تسليم الأسلحة والذخيرة للأفراد المأذون لهم، وذلك بوسائل منها تقديم الدعم العاجل لوضع استراتيجية شاملة لإدارة الأسلحة والذخيرة تستند إلى الممارسات والمبادرات الراهنة وتحدد أولويات واقعية قصيرة الأجل، بما يشمل الاعتماد على التسجيل البيومتري الموسع للقوات الذي تقوم به الأمم المتحدة حاليا وعلى نظام بطاقات الأسلحة المعمول به فعلا؛
(c)(ج)
That the Security Council, in its next resolution on the Somalia sanctions regime, urge Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure that they are in full compliance with paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 2111 (2013) when considering the provision of weapons, military equipment or technical assistance or training intended solely for the purposes of helping to develop Somali security sector institutions other than the security forces of the Federal Government;أن يحث مجلس الأمن، في قراره القادم بشأن نظام الجزاءات المتعلقة بالصومال، الدول الأعضاء والمنظمات الدولية والإقليمية ودون الإقليمية على التأكد من أنها تمتثل تماما لأحكام الفقرة 11 (أ) من القرار 2111 (2013) عند النظر في توفير أسلحة أو معدات عسكرية أو مساعدة تقنية أو تدريب لغرض حصري هو المساعدة في تطوير مؤسسات قطاع الأمن الصومالية غير قوات الأمن التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية؛
(d)(د)
That the Security Council, in its next resolution on the Somalia sanctions regime, emphasize the need for AMISOM and the Somali National Army to fully comply with their obligations under paragraph 6 of resolution 2182 (2014) and that it consider extending those obligations to all authorities in Somalia, in order to ensure the comprehensive, transparent management and disposal of such materiel and to facilitate tracing and analysis, which exposes Al-Shabaab operations and supply channels;أن يشدد مجلس الأمن، في قراره القادم بشأن نظام الجزاءات المتعلقة بالصومال، على الحاجة إلى أن تمتثل بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال والجيش الوطني الصومالي امتثالا كاملا لالتزاماتهما بموجب الفقرة 6 من القرار 2182 (2014) وأن ينظر في توسيع نطاق هذه الالتزامات ليشمل جميع السلطات في الصومال، وذلك من أجل ضمان إدارة هذه الأعتدة والتصرف فيها بشكل شامل وشفاف وتيسير التتبع والتحليل، اللذين يكشفان عمليات حركة الشباب وقنوات الإمداد التي تستخدمها؛
(e)(هـ)
That the Security Council renew the authorization set out in paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014) and request the Committee to issue an implementation assistance notice that provides guidance to Member States on the framework for conducting maritime interdiction of weapons and other materiel prohibited by the arms embargo;أن يجدد مجلس الأمن الإذن الوارد في الفقرة 15 من القرار 2182 (2014) ويطلب إلى اللجنة أن تصدر مذكرة للمساعدة على التنفيذ توفر الإرشاد للدول الأعضاء فيما يتعلق بإطار تنفيذ الاعتراض البحري للأسلحة والأعتدة الأخرى المشمولة بحظر الأسلحة؛
(f)(و)
That the Security Council, in the context of effective monitoring of compliance with paragraph 10 (c) of resolution 2111 (2013) by the Monitoring Group, request AMISOM and its strategic partners to clarify respective roles, responsibilities and lines of command with respect to operations conducted under the African Union strategic concept in cooperation and coordination with AMISOM.إن يطلب مجلس الأمن، في سياق الرصد الفعال من قِبل فريق الرصد لمدى الامتثال للفقرة 10 (ج) من القرار 2111 (2013)، إلى بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي وشركائها الاستراتيجيين توضيح أدوار ومسؤوليات كل طرف منهم وتسلسل القيادة لديه فيما يتعلق بالعمليات المضطلع بها في إطار المفهوم الاستراتيجي للاتحاد الأفريقي بالتعاون والتنسيق مع البعثة التابعة للاتحاد.
D.دال -
Obstruction of humanitarian assistanceعرقلة المساعدة الإنسانية
174. The Monitoring Group recommends:١٧4 - يوصي فريق الرصد بما يلي:
(a)(أ)
That the Security Council request AMISOM and the humanitarian community to continue to prioritize the full implementation of the Somalia Country-Specific Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines, including extending the dissemination of their principles to other armed actors operating in Somalia;أن يطلب مجلس الأمن من بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي ودوائر العمل الإنساني مواصلة إعطاء الأولوية للتنفيذ الكامل للمبادئ التوجيهية القطرية الخاصة بالصومال بشأن التنسيق المدني - العسكري في المجال الإنساني، بما في ذلك توسيع نطاق نشر القواعد المنصوص عليها في هذه المبادئ التوجيهية ليشمل الجهات الفاعلة المسلحة الأخرى العاملة في الصومال؛
(b)(ب)
That the Security Council urge the Federal Government of Somalia, AMISOM and its strategic partners, and all other armed actors operating in Somalia to take steps to mitigate the impact on civilians of military operations, including creating an enabling environment for humanitarian actors to deliver and ensuring freedom of movement along supply routes;أن يحث مجلس الأمن حكومة الصومال الاتحادية وبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي وشركائها الاستراتيجيين وجميع الجهات الفاعلة المسلحة الأخرى العاملة في الصومال، على اتخاذ خطوات للتخفيف من أثر العمليات العسكرية على المدنيين، بما في ذلك تهيئة بيئة مواتية للجهات الفاعلة في مجال تقديم المساعدة الإنسانية كي تقدم المساعدة وتضمن حرية تنقلها على طول طرق الإمداد؛
(c)(ج)
That the Security Council, in its next resolution on Somalia, remind all parties to the conflicts and all governing authorities in Somalia that the neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian action must be respected and ensured, including as a critical element of safeguarding the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and operations, and, in this regard, that donors be encouraged to increase the allocation of funds for principled humanitarian assistance, detached from stabilization or State-building agendas.أن يذكِّر مجلس الأمن في قراره القادم المتعلق بالصومال جميع أطراف النزاعات وجميع السلطات الحاكمة في الصومال بوجوب احترام وضمان حياد العمل الإنساني وتجرده واستقلاله، بما في ذلك بوصفه عنصرا حاسما من عناصر ضمان سلامة وأمن موظفي المساعدة الإنسانية والعمليات الإنسانية؛ وأن تشجَّع الجهات المانحة، في هذا الصدد، على زيادة تخصيص الأموال للمساعدة الإنسانية المحكومة بمبادئ، بمعزل عن خطط تثبيت الاستقرار أو بناء الدولة؛
E.هاء -
Violations of international humanitarian law involving the targeting of civilians 175.انتهاكات القانون الدولي الإنساني التي تنطوي على استهداف المدنيين
The Monitoring Group recommends:١٧5 - يوصي فريق الرصد بما يلي:
(a)(أ)
That the Security Council request the Federal Government of Somalia to both enhance and seek support for capacity to build civilian oversight of the Federal Government of Somalia security forces, in addition to prioritizing the investigation and prosecution of senior political and military leaders with command responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law;أن يطلب مجلس الأمن من حكومة الصومال الاتحادية أن تعزز الرقابة المدنية على قوات الأمن التابعة لها وأن تلتمس الدعم لتوفير قدرة على بناء تلك الرقابة، إلى جانب إعطاء أولوية للتحقيق مع كبار القادة السياسيين والعسكريين المسؤولين بحكم كونهم قادة عن انتهاكات القانون الدولي الإنساني وملاحقتهم قضائيا؛
(b)(ب)
That the Security Council request Member States to support enhanced capacity for the UNSOM human rights section, in particular an increase in its regional presence and ability to perform its responsibilities under the United Nations human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces with regard to, inter alia, conducting risk assessments and monitoring compliance as the number of forces receiving support and assistance from United Nations entities expands;أن يطلب مجلس الأمن إلى الدول الأعضاء دعم تعزيز قدرة قسم حقوق الإنسان ببعثة الأمم المتحدة في الصومال، ولا سيما زيادة وجوده الإقليمي وقدرته على أداء مسؤولياته، في إطار سياسة الأمم المتحدة لبذل العناية الواجبة في مجال حقوق الإنسان فيما يخص دعم الأمم المتحدة لقوات الأمن غير التابعة لها، عن القيام بأمور منها إجراء تقييمات للمخاطر ورصد الامتثال، بالنظر إلى أن عدد القوات التي تتلقى الدعم والمساعدة من كيانات الأمم المتحدة آخذ في الازدياد؛
(c)(ج)
That the Security Council request the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to work with the Federal Government of Somalia and relevant United Nations agencies in mapping the most serious violations of applicable international law committed by all parties to the conflicts in Somalia, a necessary precursor to developing options for an appropriate and comprehensive transitional justice strategy;أن يطلب مجلس الأمن إلى مفوضية الأمم المتحدة لحقوق الإنسان العمل مع حكومة الصومال الاتحادية ووكالات الأمم المتحدة المعنية لتحديد أخطر انتهاكات القانون الدولي الواجب التطبيق المرتكبة من جانب جميع أطراف النزاعات في الصومال، باعتبار ذلك مقدمة ضرورية لوضع خيارات لاستراتيجية مناسبة وشاملة في مجال العدالة الانتقالية؛
(d)(د)
That the Security Council, in its next resolution on Somalia, emphasize the obligation of all Member States to ensure that their forces adhere strictly to international law in all operations conducted in Somalia, whether within or outside the AMISOM concept of operations, including investigating and prosecuting personnel who commit grave breaches of international humanitarian law;أن يشدد مجلس الأمن، في قراره القادم المتعلق بالصومال، على التزام جميع الدول الأعضاء بضمان أن تلتزم قواتها بالقانون الدولي التزاما كاملا في جميع العمليات التي تنفذ في الصومال، سواء في إطار مفهوم عمليات بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي أو خارجه، بما في ذلك إجراء تحقيقات بشأن مرتكبي انتهاكات القانون الدولي الإنساني ومقاضاتهم؛
(e)(هـ)
That the Security Council urgently request the Federal Government of Somalia to implement national laws and policies relating to forced evictions, including undertaking investigations and prosecutions of those who violate the law in the course of such operations;أن يطلب مجلس الأمن على وجه السرعة من حكومة الصومال الاتحادية تنفيذ القوانين والسياسات الوطنية المتعلقة بالإخلاء القسري، بما في ذلك إجراء تحقيقات بشأن الذين ينتهكون القانون في سياق هذه العمليات ومقاضاتهم؛
(f)(و)
That the Security Council request the African Union, AMISOM and countries that contribute troops to AMISOM to:أن يطلب مجلس الأمن من الاتحاد الأفريقي وبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي والبلدان المساهمة بقوات فيها القيام بما يلي:
(i)’1‘
Encourage cooperation and engagement by all parties, in particular troop contingents, with the recently established AMISOM Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell, in order to ensure that the data and analysis generated are integrated swiftly into operations and contribute to a decrease in civilian casualties and injuries;التشجيع على تعاون وتواصل جميع الأطراف، وخاصة الوحدات العسكرية، مع خلية بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال المنشأة حديثا والمعنية بحصر الخسائر في صفوف المدنيين وتحليلها والتصرف حيالها، وذلك لضمان سرعة مراعاة العمليات للبيانات والتحليلات التي تنتهي إليها الخلية وللإسهام في التقليل من الخسائر والجرحى في صفوف المدنيين؛
consideration should also be given to the establishment of a common fund to support compensation for civilian casualties of AMISOM through the Cell;وينبغي أيضا النظر في إنشاء صندوق مشترك لدعم التعويض عن خسائر بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي من المدنيين عن طريق الخلية المذكورة؛
(ii)’2‘
Ensure regular and transparent provision of detailed information by troop-contributing countries on measures taken at the national level to investigate, prosecute and punish military and civilian personnel responsible for the commission of violations against civilians in the course of their deployment;كفالة أن توافي البلدان المساهمة بقوات بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي على نحو منتظم وشفاف بمعلومات مفصلة بشأن التدابير المتخذة على الصعيد الوطني لإجراء تحقيقات بشأن الأفراد العسكريين والمدنيين المسؤولين عن ارتكاب انتهاكات بحق المدنيين أثناء انتشارهم ومقاضاتهم ومعاقبتهم؛
(iii)’3‘
Immediately implement the recommendations of the African Union independent investigation team established to investigate allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by AMISOM personnel.التنفيذ الفوري لتوصيات فريق التحقيقات المستقل التابع للاتحاد الأفريقي المنشأ للتحقيق في ادعاءات ارتكاب أفراد من بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي استغلالا وانتهاكا جنسيين.
F.واو -
Violations of the ban on charcoalانتهاكات حظر تصدير الفحم
176. The Monitoring Group recommends:١٧6 - يوصي فريق الرصد بما يلي:
(a)(أ)
That the Security Council request Member States to take action in accordance with their national laws against shipping companies identified by the Monitoring Group as using false documentation and to provide the Monitoring Group, on a quarterly basis, with documentation related to import and export of charcoal;أن يطلب مجلس الأمن من الدول الأعضاء اتخاذ إجراءات وفقا لقوانينها الوطنية ضد شركات الشحن التي حددها فريق الرصد على أنها استخدمت وثائق مزيفة وموافاة فريق الرصد، فصليا، بالوثائق المتعلقة باستيراد الفحم وتصديره؛
(b)(ب)
That the Security Council, in its next resolution on Somalia, and in furtherance of compliance with paragraphs 18 and 20 of resolution 2111 (2013), request AMISOM and countries that contribute troops to AMISOM to take active steps to support and assist the Somali authorities in preventing the export of charcoal and, in this regard, to report to the Council on such actions six months from the adoption of the new resolution;أن يطلب مجلس الأمن، في قراره القادم المتعلق بالصومال، وتعزيزا للامتثال للفقرتين 18 و 20 من القرار 2111 (2013)، من بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي والبلدان المساهمة بقوات فيها أن تتخذ خطوات فعالة لدعم ومساعدة السلطات الصومالية على منع تصدير الفحم، وأن تقدما في هذا الصدد تقريرا إلى مجلس الأمن عن هذه الإجراءات بعد اتخاذ القرار الجديد بستة أشهر؛
(c)(ج)
That the Security Council consider explicitly encouraging and authorizing Member States to reroute vessels carrying Somali charcoal to the Mogadishu port.أن ينظر مجلس الأمن في أن يشجع ويأذن صراحة بأن تغير الدول الأعضاء مسار السفن المحملة بالفحم الصومالي بحيث تتجه إلى ميناء مقديشيو.
G.زاي -
Sanctions list 177.قائمة الخاضعين للجزاءات
The Monitoring Group recommends that the Committee proceed without delay to designate for targeted measures:١٧7 - يوصي فريق الرصد بأن تمضي اللجنة قدما دونما تأخير في إدراج الآتي ذكرهم ضمن المستهدفين بالتدابير الموجهة:
(a)(أ)
Known pirates and their associates identified by the Monitoring Group or Member States between 2009 and 2015;القراصنة المعروفين وشركائهم الذين حددهم فريق الرصد أو الدول الأعضاء بين عامي 2009 و 2015؛
(b)(ب)
Individuals and entities responsible for the misappropriation of public resources, including individuals and entities in the private sector;الأفراد والكيانات المسؤولين عن الاستيلاء على الموارد العامة، بما في ذلك الأفراد والكيانات في القطاع الخاص؛
(c)(ج)
Individuals involved in the diversion of weapons from official government stockpiles;الأفراد الضالعين في تسريب الأسلحة من المخزونات الحكومية الرسمية؛
(d)(د)
Individuals and entities, including importers, exporters and transporters, involved in the trading of Somali charcoal.الأفراد والكيانات، بما في ذلك المستوردين والمصدرين والناقلين، المشاركين في تجارة الفحم الصومالي.
/183/343
15-1601215-16012
15-1601215-16012
/184/343
Annex 1Annex 1
Spoiler politics and the capture of state resourcesSpoiler politics and the capture of state resources
Annex 1.1: Formation of Interim Galmudug AdministrationAnnex 1.1: Formation of Interim Galmudug Administration
1.1.
The formation of the Interim Galmudug Administration (IGA) started in earnest with the Galgadud and Mudug Reconciliation Conference in January 2015.The formation of the Interim Galmudug Administration (IGA) started in earnest with the Galgadud and Mudug Reconciliation Conference in January 2015.
It concluded with the appointment of Abdikarim Hussein Guled as President in July and the formation of a 24-member cabinet in late August.It concluded with the appointment of Abdikarim Hussein Guled as President in July and the formation of a 24-member cabinet in late August.
As with the establishment the Interim Jubba Administration and the Interim South West State Administration, losers in the process have cried foul and multiple allegations of interference have emerged.As with the establishment the Interim Jubba Administration and the Interim South West State Administration, losers in the process have cried foul and multiple allegations of interference have emerged.
The formation of the IGA demonstrates the manner in which multiple political and clan networks competed to capture state resources, and in doing so instigated both new conflict and threatened the re-emergence of old conflict.The formation of the IGA demonstrates the manner in which multiple political and clan networks competed to capture state resources, and in doing so instigated both new conflict and threatened the re-emergence of old conflict.
In 2016, the political stakes will be higher, as will the overall threat posed to peace, security and stability in Somalia if greater efforts are not made by all stakeholders to engage in the next transition process constructively.In 2016, the political stakes will be higher, as will the overall threat posed to peace, security and stability in Somalia if greater efforts are not made by all stakeholders to engage in the next transition process constructively.
Attempts to manipulate the state formation processAttempts to manipulate the state formation process
2.2.
The Damul Jadid political association close to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud invested heavily – financially and politically – in the appointment of its member, Abdikarim Hussein Guled, as President of the IGA.The Damul Jadid political association close to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud invested heavily – financially and politically – in the appointment of its member, Abdikarim Hussein Guled, as President of the IGA.
Indeed, other political associations and networks, including Ala Sheikh, are also known to have attempted to buy support for their appointees throughout the state formation process – from the allegiance of members of the technical committee to voting preferences of the 68 members of the Regional Assembly.Indeed, other political associations and networks, including Ala Sheikh, are also known to have attempted to buy support for their appointees throughout the state formation process – from the allegiance of members of the technical committee to voting preferences of the 68 members of the Regional Assembly.
None, however, had the comparative advantage that Abdikarim Guled received from the outset.None, however, had the comparative advantage that Abdikarim Guled received from the outset.
3.3.
The process of state formation between Galgadud Region and parts of Mudug Region was initiated in July 2014.The process of state formation between Galgadud Region and parts of Mudug Region was initiated in July 2014.
Representatives of the former Regional State of Galmudug, the Administration of Himan and Heeb, and the Administration of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) were invited to attend a meeting with representatives of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).Representatives of the former Regional State of Galmudug, the Administration of Himan and Heeb, and the Administration of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) were invited to attend a meeting with representatives of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).
On 31 July the Central Regions State Formation Agreement was signed by Abdi Hassan Awale “Qebdiid” (President of Galmudug State), Sheikh Ibraham Sheikh Hassan Gureye (representing ASWJ) and four FGS ministerial representatives from the region.On 31 July the Central Regions State Formation Agreement was signed by Abdi Hassan Awale “Qebdiid” (President of Galmudug State), Sheikh Ibraham Sheikh Hassan Gureye (representing ASWJ) and four FGS ministerial representatives from the region.
Minister of Interior Affairs and Federalism Abdullahi Godah Barre served as Guarantor for the Agreement, and representatives of the European Union, the United Nations Office for Somalia (UNSOM), and the African Union served as witnesses.Minister of Interior Affairs and Federalism Abdullahi Godah Barre served as Guarantor for the Agreement, and representatives of the European Union, the United Nations Office for Somalia (UNSOM), and the African Union served as witnesses.
Abdullahi Mohamed Ali “Barleh” of the Himan and Heeb administration signed the Agreement a week later on 6 August 2014.Abdullahi Mohamed Ali “Barleh” of the Himan and Heeb administration signed the Agreement a week later on 6 August 2014.
4.4.
Under the terms of the Agreement a 25-member technical committee “representing all the clans that live in [the] regions” was to be established within 10 days of its signing.Under the terms of the Agreement a 25-member technical committee “representing all the clans that live in [the] regions” was to be established within 10 days of its signing.
The process of creating the administration was due to be completed within 60 days of the signing of the agreement, and to be “guided and facilitated” by the FGS.The process of creating the administration was due to be completed within 60 days of the signing of the agreement, and to be “guided and facilitated” by the FGS.
The FGS was furthermore “responsible for ensuring the implementation and success” of the agreement, and for preparing the “roles and responsibilities of the technical committee”.The FGS was furthermore “responsible for ensuring the implementation and success” of the agreement, and for preparing the “roles and responsibilities of the technical committee”.
On 26 August 2014, Abdullahi Godah Barre announced the appointment of 27 members to the technical committee.On 26 August 2014, Abdullahi Godah Barre announced the appointment of 27 members to the technical committee.
5.5.
Elements of ASWJ referred to as the Sufa group and led by Sheikh Abdirisaq Mohamed Al Ashari, had opposed the Central Regions State Formation Agreement from the outset, claiming that the group’s signatory, Sheikh Ibraham Sheikh Hassan Gureye, did not represent them.Elements of ASWJ referred to as the Sufa group and led by Sheikh Abdirisaq Mohamed Al Ashari, had opposed the Central Regions State Formation Agreement from the outset, claiming that the group’s signatory, Sheikh Ibraham Sheikh Hassan Gureye, did not represent them.
In October 2014 the Sufa group attempted to arrest the District Commissioner of Guriel town for supporting the FGS-led state formation process.In October 2014 the Sufa group attempted to arrest the District Commissioner of Guriel town for supporting the FGS-led state formation process.
In November conflict erupted between Sufa fighters and the Somali National Army (SNA) in the regional capital of Galgadud, Dhusamareb.In November conflict erupted between Sufa fighters and the Somali National Army (SNA) in the regional capital of Galgadud, Dhusamareb.
6.6.
Throughout November and December 2014, the Sufa group of ASWJ consolidated its control over Guriel town, as the SNA regained control of Dhusamareb.Throughout November and December 2014, the Sufa group of ASWJ consolidated its control over Guriel town, as the SNA regained control of Dhusamareb.
On 15 December SNA troops were sent to recover Guriel as Sufa fighters retreated westwards towards Hiran Region, though intermittent clashes between the two sides continued.On 15 December SNA troops were sent to recover Guriel as Sufa fighters retreated westwards towards Hiran Region, though intermittent clashes between the two sides continued.
7.7.
As SNA troops were advancing on Guriel in mid-December, members of the Technical Committee were attending a training workshop in Mogadishu.As SNA troops were advancing on Guriel in mid-December, members of the Technical Committee were attending a training workshop in Mogadishu.
Following completion of the training workshop, on 17 December 2014 the committee elected Halimo Ismail Ibrahim “Yarey” to serve as chair.Following completion of the training workshop, on 17 December 2014 the committee elected Halimo Ismail Ibrahim “Yarey” to serve as chair.
In early January 2015 meetings were held in Guriel, with the involvement of members of the technical committee, to ease the growing tensions.In early January 2015 meetings were held in Guriel, with the involvement of members of the technical committee, to ease the growing tensions.
8.8.
On 25 January the Galgadud and Mudug Reconciliation Conference commenced in Dhusamareb, with approximately 400 elders from the two regions participating.On 25 January the Galgadud and Mudug Reconciliation Conference commenced in Dhusamareb, with approximately 400 elders from the two regions participating.
As the conference continued throughout February and into March, conflict between the SNA and Sufa group continued west of the town.As the conference continued throughout February and into March, conflict between the SNA and Sufa group continued west of the town.
On 3 March the FGS Minister of Defence, General Abdulkadir Sheikh Dini visited Guriel in an attempt to end the on-going conflict.On 3 March the FGS Minister of Defence, General Abdulkadir Sheikh Dini visited Guriel in an attempt to end the on-going conflict.
As it grew increasingly obvious that the Sufa group would not agree to the terms of a peace agreement, Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) AMISOM troops arrived in the town to prop up the SNA and enforce a ceasefire.As it grew increasingly obvious that the Sufa group would not agree to the terms of a peace agreement, Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) AMISOM troops arrived in the town to prop up the SNA and enforce a ceasefire.
9.9.
On 25 March, a communiqué was disseminated announcing the end of the Galgadud and Mudug Reconciliation Conference and the beginning of the State Formation Conference of Galgadud and Mudug, with Dhusamareb continuing to host the delegates – despite assumptions among many, and particularly Abdullahi “Barley”, that it would move to Adado town further north near the border with Mudug Region.On 25 March, a communiqué was disseminated announcing the end of the Galgadud and Mudug Reconciliation Conference and the beginning of the State Formation Conference of Galgadud and Mudug, with Dhusamareb continuing to host the delegates – despite assumptions among many, and particularly Abdullahi “Barley”, that it would move to Adado town further north near the border with Mudug Region.
The total number of delegates was also increased to 510.The total number of delegates was also increased to 510.
Two weeks later, on 8 April, after much political wrangling, President Hassan Sheikh announced that the State Formation Conference would in fact be moving to Adado and would commence on 11 April, however Dhusamareb was declared the provisional capital of the future federal member state.Two weeks later, on 8 April, after much political wrangling, President Hassan Sheikh announced that the State Formation Conference would in fact be moving to Adado and would commence on 11 April, however Dhusamareb was declared the provisional capital of the future federal member state.
10.10.
On 22 April 2015, as delegates for the State Formation Conference were still arriving, former Minister of Defence and close ally to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Abdikarim Guled announced his intention to run for presidency of the IGA.On 22 April 2015, as delegates for the State Formation Conference were still arriving, former Minister of Defence and close ally to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Abdikarim Guled announced his intention to run for presidency of the IGA.
11.11.
Allegations that the chair of the technical committee, Halimo “Yarey”, was overstepping her authority began to emerge in early May 2015 as the committee started to appoint members to a Galmudug Regional Assembly.Allegations that the chair of the technical committee, Halimo “Yarey”, was overstepping her authority began to emerge in early May 2015 as the committee started to appoint members to a Galmudug Regional Assembly.
On 12 May, the Minister of Interior and Federal Affairs, Abdirahman Mohamed Hussein “Odowaa” arrived in Adado to help address growing tensions among the delegates, prompting “Qebdiid” to accuse the Minister of interfering in the process.On 12 May, the Minister of Interior and Federal Affairs, Abdirahman Mohamed Hussein “Odowaa” arrived in Adado to help address growing tensions among the delegates, prompting “Qebdiid” to accuse the Minister of interfering in the process.
On 16 May, the Minister announced that matters with “Qebdiid” had been resolved, and that the conference would soon continue.On 16 May, the Minister announced that matters with “Qebdiid” had been resolved, and that the conference would soon continue.
12.12.
Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Shermarke arrived in Adado on 31 May to officially open the second phase of the State Formation Conference when delegates would nominate MPs on behalf of their sub-clans.Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Shermarke arrived in Adado on 31 May to officially open the second phase of the State Formation Conference when delegates would nominate MPs on behalf of their sub-clans.
A week later, on 7 June, the ASWJ Sufi group overran Dhusamareb, forcing SNA troops to withdraw from the city.A week later, on 7 June, the ASWJ Sufi group overran Dhusamareb, forcing SNA troops to withdraw from the city.
The next day they extended their control over nearby villages establishing a defensive perimeter, and two days later peaceful demonstrations against the Adado state formation process were held in the city.The next day they extended their control over nearby villages establishing a defensive perimeter, and two days later peaceful demonstrations against the Adado state formation process were held in the city.
13.13.
On 18 June, after an Al-Shabaab attack on the conference facilities was thwarted by security guards, the Constitution of Galmudug State was approved by the State Formation Conference delegate.On 18 June, after an Al-Shabaab attack on the conference facilities was thwarted by security guards, the Constitution of Galmudug State was approved by the State Formation Conference delegate.
The Constitution claimed the incorporation of Galgadud Region and the whole of Mudug Region – including the northern districts claimed by Puntland – and confirmed Dhusamareb as the future capital of the state, despite it being held by the ASWJ Sufa group at the time.The Constitution claimed the incorporation of Galgadud Region and the whole of Mudug Region – including the northern districts claimed by Puntland – and confirmed Dhusamareb as the future capital of the state, despite it being held by the ASWJ Sufa group at the time.
14.14.
Claims to the northern districts of Mudug Region prompted an immediate reaction from the Puntland administration in Garowe (see below).Claims to the northern districts of Mudug Region prompted an immediate reaction from the Puntland administration in Garowe (see below).
A press statement released by the office of President Abdiweli Mohammed Ali “Gaas” is reported to have warned of future conflict with the Galmudug administration if claims to northern Mudug were not withdrawn.A press statement released by the office of President Abdiweli Mohammed Ali “Gaas” is reported to have warned of future conflict with the Galmudug administration if claims to northern Mudug were not withdrawn.
Over the following few weeks a series of demonstrations were held throughout Puntland opposing any attempts to threaten the state’s territorial integrity.Over the following few weeks a series of demonstrations were held throughout Puntland opposing any attempts to threaten the state’s territorial integrity.
15.15.
Amid growing rhetoric against the process, on 20 June the Technical Committee released the list of MPs that would serve in the Regional Assembly and elect the president of the IRA.Amid growing rhetoric against the process, on 20 June the Technical Committee released the list of MPs that would serve in the Regional Assembly and elect the president of the IRA.
Two days later they were sworn in in at a ceremony held in Adado, and a week later they selected Ali Ga’al Asir to serve as Speaker of the Regional Assembly.Two days later they were sworn in in at a ceremony held in Adado, and a week later they selected Ali Ga’al Asir to serve as Speaker of the Regional Assembly.
Presidential candidates were then invited to make formal applications on 30 June.Presidential candidates were then invited to make formal applications on 30 June.
On 1 July, as ASWJ announced the appointment of Sheikh Mohamed Shakur Ali Hassan as president of its rival state from Dhusamareb, a list of six candidates were announced in Adado including Abdikarim Hussein Guled, Ahmed Abdisalan Adan, Ahmed Moallim Fiqi and Abdi Hassan Awale “Qebdiid”.On 1 July, as ASWJ announced the appointment of Sheikh Mohamed Shakur Ali Hassan as president of its rival state from Dhusamareb, a list of six candidates were announced in Adado including Abdikarim Hussein Guled, Ahmed Abdisalan Adan, Ahmed Moallim Fiqi and Abdi Hassan Awale “Qebdiid”.
On 4 July, following three rounds of voting Abdikarim Hussein Guled secured the presidency.On 4 July, following three rounds of voting Abdikarim Hussein Guled secured the presidency.
Guled’s political ally Mohmad Hashi Araby was subsequently appointed as his vice president following a closely fought contest with Bashir Diriye Sharif.Guled’s political ally Mohmad Hashi Araby was subsequently appointed as his vice president following a closely fought contest with Bashir Diriye Sharif.
The northern borders of a Galmudug Federal Member StateThe northern borders of a Galmudug Federal Member State
16.16.
The northern borders of a future Galmudug Federal Member State remain undefined.The northern borders of a future Galmudug Federal Member State remain undefined.
Twice the FGS assured the Puntland authorities – in October 2014 and April 2015 – of its commitment not to compromise the territorial integrity of Puntland which extends as far south as the city of Galkayco in Galkayco District of Mudug Region.Twice the FGS assured the Puntland authorities – in October 2014 and April 2015 – of its commitment not to compromise the territorial integrity of Puntland which extends as far south as the city of Galkayco in Galkayco District of Mudug Region.
A clear dividing line in the city separates the Majeerteen dominated north from Haber Gedir-dominated south.A clear dividing line in the city separates the Majeerteen dominated north from Haber Gedir-dominated south.
The extent of Puntland territory east and west of Galkayco, however, is poorly demarcated and remains a potential flash point for conflict between the two traditionally strongest clan families in Somalia, the Hawiye and Darod.The extent of Puntland territory east and west of Galkayco, however, is poorly demarcated and remains a potential flash point for conflict between the two traditionally strongest clan families in Somalia, the Hawiye and Darod.
Though the dividing line is fluid, Puntland maintains de facto control of Jariban District, most of Galdogob District, and the north of Galkacyo District in Mudug Region, leaving the south of Galkacyo District, most of Hobyo District, and all of Harardhere District within Galmudug territory.Though the dividing line is fluid, Puntland maintains de facto control of Jariban District, most of Galdogob District, and the north of Galkacyo District in Mudug Region, leaving the south of Galkacyo District, most of Hobyo District, and all of Harardhere District within Galmudug territory.
17.17.
The 1993 Mudug Peace Agreement – signed by General Mohamed Farah Aideed representing the United Somali Congress and Haber Gedir (Hawiye) communities in southern Mudug, and former TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf, representing the Somali Salvation Democratic Front at the time and Majeerteen (Darod) communities in northern Mudug – introduced relative stability in the region following several years of heavy inter-clan conflict.The 1993 Mudug Peace Agreement – signed by General Mohamed Farah Aideed representing the United Somali Congress and Haber Gedir (Hawiye) communities in southern Mudug, and former TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf, representing the Somali Salvation Democratic Front at the time and Majeerteen (Darod) communities in northern Mudug – introduced relative stability in the region following several years of heavy inter-clan conflict.
Though never fully implemented, the principles of the peace agreement dividing the territory were, at least until the Galmudug State Formation Conference, loosely adhered to.Though never fully implemented, the principles of the peace agreement dividing the territory were, at least until the Galmudug State Formation Conference, loosely adhered to.
As the authors of a report on the Mudug Peace Agreement prepared by the Puntland Development Research Center in 2006 state, “[i]n many respects, Mudug – and its peace – are pivotal to the entire future of Somalia: as a vital crossroads for trade with the Somali regions of Eastern Ethiopia;As the authors of a report on the Mudug Peace Agreement prepared by the Puntland Development Research Center in 2006 state, “[i]n many respects, Mudug – and its peace – are pivotal to the entire future of Somalia: as a vital crossroads for trade with the Somali regions of Eastern Ethiopia;
a commercial ‘meeting-point’ for the nation’s northern and southern regions;a commercial ‘meeting-point’ for the nation’s northern and southern regions;
and – perhaps most importantly – as a unique melting pot in which the Darod, Hawiye and other clans meet and interact”.and – perhaps most importantly – as a unique melting pot in which the Darod, Hawiye and other clans meet and interact”.
18.18.
The apparent inclusion of all of Mudug Region in the initial approved Galmudug Constitution threatens the relative stability that followed the signing of the Mudug Peace Agreement.The apparent inclusion of all of Mudug Region in the initial approved Galmudug Constitution threatens the relative stability that followed the signing of the Mudug Peace Agreement.
Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid ‘Sharmarke’ travelled to Garowe in July 2015 in an attempt to ease tensions over the border but ultimately returned to Mogadishu having achieved little.Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid ‘Sharmarke’ travelled to Garowe in July 2015 in an attempt to ease tensions over the border but ultimately returned to Mogadishu having achieved little.
The FGS and Galmudug are now presented with a challenge which has serious implications for the peace, security and stability of Somalia.The FGS and Galmudug are now presented with a challenge which has serious implications for the peace, security and stability of Somalia.
By adhering to the general principles of the Mudug Peace Agreement, splitting Mudug Region, they will likely prevent an outbreak of inter-communal conflict in the region.By adhering to the general principles of the Mudug Peace Agreement, splitting Mudug Region, they will likely prevent an outbreak of inter-communal conflict in the region.
They would, however, also defy the Provisional Constitution requirement that a federal member state be formed of at least two contiguous regions as defined in 1991, and potentially invite multiple claims for constitutional exceptions to be made in the state formation process.They would, however, also defy the Provisional Constitution requirement that a federal member state be formed of at least two contiguous regions as defined in 1991, and potentially invite multiple claims for constitutional exceptions to be made in the state formation process.
In the absence of a Constitutional Court or indeed a fully functioning independent Boundaries and Federation Commission, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has once again offered to step in and mediate between Puntland and the Galmudug IRA.In the absence of a Constitutional Court or indeed a fully functioning independent Boundaries and Federation Commission, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has once again offered to step in and mediate between Puntland and the Galmudug IRA.
At the time of writing, there was little evidence of progress being made to determine the northern border of a future Galmudug Federal Member State.At the time of writing, there was little evidence of progress being made to determine the northern border of a future Galmudug Federal Member State.
Conflict with Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’aConflict with Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a
19.19.
Prior to the signing of the Central Regions State Formation Agreement, ASWJ had contributed significantly to relative security in the areas under its control, extending from the north east Hiran Region across the northern parts of Galgadud Region.Prior to the signing of the Central Regions State Formation Agreement, ASWJ had contributed significantly to relative security in the areas under its control, extending from the north east Hiran Region across the northern parts of Galgadud Region.
While the split within ASWJ may originally have had more to do with Haber Gedir sub-clan politics than ideological positions, the FGS’ loss of a key military ally and the emergence of a new, well-armed opposition group in central Somalia may prove to have significant consequences for the region.While the split within ASWJ may originally have had more to do with Haber Gedir sub-clan politics than ideological positions, the FGS’ loss of a key military ally and the emergence of a new, well-armed opposition group in central Somalia may prove to have significant consequences for the region.
ASWJ’s initiation of the parallel state formation process, and the election of their own president 3 days before Abdikarim Guled won the presidency of the Galmudug IRA, indicate an entrenchment of their position in the region.ASWJ’s initiation of the parallel state formation process, and the election of their own president 3 days before Abdikarim Guled won the presidency of the Galmudug IRA, indicate an entrenchment of their position in the region.
20.20.
Diverting the resources of the SNA and AMISOM to engage with a former ally, at a time when both forces are already stretched thin attempting to hold ground recovered from Al-Shabaab and continue offences against the group, represents a further grave threat to peace, security and stability in the region.Diverting the resources of the SNA and AMISOM to engage with a former ally, at a time when both forces are already stretched thin attempting to hold ground recovered from Al-Shabaab and continue offences against the group, represents a further grave threat to peace, security and stability in the region.
21.21.
The failure to mitigate conflict between ASWJ and the SNA early on in the process and to ensure the interests of all influential stakeholders were at least nominally represented in it, compromises the future legitimacy of the IGA unless significant political, and likely financial, capital is spent securing full ASWJ buy-in.The failure to mitigate conflict between ASWJ and the SNA early on in the process and to ensure the interests of all influential stakeholders were at least nominally represented in it, compromises the future legitimacy of the IGA unless significant political, and likely financial, capital is spent securing full ASWJ buy-in.
Media reports suggest that the administration was partially successful in achieving this prior to the formation of the cabinet.Media reports suggest that the administration was partially successful in achieving this prior to the formation of the cabinet.
Despite having recently lost the town of Abudwaq to IGA forces, at the time of writing a militarily powerful faction of ASWJ that continues to oppose the IGA maintained control of Dhusamareb, the agreed capital of a future Galmudug FMS and seat of government for the IGA.Despite having recently lost the town of Abudwaq to IGA forces, at the time of writing a militarily powerful faction of ASWJ that continues to oppose the IGA maintained control of Dhusamareb, the agreed capital of a future Galmudug FMS and seat of government for the IGA.
Link Natural ResourcesLink Natural Resources
22.22.
As the Galgadud and Mudug Reconciliation Conference was on-going, evidence obtained by the Monitoring Group suggests that a private extractives company entered into an agreement with the former Galmudug State under its president, Abdi Hassan Awale “Qebdiid”.As the Galgadud and Mudug Reconciliation Conference was on-going, evidence obtained by the Monitoring Group suggests that a private extractives company entered into an agreement with the former Galmudug State under its president, Abdi Hassan Awale “Qebdiid”.
The deal is signed by the former ‘Minister of Petroleum and Minerals of Galmudug State’, Hared Ali Hared, who now serves as Deputy Speaker of the Galmudug Regional Assembly.The deal is signed by the former ‘Minister of Petroleum and Minerals of Galmudug State’, Hared Ali Hared, who now serves as Deputy Speaker of the Galmudug Regional Assembly.
The contract apparently awards the company the right to export minerals, gas and oil.The contract apparently awards the company the right to export minerals, gas and oil.
According to a presentation prepared by Link Natural Resources, the company appears most interested in the “very high tonnage surficial Uranium mineralization discovered in Galguduud region in late 60’s”.According to a presentation prepared by Link Natural Resources, the company appears most interested in the “very high tonnage surficial Uranium mineralization discovered in Galguduud region in late 60’s”.
23.23.
According to the same presentation, the proposed concession area extends will into northern Galkayo District, and thereby into territory claimed by the Puntland.According to the same presentation, the proposed concession area extends will into northern Galkayo District, and thereby into territory claimed by the Puntland.
In a telephone interview on 8 September 2015 the company’s CEO, Sam McKay informed the Monitoring Group that the company had recently discussed the matter with representatives of both the IGA and the Puntland authorities though he would not disclose who these discussions were held with.In a telephone interview on 8 September 2015 the company’s CEO, Sam McKay informed the Monitoring Group that the company had recently discussed the matter with representatives of both the IGA and the Puntland authorities though he would not disclose who these discussions were held with.
24.24.
The contract also includes, “as a gesture of goodwill”, a commitment by Link National Resources to assist “with financing the required security essential to provide a conclusive working environment for both parties”, raising clear concerns with regards to the arms embargo.The contract also includes, “as a gesture of goodwill”, a commitment by Link National Resources to assist “with financing the required security essential to provide a conclusive working environment for both parties”, raising clear concerns with regards to the arms embargo.
SummarySummary
25.25.
The formation of the IGA demonstrates the inherent risks to the peace, security and stability of Somalia involved in the federalization process.The formation of the IGA demonstrates the inherent risks to the peace, security and stability of Somalia involved in the federalization process.
In a contest fought by a complex array of political, clan and business networks, the FGS lost a powerful allied militia and has potentially opened a new front of conflict as a resurgent Al-Shabaab threatens to reverse territorial gains made against it.In a contest fought by a complex array of political, clan and business networks, the FGS lost a powerful allied militia and has potentially opened a new front of conflict as a resurgent Al-Shabaab threatens to reverse territorial gains made against it.
An important though fragile peace agreement signed in 1993 between communities living in Mudug Region is at risk of collapsing, which could result in inter-communal conflict spreading throughout central Somalia, and would likely prompt the total withdrawal of Puntland from the federal project.An important though fragile peace agreement signed in 1993 between communities living in Mudug Region is at risk of collapsing, which could result in inter-communal conflict spreading throughout central Somalia, and would likely prompt the total withdrawal of Puntland from the federal project.
Annex 1.2: Bribery of Federal MPsAnnex 1.2: Bribery of Federal MPs
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Annex 2Annex 2
Natural resourcesNatural resources
Annex 2.1: Sale of fishing licensesAnnex 2.1: Sale of fishing licenses
1.1.
On 25 July 2013, the FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources entered into an agreement authorising Somalia-FishGuard Ltd. to be the sole agent responsible for the sale of fishing licenses on behalf of the FGS (see S/2014/726, annex 5.1), and granting the company a 49 per cent share of the revenues generated.On 25 July 2013, the FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources entered into an agreement authorising Somalia-FishGuard Ltd. to be the sole agent responsible for the sale of fishing licenses on behalf of the FGS (see S/2014/726, annex 5.1), and granting the company a 49 per cent share of the revenues generated.
However, a 21 November 2014 letter from former Minister Mohamed Olow Barrow to Somalia FishGuard criticised the terms of the deal and demanded they be renegotiated.However, a 21 November 2014 letter from former Minister Mohamed Olow Barrow to Somalia FishGuard criticised the terms of the deal and demanded they be renegotiated.
According to the current Director General of the Ministry, Ahmed Iman, the Somalia FishGuard contract has been suspended.According to the current Director General of the Ministry, Ahmed Iman, the Somalia FishGuard contract has been suspended.
Subsequently, the Ministry has since begun selling fishing licenses directly, largely to China-flagged longliners.Subsequently, the Ministry has since begun selling fishing licenses directly, largely to China-flagged longliners.
2.2.
The Monitoring Group is concerned that the sale of licenses, especially without a federal-regional resource sharing agreement in place, has the potential to fuel corruption and even conflict.The Monitoring Group is concerned that the sale of licenses, especially without a federal-regional resource sharing agreement in place, has the potential to fuel corruption and even conflict.
As one of the few FGS ministries capable of generating external revenue, the Monitoring Group is concerned over the potential for that revenue stream to be diverted around the FGS’ public financial management system and subsequently misappropriated by agents of the state.As one of the few FGS ministries capable of generating external revenue, the Monitoring Group is concerned over the potential for that revenue stream to be diverted around the FGS’ public financial management system and subsequently misappropriated by agents of the state.
Sale of licenses to Chinese longlinersSale of licenses to Chinese longliners
3.3.
Since March 2015, the FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources has sold 11 licenses, mostly to China-flagged longliners fishing for tuna and tuna-like species, generating more than USD 180,000 in revenue (see annex 2.1.a for a chart of fishing licenses issued by the Ministry from March to August 2015).Since March 2015, the FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources has sold 11 licenses, mostly to China-flagged longliners fishing for tuna and tuna-like species, generating more than USD 180,000 in revenue (see annex 2.1.a for a chart of fishing licenses issued by the Ministry from March to August 2015).
4.4.
On 18 March 2015, the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Mohamed Aimoy, told the Monitoring Group that the Ministry was not currently issuing licenses.On 18 March 2015, the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Mohamed Aimoy, told the Monitoring Group that the Ministry was not currently issuing licenses.
However on 17 March 2015 the Ministry had already issued its first license of the year, a two-month permit to the Belize-flagged trawler Greko 2.However on 17 March 2015 the Ministry had already issued its first license of the year, a two-month permit to the Belize-flagged trawler Greko 2.
Also in March 2015, the Ministry began selling licenses to the Chinese agent Simon Chen, representing the Yu Shian Group, a multinational fishing agency and consultancy firm.Also in March 2015, the Ministry began selling licenses to the Chinese agent Simon Chen, representing the Yu Shian Group, a multinational fishing agency and consultancy firm.
Commencing 23 March 2015, Chen purchased three-month licenses for three vessels owned the Hangzhou-based company Zhejiang Ocean Family, a client of Yu Shian Group.Commencing 23 March 2015, Chen purchased three-month licenses for three vessels owned the Hangzhou-based company Zhejiang Ocean Family, a client of Yu Shian Group.
5.5.
Revenues from the sale of these licenses were routed to a bank account in Djibouti in the name of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources.Revenues from the sale of these licenses were routed to a bank account in Djibouti in the name of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources.
A remittance slip dated 23 March 2015 (attached in annex 2.1.b) shows one transfer of USD 40,100 into the Ministry’s Djibouti Dahabshiil account by Yu Shian International Pty, as payment on behalf of Zhejiang Ocean Family for fishing licenses for the Xin Shi Ji 37 and Xin Shi Ji 76 (see annex 2.1.c for a copy of the Xin Shi Ji 76’s license).A remittance slip dated 23 March 2015 (attached in annex 2.1.b) shows one transfer of USD 40,100 into the Ministry’s Djibouti Dahabshiil account by Yu Shian International Pty, as payment on behalf of Zhejiang Ocean Family for fishing licenses for the Xin Shi Ji 37 and Xin Shi Ji 76 (see annex 2.1.c for a copy of the Xin Shi Ji 76’s license).
6.6.
The Ministry’s use of a private bank account outside of Somalia constitutes a violation of a February 2014 ministerial directive requiring all Government revenue to be deposited in the Treasury Single Account (TSA) at the Central Bank of Somalia.The Ministry’s use of a private bank account outside of Somalia constitutes a violation of a February 2014 ministerial directive requiring all Government revenue to be deposited in the Treasury Single Account (TSA) at the Central Bank of Somalia.
The Monitoring Group shared the details of the Ministry’s Djibouti account with the FGS Minister of Finance, Mohamed Aden Ibrahim, on 18 July 2015.The Monitoring Group shared the details of the Ministry’s Djibouti account with the FGS Minister of Finance, Mohamed Aden Ibrahim, on 18 July 2015.
IUU fishing and subsequent license purchases by Chinese longlinersIUU fishing and subsequent license purchases by Chinese longliners
7.7.
At the 19th Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) held in Busan, Republic of Korea from 27 April to 1 May 2015, the FGS delegation presented a paper on IUU activities in the Somali EEZ.At the 19th Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) held in Busan, Republic of Korea from 27 April to 1 May 2015, the FGS delegation presented a paper on IUU activities in the Somali EEZ.
The report highlighted illegal fishing by seven Chinese longliners, all bearing the name Lu Qing Yuan Yu or Xin Shi Ji.The report highlighted illegal fishing by seven Chinese longliners, all bearing the name Lu Qing Yuan Yu or Xin Shi Ji.
The Chinese delegation at the conference expressed surprise that Chinese longliners were operating within Somalia’s EEZ, and offered to contact the vessels to ask them to leave the area.The Chinese delegation at the conference expressed surprise that Chinese longliners were operating within Somalia’s EEZ, and offered to contact the vessels to ask them to leave the area.
Later that same day, all the Chinese longliners fishing without licenses had left Somalia’s EEZ.Later that same day, all the Chinese longliners fishing without licenses had left Somalia’s EEZ.
8.8.
Following the Chinese Government’s crackdown on China-flagged vessels fishing illegally within Somalia’s EEZ, the companies involved immediately sought to purchase licenses from the FGS.Following the Chinese Government’s crackdown on China-flagged vessels fishing illegally within Somalia’s EEZ, the companies involved immediately sought to purchase licenses from the FGS.
A Taiwanese agent, Howard Tan, subsequently purchased fishing licenses from the Ministry for seven China-flagged longliners in May 2015 on behalf of their parent company, Deepsea Fisheries Management Ltd.: the Liao Yuan Yu 99, and the Lu Qing Yuan Yu 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, and 108.A Taiwanese agent, Howard Tan, subsequently purchased fishing licenses from the Ministry for seven China-flagged longliners in May 2015 on behalf of their parent company, Deepsea Fisheries Management Ltd.: the Liao Yuan Yu 99, and the Lu Qing Yuan Yu 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, and 108.
Six of the seven vessels had been singled out for illegal fishing during the 19th Session of the IOTC.Six of the seven vessels had been singled out for illegal fishing during the 19th Session of the IOTC.
The payments for these licenses were made to the Ministry’s Djibouti-based Dahabshiil bank account.The payments for these licenses were made to the Ministry’s Djibouti-based Dahabshiil bank account.
9.9.
Director General Iman subsequently wrote to Howard Tan on 29 June 2015: Dear Howard, As we discussed before please kindly ask the below named vessel owners to pay urgently the fined vessels US Dollar $ 10,000 each for penalty charges according to their illegal fishing time period in Somalia marine waters without license in accordance with Somali fisheries regulations.Director General Iman subsequently wrote to Howard Tan on 29 June 2015: Dear Howard, As we discussed before please kindly ask the below named vessel owners to pay urgently the fined vessels US Dollar $ 10,000 each for penalty charges according to their illegal fishing time period in Somalia marine waters without license in accordance with Somali fisheries regulations.
The email then lists six fishing vessels, the Lu Qing Yuan Yu 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, and 108, assessing each a fine of USD 10,000.The email then lists six fishing vessels, the Lu Qing Yuan Yu 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, and 108, assessing each a fine of USD 10,000.
An examination of the 2014 Fisheries Law, however, reveals no legislative basis for the fines assessed by Iman.An examination of the 2014 Fisheries Law, however, reveals no legislative basis for the fines assessed by Iman.
It appears that he was acting on his own discretion in assessing arbitrary amounts to be paid by the company.It appears that he was acting on his own discretion in assessing arbitrary amounts to be paid by the company.
10.10.
On 15 April 2015, another Taiwanese agent, Richard Tan, questioned Hussein Ahmed, a Ministry official, concerning the propriety of making payments to a bank account in Djibouti: I note that this bank account is maintained in Djibouti and not in Somalia.On 15 April 2015, another Taiwanese agent, Richard Tan, questioned Hussein Ahmed, a Ministry official, concerning the propriety of making payments to a bank account in Djibouti: I note that this bank account is maintained in Djibouti and not in Somalia.
And potentially questions will be raised as to why the account for the ministry is being maintained in Djibouti but not in Somalia.And potentially questions will be raised as to why the account for the ministry is being maintained in Djibouti but not in Somalia.
Iman forwarded the message to Minister Aimoy, who sent back a response to Iman in the Somali language on 18 April 2015: Mr. Director General, please convince these people of the reasons we’re using Dahabshiil bank in Djibouti.Iman forwarded the message to Minister Aimoy, who sent back a response to Iman in the Somali language on 18 April 2015: Mr. Director General, please convince these people of the reasons we’re using Dahabshiil bank in Djibouti.
Thank you (unofficial translation).Thank you (unofficial translation).
11.11.
The FGS Minister of Finance, Mohamed Ibrahim Aden, provided the Monitoring Group with a statement for the Ministry of Fisheries Dahabshiil account from 3 February 2015 to 25 August 2015 (see annex 2.1.d).The FGS Minister of Finance, Mohamed Ibrahim Aden, provided the Monitoring Group with a statement for the Ministry of Fisheries Dahabshiil account from 3 February 2015 to 25 August 2015 (see annex 2.1.d).
From 31 March to 24 May 2015, the statement shows five deposits in payment for license fees from Deepsea Fisheries Management Ltd. and Yu Shian International Pty, totalling roughly USD 180,000.From 31 March to 24 May 2015, the statement shows five deposits in payment for license fees from Deepsea Fisheries Management Ltd. and Yu Shian International Pty, totalling roughly USD 180,000.
12.12.
By 27 April 2015, the USD 180,000 in fishing license fees had been transferred in two instalments from the Ministry’s Dahabshiil account into its account at the Central Bank of Somalia (#80) – as opposed to the TSA, as should have been the procedure – and withdrawn shortly thereafter.By 27 April 2015, the USD 180,000 in fishing license fees had been transferred in two instalments from the Ministry’s Dahabshiil account into its account at the Central Bank of Somalia (#80) – as opposed to the TSA, as should have been the procedure – and withdrawn shortly thereafter.
On 9 April 2015, the first instalment of USD 64,900 appeared in the Ministry of Fisheries CBS account.On 9 April 2015, the first instalment of USD 64,900 appeared in the Ministry of Fisheries CBS account.
The next day, a representative of the Ministry withdrew USD 63,950 in cash from the CBS account.The next day, a representative of the Ministry withdrew USD 63,950 in cash from the CBS account.
On 27 April 2015, the remaining USD 114,700 was transferred from the Dahabshiil account to the CBS account.On 27 April 2015, the remaining USD 114,700 was transferred from the Dahabshiil account to the CBS account.
The following day, USD 113,000 was withdrawn in cash from the CBS account in the name of an individual named Hussein Dhuubow.The following day, USD 113,000 was withdrawn in cash from the CBS account in the name of an individual named Hussein Dhuubow.
The Ministry informed the Central Bank Governor that Dhuubow was a building contractor owed money for the refurbishment of the Ministry’s headquarters in Mogadishu.The Ministry informed the Central Bank Governor that Dhuubow was a building contractor owed money for the refurbishment of the Ministry’s headquarters in Mogadishu.
13.13.
As of this writing, the Monitoring Group had not yet been unable to verify the identity of Hussein Dhuubow, or confirm that the fishing license funds had been utilised towards the Ministry building in Mogadishu.As of this writing, the Monitoring Group had not yet been unable to verify the identity of Hussein Dhuubow, or confirm that the fishing license funds had been utilised towards the Ministry building in Mogadishu.
Doggang Daping Enterprises GroupDoggang Daping Enterprises Group
14.14.
The Monitoring Group has obtained a copy of a draft agreement (provided in annex 2.1.e) between the FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and Doggang Daping Enterprises Group, a fisheries company based out of Liaoning, China.The Monitoring Group has obtained a copy of a draft agreement (provided in annex 2.1.e) between the FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and Doggang Daping Enterprises Group, a fisheries company based out of Liaoning, China.
The agreement demonstrates the Ministry’s efforts to drastically expand the sale of fishing licenses, without regard for Somali national law or regional agreements.The agreement demonstrates the Ministry’s efforts to drastically expand the sale of fishing licenses, without regard for Somali national law or regional agreements.
The agreement is written in broken English and evidently without legal oversight.The agreement is written in broken English and evidently without legal oversight.
15.15.
The draft agreement grants Doggang Daping a seven-year exclusive right to purchase licenses for up to 50 trawlers or purse seiners, while prohibiting other companies of Chinese origin from engaging in fishing activities in Somali waters.The draft agreement grants Doggang Daping a seven-year exclusive right to purchase licenses for up to 50 trawlers or purse seiners, while prohibiting other companies of Chinese origin from engaging in fishing activities in Somali waters.
With a maximum license fee of USD 250,000 per fishing vessel per year, the potential annual revenue to the Ministry amounts to USD 12.5 million.With a maximum license fee of USD 250,000 per fishing vessel per year, the potential annual revenue to the Ministry amounts to USD 12.5 million.
Given the Ministry’s past practice, this revenue would most likely be diverted into the Ministry’s private Dahabshiil bank account in Djibouti, thereby circumventing the FGS’ Treasury Single Account at the Central Bank.Given the Ministry’s past practice, this revenue would most likely be diverted into the Ministry’s private Dahabshiil bank account in Djibouti, thereby circumventing the FGS’ Treasury Single Account at the Central Bank.
16.16.
Paragraph 1 of the draft agreement stipulates that Doggang Daping “may bring its own security with weapons on board [its fishing vessels]” as well as “inside…company offices”.Paragraph 1 of the draft agreement stipulates that Doggang Daping “may bring its own security with weapons on board [its fishing vessels]” as well as “inside…company offices”.
This clause, in essence, authorises the company to violate the Security Council’s arms embargo on Somalia.This clause, in essence, authorises the company to violate the Security Council’s arms embargo on Somalia.
17.17.
Paragraph 3 of the draft agreement permits Doggang Daping to fish within six nautical miles from shore, as well as trawl for demersal species such as octopus and scallops.Paragraph 3 of the draft agreement permits Doggang Daping to fish within six nautical miles from shore, as well as trawl for demersal species such as octopus and scallops.
The clause twice violates the FGS’ own 2014 Fisheries Law, which requires foreign fishing vessels to remain at least 24 nautical miles from shore in order to avoid encroaching on local fishermen;The clause twice violates the FGS’ own 2014 Fisheries Law, which requires foreign fishing vessels to remain at least 24 nautical miles from shore in order to avoid encroaching on local fishermen;
the Law also prohibits the practice of bottom trawling.the Law also prohibits the practice of bottom trawling.
In addition, the paragraph contravenes an April 2014 agreement between the FGS and Puntland, Galmudug, and the IJA, which held that coastal demersal stocks were to be managed at the regional, not federal, level.In addition, the paragraph contravenes an April 2014 agreement between the FGS and Puntland, Galmudug, and the IJA, which held that coastal demersal stocks were to be managed at the regional, not federal, level.
18.18.
The draft agreement obligates Doggang Daping to pay the Ministry a USD 70,000 “royalty fee” to be used towards “capacity building”.The draft agreement obligates Doggang Daping to pay the Ministry a USD 70,000 “royalty fee” to be used towards “capacity building”.
This provision draws parallels to the Monitoring Group’s investigation into Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Limited (see annex 2.5), which reveals how the term “capacity building” was employed by the FGS Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources in order to solicit bribes to ministerial and other FGS officials.This provision draws parallels to the Monitoring Group’s investigation into Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Limited (see annex 2.5), which reveals how the term “capacity building” was employed by the FGS Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources in order to solicit bribes to ministerial and other FGS officials.
However, the Monitoring Group has no evidence that the “capacity building” clause in the Doggang Daping draft agreement was intended to serve the same purpose.However, the Monitoring Group has no evidence that the “capacity building” clause in the Doggang Daping draft agreement was intended to serve the same purpose.
19.19.
As of this writing, the draft agreement had not been signed by either the Ministry or Doggang Daping.As of this writing, the draft agreement had not been signed by either the Ministry or Doggang Daping.
Director General Iman told the Monitoring Group that representatives of Doggang Daping had met with the Ministry in Mogadishu in the hopes of obtaining a deep-sea fishing contract, but had been rebuffed.Director General Iman told the Monitoring Group that representatives of Doggang Daping had met with the Ministry in Mogadishu in the hopes of obtaining a deep-sea fishing contract, but had been rebuffed.
However, a 7 August 2015 email from Director General Iman to Doggang Daping, copying Minister Aimoy and other Ministry officials, indicates the Ministry’s eagerness to cement the agreement: Dear Colleagues, Kindly see attached little pit (sic) amended the previous Fishing Agreement Draft Between Somalia and China.However, a 7 August 2015 email from Director General Iman to Doggang Daping, copying Minister Aimoy and other Ministry officials, indicates the Ministry’s eagerness to cement the agreement: Dear Colleagues, Kindly see attached little pit (sic) amended the previous Fishing Agreement Draft Between Somalia and China.
Kindly also note that we are ready to final it (sic) as soon as possible.Kindly also note that we are ready to final it (sic) as soon as possible.
Annex 2.1.a: Chart of FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources licence sales from March-August 2015Annex 2.1.a: Chart of FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources licence sales from March-August 2015
Annex 2.1.b: Remittance advice form for license fees totalling USD 40,100 for the Xin Shi Ji 37 and Xin Shi Ji 76, paid by Yushian International Pty Ltd.Annex 2.1.b: Remittance advice form for license fees totalling USD 40,100 for the Xin Shi Ji 37 and Xin Shi Ji 76, paid by Yushian International Pty Ltd.
Annex 2.1.c: Six-month fishing license for the Xin Shi Ji 76, sold by Director General Iman to agent Simon ChenAnnex 2.1.c: Six-month fishing license for the Xin Shi Ji 76, sold by Director General Iman to agent Simon Chen
Annex 2.1.d: Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources Dahabshiil bank statement from 3 February 2015 to 25 August 2015Annex 2.1.d: Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources Dahabshiil bank statement from 3 February 2015 to 25 August 2015
Annex 2.1.e: Draft agreement between the FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and Doggang Daping Enterprises GroupAnnex 2.1.e: Draft agreement between the FGS Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and Doggang Daping Enterprises Group
Annex 2.2: The Al Amal and Poseidon, and the assault on the Auditor GeneralAnnex 2.2: The Al Amal and Poseidon, and the assault on the Auditor General
20.20.
Corruption involving the sale of fishing licenses threatens to undermine Somali public institutions, including the Office of the Auditor General.Corruption involving the sale of fishing licenses threatens to undermine Somali public institutions, including the Office of the Auditor General.
In January 2015, the efforts of the Auditor General, Nur Farah, to investigate the illegal fishing activities of a vessel that had entered Mogadishu port, may have directly resulted in an assault on his person and subsequent threats against his life.In January 2015, the efforts of the Auditor General, Nur Farah, to investigate the illegal fishing activities of a vessel that had entered Mogadishu port, may have directly resulted in an assault on his person and subsequent threats against his life.
BackgroundBackground
21.21.
On 9 January 2015, the fishing carrier vessel Al Amal entered Mogadishu port, flying the Somali flag, in order to refuel (Al Amal’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) track from 9-15 January is available in annex 2.2.e).On 9 January 2015, the fishing carrier vessel Al Amal entered Mogadishu port, flying the Somali flag, in order to refuel (Al Amal’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) track from 9-15 January is available in annex 2.2.e).
From 3 to 5 January, the Al Amal’s sister ship, the trawler Poseidon, had remained in close proximity to Mogadishu port, prior to proceeding towards Kismayo and subsequently Mombasa (Poseidon’s AIS track is also available in annex 2.2.e).From 3 to 5 January, the Al Amal’s sister ship, the trawler Poseidon, had remained in close proximity to Mogadishu port, prior to proceeding towards Kismayo and subsequently Mombasa (Poseidon’s AIS track is also available in annex 2.2.e).
22.22.
AIS tracks show that since the beginning of 2015, the Al Amal and Poseidon have operated in tandem, with the Poseidon engaged mostly in fishing activities and the Al Amal serving as a carrier ship for storing the Poseidon’s catch.AIS tracks show that since the beginning of 2015, the Al Amal and Poseidon have operated in tandem, with the Poseidon engaged mostly in fishing activities and the Al Amal serving as a carrier ship for storing the Poseidon’s catch.
Both vessels are owned by the Yemeni-based Burum Seafood Co. (for the Al Amal’s registration certificate, see annex 2.2.d).Both vessels are owned by the Yemeni-based Burum Seafood Co. (for the Al Amal’s registration certificate, see annex 2.2.d).
The Monitoring Group has yet to identify the beneficial owners of Burum Seafood Co., however a Republic of Korea national, An Hyun Soo, represents the company.The Monitoring Group has yet to identify the beneficial owners of Burum Seafood Co., however a Republic of Korea national, An Hyun Soo, represents the company.
Dubai licensing networkDubai licensing network
23.23.
Upon entering Mogadishu harbour, the Al Amal was inspected by the Mogadishu port authority.Upon entering Mogadishu harbour, the Al Amal was inspected by the Mogadishu port authority.
The ship’s crew produced a one-year Puntland fishing license that ostensibly authorised it to fish in Somalia’s EEZ from 1 September 2014 until 1 September 2015.The ship’s crew produced a one-year Puntland fishing license that ostensibly authorised it to fish in Somalia’s EEZ from 1 September 2014 until 1 September 2015.
FGS officials subsequently contacted the Puntland Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, which responded with a letter (available in annex 2.2.b) on 15 January 2015 to the FGS, declaring the license to be a forgery.FGS officials subsequently contacted the Puntland Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, which responded with a letter (available in annex 2.2.b) on 15 January 2015 to the FGS, declaring the license to be a forgery.
The letter stated that Puntland only issues licenses for 45-day periods, and requested that the FGS hold the vessel so that Puntland authorities could take punitive action against it.The letter stated that Puntland only issues licenses for 45-day periods, and requested that the FGS hold the vessel so that Puntland authorities could take punitive action against it.
24.24.
The agent listed on the license is “Cabdi Nuur”.The agent listed on the license is “Cabdi Nuur”.
“Cabdi Nuur”, also known as Abdinor, is based in Bosaso and is a “point man” of a network supplying licenses to Korean fishing vessels.“Cabdi Nuur”, also known as Abdinor, is based in Bosaso and is a “point man” of a network supplying licenses to Korean fishing vessels.
“According to An Hyun Soo, fishing licenses for five of his vessels were purchased from this Dubai network, at prices ranging from USD 15,000 to USD 20,000 each.“According to An Hyun Soo, fishing licenses for five of his vessels were purchased from this Dubai network, at prices ranging from USD 15,000 to USD 20,000 each.
25.25.
Iranian fishing agents also appear to be purchasing licenses through this Dubai network.Iranian fishing agents also appear to be purchasing licenses through this Dubai network.
At the 19th Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) held in Busan, Republic of Korea from 27 April to 1 May 2015, the Iranian delegation claimed that Iranian fishing vessels were not engaged in IUU fishing, but rather that the Iranian fishing fleet was purchasing Puntland licenses from an agent in Dubai.At the 19th Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) held in Busan, Republic of Korea from 27 April to 1 May 2015, the Iranian delegation claimed that Iranian fishing vessels were not engaged in IUU fishing, but rather that the Iranian fishing fleet was purchasing Puntland licenses from an agent in Dubai.
The Iranian delegation provided no subsequent information regarding the identity of this agent, despite follow-up inquiries by an individual present at the conference.The Iranian delegation provided no subsequent information regarding the identity of this agent, despite follow-up inquiries by an individual present at the conference.
However, An Hyun Soo told the Monitoring Group that Iranian fishing agents regularly purchased licenses from a broker named “Abdulkadir” in Dubai.However, An Hyun Soo told the Monitoring Group that Iranian fishing agents regularly purchased licenses from a broker named “Abdulkadir” in Dubai.
As further corroboration, an Iranian gillnetter inspected in Salalah port, Oman, from 8 to 9 March 2015 produced a Puntland license that had been modified and was valid only until December 2013;As further corroboration, an Iranian gillnetter inspected in Salalah port, Oman, from 8 to 9 March 2015 produced a Puntland license that had been modified and was valid only until December 2013;
however, the agent field was left blank (see annex 2.2.g for a copy of this fake license).however, the agent field was left blank (see annex 2.2.g for a copy of this fake license).
The Monitoring Group’s 2013 report also highlighted the use of forged documents by Iranian fishing dhows, providing copies of four such licenses (see S/2013/413, annex 3.1).The Monitoring Group’s 2013 report also highlighted the use of forged documents by Iranian fishing dhows, providing copies of four such licenses (see S/2013/413, annex 3.1).
26.26.
The FGS Auditor General Nur Farah also conducted an inspection of the Al Amal in Mogadishu, informing the SEMG that the vessel was holding 70 tonnes of catch in its hold.The FGS Auditor General Nur Farah also conducted an inspection of the Al Amal in Mogadishu, informing the SEMG that the vessel was holding 70 tonnes of catch in its hold.
Farah concluded the vessel had been fishing illegally and attempted to detain it.Farah concluded the vessel had been fishing illegally and attempted to detain it.
A 15 January 2015 text message, seen by the Monitoring Group, from the FGS Director General of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Ahmed Iman, reveals that Iman also believed the Al Amal to be an “illegal fishing vessel”.A 15 January 2015 text message, seen by the Monitoring Group, from the FGS Director General of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Ahmed Iman, reveals that Iman also believed the Al Amal to be an “illegal fishing vessel”.
Despite of the Director General’s and Auditor General’s positions, and the documentary evidence that Al Amal was not licensed to fish in Somalia’s EEZ, the vessel was released on 15 January 2015 and left Mogadishu port the same day.Despite of the Director General’s and Auditor General’s positions, and the documentary evidence that Al Amal was not licensed to fish in Somalia’s EEZ, the vessel was released on 15 January 2015 and left Mogadishu port the same day.
An Hyun Soo told the Monitoring Group that that Mogadishu’s port authority had asked for money in exchange for the vessel’s release, but did not confirm whether any amount had been paid.An Hyun Soo told the Monitoring Group that that Mogadishu’s port authority had asked for money in exchange for the vessel’s release, but did not confirm whether any amount had been paid.
27.27.
Auditor General Farah stated in a subsequent media interview that the vessel had been freed after President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud sent a letter to the Banadir Regional Court.Auditor General Farah stated in a subsequent media interview that the vessel had been freed after President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud sent a letter to the Banadir Regional Court.
However, Farah also claimed in the same interview that the FGS Attorney General, Dr. Ahmed Ali Dahir, had ordered the vessel released.However, Farah also claimed in the same interview that the FGS Attorney General, Dr. Ahmed Ali Dahir, had ordered the vessel released.
In an interview with the Monitoring Group, Farah recounted he had been “told by ‘upper management’ to let [the Al Amal] go”.In an interview with the Monitoring Group, Farah recounted he had been “told by ‘upper management’ to let [the Al Amal] go”.
The Attorney General, conversely, told the Monitoring Group that the Al Amal had entered Mogadishu to buy fish from local markets, and that the vessel possessed both a valid Puntland license and a “general trading license” issued by the FGS.The Attorney General, conversely, told the Monitoring Group that the Al Amal had entered Mogadishu to buy fish from local markets, and that the vessel possessed both a valid Puntland license and a “general trading license” issued by the FGS.
As noted above, the Monitoring Group has concluded that the Al Amal’s Puntland license was a forgery, and the Group has not been able to confirm the existence of any additional licenses or permits carried by the vessel.As noted above, the Monitoring Group has concluded that the Al Amal’s Puntland license was a forgery, and the Group has not been able to confirm the existence of any additional licenses or permits carried by the vessel.
28.28.
The Monitoring Group contacted the Puntland Government in August and September 2015 to request information on the issuing of forged fishing licenses, but did not receive a response.The Monitoring Group contacted the Puntland Government in August and September 2015 to request information on the issuing of forged fishing licenses, but did not receive a response.
Assault on the Auditor GeneralAssault on the Auditor General
29.29.
On 18 January 2015, three days after the release of the Al Amal, the Auditor General was prevented from entering his office at Villa Somalia and was reportedly assaulted by the compound’s guards.On 18 January 2015, three days after the release of the Al Amal, the Auditor General was prevented from entering his office at Villa Somalia and was reportedly assaulted by the compound’s guards.
Farah told the Monitoring Group that the presidential guards repeatedly brought down a checkpoint barrier on his vehicle, forcing him to take cover in the foot well.Farah told the Monitoring Group that the presidential guards repeatedly brought down a checkpoint barrier on his vehicle, forcing him to take cover in the foot well.
Farah also told the Group that he believed his attempt to detain the Al Amal had brought on the attack, and that he had since stopped investigating IUU fishing because he feared for his safety.Farah also told the Group that he believed his attempt to detain the Al Amal had brought on the attack, and that he had since stopped investigating IUU fishing because he feared for his safety.
Farah also claimed in interviews with local media that his life was in danger.Farah also claimed in interviews with local media that his life was in danger.
The Group is not aware of subsequent threats against Farah since January 2015.The Group is not aware of subsequent threats against Farah since January 2015.
The grounding of the Al Amal in PuntlandThe grounding of the Al Amal in Puntland
30.30.
On 5 August 2015, the Al Amal experienced mechanical problems and ran aground off the coast of Puntland near the former pirate base of Eyl (a photo of the grounded vessel is available in annex 2.2.h).On 5 August 2015, the Al Amal experienced mechanical problems and ran aground off the coast of Puntland near the former pirate base of Eyl (a photo of the grounded vessel is available in annex 2.2.h).
The 34-member crew was subsequently rescued in an operation carried out by the Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF).The 34-member crew was subsequently rescued in an operation carried out by the Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF).
The crew was transported to Garowe and the majority repatriated;The crew was transported to Garowe and the majority repatriated;
however the captain and the chief engineer were detained in Puntland, pending possible criminal action against the vessel for illegal fishing and environmental damage.however the captain and the chief engineer were detained in Puntland, pending possible criminal action against the vessel for illegal fishing and environmental damage.
31.31.
The Monitoring Group has obtained a copy of the Puntland fishing license the Al Amal was carrying at the time it ran aground, reproduced in annex 2.2.c.The Monitoring Group has obtained a copy of the Puntland fishing license the Al Amal was carrying at the time it ran aground, reproduced in annex 2.2.c.
Similar to the license produced by Al Amal’s crew upon inspection at Mogadishu port, this document was forged, with the fields containing the length of its validly, dates, and nationality of the vessel noticeably altered by computer.Similar to the license produced by Al Amal’s crew upon inspection at Mogadishu port, this document was forged, with the fields containing the length of its validly, dates, and nationality of the vessel noticeably altered by computer.
The dates on the license purport it to be valid from 25 November 2014 to 25 November 2015;The dates on the license purport it to be valid from 25 November 2014 to 25 November 2015;
however, the license is signed and stamped by former Puntland Minister of Fisheries Mohamed Farah Adan, who had left his post by February 2014.however, the license is signed and stamped by former Puntland Minister of Fisheries Mohamed Farah Adan, who had left his post by February 2014.
Private Armed Security Teams (PASTs)Private Armed Security Teams (PASTs)
32.32.
According to the Al Amal’s crew manifest, on file with the Monitoring Group, the two Yemeni crewmembers served on board as an armed security detail.According to the Al Amal’s crew manifest, on file with the Monitoring Group, the two Yemeni crewmembers served on board as an armed security detail.
Not only was their presence a violation of the arms embargo on Somalia, such deployments have the potential to recreate the conditions that led to the emergence of Somali piracy in 2007, by fomenting conflict between foreign fishing vessels and local fishermen.Not only was their presence a violation of the arms embargo on Somalia, such deployments have the potential to recreate the conditions that led to the emergence of Somali piracy in 2007, by fomenting conflict between foreign fishing vessels and local fishermen.
33.33.
The deployment of PASTs on board Al Amal and Poseidon appears to have been standard practice.The deployment of PASTs on board Al Amal and Poseidon appears to have been standard practice.
After leaving the vicinity of Mogadisu port on 5 January 2015, the Poseidon arrived at Kismayo on 6 February.After leaving the vicinity of Mogadisu port on 5 January 2015, the Poseidon arrived at Kismayo on 6 February.
According to An Hyun Soo the vessel then discharged a Somali private security detachment before proceeding to Mombasa.According to An Hyun Soo the vessel then discharged a Somali private security detachment before proceeding to Mombasa.
This testimony is corroborated by other information received by the Monitoring Group to the effect that both Poseidon and Al Amal have routinely employed Somali-origin PASTs on board.This testimony is corroborated by other information received by the Monitoring Group to the effect that both Poseidon and Al Amal have routinely employed Somali-origin PASTs on board.
Annex 2.2.a: Fake Puntland license obtained by FGS Auditor General Nur Farah during his inspection of the Al Amal in Mogadishu port on 13 January 2015Annex 2.2.a: Fake Puntland license obtained by FGS Auditor General Nur Farah during his inspection of the Al Amal in Mogadishu port on 13 January 2015
Annex 2.2.b: Letter from Puntland Government dated 15 January 2015, declaring the Al Amal’s license to be forgedAnnex 2.2.b: Letter from Puntland Government dated 15 January 2015, declaring the Al Amal’s license to be forged
Annex 2.2.c: Forged Puntland fishing license for Al Amal produced after the vessel ran aground near Eyl, Puntland on 5 August 2015Annex 2.2.c: Forged Puntland fishing license for Al Amal produced after the vessel ran aground near Eyl, Puntland on 5 August 2015
Annex 2.2.d: Yemeni registration certificate for Al AmalAnnex 2.2.d: Yemeni registration certificate for Al Amal
Annex 2.2.e: AIS tracks for the Poseidon and Al Amal, showing their proximity to Mogadishu port from 3 January 2015 to 15 January 2015, when the Al Amal left MogadishuAnnex 2.2.e: AIS tracks for the Poseidon and Al Amal, showing their proximity to Mogadishu port from 3 January 2015 to 15 January 2015, when the Al Amal left Mogadishu
Annex 2.2.f: Puntland license for the Poseidon, the sister ship of the Al Amal, altered by computer.Annex 2.2.f: Puntland license for the Poseidon, the sister ship of the Al Amal, altered by computer.
Annex 2.2.g: Fake Puntland fishing license for an Iranian gillnetter inspected in Salalah from 8-9 March 2015.Annex 2.2.g: Fake Puntland fishing license for an Iranian gillnetter inspected in Salalah from 8-9 March 2015.
Annex 2.2.h: The Al Amal ran aground near Eyl, Puntland on 5 August 2015Annex 2.2.h: The Al Amal ran aground near Eyl, Puntland on 5 August 2015
Annex 2.3: Continuing privatisation of Somalia’s maritime spaceAnnex 2.3: Continuing privatisation of Somalia’s maritime space
34.34.
The Monitoring Group believes that the continuing privatisation of Somalia’s maritime space – through empowering private companies to simultaneous manage marine resources, issue fishing licenses, and provide security – represents a threat to peace and security as per paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1844 (2008).The Monitoring Group believes that the continuing privatisation of Somalia’s maritime space – through empowering private companies to simultaneous manage marine resources, issue fishing licenses, and provide security – represents a threat to peace and security as per paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1844 (2008).
During the Group’s mandate, two companies, Somali Security Services Ltd.During the Group’s mandate, two companies, Somali Security Services Ltd.
(SSS Ltd.) and Anglo Somaliland Resources Ltd.(SSS Ltd.) and Anglo Somaliland Resources Ltd.
(ASR Ltd.), have been granted such rights in Puntland and Somaliland, respectively.(ASR Ltd.), have been granted such rights in Puntland and Somaliland, respectively.
Somali Security Services Ltd.Somali Security Services Ltd.
(SSS Ltd.) in Puntland(SSS Ltd.) in Puntland
35.35.
On 23 March 2015, The Somali Security Services Ltd.On 23 March 2015, The Somali Security Services Ltd.
(SSS Ltd.) entered into a nine-month agreement with the Puntland Government to provide Coast Guard services.(SSS Ltd.) entered into a nine-month agreement with the Puntland Government to provide Coast Guard services.
In exchange, the company will receive 30 per cent of Government revenue obtained from fishing license sales and fines imposed on arrested vessels.In exchange, the company will receive 30 per cent of Government revenue obtained from fishing license sales and fines imposed on arrested vessels.
The contract also stipulates that the company’s marines will be drawn from the ranks of the Puntland police force.The contract also stipulates that the company’s marines will be drawn from the ranks of the Puntland police force.
A copy of the SSS Ltd. contract is provided in annex 2.3.a.A copy of the SSS Ltd. contract is provided in annex 2.3.a.
36.36.
SSS Ltd. is headed by Abdiweli Ali Taar, a former taxi driver and sales clerk from Toronto, Canada.SSS Ltd. is headed by Abdiweli Ali Taar, a former taxi driver and sales clerk from Toronto, Canada.
Taar is a close personal associate of Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gaas”.Taar is a close personal associate of Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gaas”.
When the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) placed “Gaas” under house arrest in October 2012 in Bosaso, while “Gaas” was still an opposition politician, he was staying at Taar’s residence.When the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) placed “Gaas” under house arrest in October 2012 in Bosaso, while “Gaas” was still an opposition politician, he was staying at Taar’s residence.
37.37.
Prior to founding SSS Ltd., Taar headed another private outfit, the Somali-Canadian Coast Guard (SomCan), which served as Puntland’s Coast Guard from 2002-2005 and again from 2008-2009.Prior to founding SSS Ltd., Taar headed another private outfit, the Somali-Canadian Coast Guard (SomCan), which served as Puntland’s Coast Guard from 2002-2005 and again from 2008-2009.
Even though SomCan was not authorised to sell fishing licenses, the company nonetheless sold licenses to its own private clients, with Taar signing many of them personally.Even though SomCan was not authorised to sell fishing licenses, the company nonetheless sold licenses to its own private clients, with Taar signing many of them personally.
In particular, SomCan favoured one client – the Thai fishing company Sirichai – and stationed its marines on the decks of Sirichai’s fishing vessels.In particular, SomCan favoured one client – the Thai fishing company Sirichai – and stationed its marines on the decks of Sirichai’s fishing vessels.
SomCan’s practices led to conflicts with local fishermen, contributing over time to the emergence of Somali piracy.SomCan’s practices led to conflicts with local fishermen, contributing over time to the emergence of Somali piracy.
SomCan’s first Coast Guard stint came to an end when the company’s own marines hijacked a fishing vessel they had been tasked with guarding, the Sirichainava 12, and demanded a USD 800,000 ransom.SomCan’s first Coast Guard stint came to an end when the company’s own marines hijacked a fishing vessel they had been tasked with guarding, the Sirichainava 12, and demanded a USD 800,000 ransom.
38.38.
Following the disbanding of SomCan in 2005, some of the company’s former marines later turned to piracy on a more permanent basis, using their skills in maritime navigation and boarding operations to hijack foreign vessels.Following the disbanding of SomCan in 2005, some of the company’s former marines later turned to piracy on a more permanent basis, using their skills in maritime navigation and boarding operations to hijack foreign vessels.
The ranks of Somali pirates were further swelled by ex-marines trained by Hart Security, a UK company headed by a former SAS officer, Lord Richard Westbury, which had previously operated a Coast Guard in Puntland from 1999-2002.The ranks of Somali pirates were further swelled by ex-marines trained by Hart Security, a UK company headed by a former SAS officer, Lord Richard Westbury, which had previously operated a Coast Guard in Puntland from 1999-2002.
39.39.
SSS Ltd. only began operations in April 2015, and it is not yet clear if the company will experience the same unintended fallout that plagued the last two private Coast Guards in Puntland.SSS Ltd. only began operations in April 2015, and it is not yet clear if the company will experience the same unintended fallout that plagued the last two private Coast Guards in Puntland.
The fact that the Puntland authorities are supplying the marines on board SSS Ltd’.s vessels should help mitigate the risk, since they are likely to serve the state rather than private interests.The fact that the Puntland authorities are supplying the marines on board SSS Ltd’.s vessels should help mitigate the risk, since they are likely to serve the state rather than private interests.
However, it remains problematic that a for-profit company responsible for providing maritime security to a regional authority should directly benefit from the sale of fishing licenses.However, it remains problematic that a for-profit company responsible for providing maritime security to a regional authority should directly benefit from the sale of fishing licenses.
As in the past, company officials may succumb to the temptation of selling illicit licenses to international clients, fuelling the cycle of corruption and conflict with local fishermen that helped prime the conditions for the explosion of Somali piracy in 2007 and 2008.As in the past, company officials may succumb to the temptation of selling illicit licenses to international clients, fuelling the cycle of corruption and conflict with local fishermen that helped prime the conditions for the explosion of Somali piracy in 2007 and 2008.
Anglo Somaliland Resources Ltd. in SomalilandAnglo Somaliland Resources Ltd. in Somaliland
40.40.
On 26 February 2015, Sir Tony Baldry, a former UK MP for Banbury, incorporated the company Anglo Somaliland Resources Ltd (ASR Ltd.) in the UK.On 26 February 2015, Sir Tony Baldry, a former UK MP for Banbury, incorporated the company Anglo Somaliland Resources Ltd (ASR Ltd.) in the UK.
In August 2015, the company signed a contract in Somaliland authorising the company to sell fishing licenses.In August 2015, the company signed a contract in Somaliland authorising the company to sell fishing licenses.
This contract was the culmination of a series of attempts by Baldry to conduct business in Somalia stretching back to at least 2012, when he was still a member of the UK House of Commons.This contract was the culmination of a series of attempts by Baldry to conduct business in Somalia stretching back to at least 2012, when he was still a member of the UK House of Commons.
Baldry served as an MP from 1983 to 2015, when he stood down to pursue his business interests.Baldry served as an MP from 1983 to 2015, when he stood down to pursue his business interests.
Somaliland agreementSomaliland agreement
41.41.
In an April 2015 interview, Baldry informed the Monitoring Group of his intention to conduct business in Somaliland through the newly-incorporated ASR Ltd.In an April 2015 interview, Baldry informed the Monitoring Group of his intention to conduct business in Somaliland through the newly-incorporated ASR Ltd.
Baldry stated that he was embarking on a “Coast Guard-related” project aimed at protecting Somaliland’s fishing licensing system.Baldry stated that he was embarking on a “Coast Guard-related” project aimed at protecting Somaliland’s fishing licensing system.
Baldry has since denied in multiple emails to the Monitoring Group that ASR Ltd. is involved in any Coast Guard project, but rather in a scheme aimed at “improving fisheries management” in Somaliland.Baldry has since denied in multiple emails to the Monitoring Group that ASR Ltd. is involved in any Coast Guard project, but rather in a scheme aimed at “improving fisheries management” in Somaliland.
Baldry further told the Group that he was the “only person persevering in trying to help [the Somali people]”.Baldry further told the Group that he was the “only person persevering in trying to help [the Somali people]”.
42.42.
On 21 April 2015, Baldry’s business partner, Ian Fenwick, sent an email to Baldry and their other partners, with an attached photo of Fenwick posing with four Somali individuals in Hargiesa (this photo is attached in annex 2.3.b).On 21 April 2015, Baldry’s business partner, Ian Fenwick, sent an email to Baldry and their other partners, with an attached photo of Fenwick posing with four Somali individuals in Hargiesa (this photo is attached in annex 2.3.b).
The email read:The email read:
Deal signed by the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources on my left.Deal signed by the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources on my left.
Followed by reception at the Presidential building with the Presidential Minister who welcomed me to Hargeisa and invited me to become a Business Ambassador for Somaliand (sic).Followed by reception at the Presidential building with the Presidential Minister who welcomed me to Hargeisa and invited me to become a Business Ambassador for Somaliand (sic).
According to Baldry, this “deal” consisted of an MOU with the Somaliland Government “to help enhance Somaliland’s sea fisheries”.According to Baldry, this “deal” consisted of an MOU with the Somaliland Government “to help enhance Somaliland’s sea fisheries”.
43.43.
On 4 August 2015, ASR Ltd. signed a formal contract with the Somaliland Government granting the company the exclusive right to fish in Somaliland’s territorial coastal waters, as well to sell licenses to third parties (see annex 2.3.c for a copy of the first page of this contract).On 4 August 2015, ASR Ltd. signed a formal contract with the Somaliland Government granting the company the exclusive right to fish in Somaliland’s territorial coastal waters, as well to sell licenses to third parties (see annex 2.3.c for a copy of the first page of this contract).
In exchange, the Somaliland Government received a signing bonus of USD 500, and will receive USD 2,000 annually from ASR Ltd., plus 40 per cent of revenues from the sale of fishing licenses.In exchange, the Somaliland Government received a signing bonus of USD 500, and will receive USD 2,000 annually from ASR Ltd., plus 40 per cent of revenues from the sale of fishing licenses.
44.44.
The Monitoring Group is highly concerned that that the granting of exclusive fishing rights to a foreign company may cause resentment among local fishermen and coastal communities.The Monitoring Group is highly concerned that that the granting of exclusive fishing rights to a foreign company may cause resentment among local fishermen and coastal communities.
As in other regions of Somalia – particularly Puntland – such resentment has the potential to lead to the outbreak of violence between foreign fishing crews and local residents, and even to acts of piracy.As in other regions of Somalia – particularly Puntland – such resentment has the potential to lead to the outbreak of violence between foreign fishing crews and local residents, and even to acts of piracy.
Annex 2.3.a: Copy of 23 March 2015 contract between Somali Security Services Ltd. and the Puntland GovernmentAnnex 2.3.a: Copy of 23 March 2015 contract between Somali Security Services Ltd. and the Puntland Government
Annex 2.3.b: Ian Fenwick in Somaliland to sign the Anglo Somaliland Resources Ltd.Annex 2.3.b: Ian Fenwick in Somaliland to sign the Anglo Somaliland Resources Ltd.
MOU (second from right)MOU (second from right)
Annex 2.3.c: First page of the 4 August 2015 contract between Anglo Somaliland Resources and the Government of SomalilandAnnex 2.3.c: First page of the 4 August 2015 contract between Anglo Somaliland Resources and the Government of Somaliland
Annex 2.4: Hijackings of the Iranian dhows FV Siraj and FV Jaber by pirates linked to Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje”Annex 2.4: Hijackings of the Iranian dhows FV Siraj and FV Jaber by pirates linked to Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje”
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Annex 2.5: Soma Oil & Gas Holdings LimitedAnnex 2.5: Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Limited
45.45.
As a case study illustrating the need for the establishing of strong public institutions prior to the development of Somalia’s extractives sector, the Monitoring Group has conducted an extensive investigation into the operations of Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Limited (Soma).As a case study illustrating the need for the establishing of strong public institutions prior to the development of Somalia’s extractives sector, the Monitoring Group has conducted an extensive investigation into the operations of Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Limited (Soma).
Soma is an extractives exploration company that secured a lucrative contract in August 2013 with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to conduct seismic surveying off the country’s southern and central coast.Soma is an extractives exploration company that secured a lucrative contract in August 2013 with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to conduct seismic surveying off the country’s southern and central coast.
The contract awarded Soma the subsequent right to exploit 12 offshore oil and gas blocks (totalling 60,000 km2) of its own choosing.The contract awarded Soma the subsequent right to exploit 12 offshore oil and gas blocks (totalling 60,000 km2) of its own choosing.
46.46.
The Group has obtained evidence demonstrating that Soma has been making regular payments since June 2014 to civil servants in the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (the Ministry), some of whom were instrumental in both securing the company’s initial contract, and negotiating subsequent agreements.The Group has obtained evidence demonstrating that Soma has been making regular payments since June 2014 to civil servants in the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (the Ministry), some of whom were instrumental in both securing the company’s initial contract, and negotiating subsequent agreements.
A “Capacity Building Agreement” was signed by Soma and the Ministry mainly to channel these payments.A “Capacity Building Agreement” was signed by Soma and the Ministry mainly to channel these payments.
The evidence collected by the Monitoring Group demonstrates that this Capacity Building Agreement created a serious conflict of interest, in a number of cases appearing to fund systematic payoffs to senior ministerial officials.The evidence collected by the Monitoring Group demonstrates that this Capacity Building Agreement created a serious conflict of interest, in a number of cases appearing to fund systematic payoffs to senior ministerial officials.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 2002 (2011) and paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 2060 (2012), the Monitoring Group will describe acts that undermine Somali public institutions through corruption and will demonstrate how:Pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 2002 (2011) and paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 2060 (2012), the Monitoring Group will describe acts that undermine Somali public institutions through corruption and will demonstrate how:
The Capacity Building Agreement was likely part of a quid pro quo arrangement, whereby the Ministry would protect Soma’s contract from the potential negative consequences of a forthcoming review by the Financial Governance Committee (FGC), a body chaired by the FGS Minister of Finance and tasked with reviewing Government contracts;The Capacity Building Agreement was likely part of a quid pro quo arrangement, whereby the Ministry would protect Soma’s contract from the potential negative consequences of a forthcoming review by the Financial Governance Committee (FGC), a body chaired by the FGS Minister of Finance and tasked with reviewing Government contracts;
as a possible further quid pro quo, Ministry officials arranged to extend the offshore area in which Soma is permitted to conduct seismic surveying (“Evaluation Area”) and later, at Soma’s behest, began to renegotiate the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) for the company’s future blocks – all while on Soma’s payroll;as a possible further quid pro quo, Ministry officials arranged to extend the offshore area in which Soma is permitted to conduct seismic surveying (“Evaluation Area”) and later, at Soma’s behest, began to renegotiate the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) for the company’s future blocks – all while on Soma’s payroll;
senior civil servants awarded themselves ‘salaries’ pursuant to spuriously drafted contracts for positions they already held;senior civil servants awarded themselves ‘salaries’ pursuant to spuriously drafted contracts for positions they already held;
at least six officials on Soma’s ‘capacity building’ payroll simultaneously drew FGS civil servant salaries;at least six officials on Soma’s ‘capacity building’ payroll simultaneously drew FGS civil servant salaries;
Soma transferred the first instalment of ‘capacity building’ funds to the Ministry before performing internal due diligence on the individuals who were to receive salary payments.Soma transferred the first instalment of ‘capacity building’ funds to the Ministry before performing internal due diligence on the individuals who were to receive salary payments.
The company continued to transfer funds even once their identities became known to the company and;The company continued to transfer funds even once their identities became known to the company and;
Soma paid close to half a million dollars to an ostensibly independent legal advisor to the Ministry, J. Jay Park.Soma paid close to half a million dollars to an ostensibly independent legal advisor to the Ministry, J. Jay Park.
47.47.
The Monitoring Group further describes how the misuse of ‘capacity building’ in the Soma context fits within a broader pattern of misconduct and misappropriation at the Ministry.The Monitoring Group further describes how the misuse of ‘capacity building’ in the Soma context fits within a broader pattern of misconduct and misappropriation at the Ministry.
The Monitoring Group has obtained evidence, for example, of the Ministry’s attempts to persuade at least one other oil and gas company to pay ‘salaries’ to its staff.The Monitoring Group has obtained evidence, for example, of the Ministry’s attempts to persuade at least one other oil and gas company to pay ‘salaries’ to its staff.
Ministry staff also diverted payments from another company into a privately held ministerial bank account in contravention of FGS regulations – and indeed attempted to have Soma direct its funding into this account.Ministry staff also diverted payments from another company into a privately held ministerial bank account in contravention of FGS regulations – and indeed attempted to have Soma direct its funding into this account.
48.48.
The Monitoring Group’s findings reinforce the rationale for its previous calls for the implementation of clear legal and policy frameworks governing the engagement of the extractives industry in Somalia.The Monitoring Group’s findings reinforce the rationale for its previous calls for the implementation of clear legal and policy frameworks governing the engagement of the extractives industry in Somalia.
In particular the FGS should be encouraged to apply its existing legislation, especially the 2008 Petroleum Law, in the management of both current and future oil and gas contracts.In particular the FGS should be encouraged to apply its existing legislation, especially the 2008 Petroleum Law, in the management of both current and future oil and gas contracts.
As required by this legislation, it is critical to establish an independent Somali Petroleum Authority to serve as regulator for the industry.As required by this legislation, it is critical to establish an independent Somali Petroleum Authority to serve as regulator for the industry.
The Federal Parliament should also approve current, future contracts and authorisations – including the draft Soma PSA currently under consideration by the Ministry.The Federal Parliament should also approve current, future contracts and authorisations – including the draft Soma PSA currently under consideration by the Ministry.
49.49.
The Monitoring Group recognises the considerable potential of oil and gas discoveries in Somalia and in Somali waters, but also the threat to peace, security and stability posed by an unregulated extractives industry.The Monitoring Group recognises the considerable potential of oil and gas discoveries in Somalia and in Somali waters, but also the threat to peace, security and stability posed by an unregulated extractives industry.
The Group has previously highlighted both the risks of corruption in the sector, and the “shortcomings” in transparency and capacity of Somalia’s petroleum institutions (S/2013/413 and S/2014/726).The Group has previously highlighted both the risks of corruption in the sector, and the “shortcomings” in transparency and capacity of Somalia’s petroleum institutions (S/2013/413 and S/2014/726).
The Group will, therefore, again recommend a moratorium on all PSAs until the necessary arrangements and institutions are in place to manage the industry for the good of the Somali people.The Group will, therefore, again recommend a moratorium on all PSAs until the necessary arrangements and institutions are in place to manage the industry for the good of the Somali people.
Background to the Capacity Building AgreementBackground to the Capacity Building Agreement
50.50.
The circumstances and chronology of events surrounding the Capacity Building Agreement are integral to an understanding of how an ostensibly positive arrangement for Somalia was in fact a scheme concocted by the Ministry, with Soma’s acceptance, in the expectation of reciprocal benefits.The circumstances and chronology of events surrounding the Capacity Building Agreement are integral to an understanding of how an ostensibly positive arrangement for Somalia was in fact a scheme concocted by the Ministry, with Soma’s acceptance, in the expectation of reciprocal benefits.
51.51.
In a May 2013 interview, the former Minister for National Resources, Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, asserted that the FGS “should wait until we have the right laws in place” before entering into agreements with oil and gas firms.In a May 2013 interview, the former Minister for National Resources, Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, asserted that the FGS “should wait until we have the right laws in place” before entering into agreements with oil and gas firms.
Three months later, on 6 August 2013, the FGS signed a Seismic Option Agreement (SOA) with Soma, in which the latter agreed to conduct a seismic survey within an area to be confirmed in a later “Reconnaissance Authorisation” agreement.Three months later, on 6 August 2013, the FGS signed a Seismic Option Agreement (SOA) with Soma, in which the latter agreed to conduct a seismic survey within an area to be confirmed in a later “Reconnaissance Authorisation” agreement.
On 9 January 2014, with the “Evaluation Area” agreed, the FGS formally entered into a Reconnaissance Authorisation agreement with Soma (see annex 2.5.a).On 9 January 2014, with the “Evaluation Area” agreed, the FGS formally entered into a Reconnaissance Authorisation agreement with Soma (see annex 2.5.a).
52.52.
On 21 January 2014 Daud Mohamed Omar was appointed as FGS Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources.On 21 January 2014 Daud Mohamed Omar was appointed as FGS Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources.
Fewer than two weeks later, on 2 March 2014, the original SOA with Soma was sent to the newly established Financial Governance Committee (FGC) for review.Fewer than two weeks later, on 2 March 2014, the original SOA with Soma was sent to the newly established Financial Governance Committee (FGC) for review.
53.53.
On 5 March 2014 Soma made arrangements for Minister Omar, Farah Abdi Hassan, the Director General of the Ministry, and Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed and J. Jay Park, advisors to the Ministry, to stay at Nairobi’s Fairmont Hotel from 9-13 March 2014 in order to hold meetings with the company (see annex 2.5.b for a photo of one of these meetings).On 5 March 2014 Soma made arrangements for Minister Omar, Farah Abdi Hassan, the Director General of the Ministry, and Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed and J. Jay Park, advisors to the Ministry, to stay at Nairobi’s Fairmont Hotel from 9-13 March 2014 in order to hold meetings with the company (see annex 2.5.b for a photo of one of these meetings).
54.54.
On 10 March 2014, Minister Omar signed a “First Amendment Agreement” to the 6 August 2013 SOA, which was subsequently transmitted to Soma on 22 March to be countersigned (see annex 2.5.c).On 10 March 2014, Minister Omar signed a “First Amendment Agreement” to the 6 August 2013 SOA, which was subsequently transmitted to Soma on 22 March to be countersigned (see annex 2.5.c).
The Agreement included a request for “capacity assistance in connection with the supporting work of the Government in relation to the seismic survey…” In a letter dated 15 March 2014 and also sent to Soma on 22 March, Minister Omar formally requested “that Soma provide financial support to the Government”.The Agreement included a request for “capacity assistance in connection with the supporting work of the Government in relation to the seismic survey…” In a letter dated 15 March 2014 and also sent to Soma on 22 March, Minister Omar formally requested “that Soma provide financial support to the Government”.
55.55.
Specifically, Minister Omar requested support with:Specifically, Minister Omar requested support with:
(a)(a)
rehabilitation of the Ministry’s offices in Mogadishu;rehabilitation of the Ministry’s offices in Mogadishu;
(b)(b)
furnishing and equipping the Ministry’s office, including establishment of a data room;furnishing and equipping the Ministry’s office, including establishment of a data room;
(c)(c)
the hiring and contracting of qualified technical staff and expert consultants and advisors, inside and outside of Somalia, including covering the costs of:the hiring and contracting of qualified technical staff and expert consultants and advisors, inside and outside of Somalia, including covering the costs of:
1.1.
salary or consulting fees;salary or consulting fees;
2.2.
benefits;benefits;
3.3.
accommodation allowance;accommodation allowance;
and,and,
4.4.
business related travel;business related travel;
(d)(d)
training programs for Ministry staff;training programs for Ministry staff;
(e)(e)
Petroleum regime development programs focused on the following objectives:Petroleum regime development programs focused on the following objectives:
1.1.
harmonization of Somalia’s constitutional provisions governing petroleum and minerals issues;harmonization of Somalia’s constitutional provisions governing petroleum and minerals issues;
2.2.
development of petroleum policy, petroleum law, petroleum regulations, and model host government contracts;development of petroleum policy, petroleum law, petroleum regulations, and model host government contracts;
andand
3.3.
conferring and developing consensus with governments of regional member states;conferring and developing consensus with governments of regional member states;
andand
(f)(f)
Other areas as may be agreed in writing by Government and Soma (see annex 2.5.d for a copy of this letter).Other areas as may be agreed in writing by Government and Soma (see annex 2.5.d for a copy of this letter).
56.56.
On 27 March 2014, the Director General of the Ministry, Farah Abdi Hassan, expressed annoyance over delays in Soma’s response to the Ministry’s request for capacity assistance, declaring in an email addressed to the Ministry’s legal advisor, Jay Park, that the Ministry would not stand for Soma “questioning” or “delaying” the programme.On 27 March 2014, the Director General of the Ministry, Farah Abdi Hassan, expressed annoyance over delays in Soma’s response to the Ministry’s request for capacity assistance, declaring in an email addressed to the Ministry’s legal advisor, Jay Park, that the Ministry would not stand for Soma “questioning” or “delaying” the programme.
He also warned that Soma’s contractual agreements with the FGS, both past and prospective, would be subject to review if “assistance” were not provided: “If the SOMA questions the assistance [to] the Ministry then so many things goes [sic] to review, while the parliament is asking to ratify the SOA agreement”.He also warned that Soma’s contractual agreements with the FGS, both past and prospective, would be subject to review if “assistance” were not provided: “If the SOMA questions the assistance [to] the Ministry then so many things goes [sic] to review, while the parliament is asking to ratify the SOA agreement”.
57.57.
On 17 April 2014, Director General Hassan wrote to two of Soma’s directors, CEO Robert Sheppard and Hassan Khaire, informing them that the Natural Resources Subcommittee of the FGS Parliament had requested a copy of the 6 August 2013 SOA for review.On 17 April 2014, Director General Hassan wrote to two of Soma’s directors, CEO Robert Sheppard and Hassan Khaire, informing them that the Natural Resources Subcommittee of the FGS Parliament had requested a copy of the 6 August 2013 SOA for review.
In the correspondence, Hassan again suggested a link between the provision of ‘capacity building’ and the protection of the Soma SOA from official review: “[w]hy don’t you sign the [First Amendment Agreement] and return, because, I am sure it will protect the [SOA] agreement”.In the correspondence, Hassan again suggested a link between the provision of ‘capacity building’ and the protection of the Soma SOA from official review: “[w]hy don’t you sign the [First Amendment Agreement] and return, because, I am sure it will protect the [SOA] agreement”.
The very same day, Sheppard sent a formal letter to Minister Omar confirming Soma’s desire to move ahead with the agreement:The very same day, Sheppard sent a formal letter to Minister Omar confirming Soma’s desire to move ahead with the agreement:
Soma Oil & Gas understands your request for support in regards to capacity building at the Ministry.Soma Oil & Gas understands your request for support in regards to capacity building at the Ministry.
In the next few days, I will be writing a separate letter to you outlining how Soma Oil & Gas proposes to support the Ministry in this regard.In the next few days, I will be writing a separate letter to you outlining how Soma Oil & Gas proposes to support the Ministry in this regard.
58.58.
Three days later, on 20 April 2014, Soma followed through on its pledge, and a draft text of the Capacity Building Agreement was sent to Director General Hassan for his review.Three days later, on 20 April 2014, Soma followed through on its pledge, and a draft text of the Capacity Building Agreement was sent to Director General Hassan for his review.
59.59.
Three days after receipt of this draft agreement, the FGC “Confidential Assessment” of the Soma SOA arrived at the Ministry.Three days after receipt of this draft agreement, the FGC “Confidential Assessment” of the Soma SOA arrived at the Ministry.
While specific improvements to the SOA were recommended – alongside more general concerns raised regarding “contracting in the oil and gas sector as a whole” – the FGC did not make recommendations that threatened the validity of the Soma deal.While specific improvements to the SOA were recommended – alongside more general concerns raised regarding “contracting in the oil and gas sector as a whole” – the FGC did not make recommendations that threatened the validity of the Soma deal.
60.60.
The Capacity Building Agreement (“the Agreement”) was signed by the Minister on 27 April 2014 and by Robert Sheppard on 15 May 2014 (see annex 2.5.e).The Capacity Building Agreement (“the Agreement”) was signed by the Minister on 27 April 2014 and by Robert Sheppard on 15 May 2014 (see annex 2.5.e).
In the Agreement Soma pledged to cover the salary costs, up to USD 5,000 per month each, for a maximum of six “qualified technical staff, consultants and advisors, inside and outside of Somalia” over a 12-month period (totalling USD 360,000).In the Agreement Soma pledged to cover the salary costs, up to USD 5,000 per month each, for a maximum of six “qualified technical staff, consultants and advisors, inside and outside of Somalia” over a 12-month period (totalling USD 360,000).
Soma also committed to “pay the cost of office equipment, transportation, and other working tools which shall not exceed lump sum of [USD 40,000]”.Soma also committed to “pay the cost of office equipment, transportation, and other working tools which shall not exceed lump sum of [USD 40,000]”.
The Agreement therefore capped the total capacity support to be provided by Soma, including salary payments, at USD 400,000.The Agreement therefore capped the total capacity support to be provided by Soma, including salary payments, at USD 400,000.
The Agreement did not include, however, any provision for funding of training or petroleum regime development programmes, as had also been requested in the Ministry’s letter of 15 March 2014.The Agreement did not include, however, any provision for funding of training or petroleum regime development programmes, as had also been requested in the Ministry’s letter of 15 March 2014.
61.61.
Among the conditions of the Agreement was a requirement for the Ministry to submit monthly written reports to Soma, providing the names, terms of reference, and employment contracts for each proposed staff member.Among the conditions of the Agreement was a requirement for the Ministry to submit monthly written reports to Soma, providing the names, terms of reference, and employment contracts for each proposed staff member.
Critically, the Agreement prohibited the Ministry from contracting any “connected person” within the framework of the programme.Critically, the Agreement prohibited the Ministry from contracting any “connected person” within the framework of the programme.
“Connected person” was defined as “any person, company, other organisation or legal entity directly or indirectly controlled by any member of the Government or who is otherwise directly or indirectly related to or connected to any member of the Government”.“Connected person” was defined as “any person, company, other organisation or legal entity directly or indirectly controlled by any member of the Government or who is otherwise directly or indirectly related to or connected to any member of the Government”.
62.62.
On 27 April 2015, Soma signed an extension of the Agreement with the Ministry, prolonging the duration of the programme for an additional six months, from April to September 2015.On 27 April 2015, Soma signed an extension of the Agreement with the Ministry, prolonging the duration of the programme for an additional six months, from April to September 2015.
Under the extension, Soma agreed to provide further “capacity support payments” of USD 30,000 per month, equalling a total over six months of USD 180,000.Under the extension, Soma agreed to provide further “capacity support payments” of USD 30,000 per month, equalling a total over six months of USD 180,000.
PaymentsPayments
63.63.
On 22 May 2014 Soma’s CFO, Philip Wolfe, sent the Director General a template invoice for the Ministry to submit.On 22 May 2014 Soma’s CFO, Philip Wolfe, sent the Director General a template invoice for the Ministry to submit.
The next day, a USD 70,000 invoice for the first instalment of the ‘capacity building’ funds, signed by Director General Hassan and Deputy Director General Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi – who both later received salaries themselves under the Agreement – was returned to Soma (see annex 2.5.f).The next day, a USD 70,000 invoice for the first instalment of the ‘capacity building’ funds, signed by Director General Hassan and Deputy Director General Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi – who both later received salaries themselves under the Agreement – was returned to Soma (see annex 2.5.f).
64.64.
Following receipt of the first instalment of the Soma funds in the Ministry’s Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) account, Director General Hassan attempted to persuade Soma to circumvent the CBS when making future transfers.Following receipt of the first instalment of the Soma funds in the Ministry’s Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) account, Director General Hassan attempted to persuade Soma to circumvent the CBS when making future transfers.
Such an arrangement would be in flagrant violation of FGS Ministry of Finance directives, which require that all FGS revenue be channelled through the Treasury Single Account at the CBS.Such an arrangement would be in flagrant violation of FGS Ministry of Finance directives, which require that all FGS revenue be channelled through the Treasury Single Account at the CBS.
On 29 June 2014, Hassan emailed Soma CEO Robert Sheppard and CFO Philip Wolfe explaining,On 29 June 2014, Hassan emailed Soma CEO Robert Sheppard and CFO Philip Wolfe explaining,
I am thinking to change the route or have an account from another bank.I am thinking to change the route or have an account from another bank.
We realized how things gets [sic] late if we didn’t get alternative way, there are number of private companies which are easier to use and more efficient than the central bank.We realized how things gets [sic] late if we didn’t get alternative way, there are number of private companies which are easier to use and more efficient than the central bank.
65.65.
Wolfe refused the Director General’s suggestion, informing him that Soma would continue to route ‘capacity building’ monies to the CBS for purposes of transparency.Wolfe refused the Director General’s suggestion, informing him that Soma would continue to route ‘capacity building’ monies to the CBS for purposes of transparency.
66.66.
Soma transferred a total of USD 400,000 for the Capacity Building Agreement in three instalments to the Ministry’s CBS account.Soma transferred a total of USD 400,000 for the Capacity Building Agreement in three instalments to the Ministry’s CBS account.
The company also transferred an additional USD 90,000 instalment in May 2015, the first payment pursuant to the extension of the Agreement on 27 April 2015:The company also transferred an additional USD 90,000 instalment in May 2015, the first payment pursuant to the extension of the Agreement on 27 April 2015:
1.1.
USD 70,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 30 June 2014;USD 70,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 30 June 2014;
2.2.
USD 150,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 17 August 2014;USD 150,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 17 August 2014;
3.3.
USD 180,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 13 November 2014;USD 180,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 13 November 2014;
4.4.
USD 90,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 28 May 2015.USD 90,000: receipt confirmed by the Ministry on 28 May 2015.
67.67.
The Monitoring Group has obtained a ‘salary chart’ sent to the Ministry by Soma in March 2015.The Monitoring Group has obtained a ‘salary chart’ sent to the Ministry by Soma in March 2015.
This chart details the ‘capacity building’ payments Soma made (totalling USD 295,800) to 14 ministerial employees from March 2014 to the end of February 2015, with projections of future payments continuing up to June 2015 (see annex 2.5.g).This chart details the ‘capacity building’ payments Soma made (totalling USD 295,800) to 14 ministerial employees from March 2014 to the end of February 2015, with projections of future payments continuing up to June 2015 (see annex 2.5.g).
The 14 employees listed on the salary chart, and the amounts they are listed as having received, are:The 14 employees listed on the salary chart, and the amounts they are listed as having received, are:
NameName
Title(s)Title(s)
Received from Soma as of February 2015Received from Soma as of February 2015
Farah Abdi HassanFarah Abdi Hassan
-Director General-Director General
USD 36,000USD 36,000
Jabril Mohamoud GeeddiJabril Mohamoud Geeddi
-Deputy Director General-Deputy Director General
Director of Administration & Finance DepartmentDirector of Administration & Finance Department
-Senior Management Advisor-Senior Management Advisor
USD 36,000USD 36,000
Mohamed Ali-nur HagiMohamed Ali-nur Hagi
-Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister-Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister
-Director of Planning & Development Department-Director of Planning & Development Department
Senior Resource EconomistSenior Resource Economist
USD 33,000USD 33,000
Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar HusseinDr. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein
-Director of Exploration Department-Director of Exploration Department
-Senior Petroleum Geologist-Senior Petroleum Geologist
USD 30,000USD 30,000
Hussein Ali AhmedHussein Ali Ahmed
-Managing Director of the Somalia Petroleum Corporation (SPC)-Managing Director of the Somalia Petroleum Corporation (SPC)
-Director of Oil Management Department-Director of Oil Management Department
-Senior Economic Advisor-Senior Economic Advisor
USD 16,000USD 16,000
Yusuf Hassan IsackYusuf Hassan Isack
-Head of Public Relations-Head of Public Relations
-Media Expert-Media Expert
USD 24,000USD 24,000
Abdinor Mohamed AhmedAbdinor Mohamed Ahmed
-Media Coverage-Media Coverage
-Reporter-Reporter
-Public Relations-Public Relations
USD 16,000USD 16,000
Abdullahi Mohamed WarfaaAbdullahi Mohamed Warfaa
-International Relations-International Relations
USD 16,000USD 16,000
Mohamed Yousuf AliMohamed Yousuf Ali
-Director of Legal Affairs Department-Director of Legal Affairs Department
-Senior Legal Expert-Senior Legal Expert
USD 32,000USD 32,000
Dr. Abdi Mohamed SiadDr. Abdi Mohamed Siad
-Senior Advisor-Senior Advisor
-Mineralogist-Mineralogist
USD 32,000USD 32,000
Leila Ali AhmedLeila Ali Ahmed
-Administration Assistant-Administration Assistant
USD 4,200USD 4,200
Dr. Abdullahi Haider MohamedDr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed
-Senior expert &Team Leader-Senior expert &Team Leader
-FGS Advisor on Oil & Gas-FGS Advisor on Oil & Gas
-Diplomat-Diplomat
USD 15,000USD 15,000
Abdirzak Hassan AwedAbdirzak Hassan Awed
-Personal Assistant-Personal Assistant
USD 4,000USD 4,000
Farah Ahmed Isma’ilFarah Ahmed Isma’il
-Personal Assistant-Personal Assistant
USD 1,600USD 1,600
Double dippingDouble dipping
68.68.
The Monitoring Group has been able to confirm, through information provided by the FGS Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources itself that at least six Ministry officials paid by Soma under the Capacity Building Agreement concurrently drew civil servant salaries from the FGS:The Monitoring Group has been able to confirm, through information provided by the FGS Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources itself that at least six Ministry officials paid by Soma under the Capacity Building Agreement concurrently drew civil servant salaries from the FGS:
1.1.
Farah Abdi HassanFarah Abdi Hassan
2.2.
Jabril Mohamoud GeeddiJabril Mohamoud Geeddi
3.3.
Mohamed Ali-nur HagiMohamed Ali-nur Hagi
4.4.
Abdulkadir Abiikar HusseinAbdulkadir Abiikar Hussein
5.5.
Hussein Ali AhmedHussein Ali Ahmed
6.6.
Leila Ali AhmedLeila Ali Ahmed
69.69.
The Monitoring Group has been unable to find evidence that the Capacity Building Agreement was reflected in the 2014 FGS national budget.The Monitoring Group has been unable to find evidence that the Capacity Building Agreement was reflected in the 2014 FGS national budget.
When contacted by the Monitoring Group, the Minister of Finance, H.E. Mohamed Aden, stated that he was unaware of a privately funded capacity building programme in any FGS ministry, informing the SEMG that “[a]s far as I am aware there is no private capacity injection programs.When contacted by the Monitoring Group, the Minister of Finance, H.E. Mohamed Aden, stated that he was unaware of a privately funded capacity building programme in any FGS ministry, informing the SEMG that “[a]s far as I am aware there is no private capacity injection programs.
All capacity injection programs are through multitrust and/or bilateral donors”.All capacity injection programs are through multitrust and/or bilateral donors”.
Soma did not directly respond to a question from the Monitoring Group as to whether the company had notified the Ministry for Finance about the Capacity Building Agreement, stating only that “Soma signed the Capacity Building Agreements with the Ministry of Petroleum & Mineral Resources”.Soma did not directly respond to a question from the Monitoring Group as to whether the company had notified the Ministry for Finance about the Capacity Building Agreement, stating only that “Soma signed the Capacity Building Agreements with the Ministry of Petroleum & Mineral Resources”.
Profiles of officials who received payments from SomaProfiles of officials who received payments from Soma
70.70.
The Monitoring Group has compiled profiles, below, of the officials who received payments under Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.The Monitoring Group has compiled profiles, below, of the officials who received payments under Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.
A number of these officials – including the Director General of the Ministry, the Deputy Director General, and the Permanent Secretary to the FGS Prime Minister – occupy positions in which they routinely take decisions directly bearing on the company’s financial interests in Somalia.A number of these officials – including the Director General of the Ministry, the Deputy Director General, and the Permanent Secretary to the FGS Prime Minister – occupy positions in which they routinely take decisions directly bearing on the company’s financial interests in Somalia.
As such, their receiving payments from Soma represented a clear conflict of interest.As such, their receiving payments from Soma represented a clear conflict of interest.
71.71.
In addition, three individuals listed on Soma’s salary chart have told the Monitoring Group that they only received a fraction of the amount allocated to them on paper.In addition, three individuals listed on Soma’s salary chart have told the Monitoring Group that they only received a fraction of the amount allocated to them on paper.
One alleged recipient of USD 28,000 in ‘missing’ payments has asserted that he does not recognise the signature on the payslip receipt provided to him for inspection by the Monitoring Group.One alleged recipient of USD 28,000 in ‘missing’ payments has asserted that he does not recognise the signature on the payslip receipt provided to him for inspection by the Monitoring Group.
It is not yet clear to the Group who signed for or received these monies.It is not yet clear to the Group who signed for or received these monies.
Farah Abdi HassanFarah Abdi Hassan
Director General of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral ResourcesDirector General of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
72.72.
Farah Abdi Hassan was appointed Director General of the then-Ministry of National Resources in July 2013, and has retained this position since its successor ministry, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, was created in January 2014.Farah Abdi Hassan was appointed Director General of the then-Ministry of National Resources in July 2013, and has retained this position since its successor ministry, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, was created in January 2014.
As Director General, Hassan served as the Ministry’s primary point of contact for Soma and other oil and gas firms, affording him a great deal of influence.As Director General, Hassan served as the Ministry’s primary point of contact for Soma and other oil and gas firms, affording him a great deal of influence.
An April 2014 memo from Minister Omar, seen by the Monitoring Group, stipulated that Hassan was to be “the lead contact and the focal point of the Ministry in all aspects of communications”.An April 2014 memo from Minister Omar, seen by the Monitoring Group, stipulated that Hassan was to be “the lead contact and the focal point of the Ministry in all aspects of communications”.
73.73.
Hassan was present for negotiations over the First Amendment Agreement in Nairobi in March 2014.Hassan was present for negotiations over the First Amendment Agreement in Nairobi in March 2014.
In May 2014 Hassan co-signed, with Jabril Mahamoud Geeddi, the first invoice for the programme.In May 2014 Hassan co-signed, with Jabril Mahamoud Geeddi, the first invoice for the programme.
He then proceeded to sign a new contract for his existing position – formulated by Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi (see below) and countersigned by Minister Omar – backdated to March 2014 (see annex 2.5.h).He then proceeded to sign a new contract for his existing position – formulated by Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi (see below) and countersigned by Minister Omar – backdated to March 2014 (see annex 2.5.h).
74.74.
Hassan was paid USD 3,000 per month under the Capacity Building Agreement, and by February 2015 had received a total of USD 36,000.Hassan was paid USD 3,000 per month under the Capacity Building Agreement, and by February 2015 had received a total of USD 36,000.
According to the FGS Ministry of Finance, Hassan also draws a civil servant monthly salary of USD 1,235.According to the FGS Ministry of Finance, Hassan also draws a civil servant monthly salary of USD 1,235.
Over the course of one year, therefore, Soma made monthly payments to the most senior civil servant in the Ministry equivalent to almost triple his Government salary.Over the course of one year, therefore, Soma made monthly payments to the most senior civil servant in the Ministry equivalent to almost triple his Government salary.
Dr. Abdullahi Haider MohamedDr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed
Senior expert & Team LeaderSenior expert & Team Leader
FGS Advisor on Oil and GasFGS Advisor on Oil and Gas
75.75.
Between October 2014 and February 2015, Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed held the position of “Senior expert & Team Leader” at the Ministry, and was paid a total of USD 15,000 through Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.Between October 2014 and February 2015, Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed held the position of “Senior expert & Team Leader” at the Ministry, and was paid a total of USD 15,000 through Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.
Haider was due to receive an additional USD 9,000 up to April 2015.Haider was due to receive an additional USD 9,000 up to April 2015.
76.76.
The SEMG’s 2014 final report (S/2014/726) identified Haider as a special advisor to FGS President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and one of two “key architects” of the Soma deal.The SEMG’s 2014 final report (S/2014/726) identified Haider as a special advisor to FGS President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and one of two “key architects” of the Soma deal.
The SEMG’s current investigation into Haider’s role corroborates this assessment.The SEMG’s current investigation into Haider’s role corroborates this assessment.
According to a former advisor to the Ministry, negotiations over the Soma deal were conducted by Haider, Ministry legal advisor Jay Park, and then-FGS petroleum minister Abdirizak Omar Mohamed during the Somalia conference in London in May 2013.According to a former advisor to the Ministry, negotiations over the Soma deal were conducted by Haider, Ministry legal advisor Jay Park, and then-FGS petroleum minister Abdirizak Omar Mohamed during the Somalia conference in London in May 2013.
In a 1 July 2015 letter to the SEMG, Soma acknowledged that Haider “represented the Federal Government…in the negotiations around the Seismic Option Agreement that was signed in August 2013”.In a 1 July 2015 letter to the SEMG, Soma acknowledged that Haider “represented the Federal Government…in the negotiations around the Seismic Option Agreement that was signed in August 2013”.
77.77.
Haider’s influence in the Ministry extended beyond the Soma portfolio: on 9 August 2013, three days after the Soma SOA was signed, Patrick Molliere, a former oil executive and at the time an advisor to the Ministry, received an email from the Ministry’s interlocutor at Royal Dutch Shell plc, William Sevier: “Hope all is well.Haider’s influence in the Ministry extended beyond the Soma portfolio: on 9 August 2013, three days after the Soma SOA was signed, Patrick Molliere, a former oil executive and at the time an advisor to the Ministry, received an email from the Ministry’s interlocutor at Royal Dutch Shell plc, William Sevier: “Hope all is well.
We have been advised to deal with Dr Haider wit [sic] cc to Minister”.We have been advised to deal with Dr Haider wit [sic] cc to Minister”.
78.78.
Since 2010, Haider has been referred to interchangeably as a presidential, ministerial, or governmental advisor on oil and gas.Since 2010, Haider has been referred to interchangeably as a presidential, ministerial, or governmental advisor on oil and gas.
A regional news service stated that Haider “has become de facto the privileged interlocutor for international oil organisations”.A regional news service stated that Haider “has become de facto the privileged interlocutor for international oil organisations”.
Haider’s LinkedIn profile currently identifies him as a “Senior Adviser at Commission for Petroleum & Mineral Resources” and previously as a “Senior Adviser, Oil and Gas” from 2010-2014.Haider’s LinkedIn profile currently identifies him as a “Senior Adviser at Commission for Petroleum & Mineral Resources” and previously as a “Senior Adviser, Oil and Gas” from 2010-2014.
Indicative of his status within the FGS, Haider carries a diplomatic passport, which lists his occupation as “Diplomat” (see annex 2.5.j for a copy of Haider’s diplomatic passport).Indicative of his status within the FGS, Haider carries a diplomatic passport, which lists his occupation as “Diplomat” (see annex 2.5.j for a copy of Haider’s diplomatic passport).
79.79.
As recently as April 2015, during an oil and gas conference – after his tenure as “Senior expert & Team Leader” at the Ministry had come to an end – Haider was again being presented as a ‘senior advisor’ to the FGS.As recently as April 2015, during an oil and gas conference – after his tenure as “Senior expert & Team Leader” at the Ministry had come to an end – Haider was again being presented as a ‘senior advisor’ to the FGS.
At the conference, which took place in London from 27-28 April 2015, Haider conducted side meetings with industry executives, at which the Minister was not present.At the conference, which took place in London from 27-28 April 2015, Haider conducted side meetings with industry executives, at which the Minister was not present.
80.80.
Prior to, during, and after the period when he received payments via the Soma Capacity Building Agreement, Haider was in a position to exert significant influence on Government decisions directly bearing on Soma’s business prospects in Somalia.Prior to, during, and after the period when he received payments via the Soma Capacity Building Agreement, Haider was in a position to exert significant influence on Government decisions directly bearing on Soma’s business prospects in Somalia.
In this context, his signing of a contract with the Ministry to serve as “Senior expert & Team Leader” was merely a temporary re-hatting of his already existing role, in order to facilitate his receiving payments from Soma.In this context, his signing of a contract with the Ministry to serve as “Senior expert & Team Leader” was merely a temporary re-hatting of his already existing role, in order to facilitate his receiving payments from Soma.
Mohamed Ali-nur HagiMohamed Ali-nur Hagi
Permanent Secretary to the Prime MinisterPermanent Secretary to the Prime Minister
Director of Planning & Development Dept / Senior Resource EconomistDirector of Planning & Development Dept / Senior Resource Economist
81.81.
Prior to joining the Ministry in April 2014, Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi served as Minister of Planning for Galmudug regional authority.Prior to joining the Ministry in April 2014, Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi served as Minister of Planning for Galmudug regional authority.
From April 2014 to February 2015, Hagi received a total of USD 33,000 from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.From April 2014 to February 2015, Hagi received a total of USD 33,000 from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.
According to the salary chart Hagi was also due an additional USD 3,000 for the month of March 2015.According to the salary chart Hagi was also due an additional USD 3,000 for the month of March 2015.
82.82.
Internal ministerial correspondence shows that Hagi drafted his own employment contract, which subsequently became the template for each subsequent contract signed by payees of the Capacity Building Agreement.Internal ministerial correspondence shows that Hagi drafted his own employment contract, which subsequently became the template for each subsequent contract signed by payees of the Capacity Building Agreement.
Hagi also drafted the terms of reference for his own position, “Director of Planning and Development Department & Senior Resource Economist”, as well as that of Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed (“Senior expert & Team Leader”).Hagi also drafted the terms of reference for his own position, “Director of Planning and Development Department & Senior Resource Economist”, as well as that of Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed (“Senior expert & Team Leader”).
83.83.
Since at least 9 February 2015, Hagi has served as the Permanent Secretary to the FGS Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Shermarke.Since at least 9 February 2015, Hagi has served as the Permanent Secretary to the FGS Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Shermarke.
However, Soma continued to pay Hagi once he had become the prime minister’s top staffer.However, Soma continued to pay Hagi once he had become the prime minister’s top staffer.
Hagi confirmed to the SEMG in July 2015 that he had received ‘capacity building’ salary payments up to the end of February 2015;Hagi confirmed to the SEMG in July 2015 that he had received ‘capacity building’ salary payments up to the end of February 2015;
Soma’s salary chart shows that he was due to be paid up to the end of March.Soma’s salary chart shows that he was due to be paid up to the end of March.
84.84.
Hagi has provided the Monitoring Group with a copy of a decree marking his appointment as Permanent Secretary, dated 9 February 2015 and signed by Prime Minister Shermarke.Hagi has provided the Monitoring Group with a copy of a decree marking his appointment as Permanent Secretary, dated 9 February 2015 and signed by Prime Minister Shermarke.
However, an 11 January 2015 email from Director General Hassan to seven other senior members of the Ministry makes reference to “A-Mohamed Hagi, the PS of office of the Prime minister”.However, an 11 January 2015 email from Director General Hassan to seven other senior members of the Ministry makes reference to “A-Mohamed Hagi, the PS of office of the Prime minister”.
This reference suggests that Hagi may have been serving unofficially as Prime Minister Shermarke’s Permanent Secretary as early as the beginning of January, and was apparently regarded as such by other Ministry officials.This reference suggests that Hagi may have been serving unofficially as Prime Minister Shermarke’s Permanent Secretary as early as the beginning of January, and was apparently regarded as such by other Ministry officials.
Jabril Mohamoud GeeddiJabril Mohamoud Geeddi
Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral ResourcesDeputy Director General of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
Director of Administration & Finance Department / Senior Management advisorDirector of Administration & Finance Department / Senior Management advisor
85.85.
Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi has been employed at the Ministry since January 2013, originally under the title of “Coordinator”.Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi has been employed at the Ministry since January 2013, originally under the title of “Coordinator”.
Geeddi’s employment contract, signed for the purposes of receiving a Soma ‘capacity building’ salary, lists his position as “Director of Administration & Finance Department & Senior Management advisor”.Geeddi’s employment contract, signed for the purposes of receiving a Soma ‘capacity building’ salary, lists his position as “Director of Administration & Finance Department & Senior Management advisor”.
However, his curriculum vitae, as well as extensive internal correspondence from the Ministry on file with the Monitoring Group, identifies him as the Deputy Director General of the Ministry.However, his curriculum vitae, as well as extensive internal correspondence from the Ministry on file with the Monitoring Group, identifies him as the Deputy Director General of the Ministry.
86.86.
In an email dated 30 July 2014, Geeddi provided a description, in the third person, of his function at the Ministry: “Mr. Geddi is responsible for the administration and finance sector, of the Ministry, and he’s full time employee who earns a standard salary of grade A from the government plus bonus…In an email dated 30 July 2014, Geeddi provided a description, in the third person, of his function at the Ministry: “Mr. Geddi is responsible for the administration and finance sector, of the Ministry, and he’s full time employee who earns a standard salary of grade A from the government plus bonus…
[emphasis added]”.[emphasis added]”.
In an interview with the Monitoring Group on 11 June 2014, Director General Hassan confirmed that Geeddi was the primary official responsible for the financial administration of the Ministry, including the management of the Capacity Building Agreement.In an interview with the Monitoring Group on 11 June 2014, Director General Hassan confirmed that Geeddi was the primary official responsible for the financial administration of the Ministry, including the management of the Capacity Building Agreement.
As such, Geeddi was responsible for withdrawing ‘capacity building’ funds from the Ministry’s CBS account (see annex 2.5.k for a sample of withdrawal slips with Geeddi’s signature).As such, Geeddi was responsible for withdrawing ‘capacity building’ funds from the Ministry’s CBS account (see annex 2.5.k for a sample of withdrawal slips with Geeddi’s signature).
87.87.
Geeddi is a close associate of Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed.Geeddi is a close associate of Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed.
At the 2013 CWC Group-sponsored Somalia Oil and Gas Summit in London, held on 7 October 2013, Haider and Geeddi were observed to be “leading the minister around”.At the 2013 CWC Group-sponsored Somalia Oil and Gas Summit in London, held on 7 October 2013, Haider and Geeddi were observed to be “leading the minister around”.
Following the summit, a dinner took place at principal Soma shareholder Basil Shiblaq’s London restaurant, Maroush, which both Geeddi and Haider attended.Following the summit, a dinner took place at principal Soma shareholder Basil Shiblaq’s London restaurant, Maroush, which both Geeddi and Haider attended.
Also present were Lord Michael Howard, the Chairman of Soma, Abdullahi Mohamed Ali ‘Sanbololshe’, the FGS ambassador to the UK, petroleum minister Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, Soma CEO Robert Sheppard, CFO Philip Wolfe, Basil Shiblaq, Jay Park, as well as other individuals intimately involved in the Soma deal.Also present were Lord Michael Howard, the Chairman of Soma, Abdullahi Mohamed Ali ‘Sanbololshe’, the FGS ambassador to the UK, petroleum minister Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, Soma CEO Robert Sheppard, CFO Philip Wolfe, Basil Shiblaq, Jay Park, as well as other individuals intimately involved in the Soma deal.
88.88.
From March 2014 to February 2015, Geeddi received salary payments totalling USD 36,000, or USD 3,000 per month, from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.From March 2014 to February 2015, Geeddi received salary payments totalling USD 36,000, or USD 3,000 per month, from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.
Over the same period, he also received an FGS civil servant salary of USD 1,135 per month.Over the same period, he also received an FGS civil servant salary of USD 1,135 per month.
Hussein Ali AhmedHussein Ali Ahmed
Managing Director of the Somalia Petroleum CorporationManaging Director of the Somalia Petroleum Corporation
Director of Oil Management Department / Senior Economic AdvisorDirector of Oil Management Department / Senior Economic Advisor
89.89.
Between July 2014 and February 2015, Hussein Ali Ahmed occupied the position of “Director of Oil Management Department & Senior Economic Advisor” in the Ministry.Between July 2014 and February 2015, Hussein Ali Ahmed occupied the position of “Director of Oil Management Department & Senior Economic Advisor” in the Ministry.
Both prior to and during his time on Soma’s payroll, Ahmed served as Managing Director of the Somalia Petroleum Corporation (SPC), the national oil company that he was instrumental in establishing in 2007.Both prior to and during his time on Soma’s payroll, Ahmed served as Managing Director of the Somalia Petroleum Corporation (SPC), the national oil company that he was instrumental in establishing in 2007.
90.90.
Ahmed held a series of prominent positions prior to heading up the SPC;Ahmed held a series of prominent positions prior to heading up the SPC;
from 2004-2007, he served as special advisor on oil and gas to former Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi, and as mayor of Mogadishu from 2001-2004.from 2004-2007, he served as special advisor on oil and gas to former Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi, and as mayor of Mogadishu from 2001-2004.
In 2007, Ahmed also headed the Somalia Petroleum Law Team, which was responsible for drafting the 2008 Petroleum Law, legislation that still remains in force.In 2007, Ahmed also headed the Somalia Petroleum Law Team, which was responsible for drafting the 2008 Petroleum Law, legislation that still remains in force.
91.91.
Similar to other officials on Soma’s payroll, therefore, Ahmed has a lengthy history of oil and gas postings in the Somali Government.Similar to other officials on Soma’s payroll, therefore, Ahmed has a lengthy history of oil and gas postings in the Somali Government.
While being paid by Soma as “Director of Oil Management Department & Senior Economic Advisor” to the Ministry, he concurrently held the title of SPC Managing Director, a position of influence with direct impact on Soma’s interests in Somalia.While being paid by Soma as “Director of Oil Management Department & Senior Economic Advisor” to the Ministry, he concurrently held the title of SPC Managing Director, a position of influence with direct impact on Soma’s interests in Somalia.
92.92.
Between July 2014 and February 2015, Ahmed received a total of USD 16,000 from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.Between July 2014 and February 2015, Ahmed received a total of USD 16,000 from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.
According to the salary chart obtained by the Monitoring Group, as well as his employment contract with the Ministry, Ahmed was to receive an additional USD 8,000 up to June 2015.According to the salary chart obtained by the Monitoring Group, as well as his employment contract with the Ministry, Ahmed was to receive an additional USD 8,000 up to June 2015.
According to the FGS Ministry of Finance, Ahmed receives a civil servant salary of USD 1,135 per month.According to the FGS Ministry of Finance, Ahmed receives a civil servant salary of USD 1,135 per month.
Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar HusseinDr. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein
Director of Exploration Department / Senior Petroleum GeologistDirector of Exploration Department / Senior Petroleum Geologist
93.93.
Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein joined the Ministry in May 2014.Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein joined the Ministry in May 2014.
Hussein possesses a Master’s of Science degree in Engineering Geology and Geotechnics, and his employment contract with the Ministry lists his position as “Director of Exploration Department and Senior Petroleum Geologist”.Hussein possesses a Master’s of Science degree in Engineering Geology and Geotechnics, and his employment contract with the Ministry lists his position as “Director of Exploration Department and Senior Petroleum Geologist”.
94.94.
Hussein received USD 30,000 from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement between May 2014 and February 2015.Hussein received USD 30,000 from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement between May 2014 and February 2015.
According to the salary chart obtained by the Monitoring Group, he was due to be paid an additional USD 6,000 up to April 2015.According to the salary chart obtained by the Monitoring Group, he was due to be paid an additional USD 6,000 up to April 2015.
95.95.
In an interview with the Monitoring Group held on 11 June 2015, Director General Hassan confirmed that Hussein is a key member of a “negotiation team”, responsible for reaching an agreement on production sharing with Soma (see discussion of the “Draft Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)” below), a function he exercised whilst receiving payments from Soma.In an interview with the Monitoring Group held on 11 June 2015, Director General Hassan confirmed that Hussein is a key member of a “negotiation team”, responsible for reaching an agreement on production sharing with Soma (see discussion of the “Draft Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)” below), a function he exercised whilst receiving payments from Soma.
96.96.
An email dated 27 April 2015 from Hussein to various members of the Ministry provided an outline of the agenda for the “Exploration Department”, of which he is the director.An email dated 27 April 2015 from Hussein to various members of the Ministry provided an outline of the agenda for the “Exploration Department”, of which he is the director.
One of the agenda items he listed, to be completed by September 2015, was “[e]valuating PSAs submitted by farm-out partners of Soma Oil and Gas and signing them”.One of the agenda items he listed, to be completed by September 2015, was “[e]valuating PSAs submitted by farm-out partners of Soma Oil and Gas and signing them”.
Abdullahi Mohamed WarfaaAbdullahi Mohamed Warfaa
Personal Assistant to the MinisterPersonal Assistant to the Minister
‘International Relations’‘International Relations’
97.97.
While Abdullahi Mohamed Warfaa’s employment contract defines his role at the Ministry as relating to “International Relations”, in correspondences dated October and December 2014 he is referred to as the “personal assistant” to the Minister.While Abdullahi Mohamed Warfaa’s employment contract defines his role at the Ministry as relating to “International Relations”, in correspondences dated October and December 2014 he is referred to as the “personal assistant” to the Minister.
98.98.
Between July 2014 and February 2015, Warfaa received a total of USD 16,000 through Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.Between July 2014 and February 2015, Warfaa received a total of USD 16,000 through Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.
According to the salary chart obtained by the Monitoring Group, as well as his employment contract with the Ministry, Warfaa was due an additional USD 8,000 up to June 2015.According to the salary chart obtained by the Monitoring Group, as well as his employment contract with the Ministry, Warfaa was due an additional USD 8,000 up to June 2015.
Leila Ali AhmedLeila Ali Ahmed
Administration AssistantAdministration Assistant
99.99.
Leila Ali Ahmed was employed as an “Administration Assistant” under the Capacity Building Agreement from July 2014 to February 2015, receiving a total of USD 4,200 according to the salary chart.Leila Ali Ahmed was employed as an “Administration Assistant” under the Capacity Building Agreement from July 2014 to February 2015, receiving a total of USD 4,200 according to the salary chart.
However, from 8 August 2014 onwards Ahmed concurrently drew an FGS civil servant salary of USD 735 per month.However, from 8 August 2014 onwards Ahmed concurrently drew an FGS civil servant salary of USD 735 per month.
Possible Ghost WorkersPossible Ghost Workers
100.100.
The Monitoring Group has identified four officials on Soma’s salary chart as possible ghost workers.The Monitoring Group has identified four officials on Soma’s salary chart as possible ghost workers.
Three of these individuals claim to only have worked at the Ministry for a fraction of the time indicated in the salary chart;Three of these individuals claim to only have worked at the Ministry for a fraction of the time indicated in the salary chart;
the Group has been unable to confirm the very existence of a fourth.the Group has been unable to confirm the very existence of a fourth.
Mohamed Yousuf AliMohamed Yousuf Ali
Director of Legal Affairs Department / Senior ExpertDirector of Legal Affairs Department / Senior Expert
101.101.
Mohamed Yousuf Ali holds a Masters of Law degree, and his ‘capacity building’ employment contract designates his position within the Ministry as “Director of legal affairs Department & Senior expert”.Mohamed Yousuf Ali holds a Masters of Law degree, and his ‘capacity building’ employment contract designates his position within the Ministry as “Director of legal affairs Department & Senior expert”.
From July 2014 to February 2015, according to the salary chart, Ali collected USD 32,000 from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.From July 2014 to February 2015, according to the salary chart, Ali collected USD 32,000 from Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement.
102.102.
On 13 October 2014 Director General Hassan suspended Ali’s contract with the Ministry, citing the latter’s inability to be present in Mogadishu due to personal reasons.On 13 October 2014 Director General Hassan suspended Ali’s contract with the Ministry, citing the latter’s inability to be present in Mogadishu due to personal reasons.
Nonetheless, according to Soma’s salary chart, Ali’s salary payments continued until February 2015, despite the fact that he had not been physically present in Mogadishu since late August 2014.Nonetheless, according to Soma’s salary chart, Ali’s salary payments continued until February 2015, despite the fact that he had not been physically present in Mogadishu since late August 2014.
103.103.
Ali informed the SEMG that he had only received one salary payment of USD 4,000 before the suspension of his contract, and that the Ministry never paid him an additional two months’ salary owing.Ali informed the SEMG that he had only received one salary payment of USD 4,000 before the suspension of his contract, and that the Ministry never paid him an additional two months’ salary owing.
If true, after July 2014 Ali became effectively a ghost worker at the Ministry, with the remaining USD 28,000 owing in his contract collected by an unknown third party.If true, after July 2014 Ali became effectively a ghost worker at the Ministry, with the remaining USD 28,000 owing in his contract collected by an unknown third party.
The SEMG has yet to determine who countersigned for Ali on his payslips, or where the funds subsequently ended up.The SEMG has yet to determine who countersigned for Ali on his payslips, or where the funds subsequently ended up.
Abdi Mohamed SiadAbdi Mohamed Siad
Senior Advisor for the Ministry and MineralogistSenior Advisor for the Ministry and Mineralogist
104.104.
Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad is a senior lecturer at the University of the Western Cape in the Republic of South Africa.Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad is a senior lecturer at the University of the Western Cape in the Republic of South Africa.
He holds a PhD in Applied Geochemistry, making him the only technical expert whose employment under the Capacity Building Agreement does not represent a conflict of interest.He holds a PhD in Applied Geochemistry, making him the only technical expert whose employment under the Capacity Building Agreement does not represent a conflict of interest.
105.105.
From July 2014 to February 2015, according to the salary chart, Siad collected USD 32,000 while serving in the position of “Senior Advisor for the Ministry and Mineralogist”.From July 2014 to February 2015, according to the salary chart, Siad collected USD 32,000 while serving in the position of “Senior Advisor for the Ministry and Mineralogist”.
However, Siad informed the Monitoring Group that he returned from Mogadishu to South Africa in August 2014, and subsequently gave notice of his resignation to Minister Omar and Director General Hassan on 14 October 2014.However, Siad informed the Monitoring Group that he returned from Mogadishu to South Africa in August 2014, and subsequently gave notice of his resignation to Minister Omar and Director General Hassan on 14 October 2014.
According to Siad, he was sent one month’s salary from Hassan in the amount of USD 4,000, but received no subsequent payment.According to Siad, he was sent one month’s salary from Hassan in the amount of USD 4,000, but received no subsequent payment.
106.106.
The Monitoring Group sent Siad a ‘capacity building’ payslip dated 30 November 2014, allegedly displaying his signature;The Monitoring Group sent Siad a ‘capacity building’ payslip dated 30 November 2014, allegedly displaying his signature;
Siad confirmed that the signature was not his.Siad confirmed that the signature was not his.
The SEMG has yet to determine who forged Siad’s signature on his payslips, or who collected the USD 28,000 remaining on his contract (see annex 2.5.l for a copy of this forged payslip).The SEMG has yet to determine who forged Siad’s signature on his payslips, or who collected the USD 28,000 remaining on his contract (see annex 2.5.l for a copy of this forged payslip).
Abdirizak Hassan AwedAbdirizak Hassan Awed
Personal Assistant for the MinistryPersonal Assistant for the Ministry
107.107.
From November 2014 to February 2015, Abdirizak Hassan Awed was employed under the Capacity Building Agreement in the position of “Personal Assistant for the Ministry”, collecting a total of USD 4,000.From November 2014 to February 2015, Abdirizak Hassan Awed was employed under the Capacity Building Agreement in the position of “Personal Assistant for the Ministry”, collecting a total of USD 4,000.
According to the salary chart, he was also slated to receive an additional USD 2,000 from March to April 2015.According to the salary chart, he was also slated to receive an additional USD 2,000 from March to April 2015.
108.108.
In an email in the Somali language, Awed informed the Monitoring Group that he had been employed by the Ministry from November 2014-April 2015, but that the final two months of his salary payments had been “embezzled”.In an email in the Somali language, Awed informed the Monitoring Group that he had been employed by the Ministry from November 2014-April 2015, but that the final two months of his salary payments had been “embezzled”.
Farah Ahmed Isma’ilFarah Ahmed Isma’il
Personal Assistant for the Director General’s OfficePersonal Assistant for the Director General’s Office
109.109.
According, to the salary chart, Farah Ahmed Isma’il received USD 1,600 from November 2014 to February 2015 under the Capacity Building Agreement, and was due another USD 800 from March-April 2015.According, to the salary chart, Farah Ahmed Isma’il received USD 1,600 from November 2014 to February 2015 under the Capacity Building Agreement, and was due another USD 800 from March-April 2015.
As of 5 March 2015, the Ministry had not submitted Isma’il’s curriculum vitae, employment contract, or passport copy to Soma, as required by Soma’s internal due diligence mechanism (see “Due Diligence”, below).As of 5 March 2015, the Ministry had not submitted Isma’il’s curriculum vitae, employment contract, or passport copy to Soma, as required by Soma’s internal due diligence mechanism (see “Due Diligence”, below).
The Monitoring Group has found no communications from or to Isma’il within the Ministry correspondence it has viewed.The Monitoring Group has found no communications from or to Isma’il within the Ministry correspondence it has viewed.
As a result, the Group has so far been unable to substantiate Isma’il’s existence.As a result, the Group has so far been unable to substantiate Isma’il’s existence.
Abdinor Mohamed Ahmed and Yusuf Hassan IsackAbdinor Mohamed Ahmed and Yusuf Hassan Isack
110.110.
The Monitoring Group continues to investigate the involvement of the two remaining officials on Soma’s salary chart, Abdinor Mohamed Ahmed and Yusuf Hassan Isack.The Monitoring Group continues to investigate the involvement of the two remaining officials on Soma’s salary chart, Abdinor Mohamed Ahmed and Yusuf Hassan Isack.
Due diligenceDue diligence
111.111.
In order to perform internal due diligence on the individuals being paid under the Capacity Building Agreement, Soma required the Ministry to provide a set of documents for each payee: curriculum vitae, employment contracts, passport copies, and signed payslips.In order to perform internal due diligence on the individuals being paid under the Capacity Building Agreement, Soma required the Ministry to provide a set of documents for each payee: curriculum vitae, employment contracts, passport copies, and signed payslips.
Soma began transferring the ‘capacity building’ funds in June 2014, however, before it had received any of this documentation.Soma began transferring the ‘capacity building’ funds in June 2014, however, before it had received any of this documentation.
The Ministry began submitting the required documents in early August 2014, definitively revealing to Soma the identities of senior officials being paid, if the company had not already been aware.The Ministry began submitting the required documents in early August 2014, definitively revealing to Soma the identities of senior officials being paid, if the company had not already been aware.
112.112.
As of late as March 2015 – 11 months after the date of the Capacity Building Agreement – Soma’s representative in Nairobi was still requesting the Ministry to deliver the remaining documents the company had demanded.As of late as March 2015 – 11 months after the date of the Capacity Building Agreement – Soma’s representative in Nairobi was still requesting the Ministry to deliver the remaining documents the company had demanded.
113.113.
The Monitoring Group has found no evidence demonstrating that Soma questioned the Ministry’s choice of payees, despite the fact that the Capacity Building Agreement explicitly prohibited the contracting of “connected persons” defined in the Agreement as “any person, company, other organisation or legal entity directly or indirectly controlled by any member of the Government or who is otherwise directly or indirectly related to or connected to any member of the Government”.The Monitoring Group has found no evidence demonstrating that Soma questioned the Ministry’s choice of payees, despite the fact that the Capacity Building Agreement explicitly prohibited the contracting of “connected persons” defined in the Agreement as “any person, company, other organisation or legal entity directly or indirectly controlled by any member of the Government or who is otherwise directly or indirectly related to or connected to any member of the Government”.
Instead, Soma proceeded to transfer the remaining ‘capacity building’ funds to the Ministry in two further instalments, accepting the Ministry’s continued and absolute discretion in selecting the payees without prior notification.Instead, Soma proceeded to transfer the remaining ‘capacity building’ funds to the Ministry in two further instalments, accepting the Ministry’s continued and absolute discretion in selecting the payees without prior notification.
In response to the Monitoring Group’s inquiries, Soma claimed that “no connected persons ever received payment pursuant to Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement”, despite being aware that both the Director General and Deputy Director General of the Ministry were on the company’s payroll.In response to the Monitoring Group’s inquiries, Soma claimed that “no connected persons ever received payment pursuant to Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement”, despite being aware that both the Director General and Deputy Director General of the Ministry were on the company’s payroll.
114.114.
Soma failed to provide the Monitoring Group with the names, positions, and other requested details of the individuals who received salary payments from its Capacity Building Agreement.Soma failed to provide the Monitoring Group with the names, positions, and other requested details of the individuals who received salary payments from its Capacity Building Agreement.
In its response to the Monitoring Group’s direct request, Soma provided the following:In its response to the Monitoring Group’s direct request, Soma provided the following:
Soma Oil & Gas has put in place a robust Anti Bribery & Corruption Policy and Procedures.Soma Oil & Gas has put in place a robust Anti Bribery & Corruption Policy and Procedures.
On this basis we have reviewed the passports, curriculum vitae and contracts of all the individuals who receive salary payments from the Ministry of Petroleum & Mineral Resources under the Capacity Building Programme, as well as reviewing the monthly payroll information.On this basis we have reviewed the passports, curriculum vitae and contracts of all the individuals who receive salary payments from the Ministry of Petroleum & Mineral Resources under the Capacity Building Programme, as well as reviewing the monthly payroll information.
Soma’s statements relating to the Capacity Building AgreementSoma’s statements relating to the Capacity Building Agreement
115.115.
Soma has acknowledged the existence of its Capacity Building Agreement on multiple occasions.Soma has acknowledged the existence of its Capacity Building Agreement on multiple occasions.
In a press release dated 24 September 2014, Soma announced that the programme “will see the Company cover the salaries of a small number of experts, including geologists and geoscientists for a one-year period”.In a press release dated 24 September 2014, Soma announced that the programme “will see the Company cover the salaries of a small number of experts, including geologists and geoscientists for a one-year period”.
Soma’s public relations firm, FTI Consulting Inc., further acknowledged the existence of the programme and payments on 22 October 2014:Soma’s public relations firm, FTI Consulting Inc., further acknowledged the existence of the programme and payments on 22 October 2014:
The $400,000 commitment from Soma will enable the Ministry to employ 12 qualified geologists, geoscientists and other professionals for a one year period – these are individuals who will be trained at internationally recognised institutions and are committed to making a contribution to their own country’s development through the opening up of the hydrocarbons industry.The $400,000 commitment from Soma will enable the Ministry to employ 12 qualified geologists, geoscientists and other professionals for a one year period – these are individuals who will be trained at internationally recognised institutions and are committed to making a contribution to their own country’s development through the opening up of the hydrocarbons industry.
116.116.
Only three of the 14 ministerial officials paid by Soma possess advanced degrees in the fields of geology or geoscience.Only three of the 14 ministerial officials paid by Soma possess advanced degrees in the fields of geology or geoscience.
One of these, Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein, was already on the FGS civil servant payroll during the period he received a ‘salary’ from Soma.One of these, Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein, was already on the FGS civil servant payroll during the period he received a ‘salary’ from Soma.
A second, Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad, held a position at the Ministry for barely a month before returning home (see “Abdi Mohamed Siad”, above).A second, Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad, held a position at the Ministry for barely a month before returning home (see “Abdi Mohamed Siad”, above).
The third, Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed, was a presidential advisor.The third, Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed, was a presidential advisor.
117.117.
In an email response dated 23 September 2014 to an inquiry about capacity building from The Wall Street Journal, Director General Hassan wrote the following: “In April 2014, H.E. Minister Daud Mohamed Omar signed a capacity building paper with Soma (see picture on Ministry website) - they will help us with some office equipment and some salaries of expert staff at the Ministry for one year”.In an email response dated 23 September 2014 to an inquiry about capacity building from The Wall Street Journal, Director General Hassan wrote the following: “In April 2014, H.E. Minister Daud Mohamed Omar signed a capacity building paper with Soma (see picture on Ministry website) - they will help us with some office equipment and some salaries of expert staff at the Ministry for one year”.
The text of Hassan’s response had been drafted by Soma CFO Philip Wolfe, following a 22 September 2014 email in which the former requested Wolfe’s assistance: “Pls consult what to answer?The text of Hassan’s response had been drafted by Soma CFO Philip Wolfe, following a 22 September 2014 email in which the former requested Wolfe’s assistance: “Pls consult what to answer?
I knew that they [The Wall Street Journal] have already some hints…”I knew that they [The Wall Street Journal] have already some hints…”
118.118.
In summary, Soma’s official representations of its Capacity Building Agreement to journalists and the public are in stark contrast to the events described by and documentary evidence obtained by the Monitoring Group.In summary, Soma’s official representations of its Capacity Building Agreement to journalists and the public are in stark contrast to the events described by and documentary evidence obtained by the Monitoring Group.
Instead of being an assistance package to facilitate hiring a limited number of technical experts, Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement amounted in many cases to extra ‘salaries’ paid to top ministerial officials who had already been on the FGS payroll prior to the programme’s launch.Instead of being an assistance package to facilitate hiring a limited number of technical experts, Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement amounted in many cases to extra ‘salaries’ paid to top ministerial officials who had already been on the FGS payroll prior to the programme’s launch.
Agreement Amendments Following the Capacity Building AgreementAgreement Amendments Following the Capacity Building Agreement
119.119.
Shortly after the signing of the Capacity Building Agreement, the FGS and Soma began negotiating a further territorial allowance for Soma’s seismic exploration, as well as a draft agreement that would grant Soma a larger share of profits from potential production (“Evaluation Area Extension” and “Draft Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)”).Shortly after the signing of the Capacity Building Agreement, the FGS and Soma began negotiating a further territorial allowance for Soma’s seismic exploration, as well as a draft agreement that would grant Soma a larger share of profits from potential production (“Evaluation Area Extension” and “Draft Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)”).
The Monitoring Group has identified these concessions to Soma as potential quid pro quos related to the Capacity Building Agreement.The Monitoring Group has identified these concessions to Soma as potential quid pro quos related to the Capacity Building Agreement.
Evaluation Area ExtensionEvaluation Area Extension
120.120.
On 8 May 2014, the Minister signed a letter extending the offshore area available to Soma to survey (Evaluation Area Extension).On 8 May 2014, the Minister signed a letter extending the offshore area available to Soma to survey (Evaluation Area Extension).
“In light of [Soma’s] progress, it is the desire of the Ministry that the Evaluation Area…as agreed between the Ministry and Soma be expanded to include a larger area.“In light of [Soma’s] progress, it is the desire of the Ministry that the Evaluation Area…as agreed between the Ministry and Soma be expanded to include a larger area.
The Ministry hereby requests that Soma include within its exploration Program (as defined in the SOA) a 2D seismic survey that extends to the JORA block as outlined in the attached map”.The Ministry hereby requests that Soma include within its exploration Program (as defined in the SOA) a 2D seismic survey that extends to the JORA block as outlined in the attached map”.
The letter ends: “Also, the JORA Block will become part of the area in respect of which Soma may serve a Notice of Application for a Production Sharing Agreement pursuant to Article 2.2. of the SOA”.The letter ends: “Also, the JORA Block will become part of the area in respect of which Soma may serve a Notice of Application for a Production Sharing Agreement pursuant to Article 2.2. of the SOA”.
121.121.
The timing of the signing of the Evaluation Area Extension suggests that it may have represented a quid pro quo between the Ministry and Soma.The timing of the signing of the Evaluation Area Extension suggests that it may have represented a quid pro quo between the Ministry and Soma.
The Minister signed the Evaluation Area Extension on 8 May 2014, fewer than two weeks after agreeing the terms of the Soma Capacity Building Agreement.The Minister signed the Evaluation Area Extension on 8 May 2014, fewer than two weeks after agreeing the terms of the Soma Capacity Building Agreement.
A week later, on 15 May 2014, Soma countersigned the Capacity Building Agreement.A week later, on 15 May 2014, Soma countersigned the Capacity Building Agreement.
Draft Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)Draft Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)
122.122.
On 28 November 2014, Soma CEO Robert Sheppard addressed a letter (see annex 2.5.n) to the Minister, stating Soma’s case for revising the production sharing terms.On 28 November 2014, Soma CEO Robert Sheppard addressed a letter (see annex 2.5.n) to the Minister, stating Soma’s case for revising the production sharing terms.
The rationale presented by Soma for renegotiating the PSA included the fact that “much of the basin is in deep or ultra deep water”, the unproven nature of the reserves, and the collapsing global price of oil.The rationale presented by Soma for renegotiating the PSA included the fact that “much of the basin is in deep or ultra deep water”, the unproven nature of the reserves, and the collapsing global price of oil.
The letter also set forth Soma’s wish to also include explicit fiscal terms for gas in the revised PSA.The letter also set forth Soma’s wish to also include explicit fiscal terms for gas in the revised PSA.
123.123.
Subsequently in December 2014 a draft PSA agreement was sent to the Ministry for approval.Subsequently in December 2014 a draft PSA agreement was sent to the Ministry for approval.
The terms of this draft PSA have since been criticised for being highly unfavourable to the FGS, particularly following the publication of a Bloomberg article that first revealed the parameters of the proposed deal.The terms of this draft PSA have since been criticised for being highly unfavourable to the FGS, particularly following the publication of a Bloomberg article that first revealed the parameters of the proposed deal.
In a copy of the draft PSA seen by the Monitoring Group, Soma’s share of revenue is stipulated to be as high as 90 per cent in some cases.In a copy of the draft PSA seen by the Monitoring Group, Soma’s share of revenue is stipulated to be as high as 90 per cent in some cases.
Furthermore, the draft PSA grants the company a four-year royalty holiday for oil and gas found fewer than 1,000 metres below the sea’s surface, as well as a decade-long moratorium on paying taxes to the FGS.Furthermore, the draft PSA grants the company a four-year royalty holiday for oil and gas found fewer than 1,000 metres below the sea’s surface, as well as a decade-long moratorium on paying taxes to the FGS.
124.124.
Three months prior to the Bloomberg article, the Ministry’s own legal advisor had cautioned against signing the PSA.Three months prior to the Bloomberg article, the Ministry’s own legal advisor had cautioned against signing the PSA.
In an 8 February 2015 email to Ministry officials, the advisor wrote, “…as a matter of urgency, I wish to let you know that I am not in favor of signing the new proposed PSA from Soma.In an 8 February 2015 email to Ministry officials, the advisor wrote, “…as a matter of urgency, I wish to let you know that I am not in favor of signing the new proposed PSA from Soma.
It is not in the best interest of Somalia and, if signed, it will destroy your careers as politicians, and technocrats”.It is not in the best interest of Somalia and, if signed, it will destroy your careers as politicians, and technocrats”.
125.125.
Following publication of the Bloomberg article, the Ministry issued a statement in which it denied having received any draft PSA from Soma, further announcing that “Somalia is not accepting PSA deals at the moment”.Following publication of the Bloomberg article, the Ministry issued a statement in which it denied having received any draft PSA from Soma, further announcing that “Somalia is not accepting PSA deals at the moment”.
However, in a meeting with the Monitoring Group on 11 June 2015, Director General Hassan acknowledged that the Ministry had received the draft PSA from Soma, though he denied having personally seen it.However, in a meeting with the Monitoring Group on 11 June 2015, Director General Hassan acknowledged that the Ministry had received the draft PSA from Soma, though he denied having personally seen it.
Hassan further claimed that negotiations on the PSA had not yet begun, although he made reference to a “negotiation team”, to which Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein belongs.Hassan further claimed that negotiations on the PSA had not yet begun, although he made reference to a “negotiation team”, to which Dr. Abdulkadir Abiikar Hussein belongs.
Contrary to Hassan’s statements, internal Ministry correspondence seen by the Monitoring Group shows that Hussein sent a copy of the draft PSA to Hassan on 29 January 2015.Contrary to Hassan’s statements, internal Ministry correspondence seen by the Monitoring Group shows that Hussein sent a copy of the draft PSA to Hassan on 29 January 2015.
Both Hassan and Hussein, as previously noted, have been paid ‘salaries’ by Soma.Both Hassan and Hussein, as previously noted, have been paid ‘salaries’ by Soma.
126.126.
Correspondence seen by the Monitoring Group shows that negotiations over the draft PSA with Soma have been taking place since at least late April 2015.Correspondence seen by the Monitoring Group shows that negotiations over the draft PSA with Soma have been taking place since at least late April 2015.
In an email dated 30 April 2015, Peter Roberts, a lawyer representing the Ministry from the Houston-based firm Andrews Kurth LLP, wrote to another Ministry representative:In an email dated 30 April 2015, Peter Roberts, a lawyer representing the Ministry from the Houston-based firm Andrews Kurth LLP, wrote to another Ministry representative:
Soma - we had a cordial meeting and we promised to send to their lawyers next week a table of key issues and concerns regarding the PSA draft, with a view to discussing it with their lawyers week commencing 11 May.Soma - we had a cordial meeting and we promised to send to their lawyers next week a table of key issues and concerns regarding the PSA draft, with a view to discussing it with their lawyers week commencing 11 May.
Going well so far.Going well so far.
127.127.
The current FGS Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, H.E. Mohamed Mukhtar, told the Monitoring Group in June 2015 that the Ministry would not sign any PSA before a resource-sharing framework had been established with Somalia’s regional authorities.The current FGS Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, H.E. Mohamed Mukhtar, told the Monitoring Group in June 2015 that the Ministry would not sign any PSA before a resource-sharing framework had been established with Somalia’s regional authorities.
He also told the Monitoring Group that The African Legal Support Facility, a public international institution hosted by the African Development Bank, was in the process of assigning a legal consultant to assist the Ministry in developing a model PSA for Somalia.He also told the Monitoring Group that The African Legal Support Facility, a public international institution hosted by the African Development Bank, was in the process of assigning a legal consultant to assist the Ministry in developing a model PSA for Somalia.
Data roomData room
128.128.
Negotiations with Soma have taken place in a context of fundamental disparity, in which only one side, Soma, has access to the seismic survey data.Negotiations with Soma have taken place in a context of fundamental disparity, in which only one side, Soma, has access to the seismic survey data.
129.129.
Under the terms of the 6 August 2013 SOA, Soma was required to turn over the data obtained from its offshore seismic survey to the FGS “within a reasonable time”.Under the terms of the 6 August 2013 SOA, Soma was required to turn over the data obtained from its offshore seismic survey to the FGS “within a reasonable time”.
Although the survey was completed by June 2014, the company has yet to fulfil this obligation.Although the survey was completed by June 2014, the company has yet to fulfil this obligation.
Soma has justified the delay by referencing the lack of a data room at the Ministry, where the data may be stored properly.Soma has justified the delay by referencing the lack of a data room at the Ministry, where the data may be stored properly.
130.130.
A February 2015 internal confidential report, written by an independent legal advisor to the Ministry and on file with the SEMG, demonstrates that Ministry officials were well aware of one-sided nature of the PSA negotiation.A February 2015 internal confidential report, written by an independent legal advisor to the Ministry and on file with the SEMG, demonstrates that Ministry officials were well aware of one-sided nature of the PSA negotiation.
“The Somali government”, the report concluded, “without any knowledge of the data or its contents and conclusions, is negotiating in the blind”.“The Somali government”, the report concluded, “without any knowledge of the data or its contents and conclusions, is negotiating in the blind”.
131.131.
In a letter dated 17 October 2014, signed by Director General Hassan, Soma agreed to pay the costs of “rebuilding and refurbishment of that part of the Ministry Building that will house the data room in Mogadishu” up to a total of USD 100,000.In a letter dated 17 October 2014, signed by Director General Hassan, Soma agreed to pay the costs of “rebuilding and refurbishment of that part of the Ministry Building that will house the data room in Mogadishu” up to a total of USD 100,000.
The Ministry confirmed receipt of these funds into its CBS account on 18 December 2014.The Ministry confirmed receipt of these funds into its CBS account on 18 December 2014.
In February 2015, Soma requested an update from the Ministry on how the company’s funds had been disbursed.In February 2015, Soma requested an update from the Ministry on how the company’s funds had been disbursed.
A 3 March 2015 letter to Soma, signed by Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi, reported that “the funds are still in the above mentioned account as we have not yet began working on the project as the site for construction is currently occupied by Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)”.A 3 March 2015 letter to Soma, signed by Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi, reported that “the funds are still in the above mentioned account as we have not yet began working on the project as the site for construction is currently occupied by Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)”.
132.132.
When interviewed by the Monitoring Group on 11 June 2015, Director General Hassan acknowledged that no further progress had been made towards establishing a data room on the Ministry’s premises.When interviewed by the Monitoring Group on 11 June 2015, Director General Hassan acknowledged that no further progress had been made towards establishing a data room on the Ministry’s premises.
Hassan further stated that he lacked “a concept of what kind of room we need for data”.Hassan further stated that he lacked “a concept of what kind of room we need for data”.
Hassan could not account for the USD 100,000 transferred by Soma and referred the SEMG to Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi.Hassan could not account for the USD 100,000 transferred by Soma and referred the SEMG to Jabril Mohamoud Geeddi.
Geeddi has not responded to the Group’s request for an interview.Geeddi has not responded to the Group’s request for an interview.
133.133.
The Monitoring Group subsequently obtained records for the Ministry’s Central Bank account (#1009) that demonstrate that the funds allocated for the data room had been withdrawn by the middle of March 2015.The Monitoring Group subsequently obtained records for the Ministry’s Central Bank account (#1009) that demonstrate that the funds allocated for the data room had been withdrawn by the middle of March 2015.
As there are no names corresponding to the withdrawal entries in the records, the Group has been unable to determine who withdrew the funds or for what purpose.As there are no names corresponding to the withdrawal entries in the records, the Group has been unable to determine who withdrew the funds or for what purpose.
Pattern of corruptionPattern of corruption
134.134.
The Monitoring Group has obtained evidence suggesting that requests for ‘capacity building’ may form part of a pattern of corruption within the Ministry.The Monitoring Group has obtained evidence suggesting that requests for ‘capacity building’ may form part of a pattern of corruption within the Ministry.
135.135.
The Group has in its possession a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), dated 24 November 2014, between the Ministry and Allied Petroleum (SO) Corp., a Dubai-based petroleum exploration company “supported by Middle Eastern Sovereign Wealth Funds and major US Banks”.The Group has in its possession a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), dated 24 November 2014, between the Ministry and Allied Petroleum (SO) Corp., a Dubai-based petroleum exploration company “supported by Middle Eastern Sovereign Wealth Funds and major US Banks”.
Former Minister Daud Mohamed Omar met with Allied Petroleum CEO Justin Dibb and COO Andrew Robinson in Abu Dhabi on 5 May 2014.Former Minister Daud Mohamed Omar met with Allied Petroleum CEO Justin Dibb and COO Andrew Robinson in Abu Dhabi on 5 May 2014.
At that meeting, the company expressed its interest in signing PSAs for four blocks in the Jora region, proximate to the Kenya-Somalia border.At that meeting, the company expressed its interest in signing PSAs for four blocks in the Jora region, proximate to the Kenya-Somalia border.
Before agreeing to any PSA terms, Director General Hassan insisted that Allied Petroleum provide ‘capacity building’ support to the Ministry.Before agreeing to any PSA terms, Director General Hassan insisted that Allied Petroleum provide ‘capacity building’ support to the Ministry.
136.136.
Subsequent to that meeting, Hassan sent the text of a proposed MOU to Allied Petroleum.Subsequent to that meeting, Hassan sent the text of a proposed MOU to Allied Petroleum.
The Allied Petroleum MOU bore many similarities to the Soma MOU, with a number of the same clauses.The Allied Petroleum MOU bore many similarities to the Soma MOU, with a number of the same clauses.
For instance, the MOU stipulated that Allied Petroleum would pay the salaries of eight “consultants, advisors, or employees engaged by the Ministry”, to a maximum of USD 5,000 each per month over a 24-month period.For instance, the MOU stipulated that Allied Petroleum would pay the salaries of eight “consultants, advisors, or employees engaged by the Ministry”, to a maximum of USD 5,000 each per month over a 24-month period.
It also stipulated that Allied Petroleum was to pay for “the establishment of a data room”, a project towards which Soma had already committed USD 100,000.It also stipulated that Allied Petroleum was to pay for “the establishment of a data room”, a project towards which Soma had already committed USD 100,000.
The MOU also identified an International Bank of Somalia (IBS) account to receive the ‘capacity building’ funds, thereby bypassing the Central Bank (see annex 2.5.q for the details of the Ministry’s IBS account).The MOU also identified an International Bank of Somalia (IBS) account to receive the ‘capacity building’ funds, thereby bypassing the Central Bank (see annex 2.5.q for the details of the Ministry’s IBS account).
137.137.
The terms of the MOU make it clear that the proposed Capacity Building Agreement was intended to be a quid pro quo for the Ministry’s granting of offshore PSA rights to Allied Petroleum;The terms of the MOU make it clear that the proposed Capacity Building Agreement was intended to be a quid pro quo for the Ministry’s granting of offshore PSA rights to Allied Petroleum;
paragraph 11 states: “The Commencement Date of the MoU shall be the date, being 90 days following signature of PSA’s covering Offshore Jor[a] A, B, C, D”.paragraph 11 states: “The Commencement Date of the MoU shall be the date, being 90 days following signature of PSA’s covering Offshore Jor[a] A, B, C, D”.
Per the terms of the Evaluation Area Extension agreement with Soma, however, the Ministry had already granted exploration rights of the entire Jora region to Soma on 8 May 2014.Per the terms of the Evaluation Area Extension agreement with Soma, however, the Ministry had already granted exploration rights of the entire Jora region to Soma on 8 May 2014.
138.138.
Although Director General Hassan and CEO Justin Dibb signed the MOU with Allied Petroleum on 24 November 2014, it appears that it was never implemented.Although Director General Hassan and CEO Justin Dibb signed the MOU with Allied Petroleum on 24 November 2014, it appears that it was never implemented.
139.139.
The Ministry also approached Royal Dutch Shell plc with demands for ‘capacity building’.The Ministry also approached Royal Dutch Shell plc with demands for ‘capacity building’.
In multiple emails dating back to May 2014, Director General Hassan repeatedly reminded Shell of its capacity building obligations – including granting scholarships to Somali students – as stipulated in the pre-civil war Somali Government’s 1988 Concession Agreement with Pecten Somalia Co. (a subsidiary of Shell).In multiple emails dating back to May 2014, Director General Hassan repeatedly reminded Shell of its capacity building obligations – including granting scholarships to Somali students – as stipulated in the pre-civil war Somali Government’s 1988 Concession Agreement with Pecten Somalia Co. (a subsidiary of Shell).
In a 20 November 2014 email to Menno DeRuig, an Exploration Manager for Shell covering Sub-Saharan Africa, Hassan wrote:In a 20 November 2014 email to Menno DeRuig, an Exploration Manager for Shell covering Sub-Saharan Africa, Hassan wrote:
We repeatedly ask you issue [sic] a letter for sponsoring of university students, I don’t [know] what is [sic] the difficulties you have and you didn’t come back to us…We repeatedly ask you issue [sic] a letter for sponsoring of university students, I don’t [know] what is [sic] the difficulties you have and you didn’t come back to us…
The attached is [sic] the eligibility letters for some of the students so please you either directly communicate to the university and ask to proceed convincing [sic] that you are sponsoring or simply issue letter to sponsor to [sic] deal with them.The attached is [sic] the eligibility letters for some of the students so please you either directly communicate to the university and ask to proceed convincing [sic] that you are sponsoring or simply issue letter to sponsor to [sic] deal with them.
140.140.
Attached to the email were admission letters from USCI University in Kuala Lumpur for four Somali students: Abdirahman Farah Abdi, Asho Osman Abdi, Rakia Farah Abdi, and Salman Osman Abdi.Attached to the email were admission letters from USCI University in Kuala Lumpur for four Somali students: Abdirahman Farah Abdi, Asho Osman Abdi, Rakia Farah Abdi, and Salman Osman Abdi.
All four are children of Director General Hassan.All four are children of Director General Hassan.
Examination of email correspondence by the SEMG has revealed that each student’s admission to USCI University had been arranged through the intercession of Polaris Energy Sdn Bhd, a Malaysian oil company with which Hassan and other members of the Ministry had held meetings in Kuala Lumpur in September 2014.Examination of email correspondence by the SEMG has revealed that each student’s admission to USCI University had been arranged through the intercession of Polaris Energy Sdn Bhd, a Malaysian oil company with which Hassan and other members of the Ministry had held meetings in Kuala Lumpur in September 2014.
141.141.
On 24 November 2014 DeRuig responded to Hassan with an extensive list of documentation requirements, and also informed him that Shell would be unable to fund training programmes longer than one year in duration.On 24 November 2014 DeRuig responded to Hassan with an extensive list of documentation requirements, and also informed him that Shell would be unable to fund training programmes longer than one year in duration.
The Monitoring Group is unaware of any subsequent attempts by Hassan to arrange for Shell to fund his children’s education.The Monitoring Group is unaware of any subsequent attempts by Hassan to arrange for Shell to fund his children’s education.
Soma’s payments to an FGS legal advisorSoma’s payments to an FGS legal advisor
142.142.
The Monitoring Group has confirmed that Soma made payments to a long-standing FGS legal advisor, the Canadian lawyer J. Jay Park, QC, between 3 June 2013 and 6 August 2013.The Monitoring Group has confirmed that Soma made payments to a long-standing FGS legal advisor, the Canadian lawyer J. Jay Park, QC, between 3 June 2013 and 6 August 2013.
143.143.
The FGS’ relationship with Park long pre-dated the existence of the Capacity Building Agreement and the signature of the Soma SOA on 6 August 2013.The FGS’ relationship with Park long pre-dated the existence of the Capacity Building Agreement and the signature of the Soma SOA on 6 August 2013.
Between 2007 and August 2012, Park served as an oil and gas advisor for the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), during which time he was a member of the Petroleum Law Team responsible for drafting the 2008 legislation.Between 2007 and August 2012, Park served as an oil and gas advisor for the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), during which time he was a member of the Petroleum Law Team responsible for drafting the 2008 legislation.
In early 2013, Park was implicated in a petroleum bribery scandal in Chad two years earlier, where he had allegedly facilitated the transfer of USD 2 million to the wife of a diplomat.In early 2013, Park was implicated in a petroleum bribery scandal in Chad two years earlier, where he had allegedly facilitated the transfer of USD 2 million to the wife of a diplomat.
In April 2013, Park announced his retirement from his firm, Norton Rose Canada LLP.In April 2013, Park announced his retirement from his firm, Norton Rose Canada LLP.
In June 2013 he founded his own entity, Petroleum Regimes Advisory Ltd.In June 2013 he founded his own entity, Petroleum Regimes Advisory Ltd.
(PRA), and continued as an official advisor to the FGS, a role he exercised during the SOA negotiations with Soma.(PRA), and continued as an official advisor to the FGS, a role he exercised during the SOA negotiations with Soma.
In its 2014 report (S/2014/726), the Monitoring Group identified Jay Park, along with Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed, as a “key architect” of the Soma deal on the FGS’ side.In its 2014 report (S/2014/726), the Monitoring Group identified Jay Park, along with Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed, as a “key architect” of the Soma deal on the FGS’ side.
In 2013, one of Soma’s own representatives told an international consulting firm that Park had a role “to protect all interests” – both those of the FGS and Soma – during the SOA negotiations.In 2013, one of Soma’s own representatives told an international consulting firm that Park had a role “to protect all interests” – both those of the FGS and Soma – during the SOA negotiations.
144.144.
In a letter to the SEMG dated 1 July 2015, Soma acknowledged that it had paid Park’s fees during the SOA negotiation process, despite the apparent conflict of interest doing so entailed:In a letter to the SEMG dated 1 July 2015, Soma acknowledged that it had paid Park’s fees during the SOA negotiation process, despite the apparent conflict of interest doing so entailed:
It was of the utmost importance for Soma Oil & Gas and the Federal Government, that both parties had independent legal advice during the negotiations.It was of the utmost importance for Soma Oil & Gas and the Federal Government, that both parties had independent legal advice during the negotiations.
As the Federal Government was unable to pay for this advice which transpired late in the negotiations, the Federal Government asked if Soma would cover its legal expenses.As the Federal Government was unable to pay for this advice which transpired late in the negotiations, the Federal Government asked if Soma would cover its legal expenses.
The Company’s board took extensive independent legal advice before proceeding to do so.The Company’s board took extensive independent legal advice before proceeding to do so.
145.145.
Park acknowledged that his firm PRA had received USD 494,564.85 from Soma, through the then-Ministry of National Resources, for legal services rendered from 3 June 2013 to 6 August 2013.Park acknowledged that his firm PRA had received USD 494,564.85 from Soma, through the then-Ministry of National Resources, for legal services rendered from 3 June 2013 to 6 August 2013.
Park informed the SEMG that on 6 August 2013 – the same day the SOA was signed – then-Minister Abdirizak Omar Mohamed “issued a written direction to Soma to pay the fees associated with our work for the FGS in relation to Soma”.Park informed the SEMG that on 6 August 2013 – the same day the SOA was signed – then-Minister Abdirizak Omar Mohamed “issued a written direction to Soma to pay the fees associated with our work for the FGS in relation to Soma”.
146.146.
Soma failed to provide a response to the Monitoring Group’s inquiry regarding the size of the payment the company had made to Park.Soma failed to provide a response to the Monitoring Group’s inquiry regarding the size of the payment the company had made to Park.
However, both Soma and Park confirmed that the company had issued payment to PRA on 18 December 2014.However, both Soma and Park confirmed that the company had issued payment to PRA on 18 December 2014.
Between 6 August 2013 and 18 December 2014 Park continued to legally advise the Ministry on numerous matters, including the Capacity Building Agreement.Between 6 August 2013 and 18 December 2014 Park continued to legally advise the Ministry on numerous matters, including the Capacity Building Agreement.
PRA remains on retainer with the Ministry as of 19 July 2015, though Park told the Monitoring Group that the last legal request he had received from the Ministry was in March 2015.PRA remains on retainer with the Ministry as of 19 July 2015, though Park told the Monitoring Group that the last legal request he had received from the Ministry was in March 2015.
147.147.
Despite the fact that Park’s payment was contingent on the Ministry signing the SOA – Soma had no reason to pay his fees otherwise – both Soma and Park have maintained that their arrangement did not represent a conflict of interest.Despite the fact that Park’s payment was contingent on the Ministry signing the SOA – Soma had no reason to pay his fees otherwise – both Soma and Park have maintained that their arrangement did not represent a conflict of interest.
However, the February 2015 report by the Ministry’s legal advisor also flagged the issue of Park’s conflict of interest, and suggested that the FGS may not have received “adequate and effective legal representation” during the SOA negotiations.However, the February 2015 report by the Ministry’s legal advisor also flagged the issue of Park’s conflict of interest, and suggested that the FGS may not have received “adequate and effective legal representation” during the SOA negotiations.
Engagement with Soma and FGS officialsEngagement with Soma and FGS officials
148.148.
The Monitoring Group contacted each of the Ministry officials profiled above, informing them of its investigations and that their names will appear in this communication to the Committee.The Monitoring Group contacted each of the Ministry officials profiled above, informing them of its investigations and that their names will appear in this communication to the Committee.
As of 24 July 2015, Farah Abdi Hassan, Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi, Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad, Abdirizak Hassan Awed, Jay Park, and Mohamed Yousuf Ali had been interviewed by the Group.As of 24 July 2015, Farah Abdi Hassan, Mohamed Ali-nur Hagi, Dr. Abdi Mohamed Siad, Abdirizak Hassan Awed, Jay Park, and Mohamed Yousuf Ali had been interviewed by the Group.
149.149.
In a June 2015 interview with the Monitoring Group, H.E. Mohamed Mukhtar, FGS Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, categorised Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement as furnishing “basic support salaries for these individuals that we need at the Ministry, but cannot afford to employ”.In a June 2015 interview with the Monitoring Group, H.E. Mohamed Mukhtar, FGS Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, categorised Soma’s Capacity Building Agreement as furnishing “basic support salaries for these individuals that we need at the Ministry, but cannot afford to employ”.
He also assured the Group that Soma had received no benefit, and would receive none in future, as a result of payments the company had made to the Ministry.He also assured the Group that Soma had received no benefit, and would receive none in future, as a result of payments the company had made to the Ministry.
Minister Mukhtar further stated that he would entertain “no discussion…that those who were paid had, or will have, any influence on oil deals”.Minister Mukhtar further stated that he would entertain “no discussion…that those who were paid had, or will have, any influence on oil deals”.
150.150.
On 18 June 2015, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to Soma CEO Robert Sheppard, requesting that the company provide information on a number of the matters discussed above.On 18 June 2015, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to Soma CEO Robert Sheppard, requesting that the company provide information on a number of the matters discussed above.
Soma sent a reply to the Monitoring Group on 1 July 2015 and another on 24 July in response to the Group’s follow-up questions, much of the content of which has been cited in the preceding discussion.Soma sent a reply to the Monitoring Group on 1 July 2015 and another on 24 July in response to the Group’s follow-up questions, much of the content of which has been cited in the preceding discussion.
Background: the oil and gas sector in SomaliaBackground: the oil and gas sector in Somalia
Oil and gas as a threat to peace and securityOil and gas as a threat to peace and security
151.151.
The SEMG discussed the threat to peace and security posed by the extractives sector in Somalia in its report in 2013 (S/2013/413).The SEMG discussed the threat to peace and security posed by the extractives sector in Somalia in its report in 2013 (S/2013/413).
The Group highlighted both the risks of corruption in the sector, and the shortcomings in transparency and capacity of Somalia’s petroleum institutions: the Somalia Petroleum Corporation and Somali Petroleum Authority.The Group highlighted both the risks of corruption in the sector, and the shortcomings in transparency and capacity of Somalia’s petroleum institutions: the Somalia Petroleum Corporation and Somali Petroleum Authority.
It therefore recommended “urgent international support to the Somali Government to strengthen capacity within the SPA and to create an independently managed cadastre of oil licences, which should be linked to a clear financial trail for any signature fees collected during any licensing and re-licensing of oil acreage”.It therefore recommended “urgent international support to the Somali Government to strengthen capacity within the SPA and to create an independently managed cadastre of oil licences, which should be linked to a clear financial trail for any signature fees collected during any licensing and re-licensing of oil acreage”.
152.152.
The Monitoring Group’s 2014 report (S/2014/726) described the lack of transparency and failure to obtain parliamentary approval prior to the awarding of the Soma contract.The Monitoring Group’s 2014 report (S/2014/726) described the lack of transparency and failure to obtain parliamentary approval prior to the awarding of the Soma contract.
In the context of both the Soma investigation and investigations into oil exploration and concessions elsewhere in Somalia, the SEMG specifically recommended “that the Security Council consider deciding in a resolution to request a moratorium on all oil licensing until a legal understanding is reached between the regional and federal authorities in respect of ownership of natural resources in Somalia”.In the context of both the Soma investigation and investigations into oil exploration and concessions elsewhere in Somalia, the SEMG specifically recommended “that the Security Council consider deciding in a resolution to request a moratorium on all oil licensing until a legal understanding is reached between the regional and federal authorities in respect of ownership of natural resources in Somalia”.
153.153.
In April 2014 Adam Smith International, an international consulting firm, produced a report titled “Needs Assessment for the Extractives Industry in Somalia”, commissioned by the UK Department for International Development.In April 2014 Adam Smith International, an international consulting firm, produced a report titled “Needs Assessment for the Extractives Industry in Somalia”, commissioned by the UK Department for International Development.
Though never published, the report offered similar recommendations: the establishment of an Extractives Technical Advisory Panel consisting of international and national experts, and the provision of long-term and significant technical support to Somali institutions engaged in the extractives sector.Though never published, the report offered similar recommendations: the establishment of an Extractives Technical Advisory Panel consisting of international and national experts, and the provision of long-term and significant technical support to Somali institutions engaged in the extractives sector.
154.154.
On Soma specifically, the report notes: “We received unverified information that some pre-1991 license holders had offered to share geological data with FGS but withdrew these offers when the Soma Oil & Gas deal focusing on data acquisition was signed.On Soma specifically, the report notes: “We received unverified information that some pre-1991 license holders had offered to share geological data with FGS but withdrew these offers when the Soma Oil & Gas deal focusing on data acquisition was signed.
Some have also offered capacity building support, which has not yet been taken on by FGS”.Some have also offered capacity building support, which has not yet been taken on by FGS”.
Under a chapter dedicated to transparency and accountability, the report continues: “The SOA between the Federal Government of Somalia and UK Soma Oil & Gas awarded through direct negotiations has raised serious concerns amongst stakeholders, including the industry, about the Government’s commitment to transparent and fair management of its extractives sector”.Under a chapter dedicated to transparency and accountability, the report continues: “The SOA between the Federal Government of Somalia and UK Soma Oil & Gas awarded through direct negotiations has raised serious concerns amongst stakeholders, including the industry, about the Government’s commitment to transparent and fair management of its extractives sector”.
155.155.
The FGC Reviews of Public Sector Contracts and Concessions reached a similar conclusion: “In countries with no previous petroleum discoveries, the approach taken to exploration is similar to what we now see in Somalia.The FGC Reviews of Public Sector Contracts and Concessions reached a similar conclusion: “In countries with no previous petroleum discoveries, the approach taken to exploration is similar to what we now see in Somalia.
Investors submit unsolicited applications to develop production blocks, leading to direct negotiations.Investors submit unsolicited applications to develop production blocks, leading to direct negotiations.
These generally lack transparency and accountability, and will usually result in sub-optimal deals…These generally lack transparency and accountability, and will usually result in sub-optimal deals…
Given these considerations, and the risks to the country of allowing an expansion of ad hoc licensing, it would be prudent for the Federal Government to postpone direct negotiations on PSAs until a new legal and fiscal framework for the sector has been established”.Given these considerations, and the risks to the country of allowing an expansion of ad hoc licensing, it would be prudent for the Federal Government to postpone direct negotiations on PSAs until a new legal and fiscal framework for the sector has been established”.
Internal regulationInternal regulation
156.156.
The Somalia Petroleum Authority (SPA) was legally established by the 2008 Petroleum Law (Article 19) to serve as the “competent regulatory authority to regulate Petroleum Operations” replacing the function of the then-Ministry of National Resources’ internal Petroleum Regulatory Affairs Department.The Somalia Petroleum Authority (SPA) was legally established by the 2008 Petroleum Law (Article 19) to serve as the “competent regulatory authority to regulate Petroleum Operations” replacing the function of the then-Ministry of National Resources’ internal Petroleum Regulatory Affairs Department.
The SPA was to be given the power to grant certain contractual concessions to oil and gas firms, including Reconnaissance Authorisations, PSAs, and Surface Access Authorisations.The SPA was to be given the power to grant certain contractual concessions to oil and gas firms, including Reconnaissance Authorisations, PSAs, and Surface Access Authorisations.
It was also mandated to investigate individuals who contravened the Law, and entities contravening Authorisation conditions, independently of the Ministry.It was also mandated to investigate individuals who contravened the Law, and entities contravening Authorisation conditions, independently of the Ministry.
157.157.
The Petroleum Law directed the Somali Government to create the SPA once it was satisfied that “the quantity of Petroleum Operations in Somalia [were] sufficient to justify the costs of establishing [it]”.The Petroleum Law directed the Somali Government to create the SPA once it was satisfied that “the quantity of Petroleum Operations in Somalia [were] sufficient to justify the costs of establishing [it]”.
Despite significant interest from numerous oil and gas companies – including both oil majors still holding rights to pre-Somali civil war force majeure blocks, and smaller exploration companies – the FGS has yet to establish the SPA.Despite significant interest from numerous oil and gas companies – including both oil majors still holding rights to pre-Somali civil war force majeure blocks, and smaller exploration companies – the FGS has yet to establish the SPA.
As a result, the Ministry of National Resources granted Soma both the SOA and Reconnaissance Authorisation, as well as conducted negotiations on PSAs.As a result, the Ministry of National Resources granted Soma both the SOA and Reconnaissance Authorisation, as well as conducted negotiations on PSAs.
Its successor as of January 2014, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, has negotiated subsequent arrangements.Its successor as of January 2014, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, has negotiated subsequent arrangements.
158.158.
Even in the absence of the SPA, the 2008 Petroleum Law requires the FGS under Article 44 to make “regular publication of all material Petroleum-related payments by Authorised Persons to the Government and all material revenues received by the Government from Authorised persons to a wide audience in a publicly accessible, comprehensive and comprehensible manner”.Even in the absence of the SPA, the 2008 Petroleum Law requires the FGS under Article 44 to make “regular publication of all material Petroleum-related payments by Authorised Persons to the Government and all material revenues received by the Government from Authorised persons to a wide audience in a publicly accessible, comprehensive and comprehensible manner”.
To date, the details of payments made by Soma to the FGS have not been made public.To date, the details of payments made by Soma to the FGS have not been made public.
Annex 2.5.a: Soma Oil & Gas Offshore Evaluation AreaAnnex 2.5.a: Soma Oil & Gas Offshore Evaluation Area
Annex 2.5.b: Nairobi Fairmont Hotel Meeting PhotographAnnex 2.5.b: Nairobi Fairmont Hotel Meeting Photograph
Annex 2.5.c: First Amendment AgreementAnnex 2.5.c: First Amendment Agreement
Annex 2.5.d: Capacity Building Support Request LetterAnnex 2.5.d: Capacity Building Support Request Letter
Annex 2.5.e: Capacity Building AgreementAnnex 2.5.e: Capacity Building Agreement
Annex 2.5.f: Capacity Building InvoiceAnnex 2.5.f: Capacity Building Invoice
Annex 2.5.g: Salary ChartAnnex 2.5.g: Salary Chart
Annex 2.5.h: Farah Abdi Hassan contractAnnex 2.5.h: Farah Abdi Hassan contract
Annex 2.5.i: First page of a letter from Royal Dutch Shell plc to Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed, a presidential advisor on Soma’s payrollAnnex 2.5.i: First page of a letter from Royal Dutch Shell plc to Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed, a presidential advisor on Soma’s payroll
Annex 2.5.j: Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed’s FGS Diplomatic PassportAnnex 2.5.j: Dr. Abdullahi Haider Mohamed’s FGS Diplomatic Passport
Annex 2.5.k: Central Bank Withdrawal SlipsAnnex 2.5.k: Central Bank Withdrawal Slips
Annex 2.5.l: Forged Employee PayslipAnnex 2.5.l: Forged Employee Payslip
Annex 2.5.m: Evaluation Area ExtensionAnnex 2.5.m: Evaluation Area Extension
Annex 2.5.n: Letter on Revised Offshore PSA Fiscal TermsAnnex 2.5.n: Letter on Revised Offshore PSA Fiscal Terms
Annex 2.5.o: Data Room LetterAnnex 2.5.o: Data Room Letter
Annex 2.5.p: Allied Petroleum Memorandum of UnderstandingAnnex 2.5.p: Allied Petroleum Memorandum of Understanding
Annex 2.5.q: Ministry’s International Bank of Somalia AccountAnnex 2.5.q: Ministry’s International Bank of Somalia Account
Annex 3Annex 3
Public financial management and misappropriationPublic financial management and misappropriation
Annex 3.1: SNA financial management and misappropriationAnnex 3.1: SNA financial management and misappropriation
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Annex 3.2: Misappropriation of funds at the Somali Embassy in NairobiAnnex 3.2: Misappropriation of funds at the Somali Embassy in Nairobi
1.1.
The flow of funds between the FGS and its embassies has been subject to allegations of corruption and the misappropriation of some of those funds.The flow of funds between the FGS and its embassies has been subject to allegations of corruption and the misappropriation of some of those funds.
The Monitoring Group revealed in previous reports (S/2012/544, paragraphs 72 and 73 and S/2013/413, paragraphs 18-21) financial irregularities concerning the production and issue of passports and the misuse of funds collected by Somali Government missions overseas.The Monitoring Group revealed in previous reports (S/2012/544, paragraphs 72 and 73 and S/2013/413, paragraphs 18-21) financial irregularities concerning the production and issue of passports and the misuse of funds collected by Somali Government missions overseas.
The lack of transparency and accountability and the absence of financial discipline continue to be an issue.The lack of transparency and accountability and the absence of financial discipline continue to be an issue.
Money collected from Somali nationals for passports or other official documents is not always accounted for in full.Money collected from Somali nationals for passports or other official documents is not always accounted for in full.
In fact some Somali heads of mission consider the revenues collected or the money disbursed by the FGS as their own personal reserve.In fact some Somali heads of mission consider the revenues collected or the money disbursed by the FGS as their own personal reserve.
There are no standard procedures for the collection of fees for passports and other travel documents.There are no standard procedures for the collection of fees for passports and other travel documents.
Due to the fact that Somali banks are not fully functional, the monies collected internationally are transferred to Mogadishu through remittance companies (hawalas) or sometimes in cash.Due to the fact that Somali banks are not fully functional, the monies collected internationally are transferred to Mogadishu through remittance companies (hawalas) or sometimes in cash.
Misappropriation of funds at the Somali Embassy in NairobiMisappropriation of funds at the Somali Embassy in Nairobi
2.2.
The Monitoring Group has discovered serious irregularities concerning the management of public financial resources at the Somali Embassy in Nairobi and has conducted an investigation into funds collected by the embassy for passports and other travel documents for the period January 2014 to April 2015.The Monitoring Group has discovered serious irregularities concerning the management of public financial resources at the Somali Embassy in Nairobi and has conducted an investigation into funds collected by the embassy for passports and other travel documents for the period January 2014 to April 2015.
3.3.
The former Somali Ambassador, Mohamed Ali Nur “Americo”, had been in office for more than 10 years and was the longest-serving diplomat in Kenya.The former Somali Ambassador, Mohamed Ali Nur “Americo”, had been in office for more than 10 years and was the longest-serving diplomat in Kenya.
He was recalled to Mogadishu in early April 2015.He was recalled to Mogadishu in early April 2015.
The newly nominated Jamal Hassan began his mandate on 4 August 2015 after the Government of Kenya accepted his credentials.The newly nominated Jamal Hassan began his mandate on 4 August 2015 after the Government of Kenya accepted his credentials.
Sources informed the Monitoring Group that approximately 10 days prior to his recall Ambassador “Americo” brought a team of IT specialists into the Embassy, allegedly to perform updates on the embassy’s computers.Sources informed the Monitoring Group that approximately 10 days prior to his recall Ambassador “Americo” brought a team of IT specialists into the Embassy, allegedly to perform updates on the embassy’s computers.
In fact, information was removed from the computers and many documents were also destroyed.In fact, information was removed from the computers and many documents were also destroyed.
4.4.
Every Somali national applying for a passport in Nairobi has to pay USD 130 and KES 2,000 (USD 19) (available in annex 3.2.a).Every Somali national applying for a passport in Nairobi has to pay USD 130 and KES 2,000 (USD 19) (available in annex 3.2.a).
The Ministry of Interior requires that USD 98 of the fee is transferred to its Dahabshiil account in Mogadishu and USD 32 is kept by the embassy.The Ministry of Interior requires that USD 98 of the fee is transferred to its Dahabshiil account in Mogadishu and USD 32 is kept by the embassy.
That means that, for each passport issued, the Nairobi embassy keeps USD 51, including the KES fee.That means that, for each passport issued, the Nairobi embassy keeps USD 51, including the KES fee.
For an emergency travel document, the embassy charges USD 55.For an emergency travel document, the embassy charges USD 55.
According to high-ranking FGS officials interviewed by the Monitoring Group, all of the money collected by embassies for passports and travel documents should be transferred to the Treasury Single Account (TSA) at the Central Bank and from there the FGS would disburse funds to its embassies according to their needs.According to high-ranking FGS officials interviewed by the Monitoring Group, all of the money collected by embassies for passports and travel documents should be transferred to the Treasury Single Account (TSA) at the Central Bank and from there the FGS would disburse funds to its embassies according to their needs.
5.5.
Applicants for travel documents at the Nairobi Embassy deposit the relevant fees into two accounts in the Nairobi branch of the Transnational Bank.Applicants for travel documents at the Nairobi Embassy deposit the relevant fees into two accounts in the Nairobi branch of the Transnational Bank.
Over 7,500 Somali nationals applied for travel documents during the timeframe of the investigation.Over 7,500 Somali nationals applied for travel documents during the timeframe of the investigation.
The total amount collected in both accounts for this timeframe was USD 960,836.The total amount collected in both accounts for this timeframe was USD 960,836.
Two remittance companies, Amal Express and Dahabshiil, were used to transfer the funds to Somalia.Two remittance companies, Amal Express and Dahabshiil, were used to transfer the funds to Somalia.
The assessments of the Group are based on the statements of the two accounts for the period mentioned above and the transfer receipts from the two hawalas for the same period.The assessments of the Group are based on the statements of the two accounts for the period mentioned above and the transfer receipts from the two hawalas for the same period.
6.6.
According to bank statements, cash withdrawals were made from the two designated deposit accounts on a regular basis but the amount of money withdrawn was not consistent with the sums transferred to Mogadishu.According to bank statements, cash withdrawals were made from the two designated deposit accounts on a regular basis but the amount of money withdrawn was not consistent with the sums transferred to Mogadishu.
According to receipts from the two hawalas, the total amount transferred between January 2014 and April 2015 to the Ministry of Interior’s Dahabshiil account in Mogadishu was USD 486,258.According to receipts from the two hawalas, the total amount transferred between January 2014 and April 2015 to the Ministry of Interior’s Dahabshiil account in Mogadishu was USD 486,258.
That leads to a difference of USD 474,578.That leads to a difference of USD 474,578.
The receipts show that cash transfers were made mainly by an individual named Mohamed Ahmed Anwar (see annex 3.2.b).The receipts show that cash transfers were made mainly by an individual named Mohamed Ahmed Anwar (see annex 3.2.b).
The Group learned that he was not even an employee of the Embassy but a friend of Ambassador “Americo”.The Group learned that he was not even an employee of the Embassy but a friend of Ambassador “Americo”.
In some rare cases, the ambassador himself made transfers to Mogadishu.In some rare cases, the ambassador himself made transfers to Mogadishu.
7.7.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocates USD 49,200 for the operation of the Embassy in Nairobi per quarter.The Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocates USD 49,200 for the operation of the Embassy in Nairobi per quarter.
For the period mentioned above, in addition to the USD 474,578 from travel document fees that was not transferred to Mogadishu, the FGS allocated an additional USD 246,000 to the Embassy.For the period mentioned above, in addition to the USD 474,578 from travel document fees that was not transferred to Mogadishu, the FGS allocated an additional USD 246,000 to the Embassy.
This adds up to a total Embassy income of USD 720,578.This adds up to a total Embassy income of USD 720,578.
8.8.
Ambassador “Americo” was recalled to Mogadishu on 2 April 2015.Ambassador “Americo” was recalled to Mogadishu on 2 April 2015.
On 4 April, Anwar made six cash withdrawals totalling USD 9,000.On 4 April, Anwar made six cash withdrawals totalling USD 9,000.
At the close of business on 4 April, the two embassy accounts were almost empty, with respective balances of only KES 534 [USD 5] and USD 400.At the close of business on 4 April, the two embassy accounts were almost empty, with respective balances of only KES 534 [USD 5] and USD 400.
This means that the Somali Embassy in Nairobi spent USD 720,178 over 15 months.This means that the Somali Embassy in Nairobi spent USD 720,178 over 15 months.
For comparison, according to the Appropriation Act for the 2015 Budget, the Ministry of Health received USD 793,032 for a period of 12 months, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs USD 760,116, the Ministry of Youth and Sport USD 572,220.For comparison, according to the Appropriation Act for the 2015 Budget, the Ministry of Health received USD 793,032 for a period of 12 months, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs USD 760,116, the Ministry of Youth and Sport USD 572,220.
9.9.
The Monitoring Group corresponded with Ambassador “Americo” by telephone and email between 7 September and 12 September 2015 while he was in London.The Monitoring Group corresponded with Ambassador “Americo” by telephone and email between 7 September and 12 September 2015 while he was in London.
When asked about the passport money he stated he used it forWhen asked about the passport money he stated he used it for
…assistance of refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma, rent of vehicles for dignitaries, assistance to Somalis accused of piracy in Mombasa, assistance of needy Somalis in Kenya, i.e. tickets, school fees, hospital fees, etc. Function for the Embassy.…assistance of refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma, rent of vehicles for dignitaries, assistance to Somalis accused of piracy in Mombasa, assistance of needy Somalis in Kenya, i.e. tickets, school fees, hospital fees, etc. Function for the Embassy.
Assist Somalis throughout Kenya who needed assistance.Assist Somalis throughout Kenya who needed assistance.
Paid for school fees for students who got good grades for encouragement.Paid for school fees for students who got good grades for encouragement.
Held seminars for the youth in Eastleigh, Mombassa and other cities.Held seminars for the youth in Eastleigh, Mombassa and other cities.
Paid hospital fees for mothers, elders and other Somalis who could not pay their hospital fees (sic).Paid hospital fees for mothers, elders and other Somalis who could not pay their hospital fees (sic).
He also claimed that all these expenses were documented.He also claimed that all these expenses were documented.
10.10.
The Monitoring Group contacted the Somali Embassy in Nairobi to verify if the above expenses were accounted for.The Monitoring Group contacted the Somali Embassy in Nairobi to verify if the above expenses were accounted for.
Embassy officials who were in office when Ambassador “Americo” handed over his duties informed the Monitoring Group that the former ambassador passed on no documents whatsoever at his departure and that even the rent payments for the embassy building were USD 6,000 in arrears.Embassy officials who were in office when Ambassador “Americo” handed over his duties informed the Monitoring Group that the former ambassador passed on no documents whatsoever at his departure and that even the rent payments for the embassy building were USD 6,000 in arrears.
The Monitoring Group also understands that Ambassador “Americo” personally handled the salaries of embassy employees and all expenses.The Monitoring Group also understands that Ambassador “Americo” personally handled the salaries of embassy employees and all expenses.
Chinese Government grant and confusion over legal paymentsChinese Government grant and confusion over legal payments
11.11.
In addition, the Monitoring Group discovered that the Somali Embassy in Nairobi received a USD 1 million grant in April 2013 from the Chinese Government intended for the FGS (see annex 3.2.c), and only transferred USD 479,314 to the Central Bank of Somalia.In addition, the Monitoring Group discovered that the Somali Embassy in Nairobi received a USD 1 million grant in April 2013 from the Chinese Government intended for the FGS (see annex 3.2.c), and only transferred USD 479,314 to the Central Bank of Somalia.
The remainder was allegedly used to pay legal fees to Ibrahim, Issack & Company in Nairobi for a lawsuit concerning a Somali Government property in the Kenyan capital.The remainder was allegedly used to pay legal fees to Ibrahim, Issack & Company in Nairobi for a lawsuit concerning a Somali Government property in the Kenyan capital.
In the 1990s, the last Somali ambassador of the Siad Barre regime sold the premises of the Somali Embassy in Nairobi to a local businessman.In the 1990s, the last Somali ambassador of the Siad Barre regime sold the premises of the Somali Embassy in Nairobi to a local businessman.
Somali authorities challenged the sale at the Nairobi High Court and won the property back in 2013.Somali authorities challenged the sale at the Nairobi High Court and won the property back in 2013.
12.12.
In a letter addressed to the Finance Minister of Somalia, dated 16 September 2013 (available in annex 3.2.d), the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and Deputy Prime Minister Fawzia Yusuf H. Adam claimed that Ambassador “Americo” had received the Chinese grant into his own personal account and not into the account of the Embassy.In a letter addressed to the Finance Minister of Somalia, dated 16 September 2013 (available in annex 3.2.d), the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and Deputy Prime Minister Fawzia Yusuf H. Adam claimed that Ambassador “Americo” had received the Chinese grant into his own personal account and not into the account of the Embassy.
Furthermore, in this letter, Adam stated that Ambassador “Americo” allegedly paid USD 517,686 for legal fees to Ibrahim, Issack & Company law firm in Nairobi.Furthermore, in this letter, Adam stated that Ambassador “Americo” allegedly paid USD 517,686 for legal fees to Ibrahim, Issack & Company law firm in Nairobi.
Adam also stated that Ambassador “Americo” got approval for this expenditure from her deputy, Mohamed Nur Ga’al, then State Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, while she was away on official business.Adam also stated that Ambassador “Americo” got approval for this expenditure from her deputy, Mohamed Nur Ga’al, then State Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, while she was away on official business.
She claimed however that before leaving Mogadishu, she had appointed the Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs to act on her behalf, not Ga’al.She claimed however that before leaving Mogadishu, she had appointed the Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs to act on her behalf, not Ga’al.
Adam also stated at the end of the letter that the law firm’s original invoice for services rendered was only USD 250,000 and that USD 140,000 had been allocated in 2011 for this purpose by then-Prime Minster Mohamed Abdulahi Mohamed “Farmaajo”.Adam also stated at the end of the letter that the law firm’s original invoice for services rendered was only USD 250,000 and that USD 140,000 had been allocated in 2011 for this purpose by then-Prime Minster Mohamed Abdulahi Mohamed “Farmaajo”.
13.13.
Adam also noted that the law firm’s receipt for the payment received indicated the sum of KES 517,686 (USD 4,916) and not USD.Adam also noted that the law firm’s receipt for the payment received indicated the sum of KES 517,686 (USD 4,916) and not USD.
The Monitoring Group verified Adam’s allegations and can confirm that on 4 April 2011, then-Prime Minister “Farmaajo” wrote a letter (available in annex 3.2.e) authorising the releasing of USD 140,000 toThe Monitoring Group verified Adam’s allegations and can confirm that on 4 April 2011, then-Prime Minister “Farmaajo” wrote a letter (available in annex 3.2.e) authorising the releasing of USD 140,000 to
…cover legal fees for solicitors incurred in connection with the recovery of Somali Embassy’s assets in Kenya.…cover legal fees for solicitors incurred in connection with the recovery of Somali Embassy’s assets in Kenya.
Furthermore the aforementioned fund is additionally intended for other expenses that are owed by the injured people that were flown from Mogadishu to hospitals in Kenya.Furthermore the aforementioned fund is additionally intended for other expenses that are owed by the injured people that were flown from Mogadishu to hospitals in Kenya.
The money should be handed to Ambassador Mohamed Ali Nur.The money should be handed to Ambassador Mohamed Ali Nur.
The money was released to the Embassy on 11 April 2011, where Ambassador “Americo” was the receiving official (available in annex 3.2.f).The money was released to the Embassy on 11 April 2011, where Ambassador “Americo” was the receiving official (available in annex 3.2.f).
14.14.
On 25 April 2013, the law firm Ibrahim, Issack & Company sent a letter to “Americo” acknowledging receipt of payment for USD 517,686 for fees, costs and disbursements (available in annex 3.2.g).On 25 April 2013, the law firm Ibrahim, Issack & Company sent a letter to “Americo” acknowledging receipt of payment for USD 517,686 for fees, costs and disbursements (available in annex 3.2.g).
However a receipt from the same law firm obtained by the Monitoring Group dated 23 April 2013 indicates that sum of KES 517,686 (USD 4,916) was received from the Somali Embassy, as asserted by Adam (available in annex 3.2.h).However a receipt from the same law firm obtained by the Monitoring Group dated 23 April 2013 indicates that sum of KES 517,686 (USD 4,916) was received from the Somali Embassy, as asserted by Adam (available in annex 3.2.h).
The Group cannot confirm the exact amount paid to the law firm, but the fact that a payment of over USD 500,000 is far too large for services rendered in connection with such a lawsuit raises serious questions.The Group cannot confirm the exact amount paid to the law firm, but the fact that a payment of over USD 500,000 is far too large for services rendered in connection with such a lawsuit raises serious questions.
The Monitoring Group could not verify Adam’s claim that the law firm’s original invoice totalled only USD 250,000, but the Group has obtained information from multiple sources that the Somali business community in Nairobi also contributed substantially to the legal expenses relating to the retrieval of the former embassy premises.The Monitoring Group could not verify Adam’s claim that the law firm’s original invoice totalled only USD 250,000, but the Group has obtained information from multiple sources that the Somali business community in Nairobi also contributed substantially to the legal expenses relating to the retrieval of the former embassy premises.
15.15.
The Monitoring Group contacted Ambassador “Americo” in order to give him the opportunity to reply.The Monitoring Group contacted Ambassador “Americo” in order to give him the opportunity to reply.
Regarding the account into which the Chinese Government grant was transferred, Ambassador “Americo” produced evidence that he had told the Chinese to transfer the funds an account opened at Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) in the name of the Somali Embassy and not the usual Embassy account at the Transnational Bank.Regarding the account into which the Chinese Government grant was transferred, Ambassador “Americo” produced evidence that he had told the Chinese to transfer the funds an account opened at Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) in the name of the Somali Embassy and not the usual Embassy account at the Transnational Bank.
Embassy officials confirmed the existence of the CBA bank account and informed the Group that Ambassador “Americo” closed it just prior to his recall to Mogadishu.Embassy officials confirmed the existence of the CBA bank account and informed the Group that Ambassador “Americo” closed it just prior to his recall to Mogadishu.
Mohamed Ahmed Anwar also confirmed the existence of the CBA account and its closure by Ambassador “Americo”.Mohamed Ahmed Anwar also confirmed the existence of the CBA account and its closure by Ambassador “Americo”.
The existence of another Embassy account at different bank may have created the confusion that led to the allegation that Ambassador “Americo” had used his personal account to receive the Chinese funds.The existence of another Embassy account at different bank may have created the confusion that led to the allegation that Ambassador “Americo” had used his personal account to receive the Chinese funds.
16.16.
Ambassador “Americo” denied having knowledge of the Somali business community in Nairobi’s involvement in the payment of the legal fees for retrieval of the former embassy premises.Ambassador “Americo” denied having knowledge of the Somali business community in Nairobi’s involvement in the payment of the legal fees for retrieval of the former embassy premises.
He also stated that, to his knowledge, the Transitional Federal Government only released USD 50,000 to cover these legal fees, during the time that Nur Hassan Hussein “Nur Adde” was Prime Minister.He also stated that, to his knowledge, the Transitional Federal Government only released USD 50,000 to cover these legal fees, during the time that Nur Hassan Hussein “Nur Adde” was Prime Minister.
Ambassador “Americo” stated that he does not recall the USD 140,000 allocated by Prime Minister “Farmajo” in April 2013.Ambassador “Americo” stated that he does not recall the USD 140,000 allocated by Prime Minister “Farmajo” in April 2013.
The information regarding the USD 50,000 released by Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein is new to the Group and raises further questions relating to this case.The information regarding the USD 50,000 released by Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein is new to the Group and raises further questions relating to this case.
17.17.
Ambassador “Americo” also told the Group that the Auditor General, Nur Farah, who has looked into the case of the Chinese Government grant has cleared him of all suspicions.Ambassador “Americo” also told the Group that the Auditor General, Nur Farah, who has looked into the case of the Chinese Government grant has cleared him of all suspicions.
However, in a telephone interview with the Group on 11 September 2015, the Auditor General confirmed that while an investigation into the Chinese grant is ongoing, no conclusions had been reached.However, in a telephone interview with the Group on 11 September 2015, the Auditor General confirmed that while an investigation into the Chinese grant is ongoing, no conclusions had been reached.
Annex 3.2.a: Receipts for passport fee payments at Somali Embassy in NairobiAnnex 3.2.a: Receipts for passport fee payments at Somali Embassy in Nairobi
Annex 3.2.b: Receipt for money transfer to Mogadishu by Mohamed Ahmed AnwarAnnex 3.2.b: Receipt for money transfer to Mogadishu by Mohamed Ahmed Anwar
Annex 3.2.c: Acceptance certificate of USD 1 million grant to Somalia by Chinese GovernmentAnnex 3.2.c: Acceptance certificate of USD 1 million grant to Somalia by Chinese Government
Annex 3.2.d: Letter to Minister of Finance from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International CooperationAnnex 3.2.d: Letter to Minister of Finance from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
Annex 3.2.e: Letter from Prime Minister “Farmaajo” approving the release of USD 140,000 for legal fees concerning the former embassy premises lawsuit in NairobiAnnex 3.2.e: Letter from Prime Minister “Farmaajo” approving the release of USD 140,000 for legal fees concerning the former embassy premises lawsuit in Nairobi
Annex 3.2.f: Receipt showing the transfer of USD 140,000 to Ambassador “Americo” on behalf of the Somali Embassy in NairobiAnnex 3.2.f: Receipt showing the transfer of USD 140,000 to Ambassador “Americo” on behalf of the Somali Embassy in Nairobi
Annex 3.2.g: Letter of acknowledgement of payment from Ibrahim, Issack & CompanyAnnex 3.2.g: Letter of acknowledgement of payment from Ibrahim, Issack & Company
Annex 3.2.h: Receipt from Ibrahim, Issack & Company for KES 517,686Annex 3.2.h: Receipt from Ibrahim, Issack & Company for KES 517,686
Annex 3.3: Misappropriation of funds for Mogadishu port rehabilitationAnnex 3.3: Misappropriation of funds for Mogadishu port rehabilitation
Background to the Mogadishu port rehabilitation projectBackground to the Mogadishu port rehabilitation project
18.18.
In 1993, UNITAF peacekeeping troops took control of the operations of Mogadishu port on behalf of the Government of Somalia, in order to ensure humanitarian access to the country.In 1993, UNITAF peacekeeping troops took control of the operations of Mogadishu port on behalf of the Government of Somalia, in order to ensure humanitarian access to the country.
Operation of the port was subsequently handed over to a joint civilian board composed of representatives from UNOSOM II, UNDP, UNCTAD, and WFP.Operation of the port was subsequently handed over to a joint civilian board composed of representatives from UNOSOM II, UNDP, UNCTAD, and WFP.
Revenues gathered from port tariffs were in turn managed in trust by UNDP Somalia and WFP;Revenues gathered from port tariffs were in turn managed in trust by UNDP Somalia and WFP;
in July 1997, the entirety of the funds, USD 1,003,930, was transferred into a trust fund managed solely by UNDP Somalia.in July 1997, the entirety of the funds, USD 1,003,930, was transferred into a trust fund managed solely by UNDP Somalia.
The fund collected interest, and by January 2008 amounted to USD 1,355,066.The fund collected interest, and by January 2008 amounted to USD 1,355,066.
19.19.
In September 2008, the Mogadishu Port Authorities manager of the then-Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Abdi Gino, requested that the funds be repatriated to the TFG.In September 2008, the Mogadishu Port Authorities manager of the then-Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Abdi Gino, requested that the funds be repatriated to the TFG.
UNDP Somalia ultimately declined to do so, on the grounds that the TFG was not yet an internationally recognised Government.UNDP Somalia ultimately declined to do so, on the grounds that the TFG was not yet an internationally recognised Government.
The funds therefore remained in the UNDP Somalia trust fund.The funds therefore remained in the UNDP Somalia trust fund.
20.20.
On UNDP Somalia’s website, this trust fund is formulated as a “Mogadishu Port Rehabilitation” project that ran from 1 January 2005 until 31 December 2014 (see annex 3.3.a).On UNDP Somalia’s website, this trust fund is formulated as a “Mogadishu Port Rehabilitation” project that ran from 1 January 2005 until 31 December 2014 (see annex 3.3.a).
However, while UNDP Somalia attempted for a number of years to use the funds to purchase a fixed crane for Mogadishu port, ultimately the money was never committed to any development programme.However, while UNDP Somalia attempted for a number of years to use the funds to purchase a fixed crane for Mogadishu port, ultimately the money was never committed to any development programme.
21.21.
On 17 March 2014, the then-Minister of Ports and Marine Transport, Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow”, sent a letter to the UNDP Somalia Country Director, George Conway (available in annex 3.3.b).On 17 March 2014, the then-Minister of Ports and Marine Transport, Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow”, sent a letter to the UNDP Somalia Country Director, George Conway (available in annex 3.3.b).
The letter demanded the immediate return of the Mogadishu port funds “to its rightful owner, the Government of Somalia”, which Amin erroneously alleged had been “acquired without authorization and unconditionally from the Mogadishu Port by WFP and transferred to UNDP”.The letter demanded the immediate return of the Mogadishu port funds “to its rightful owner, the Government of Somalia”, which Amin erroneously alleged had been “acquired without authorization and unconditionally from the Mogadishu Port by WFP and transferred to UNDP”.
22.22.
Conway held three meetings with Amin between April and July 2014, at which occasions Amin was “very persistent” in his demands for the release of the funds.Conway held three meetings with Amin between April and July 2014, at which occasions Amin was “very persistent” in his demands for the release of the funds.
Recognising that the funds belonged to the FGS and that UNDP was “duty-bound” to return them, Conway nonetheless insisted that the funds be routed through the FGS’ Treasury Single Account (TSA) and ultimately be put towards fulfilling the objectives laid out by the Ministry’s 2014 Work Plan, conditions to which Amin agreed.Recognising that the funds belonged to the FGS and that UNDP was “duty-bound” to return them, Conway nonetheless insisted that the funds be routed through the FGS’ Treasury Single Account (TSA) and ultimately be put towards fulfilling the objectives laid out by the Ministry’s 2014 Work Plan, conditions to which Amin agreed.
By this point, the trust fund had grown to over USD 1.8 million with accrued interest.By this point, the trust fund had grown to over USD 1.8 million with accrued interest.
23.23.
Conway subsequently sought advice from a public financial management advisor working with the FGS, who in a 14 July 2014 email, seen by the Monitoring Group, concurred that the funds should be deposited in “the government treasury rather than the Mogadishu port account”, in order to avoid their being “spent on anything else”.Conway subsequently sought advice from a public financial management advisor working with the FGS, who in a 14 July 2014 email, seen by the Monitoring Group, concurred that the funds should be deposited in “the government treasury rather than the Mogadishu port account”, in order to avoid their being “spent on anything else”.
After receiving approval from UNDP senior management, Conway issued a letter on 4 August 2014 (available in annex 3.3.c), agreeing to release the port funds to the FGS.After receiving approval from UNDP senior management, Conway issued a letter on 4 August 2014 (available in annex 3.3.c), agreeing to release the port funds to the FGS.
The letter restated the previously agreed conditions, namely that the funds would be transferred to the TSA and subsequently be put towards the Ministry’s 2014 Work Plan, “through Government public financial management systems and budget execution processes”.The letter restated the previously agreed conditions, namely that the funds would be transferred to the TSA and subsequently be put towards the Ministry’s 2014 Work Plan, “through Government public financial management systems and budget execution processes”.
24.24.
In a 5 August 2014 email (reproduced in annex 3.3.d), Amin supplied Conway with bank details for the transfer;In a 5 August 2014 email (reproduced in annex 3.3.d), Amin supplied Conway with bank details for the transfer;
contrary to their previous understanding, however, the email directed UNDP Somalia to route the funds into a newly created Mogadishu International Port account at the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS), #1035, rather than the TSA.contrary to their previous understanding, however, the email directed UNDP Somalia to route the funds into a newly created Mogadishu International Port account at the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS), #1035, rather than the TSA.
25.25.
On 20 August 2014, a transfer of USD 859,616.10 from UNDP Somalia’s office in Nairobi arrived in CBS account #1035.On 20 August 2014, a transfer of USD 859,616.10 from UNDP Somalia’s office in Nairobi arrived in CBS account #1035.
On 11 September 2014, a virtually identical sum of USD 859,616.09 from UNDP Somalia arrived in the account.On 11 September 2014, a virtually identical sum of USD 859,616.09 from UNDP Somalia arrived in the account.
After deductions of banking fees, the net amount transferred from UNDP Somalia to the account totalled USD 1,693,443.71.After deductions of banking fees, the net amount transferred from UNDP Somalia to the account totalled USD 1,693,443.71.
Misappropriation of funds by former minister Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow”Misappropriation of funds by former minister Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow”
26.26.
On 27 August 2014, exactly a week following the first UNDP deposit, Minister Amin sent a letter addressed to the Accountant General, Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, and other parties (see annex 3.3.e).On 27 August 2014, exactly a week following the first UNDP deposit, Minister Amin sent a letter addressed to the Accountant General, Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, and other parties (see annex 3.3.e).
The letter contained instructions specifying that only the undersigned – namely, Amin himself, as well as the Director General of the Ministry, Abdullahi Ali Nur – would be authorised to withdraw funds from account #1035.The letter contained instructions specifying that only the undersigned – namely, Amin himself, as well as the Director General of the Ministry, Abdullahi Ali Nur – would be authorised to withdraw funds from account #1035.
The Central Bank and the Accountant General in turn approved the request.The Central Bank and the Accountant General in turn approved the request.
27.27.
On 13 September 2014, a withdrawal of USD 600,000.00 was made from the account.On 13 September 2014, a withdrawal of USD 600,000.00 was made from the account.
On 20 September 2014 an additional USD 600,000.00 was withdrawn, and a final withdrawal of USD 493,400.00 took place on 24 September.On 20 September 2014 an additional USD 600,000.00 was withdrawn, and a final withdrawal of USD 493,400.00 took place on 24 September.
Taken together, the three withdrawals totalled USD 1,693,400.00 – USD 43.71 short of the aggregate amount transferred up to that point by UNDP Somalia.Taken together, the three withdrawals totalled USD 1,693,400.00 – USD 43.71 short of the aggregate amount transferred up to that point by UNDP Somalia.
28.28.
According to the Central Bank Governor, Bashir Isse, all three withdrawals were made via cheques issued to the Ministry’s accountant, Ali Abdirahman, by the joint signature of Minister Amin and Director General Nur.According to the Central Bank Governor, Bashir Isse, all three withdrawals were made via cheques issued to the Ministry’s accountant, Ali Abdirahman, by the joint signature of Minister Amin and Director General Nur.
Therefore, while Ali Abdirahman’s name appears beside withdrawal entries in CBS records, the withdrawals themselves were authorised by Amin and Nur.Therefore, while Ali Abdirahman’s name appears beside withdrawal entries in CBS records, the withdrawals themselves were authorised by Amin and Nur.
Given the absence of prior or subsequent transactions, Amin appears to have created this account for no other purpose than to receive the UNDP funds, away from the knowledge and oversight of the FGS Ministry of Finance.Given the absence of prior or subsequent transactions, Amin appears to have created this account for no other purpose than to receive the UNDP funds, away from the knowledge and oversight of the FGS Ministry of Finance.
The Central Bank statement for account #1035 is available in annex 3.3.f.The Central Bank statement for account #1035 is available in annex 3.3.f.
29.29.
In April 2015, a former senior official with the Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport approached the Monitoring Group claiming that Amin, with the cooperation of Nur, had misappropriated almost USD 1.7 million of port rehabilitation funds.In April 2015, a former senior official with the Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport approached the Monitoring Group claiming that Amin, with the cooperation of Nur, had misappropriated almost USD 1.7 million of port rehabilitation funds.
The official told the Group that he had initially questioned Amin about how the money had been used, but backed off when he realised that the former had withdrawn it for his own purposes.The official told the Group that he had initially questioned Amin about how the money had been used, but backed off when he realised that the former had withdrawn it for his own purposes.
A Somalia anti-corruption organisation corroborated this account of misappropriation by Amin and Nur, citing testimony they obtained from another former senior Ministry official.A Somalia anti-corruption organisation corroborated this account of misappropriation by Amin and Nur, citing testimony they obtained from another former senior Ministry official.
The FGS Auditor General, Nur Farah, also informed the Monitoring Group that investigating Amin and Nur’s alleged misappropriation of the port funds was on his “to do list”, and he requested the Group’s assistance in furthering his inquiry.The FGS Auditor General, Nur Farah, also informed the Monitoring Group that investigating Amin and Nur’s alleged misappropriation of the port funds was on his “to do list”, and he requested the Group’s assistance in furthering his inquiry.
Missing office buildingMissing office building
30.30.
The Monitoring Group received information that the port funds had been earmarked within the Ministry for the construction of an office building off Corso Somalia street in Mogadishu.The Monitoring Group received information that the port funds had been earmarked within the Ministry for the construction of an office building off Corso Somalia street in Mogadishu.
On 30 August 2015 the Group obtained a photograph of the building site, which depicts a mostly empty lot containing a solitary kiosk.On 30 August 2015 the Group obtained a photograph of the building site, which depicts a mostly empty lot containing a solitary kiosk.
There is no evidence that development has begun on the site, despite the funds having been withdrawn from the CBS almost one year prior.There is no evidence that development has begun on the site, despite the funds having been withdrawn from the CBS almost one year prior.
This photograph, as well as a satellite image showing the location of the building site, is available in annex 3.3.g.This photograph, as well as a satellite image showing the location of the building site, is available in annex 3.3.g.
31.31.
The Monitoring Group contacted Yusuf Moallim Amin multiple times to request an explanation for the missing funds, but received no response.The Monitoring Group contacted Yusuf Moallim Amin multiple times to request an explanation for the missing funds, but received no response.
As of 6 September 2015 the Group had been unable to contact the former Director General, Abdullahi Ali Nur.As of 6 September 2015 the Group had been unable to contact the former Director General, Abdullahi Ali Nur.
Annex 3.3.a: UNDP Somalia web page displaying the funds being held in trust for Mogadishu port rehabilitationAnnex 3.3.a: UNDP Somalia web page displaying the funds being held in trust for Mogadishu port rehabilitation
Annex 3.3.b: 17 March 2014 letter from Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow” to UNDP Somalia Country Director George ConwayAnnex 3.3.b: 17 March 2014 letter from Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow” to UNDP Somalia Country Director George Conway
Annex 3.3.c: 4 August 2014 letter from UNDP Country Director George Conway to Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow” agreeing to transfer the Mogadishu port fundsAnnex 3.3.c: 4 August 2014 letter from UNDP Country Director George Conway to Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow” agreeing to transfer the Mogadishu port funds
Annex 3.3.d: Email from Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow” supplying bank details to UNDP Somalia Country Director George ConwayAnnex 3.3.d: Email from Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow” supplying bank details to UNDP Somalia Country Director George Conway
Annex 3.3.e: Letter from then-Minister of Ports and Marine Transport, Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow” authorising himself and Director General Abdullahi Ali Nur to withdraw funds from CBS account #1035Annex 3.3.e: Letter from then-Minister of Ports and Marine Transport, Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow” authorising himself and Director General Abdullahi Ali Nur to withdraw funds from CBS account #1035
Annex 3.3.f: Central Bank of Somalia statement for Mogadishu International Port account set up by Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow” (#1035)Annex 3.3.f: Central Bank of Somalia statement for Mogadishu International Port account set up by Yusuf Moallim Amin “Baadiyow” (#1035)
Annex 3.3.g: Photo of the empty building site intended for a Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport office buildingAnnex 3.3.g: Photo of the empty building site intended for a Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport office building
Figure 1 (below): Empty building site, 30 August 2015Figure 1 (below): Empty building site, 30 August 2015
Figure 2 (below): Location of building site (coordinates: 2°02’26.1” N 45°20’56.2” E)Figure 2 (below): Location of building site (coordinates: 2°02’26.1” N 45°20’56.2” E)
Annex 3.4: Illegal agreement relating to the taxation of khat importsAnnex 3.4: Illegal agreement relating to the taxation of khat imports
32.32.
The Monitoring Group has uncovered the existence of an illegal agreement between the Somali company ADCO and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) for the collection of taxes on khat imported from Kenya through Mogadishu International Airport (MIA).The Monitoring Group has uncovered the existence of an illegal agreement between the Somali company ADCO and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) for the collection of taxes on khat imported from Kenya through Mogadishu International Airport (MIA).
The agreement should have been submitted to the Financial Governance Committee (FGC) for review, but was not, so could be classified as part of the phenomenon of “secret contracting” as described by the Monitoring Group in a previous report (S/2014/726, paragraphs 66-69).The agreement should have been submitted to the Financial Governance Committee (FGC) for review, but was not, so could be classified as part of the phenomenon of “secret contracting” as described by the Monitoring Group in a previous report (S/2014/726, paragraphs 66-69).
33.33.
ADCO is the owner and operator of the K50 Airport, located 50 km west of Mogadishu, that was used for flights for the capital when MIA was closed due to fighting.ADCO is the owner and operator of the K50 Airport, located 50 km west of Mogadishu, that was used for flights for the capital when MIA was closed due to fighting.
Until late 2010, K50 Airport operated all flights transporting khat from Nairobi to Mogadishu.Until late 2010, K50 Airport operated all flights transporting khat from Nairobi to Mogadishu.
After Al-Shabaab took over the K50 Airport in October 2010, ADCO wrote to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and proposed to move the site for the import of khat to MIA, where they would collect taxes on the imported khat on behalf of the Ministry of Finance.After Al-Shabaab took over the K50 Airport in October 2010, ADCO wrote to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and proposed to move the site for the import of khat to MIA, where they would collect taxes on the imported khat on behalf of the Ministry of Finance.
The khat exporters syndicate – the Mira Umbrella Association (MUA) – wrote a letter to the Ministry of Finance nominating ADCO as their representative.The khat exporters syndicate – the Mira Umbrella Association (MUA) – wrote a letter to the Ministry of Finance nominating ADCO as their representative.
34.34.
At that time the Ministry of Finance was collecting USD 75,000 per month from import taxes on khat arriving at K50.At that time the Ministry of Finance was collecting USD 75,000 per month from import taxes on khat arriving at K50.
ADCO proposed to pay the Ministry a flat fee of USD 120,000 per month.ADCO proposed to pay the Ministry a flat fee of USD 120,000 per month.
An agreement was signed between the Ministry of Finance and ADCO on 6 June 2011.An agreement was signed between the Ministry of Finance and ADCO on 6 June 2011.
The TFG authorised the tariffs.The TFG authorised the tariffs.
35.35.
The agreement was renewed each year and the monthly fee paid by ADCO increased as follows: USD 300,000 in 2012;The agreement was renewed each year and the monthly fee paid by ADCO increased as follows: USD 300,000 in 2012;
USD 600,000 in 2013;USD 600,000 in 2013;
USD 650,000 from March 2014;USD 650,000 from March 2014;
and USD 800,000 from September 2014 (available in annex 3.4.a).and USD 800,000 from September 2014 (available in annex 3.4.a).
The fee increases were consistent with the increasing number of flights and quantity of khat imported through MIA.The fee increases were consistent with the increasing number of flights and quantity of khat imported through MIA.
On 14 May 2015, the Ministry of Finance terminated the contract effective 15 June 2015 (see annex 3.4.b).On 14 May 2015, the Ministry of Finance terminated the contract effective 15 June 2015 (see annex 3.4.b).
From this point forward, the Ministry of Finance began to collect the taxes directly.From this point forward, the Ministry of Finance began to collect the taxes directly.
The figures provided by the Ministry of Finance show that USD 401,080 was collected from 15 June to 1 July and USD 1,013,652 was collected in the month of July, already a substantial increase over the previously agreed monthly flat fee.The figures provided by the Ministry of Finance show that USD 401,080 was collected from 15 June to 1 July and USD 1,013,652 was collected in the month of July, already a substantial increase over the previously agreed monthly flat fee.
36.36.
Following the cancellation of the ADCO contract, the MUA requested on 19 May 2015 to pay the tax on khat imports directly into the Treasury Single Account (TSA) and the Ministry agreed.Following the cancellation of the ADCO contract, the MUA requested on 19 May 2015 to pay the tax on khat imports directly into the Treasury Single Account (TSA) and the Ministry agreed.
On 16 June 2015, the MUA wrote to the Ministry of Finance requesting to pay a flat fee during the fasting month of Ramadan due to low demand.On 16 June 2015, the MUA wrote to the Ministry of Finance requesting to pay a flat fee during the fasting month of Ramadan due to low demand.
They proposed paying USD 33,000 per day.They proposed paying USD 33,000 per day.
On 24 June 2015, the Ministry of Finance agreed that the MUA pay USD 33,350 per day or USD 1,000,000 per month (see annex 3.4.c).On 24 June 2015, the Ministry of Finance agreed that the MUA pay USD 33,350 per day or USD 1,000,000 per month (see annex 3.4.c).
The agreement with MUA would have been much like the one with ADCO, but for USD 1,000,000 per month instead of USD 800,000.The agreement with MUA would have been much like the one with ADCO, but for USD 1,000,000 per month instead of USD 800,000.
According to the Minister of Finance, Mohamed Aden Ibrahim, there was no written contract and the agreement would have only been in place for a limited period of time.According to the Minister of Finance, Mohamed Aden Ibrahim, there was no written contract and the agreement would have only been in place for a limited period of time.
37.37.
On 25 June 2015, the Attorney General of Somalia issued a decision declaring that the Minister of Finance’s order regarding the taxation of khat by way of a flat monthly fee is against a Council of Ministers’ decision and Somali fiscal legislation, and therefore must be stopped (see annex 3.4.d).On 25 June 2015, the Attorney General of Somalia issued a decision declaring that the Minister of Finance’s order regarding the taxation of khat by way of a flat monthly fee is against a Council of Ministers’ decision and Somali fiscal legislation, and therefore must be stopped (see annex 3.4.d).
The decision also stated:The decision also stated:
The Attorney General’s Office will embark on an investigation as to why illegal modifications/amendments and lowering of taxes were made with regards to the khat tariff regime, bearing in mind that we are all aware of the financial difficulties the country is facing.The Attorney General’s Office will embark on an investigation as to why illegal modifications/amendments and lowering of taxes were made with regards to the khat tariff regime, bearing in mind that we are all aware of the financial difficulties the country is facing.
The Ministry of Finance complied fully with the decision and started collecting import taxes on khat through the Customs Office.The Ministry of Finance complied fully with the decision and started collecting import taxes on khat through the Customs Office.
38.38.
Tax collection by a private company or entity which pays the government a flat fee and then is permitted to keep the difference in revenues gathered is unacceptable according to international standards.Tax collection by a private company or entity which pays the government a flat fee and then is permitted to keep the difference in revenues gathered is unacceptable according to international standards.
It is also illegal according to Somali fiscal legislation.It is also illegal according to Somali fiscal legislation.
The Customs Law No. 1, article 5 “Payment of Duties and Charges” states:The Customs Law No. 1, article 5 “Payment of Duties and Charges” states:
The obligation to pay customs duty shall include the obligation to pay when due any duties or charges due upon the goods, the collection of which is a responsibility of the customs authorities, and such payment shall be made before the goods leave the customs area.The obligation to pay customs duty shall include the obligation to pay when due any duties or charges due upon the goods, the collection of which is a responsibility of the customs authorities, and such payment shall be made before the goods leave the customs area.
39.39.
The last tariff for the import of khat was set by the FGS at USD 2,000 per tonne.The last tariff for the import of khat was set by the FGS at USD 2,000 per tonne.
With an average of 21 tonnes imported into Mogadishu per day, this equates to possible revenues of USD 42,000 in taxes (USD 1,260,000 per month or USD 15,120,000 per year).With an average of 21 tonnes imported into Mogadishu per day, this equates to possible revenues of USD 42,000 in taxes (USD 1,260,000 per month or USD 15,120,000 per year).
Therefore even at the highest flat fee paid by ADCO of USD 800,000 per month (USD 9,600,000 per year) the FGS failed to collect around USD 5,520,000 per year.Therefore even at the highest flat fee paid by ADCO of USD 800,000 per month (USD 9,600,000 per year) the FGS failed to collect around USD 5,520,000 per year.
In addition to the monthly flat fee paid to the FGS, ADCO was paying an average of USD 100,000 per month to the local authorities of Benadir region.In addition to the monthly flat fee paid to the FGS, ADCO was paying an average of USD 100,000 per month to the local authorities of Benadir region.
40.40.
In addition to the average 21 tonnes per day of khat that are imported in Mogadishu, another 21 to 28 tonnes per day are directed to Belet Weine, Adado, Galkayo or other cities according to demand.In addition to the average 21 tonnes per day of khat that are imported in Mogadishu, another 21 to 28 tonnes per day are directed to Belet Weine, Adado, Galkayo or other cities according to demand.
The Kenyan company Bluebird Aviation operates an average of six flights per day from Wilson Airport in Nairobi to Somalia.The Kenyan company Bluebird Aviation operates an average of six flights per day from Wilson Airport in Nairobi to Somalia.
Three of them land at Mogadishu International Airport and another three in different regions, according to the current demand.Three of them land at Mogadishu International Airport and another three in different regions, according to the current demand.
Another company, Skyward Express, operates one flight per day to Mogadishu.Another company, Skyward Express, operates one flight per day to Mogadishu.
Kismayo is supplied separately with one daily flight.Kismayo is supplied separately with one daily flight.
In northern Somalia, khat is also imported from Ethiopia and Djibouti by road.In northern Somalia, khat is also imported from Ethiopia and Djibouti by road.
41.41.
A conservative estimate suggests that on average a total of 70 tonnes of khat enters Somalia daily.A conservative estimate suggests that on average a total of 70 tonnes of khat enters Somalia daily.
At an average market value of USD 15,000 per tonne, up to USD 1,050,000 worth of khat is imported daily and USD 383,250,000 is imported annually.At an average market value of USD 15,000 per tonne, up to USD 1,050,000 worth of khat is imported daily and USD 383,250,000 is imported annually.
This makes it one of the most lucrative businesses in the country.This makes it one of the most lucrative businesses in the country.
In terms of projected budgetary income, the import of khat comes in second after telecommunications.In terms of projected budgetary income, the import of khat comes in second after telecommunications.
According to the Appropriation Act for the 2015 Budget, the telecommunications sector leads in terms of revenues generated at USD 13 million per year, followed by the taxation of imported khat at USD 9.6 million per year.According to the Appropriation Act for the 2015 Budget, the telecommunications sector leads in terms of revenues generated at USD 13 million per year, followed by the taxation of imported khat at USD 9.6 million per year.
The value of potential revenues generated from the taxation of imported khat amounts to three times more than import taxes on petroleum (USD 3.1 million) and the taxation of money remittance companies (USD 3.6 million), and four times more than taxes on the import of sugar (USD 2.2 million).The value of potential revenues generated from the taxation of imported khat amounts to three times more than import taxes on petroleum (USD 3.1 million) and the taxation of money remittance companies (USD 3.6 million), and four times more than taxes on the import of sugar (USD 2.2 million).
The projected income from the taxation of imported khat of USD 9.6 million is based solely on the ADCO contribution, which represents less than one-third of the total khat imported to Somalia, so government revenues could likely be much higher if properly administered.The projected income from the taxation of imported khat of USD 9.6 million is based solely on the ADCO contribution, which represents less than one-third of the total khat imported to Somalia, so government revenues could likely be much higher if properly administered.
42.42.
In addition to the social and economic impacts of khat consumption, the issue of lost government revenue is particularly concerning.In addition to the social and economic impacts of khat consumption, the issue of lost government revenue is particularly concerning.
At the latest FGS import tariff of USD 2,000 per tonne, and with an estimated 25,550 tonnes of khat imported into Somalia per year, a total of over USD 51 million should be collected.At the latest FGS import tariff of USD 2,000 per tonne, and with an estimated 25,550 tonnes of khat imported into Somalia per year, a total of over USD 51 million should be collected.
But in 2015, only USD 9.6 million of revenues from the taxation of khat imports was forecast in the Appropriation Act for the 2015 Budget.But in 2015, only USD 9.6 million of revenues from the taxation of khat imports was forecast in the Appropriation Act for the 2015 Budget.
43.43.
An improvement in tax collection on khat imports is possible.An improvement in tax collection on khat imports is possible.
The Ministry of Finance take-over of the tax collection on khat imports should increase the revenues by 40 to 50 per cent, to as much as USD 14 to 15 million per year.The Ministry of Finance take-over of the tax collection on khat imports should increase the revenues by 40 to 50 per cent, to as much as USD 14 to 15 million per year.
An agreement with Somalia’s regional governments and with Bluebird Aviation Company to collect taxes on all the khat flown into the country could again double government revenues, as currently there is no accountability for tax collection on khat outside MIA, or how that money is used.An agreement with Somalia’s regional governments and with Bluebird Aviation Company to collect taxes on all the khat flown into the country could again double government revenues, as currently there is no accountability for tax collection on khat outside MIA, or how that money is used.
Annex 3.4.a: Final agreement between FGS and ADCO, September 2014Annex 3.4.a: Final agreement between FGS and ADCO, September 2014
Annex 3.4.b: Letter from FGS terminating ADCO contract, May 2015Annex 3.4.b: Letter from FGS terminating ADCO contract, May 2015
Annex 3.4.c: Letter from FGS agreeing payment terms by MUA, June 2015Annex 3.4.c: Letter from FGS agreeing payment terms by MUA, June 2015
Annex 3.4.d: Letter from the Attorney General’s Office outlining the decision regarding the taxation of khat importsAnnex 3.4.d: Letter from the Attorney General’s Office outlining the decision regarding the taxation of khat imports
/249/343
15-1601215-16012
Annex 4Annex 4
Harakaat al-Shabaab al-MujaahidiinHarakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin
S/2015/801S/2015/801
S/2015/801S/2015/801
15-1601215-16012
/248/343
Annex 4.1: Mogadishu hotel attacksAnnex 4.1: Mogadishu hotel attacks
1.1.
In the Monitoring Group’s previous report (S/2014/726, annex 1.3), the Group noted Al-Shabaab’s more frequent use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and in particular the “growing modification” in the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).In the Monitoring Group’s previous report (S/2014/726, annex 1.3), the Group noted Al-Shabaab’s more frequent use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and in particular the “growing modification” in the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).
During the mandate, Al-Shabaab has continued to carry out frequent ‘complex’ terror attacks in Mogadishu using VBIEDs.During the mandate, Al-Shabaab has continued to carry out frequent ‘complex’ terror attacks in Mogadishu using VBIEDs.
The group’s most typical Tactic, Technique, and Procedure (TTP) is to use a VBIED to breach a perimeter, after which suicide gunmen or suicide bombers penetrate through the breach towards an inner target.The group’s most typical Tactic, Technique, and Procedure (TTP) is to use a VBIED to breach a perimeter, after which suicide gunmen or suicide bombers penetrate through the breach towards an inner target.
The preferred targets during this mandate have been prominent Mogadishu hotels, often those at which Members of Parliament (MPs) or foreign delegates habitually congregate.The preferred targets during this mandate have been prominent Mogadishu hotels, often those at which Members of Parliament (MPs) or foreign delegates habitually congregate.
Four such attacks are profiled below.Four such attacks are profiled below.
2.2.
In its last report, the Monitoring Group commented on the level of infiltration of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) security forces by Al-Shabaab, and even indicated that the Amniyat had “infiltrated the FGS at the highest levels” (S/2014/726, annex 1.3).In its last report, the Monitoring Group commented on the level of infiltration of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) security forces by Al-Shabaab, and even indicated that the Amniyat had “infiltrated the FGS at the highest levels” (S/2014/726, annex 1.3).
In at least two of the four cases profiled below, potential Al-Shabaab infiltration of the security forces, in particular the police and National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), appears to have played a role in the attacks.In at least two of the four cases profiled below, potential Al-Shabaab infiltration of the security forces, in particular the police and National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), appears to have played a role in the attacks.
Jazeera Palace Hotel (26 July 2015)Jazeera Palace Hotel (26 July 2015)
3.3.
On 26 July 2015, a lorry carrying a VBIED rammed the gate of the Jazeera Palace Hotel, which housed both the Chinese Embassy in Mogadishu as well as other diplomatic missions.On 26 July 2015, a lorry carrying a VBIED rammed the gate of the Jazeera Palace Hotel, which housed both the Chinese Embassy in Mogadishu as well as other diplomatic missions.
At least 13 people were killed, including a Somali journalist.At least 13 people were killed, including a Somali journalist.
The attack was notable for being the largest bomb employed in a terror attack in Somalia since 4 October 2011, when a suicide bomber drove a VBIED into a Transitional Federal Government complex in Mogadishu, killing 100 people, mostly students queuing for Turkish scholarships.The attack was notable for being the largest bomb employed in a terror attack in Somalia since 4 October 2011, when a suicide bomber drove a VBIED into a Transitional Federal Government complex in Mogadishu, killing 100 people, mostly students queuing for Turkish scholarships.
The size of the blast indicated an explosives weight of roughly 400 kg of TNT or 2,000 kg of HME (homemade explosives).The size of the blast indicated an explosives weight of roughly 400 kg of TNT or 2,000 kg of HME (homemade explosives).
Annex 4.1.a displays two photographs of the lorry containing the VBIED, shortly prior to detonation.Annex 4.1.a displays two photographs of the lorry containing the VBIED, shortly prior to detonation.
4.4.
According to credible information, the lorry was able to access the point of detonation because concrete barriers had been shifted the day before the attack.According to credible information, the lorry was able to access the point of detonation because concrete barriers had been shifted the day before the attack.
The reported rationale for this movement of these barriers was to allow access to vehicles engaged in the eviction of squatters from a neighbouring building.The reported rationale for this movement of these barriers was to allow access to vehicles engaged in the eviction of squatters from a neighbouring building.
If so, it is possible that the attackers had received prior information of the movement of the barriers from FGS security forces personnel involved with shifting the barriers.If so, it is possible that the attackers had received prior information of the movement of the barriers from FGS security forces personnel involved with shifting the barriers.
5.5.
Additional credible information suggests that an FGS police commander as well as other officers had been arrested over their possible collaboration with the attackers, again suggesting potential Al-Shabaab infiltration of FGS security forces.Additional credible information suggests that an FGS police commander as well as other officers had been arrested over their possible collaboration with the attackers, again suggesting potential Al-Shabaab infiltration of FGS security forces.
Makka Al-Mukarama Hotel (27 March 2015)Makka Al-Mukarama Hotel (27 March 2015)
6.6.
In a demonstration of the typical Al-Shabaab TTP discussed above, a VBIED detonated at the gate of Makka Al-Mukarama Hotel, which lies on the road linking Villa Somalia to the airport, on 27 March 2015.In a demonstration of the typical Al-Shabaab TTP discussed above, a VBIED detonated at the gate of Makka Al-Mukarama Hotel, which lies on the road linking Villa Somalia to the airport, on 27 March 2015.
Five gunmen clad in Somali National Army (SNA) uniforms then entered the compound, initiating a siege that ended only hours later, when NISA special forces (Gashaan) stormed the building.Five gunmen clad in Somali National Army (SNA) uniforms then entered the compound, initiating a siege that ended only hours later, when NISA special forces (Gashaan) stormed the building.
At least 14 people were killed, including the FGS Ambassador to Switzerland, Yusuf Mohamed Ismail “Bari-Bari”.At least 14 people were killed, including the FGS Ambassador to Switzerland, Yusuf Mohamed Ismail “Bari-Bari”.
Central Hotel (20 February 2015)Central Hotel (20 February 2015)
7.7.
In another example of the typical TTP, on 20 February 2015 a pre-deployed VBIED exploded inside the compound of the Central Hotel, where FGS officials were engaged in Friday prayers.In another example of the typical TTP, on 20 February 2015 a pre-deployed VBIED exploded inside the compound of the Central Hotel, where FGS officials were engaged in Friday prayers.
Following the breach at the main gate, an Al-Shabaab suicide bomber penetrated the compound and blew himself up, according to police.Following the breach at the main gate, an Al-Shabaab suicide bomber penetrated the compound and blew himself up, according to police.
8.8.
At least 10 people were killed in the attack.At least 10 people were killed in the attack.
The FGS Deputy Prime Minister, Mohamed Omar Arte, was present at the hotel and was injured during the attack, while two MPs were killed.The FGS Deputy Prime Minister, Mohamed Omar Arte, was present at the hotel and was injured during the attack, while two MPs were killed.
9.9.
Lul Ahmed Dahir, a Dutch national who worked at the hotel reception, is believed to have facilitated the entry of the VBIED into the Central Hotel compound.Lul Ahmed Dahir, a Dutch national who worked at the hotel reception, is believed to have facilitated the entry of the VBIED into the Central Hotel compound.
Figure 1 (below): Scene of the Central Hotel attackFigure 1 (below): Scene of the Central Hotel attack
SYL Hotel (22 January 2015)SYL Hotel (22 January 2015)
10.10.
On 22 January 2015, a VBIED exploded at the gate of the SYL Hotel, located in the vicinity of Villa Somalia.On 22 January 2015, a VBIED exploded at the gate of the SYL Hotel, located in the vicinity of Villa Somalia.
At the time of the attack a bilateral meeting between FGS officials and Turkish delegates was taking place, one day before Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was due to visit Mogadishu.At the time of the attack a bilateral meeting between FGS officials and Turkish delegates was taking place, one day before Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was due to visit Mogadishu.
At least two police officers were killed in the explosion, though no members of the Turkish delegation were harmed.At least two police officers were killed in the explosion, though no members of the Turkish delegation were harmed.
11.11.
The Monitoring Group obtained a copy of a preliminary report, in the Somali language, prepared by a national committee appointed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to investigate the SYL attack.The Monitoring Group obtained a copy of a preliminary report, in the Somali language, prepared by a national committee appointed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to investigate the SYL attack.
The report revealed that in the aftermath of the incident, police removed or looted evidence from the scene, including the mobile phone used by one of the attackers.The report revealed that in the aftermath of the incident, police removed or looted evidence from the scene, including the mobile phone used by one of the attackers.
The owner of the vehicle used in the attack, identified as a 2002 white Toyota Ipsum, was taken into custody.The owner of the vehicle used in the attack, identified as a 2002 white Toyota Ipsum, was taken into custody.
In addition, the report concluded that,In addition, the report concluded that,
… at least 30 minutes before the explosion, the police that were assigned to the strategic venues that were essential to the security of the hotel and the guests had vacated their positions (unofficial translation).at least 30 minutes before the explosion, the police that were assigned to the strategic venues that were essential to the security of the hotel and the guests had vacated their positions (unofficial translation).
12.12.
In early March 2015, 11 members of the security forces – including three Al-Shabaab defectors working for NISA – were arrested in connection to the SYL attack.In early March 2015, 11 members of the security forces – including three Al-Shabaab defectors working for NISA – were arrested in connection to the SYL attack.
Both of these events appear to indicate that infiltration by Al-Shabaab of the security forces, including NISA, was a factor in the planning of the SYL attack.Both of these events appear to indicate that infiltration by Al-Shabaab of the security forces, including NISA, was a factor in the planning of the SYL attack.
However, by 11 June 2015, according to FGS Attorney General Dr. Ahmed Ali Dahir, all 11 suspects had been released.However, by 11 June 2015, according to FGS Attorney General Dr. Ahmed Ali Dahir, all 11 suspects had been released.
Annex 4.1.a: Lorry used to transport VBIED to the Jazeera Hotel, shortly before the detonationAnnex 4.1.a: Lorry used to transport VBIED to the Jazeera Hotel, shortly before the detonation
Annex 4.2: Garissa University College attackAnnex 4.2: Garissa University College attack
OverviewOverview
13.13.
In the early morning hours of 2 April 2015, four Al-Shabaab gunmen stormed the campus of Garissa University College in North-Eastern Kenya, roughly 150 km from the border with Somalia.In the early morning hours of 2 April 2015, four Al-Shabaab gunmen stormed the campus of Garissa University College in North-Eastern Kenya, roughly 150 km from the border with Somalia.
After killing at least a dozen students in an initial massacre, the militants herded others into Elgon B, a dormitory for female students, and barricaded themselves within (see satellite image in annex 4.2.f for the route taken by the attackers).After killing at least a dozen students in an initial massacre, the militants herded others into Elgon B, a dormitory for female students, and barricaded themselves within (see satellite image in annex 4.2.f for the route taken by the attackers).
The dormitory was strategically located in the rear of the university’s campus and offered clear lines of sight across multiple directions and approach vectors.The dormitory was strategically located in the rear of the university’s campus and offered clear lines of sight across multiple directions and approach vectors.
Indeed, once the militants had entered the dormitory, one gunman ascended to the second floor stairway, which he used as a sniper’s nest to fend off Kenyan security forces personnel, as well as shoot at students sheltering in a neighbouring dormitory across a field (a photo of this sniping position is provided in annex 4.2.d).Indeed, once the militants had entered the dormitory, one gunman ascended to the second floor stairway, which he used as a sniper’s nest to fend off Kenyan security forces personnel, as well as shoot at students sheltering in a neighbouring dormitory across a field (a photo of this sniping position is provided in annex 4.2.d).
14.14.
Kenyan security forces personnel were slow to arrive on the scene.Kenyan security forces personnel were slow to arrive on the scene.
The General Service Unit’s (GSU) elite commando unit, RECCE Squad, eventually arrived from Nairobi in the late afternoon and launched an assault on the dormitory, killing all four gunmen.The General Service Unit’s (GSU) elite commando unit, RECCE Squad, eventually arrived from Nairobi in the late afternoon and launched an assault on the dormitory, killing all four gunmen.
By roughly 6 p.m. the siege had ended.By roughly 6 p.m. the siege had ended.
By that time the militants had executed over a hundred students holed up in the dormitory.By that time the militants had executed over a hundred students holed up in the dormitory.
The aggregate death toll from the attack amounted to 148, marking the attack as the deadliest on Kenyan soil since the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in Nairobi.The aggregate death toll from the attack amounted to 148, marking the attack as the deadliest on Kenyan soil since the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in Nairobi.
15.15.
Following the attack, the Kenyan Government quickly named the Al-Shabaab regional leader Mohamed Mohamud “Gamadheere” (“long arms”) as its mastermind, and raised the bounty on his capture (see annex 4.2.c for a photo of “Gamadheere”).Following the attack, the Kenyan Government quickly named the Al-Shabaab regional leader Mohamed Mohamud “Gamadheere” (“long arms”) as its mastermind, and raised the bounty on his capture (see annex 4.2.c for a photo of “Gamadheere”).
“Gamadheere” had been previously linked to two Garissa church attacks in 2012, as well as the more recent 22 November 2014 massacre of bus passengers near Mandera.“Gamadheere” had been previously linked to two Garissa church attacks in 2012, as well as the more recent 22 November 2014 massacre of bus passengers near Mandera.
Timeline of the Garissa University AttackTimeline of the Garissa University Attack
Prior to attackPrior to attack
Multiple security sources informed the Monitoring Group that the attackers were present in Garissa 10-14 days prior to the attack, moving between residences in Garissa’s market district (Bulo Mugdi).Multiple security sources informed the Monitoring Group that the attackers were present in Garissa 10-14 days prior to the attack, moving between residences in Garissa’s market district (Bulo Mugdi).
2 April 20152 April 2015
05:30-06:30:05:30-06:30:
Four attackers reach the main gate at Garissa University College in two Toyota Proboxes.Four attackers reach the main gate at Garissa University College in two Toyota Proboxes.
They shoot dead two unarmed guards manning the gate and injure two others.They shoot dead two unarmed guards manning the gate and injure two others.
The militants’ entry to the campus is facilitated by an unsecured pedestrian gate, which is open to allow residents of the town to attend the campus mosque for Friday prayer;The militants’ entry to the campus is facilitated by an unsecured pedestrian gate, which is open to allow residents of the town to attend the campus mosque for Friday prayer;
Two additional guards run into the campus mosque for cover and are unharmed;Two additional guards run into the campus mosque for cover and are unharmed;
The attackers engage two policemen once inside the compound;The attackers engage two policemen once inside the compound;
the latter quickly retreat following a brief exchange of fire;the latter quickly retreat following a brief exchange of fire;
The gunmen proceed to a classroom being used as a Good Friday prayer centre, where they shoot and kill between 12 and 18 students engaged in prayer or working on school assignments;The gunmen proceed to a classroom being used as a Good Friday prayer centre, where they shoot and kill between 12 and 18 students engaged in prayer or working on school assignments;
The attacks split into two teams, herding students towards the Elgon dormitories at the South-Eastern end of the campus;The attacks split into two teams, herding students towards the Elgon dormitories at the South-Eastern end of the campus;
Between 107 and 113 students are massacred in Elgon B dormitory, the majority within an hour of the attackers entering the campus.Between 107 and 113 students are massacred in Elgon B dormitory, the majority within an hour of the attackers entering the campus.
06:30-06:45:06:30-06:45:
Police officers arrive at the university campus and begin to cordon off the scene.Police officers arrive at the university campus and begin to cordon off the scene.
07:00-07:30:07:00-07:30:
Kenya Defence Force (KDF) special forces troops from the nearby Garissa barracks arrive at the campus.Kenya Defence Force (KDF) special forces troops from the nearby Garissa barracks arrive at the campus.
10:00:10:00:
Mobile phone coverage to the surrounding area is switched off.Mobile phone coverage to the surrounding area is switched off.
12:45:12:45:
Al-Shabaab-linked media outlets announces a recent press conference held by Al-Shabaab military spokesman Sheikh Abdulaziz Abu Muscab, in which the group claims responsibility for the attack.Al-Shabaab-linked media outlets announces a recent press conference held by Al-Shabaab military spokesman Sheikh Abdulaziz Abu Muscab, in which the group claims responsibility for the attack.
14:00-15:00:14:00-15:00:
GSU RECCE squad arrives in Garissa.GSU RECCE squad arrives in Garissa.
17:00-18:00:17:00-18:00:
GSU RECCE squad storms the dormitory, bringing the siege to a close.GSU RECCE squad storms the dormitory, bringing the siege to a close.
3 April 20153 April 2015
A survivor of the attack, Tanzania national Rashid Charles Mberesero, is found hiding in Elgon B. Although he claims to be a student, he is implicated in the plot and arrested at the scene.A survivor of the attack, Tanzania national Rashid Charles Mberesero, is found hiding in Elgon B. Although he claims to be a student, he is implicated in the plot and arrested at the scene.
Failure of securityFailure of security
16.16.
At the time of the Al-Shabaab attack, Garissa University was protected by four police officers and 12 unarmed private guards – five stationed by the main gate and seven by the rear of the campus.At the time of the Al-Shabaab attack, Garissa University was protected by four police officers and 12 unarmed private guards – five stationed by the main gate and seven by the rear of the campus.
A breach in the compound’s wall had been recently repaired at the insistence of the university’s principal, Dr. Ahmed Osman Warfa.A breach in the compound’s wall had been recently repaired at the insistence of the university’s principal, Dr. Ahmed Osman Warfa.
Warfa told the Monitoring Group that he was aware that the campus’ security arrangements were inadequate, and that he had contacted local authorities on numerous occasions but had “not been taken seriously by anyone”.Warfa told the Monitoring Group that he was aware that the campus’ security arrangements were inadequate, and that he had contacted local authorities on numerous occasions but had “not been taken seriously by anyone”.
17.17.
The Monitoring Group has obtained copies off five letters sent by Warfa from December 2014 to March 2015 to various senior Kenyan officials, warning of a potential attack and requesting security upgrades to the university campus.The Monitoring Group has obtained copies off five letters sent by Warfa from December 2014 to March 2015 to various senior Kenyan officials, warning of a potential attack and requesting security upgrades to the university campus.
The first of these, a 4 December 2014 letter from Warfa to the Deputy County Commissioner for Garissa, requested the deployment of additional police:The first of these, a 4 December 2014 letter from Warfa to the Deputy County Commissioner for Garissa, requested the deployment of additional police:
Following many incidences of terrorist attacks in many parts of northern Kenya which has posed a great security threat to Garissa town and its environs, I write to request for additional six police officers to help beef up security at the campus…In the view of the above, some students are worrying and panicking about their security.Following many incidences of terrorist attacks in many parts of northern Kenya which has posed a great security threat to Garissa town and its environs, I write to request for additional six police officers to help beef up security at the campus…In the view of the above, some students are worrying and panicking about their security.
18.18.
In an 18 December 2014 letter to the local division police commander, Warfa requested the creation of a police post at the university, as “a matter of urgency”.In an 18 December 2014 letter to the local division police commander, Warfa requested the creation of a police post at the university, as “a matter of urgency”.
A 9 January 2015 letter to the Garissa County Commissioner – the presidential appointee responsible for coordinating security countywide – described local insecurity causing students to “fear for their safety as they are returning from holidays”.A 9 January 2015 letter to the Garissa County Commissioner – the presidential appointee responsible for coordinating security countywide – described local insecurity causing students to “fear for their safety as they are returning from holidays”.
The final letter from Warfa, dated 16 March 2015, just over two weeks prior to the attack on the university, repeated his previously unheeded request for the creation of a campus police post to the County Commissioner:The final letter from Warfa, dated 16 March 2015, just over two weeks prior to the attack on the university, repeated his previously unheeded request for the creation of a campus police post to the County Commissioner:
This [police post] will help enhance and beef up our security on campus.This [police post] will help enhance and beef up our security on campus.
There are four police officers currently deployed to the University College, as well as police patrols around the college at night.There are four police officers currently deployed to the University College, as well as police patrols around the college at night.
I would appreciate if you take this as a matter of urgency and consider our request.I would appreciate if you take this as a matter of urgency and consider our request.
(This letter is reprinted in its entirety in annex 4.2.a).(This letter is reprinted in its entirety in annex 4.2.a).
Despite Warfa’s requests for assistance, no additional security measures were put in place by local or national authorities.Despite Warfa’s requests for assistance, no additional security measures were put in place by local or national authorities.
Failure of communicationFailure of communication
19.19.
The success of Al-Shabaab’s attack on Garissa University College was more due to a failure of communication than a lack of actionable intelligence.The success of Al-Shabaab’s attack on Garissa University College was more due to a failure of communication than a lack of actionable intelligence.
Since at least 25 March 2015, intelligence warning of an imminent attack against an educational institution in Kenya had been widely disseminated;Since at least 25 March 2015, intelligence warning of an imminent attack against an educational institution in Kenya had been widely disseminated;
the University of Nairobi, Kenyatta University, and the United States International University – all institutions based in Nairobi – were on high alert.the University of Nairobi, Kenyatta University, and the United States International University – all institutions based in Nairobi – were on high alert.
A note dated 25 March 2015 and posted around the campus of the University of Nairobi warned students and staff that “intelligence reports indicate that the al-Shabaab terror group is planning retaliatory attacks on…a major university”.A note dated 25 March 2015 and posted around the campus of the University of Nairobi warned students and staff that “intelligence reports indicate that the al-Shabaab terror group is planning retaliatory attacks on…a major university”.
In addition, Western embassies warned of an imminent attack on an education institution in Kenya;In addition, Western embassies warned of an imminent attack on an education institution in Kenya;
however, it appears as if the Kenyan security forces did not regard Garissa University as a primary target.however, it appears as if the Kenyan security forces did not regard Garissa University as a primary target.
20.20.
On the evening of 31 March 2015, Warfa received an SMS alert from police advising of a possible attack against four targets: Garissa Teachers Training College, NEP Technical Training Institute, Garissa Medical Training College, and Garissa University College.On the evening of 31 March 2015, Warfa received an SMS alert from police advising of a possible attack against four targets: Garissa Teachers Training College, NEP Technical Training Institute, Garissa Medical Training College, and Garissa University College.
Warfa told the Monitoring Group that the SMS only advised recipients to “be alert” and was similar to others he received on a regular basis.Warfa told the Monitoring Group that the SMS only advised recipients to “be alert” and was similar to others he received on a regular basis.
The generic nature of the message, said Warfa, led him to believe that the threat was not credible, or at least not out of the ordinary.The generic nature of the message, said Warfa, led him to believe that the threat was not credible, or at least not out of the ordinary.
21.21.
However, an SMS received by a senior Kenya police officer based in Wajir fewer than 12 hours prior to the attack (see annex 4.2.b) is evidence of the fact that more detailed intelligence of the Garissa University plot existed immediately prior to its execution.However, an SMS received by a senior Kenya police officer based in Wajir fewer than 12 hours prior to the attack (see annex 4.2.b) is evidence of the fact that more detailed intelligence of the Garissa University plot existed immediately prior to its execution.
The SMS makes reference to Al-Shabaab operatives 30 km from the town, imminently poised to attack either Garissa University or Garissa Teachers Training College.The SMS makes reference to Al-Shabaab operatives 30 km from the town, imminently poised to attack either Garissa University or Garissa Teachers Training College.
This message was not transmitted to Warfa until over a month after the fact.This message was not transmitted to Warfa until over a month after the fact.
Since Kenyan police evidently possessed the intelligence, it is unclear why it was neither acted upon – for example, by heightening the police presence in or near the university – nor transmitted to the administrators of the targeted institutions.Since Kenyan police evidently possessed the intelligence, it is unclear why it was neither acted upon – for example, by heightening the police presence in or near the university – nor transmitted to the administrators of the targeted institutions.
A regional security source summarised the problem when he told the Monitoring Group that in the Kenyan security forces, there is a “disconnect between the collection of intelligence and the use of intelligence”.A regional security source summarised the problem when he told the Monitoring Group that in the Kenyan security forces, there is a “disconnect between the collection of intelligence and the use of intelligence”.
22.22.
This disconnect between the collection and actioning of intelligence was also a factor in the failure to prevent the Westgate shopping mall attack (“Badru Nairobi Operation”) of 21 September 2013.This disconnect between the collection and actioning of intelligence was also a factor in the failure to prevent the Westgate shopping mall attack (“Badru Nairobi Operation”) of 21 September 2013.
In the run up to the incident, available intelligence indicators prior to the attack were ignored or not passed on to the relevant security forces on the ground (see S/2014/726, strictly confidential annex 2.1).In the run up to the incident, available intelligence indicators prior to the attack were ignored or not passed on to the relevant security forces on the ground (see S/2014/726, strictly confidential annex 2.1).
In the case of the Garissa University attack, conversely, the intelligence was both available and passed on to the local police;In the case of the Garissa University attack, conversely, the intelligence was both available and passed on to the local police;
however, the police failed to effectively transmit the information to relevant parties on the ground, or take effective security measures of their own.however, the police failed to effectively transmit the information to relevant parties on the ground, or take effective security measures of their own.
Failure of coordinationFailure of coordination
23.23.
During the Westgate shopping mall attack (“Badru Nairobi Operation”), failure of coordination between the Kenyan security forces was a defining factor in the response to the attack.During the Westgate shopping mall attack (“Badru Nairobi Operation”), failure of coordination between the Kenyan security forces was a defining factor in the response to the attack.
Both KDF and GSU units arrived at the scene, and confusion over the command and control structure, as well as inter-agency rivalry, contributed to a botched response that allowed the siege to drag out over three days.Both KDF and GSU units arrived at the scene, and confusion over the command and control structure, as well as inter-agency rivalry, contributed to a botched response that allowed the siege to drag out over three days.
The lack of coordination also resulted in the GSU RECCE squad commander being killed by friendly fire.The lack of coordination also resulted in the GSU RECCE squad commander being killed by friendly fire.
24.24.
While the Kenyan security forces’ response to the Garissa University attack avoided the command and control failings of the Westgate incident – the KDF cordoned off the area and duly waited for the RECCE unit to arrive – the slow response of the local police, and the logistics of transporting RECCE squad from Nairobi, were immediately identified for criticism.While the Kenyan security forces’ response to the Garissa University attack avoided the command and control failings of the Westgate incident – the KDF cordoned off the area and duly waited for the RECCE unit to arrive – the slow response of the local police, and the logistics of transporting RECCE squad from Nairobi, were immediately identified for criticism.
As the police air wing in Nairobi was unavailable, the GSU RECCE squad travelled by a combination of commercial airplane and road, despite the availability of KDF helicopters.As the police air wing in Nairobi was unavailable, the GSU RECCE squad travelled by a combination of commercial airplane and road, despite the availability of KDF helicopters.
It is unclear why GSU did not request the use of KDF aerial assets, though inter-agency rivalries may have played a role.It is unclear why GSU did not request the use of KDF aerial assets, though inter-agency rivalries may have played a role.
As a result, it was ten hours before the RECCE squad was in position to launch an assault against the militants’ position.As a result, it was ten hours before the RECCE squad was in position to launch an assault against the militants’ position.
Aftermath and Kenyan Government responseAftermath and Kenyan Government response
25.25.
On 4 April 2015, Al-Shabaab released a statement blaming the Kenyan government for “unspeakable atrocities against the Muslims of East Africa”, and further stated,On 4 April 2015, Al-Shabaab released a statement blaming the Kenyan government for “unspeakable atrocities against the Muslims of East Africa”, and further stated,
We will, by the permission of Allah, stop at nothing to avenge the deaths of our Muslim brothers until your government ceases its oppression and until all Muslim lands are liberated from Kenyan occupation.We will, by the permission of Allah, stop at nothing to avenge the deaths of our Muslim brothers until your government ceases its oppression and until all Muslim lands are liberated from Kenyan occupation.
The message aligned with the stated aim of Al-Shabaab’s regional operations, which is to strike on the home fronts of countries contributing troops to the AMISOM mission.The message aligned with the stated aim of Al-Shabaab’s regional operations, which is to strike on the home fronts of countries contributing troops to the AMISOM mission.
26.26.
In the aftermath of the attack, the Kenyan Government offered a KES 20,000,000 (USD 190,000) reward for information leading to “Gamadheere’s” capture.In the aftermath of the attack, the Kenyan Government offered a KES 20,000,000 (USD 190,000) reward for information leading to “Gamadheere’s” capture.
The Monitoring Group has been unable to establish a definitive link between “Gamadheere” and the attackers.The Monitoring Group has been unable to establish a definitive link between “Gamadheere” and the attackers.
However, two regional security sources told the Group that “Gamadheere” had been in mobile phone contact with a campus security officer who assisted the attackers by conducting reconnaissance, and was found with photographs on his mobile phone in the aftermath of the attack – probably intended for propaganda purposes.However, two regional security sources told the Group that “Gamadheere” had been in mobile phone contact with a campus security officer who assisted the attackers by conducting reconnaissance, and was found with photographs on his mobile phone in the aftermath of the attack – probably intended for propaganda purposes.
27.27.
In June 2015, five suspects were charged in Kenyan court with a combined 152 terrorism offences, including the Tanzania national arrested at the scene, Rashid Charles Mberesero.In June 2015, five suspects were charged in Kenyan court with a combined 152 terrorism offences, including the Tanzania national arrested at the scene, Rashid Charles Mberesero.
28.28.
The Kenyan Government also published a list of 86 companies and individuals suspected to be lending support to Al-Shabaab;The Kenyan Government also published a list of 86 companies and individuals suspected to be lending support to Al-Shabaab;
these included a number of hawala transfer companies and bus companies, as well as NGOs.these included a number of hawala transfer companies and bus companies, as well as NGOs.
Thirty of these names later appeared in a second, confidential list on 25 April 2015 as participants in the illicit sugar trade, which is a known source of revenue for Al-Shabaab (see strictly confidential annex 4.2.e for a copy of this list).Thirty of these names later appeared in a second, confidential list on 25 April 2015 as participants in the illicit sugar trade, which is a known source of revenue for Al-Shabaab (see strictly confidential annex 4.2.e for a copy of this list).
Annex 4.2.a: Letter from Garissa University College principal Dr. Ahmed Osman Warfa to the Garissa County Commissioner, requesting the creation of a police postAnnex 4.2.a: Letter from Garissa University College principal Dr. Ahmed Osman Warfa to the Garissa County Commissioner, requesting the creation of a police post
Annex 4.2.b: Text message warning of an imminent attack against Garissa UniversityAnnex 4.2.b: Text message warning of an imminent attack against Garissa University
Annex 4.2.c: Photo of Mohamed Mohamud “Gamadheere”, the suspected mastermind of the Garissa College University attackAnnex 4.2.c: Photo of Mohamed Mohamud “Gamadheere”, the suspected mastermind of the Garissa College University attack
Annex 4.2.d: Photographs of Garissa University campusAnnex 4.2.d: Photographs of Garissa University campus
Figure 1 (below): Classroom used as Good Friday prayer centre, where four Al-Shabaab gunmen killed between 12 and 18 studentsFigure 1 (below): Classroom used as Good Friday prayer centre, where four Al-Shabaab gunmen killed between 12 and 18 students
Figure 2 (below): Elgon A dormitoryFigure 2 (below): Elgon A dormitory
Figure 3 (below): Second floor stairway used as a sniper nest by one of the militantsFigure 3 (below): Second floor stairway used as a sniper nest by one of the militants
Figure 4 (below): Interior of Elgon B dormitory, where militants executed the majority of the students held hostage withinFigure 4 (below): Interior of Elgon B dormitory, where militants executed the majority of the students held hostage within
Annex 4.2.e: Confidential Kenyan Government list of 30 individuals implicated in sugar smugglingAnnex 4.2.e: Confidential Kenyan Government list of 30 individuals implicated in sugar smuggling
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Annex 4.2.f: Garissa University College campus, showing the route taken by the attackersAnnex 4.2.f: Garissa University College campus, showing the route taken by the attackers
Annex 4.3: Failed January 2015 Al-Shabaab plot in DjiboutiAnnex 4.3: Failed January 2015 Al-Shabaab plot in Djibouti
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Annex 4.4: Al-Shabaab and heroin traffickingAnnex 4.4: Al-Shabaab and heroin trafficking
29.29.
The eruption of the Syria conflict in 2011, as well as improved law enforcement measures along traditional heroin smuggling routes, has resulted in East Africa increasingly being used as a route to traffic heroin from Afghanistan into Europe.The eruption of the Syria conflict in 2011, as well as improved law enforcement measures along traditional heroin smuggling routes, has resulted in East Africa increasingly being used as a route to traffic heroin from Afghanistan into Europe.
Commentators have speculated that Al-Shabaab earns revenue off the East Africa heroin trade, though no conclusive evidence has yet been presented to support this claim.Commentators have speculated that Al-Shabaab earns revenue off the East Africa heroin trade, though no conclusive evidence has yet been presented to support this claim.
30.30.
Pursuant to its investigations into the financing of Al-Shabaab, the Monitoring Group has received credible information regarding the MV Amin Darya (IMO #8630784), a vessel carrying as much as 800 kg of heroin intercepted on 15 July 2014 by Kenyan authorities and subsequently destroyed.Pursuant to its investigations into the financing of Al-Shabaab, the Monitoring Group has received credible information regarding the MV Amin Darya (IMO #8630784), a vessel carrying as much as 800 kg of heroin intercepted on 15 July 2014 by Kenyan authorities and subsequently destroyed.
Nine foreign nationals were arrested in Kenya over the bust: six Pakistanis, two Indians and an Iranian.Nine foreign nationals were arrested in Kenya over the bust: six Pakistanis, two Indians and an Iranian.
31.31.
The Group’s information indicates that the vessel stopped for 10 days off the coast of Hobyo, in Central Somalia, prior to proceeding towards Kenya.The Group’s information indicates that the vessel stopped for 10 days off the coast of Hobyo, in Central Somalia, prior to proceeding towards Kenya.
During that time it took on supplies as well as gunmen – possibly affiliated with Al-Shabaab – who later disembarked.During that time it took on supplies as well as gunmen – possibly affiliated with Al-Shabaab – who later disembarked.
A businessman in Dubai, also possibly with links to Al-Shabaab, was in continual contact with the traffickers.A businessman in Dubai, also possibly with links to Al-Shabaab, was in continual contact with the traffickers.
The Monitoring Group has ascertained the name of this businessman to be Javed Ali.The Monitoring Group has ascertained the name of this businessman to be Javed Ali.
Ali was reportedly in continual contact with the arrested traffickers through the phone selector 971 556 930 803, and he has been linked the email address ali33@yahoo.com.Ali was reportedly in continual contact with the arrested traffickers through the phone selector 971 556 930 803, and he has been linked the email address ali33@yahoo.com.
The Monitoring Group attempted on multiple occasions, beginning in May 2015, to contact Javed Ali through both his email address and mobile phone, but both appeared to be inactive.The Monitoring Group attempted on multiple occasions, beginning in May 2015, to contact Javed Ali through both his email address and mobile phone, but both appeared to be inactive.
The Dubai-based company A. Ebrahimi & Partners appointed one of the suspects who was intended to serve as the clearing agent in Mombasa for the seized vessel.The Dubai-based company A. Ebrahimi & Partners appointed one of the suspects who was intended to serve as the clearing agent in Mombasa for the seized vessel.
32.32.
The Monitoring Group sent official correspondence to the UAE on 5 August 2015 requesting detailed information concerning Javed Ali and A. Ebrahimi & Partners/Ebrahim A.M. and their possible links to Al-Shabaab, but did not receive a response.The Monitoring Group sent official correspondence to the UAE on 5 August 2015 requesting detailed information concerning Javed Ali and A. Ebrahimi & Partners/Ebrahim A.M. and their possible links to Al-Shabaab, but did not receive a response.
33.33.
Although Al-Shabaab maintains a presence in Hobyo, it is not a major base of operations for the group.Although Al-Shabaab maintains a presence in Hobyo, it is not a major base of operations for the group.
It is therefore possible that the crew of the MV Amin Darya was involved in smuggling of other goods into central Somalia, unconnected to Al-Shabaab.It is therefore possible that the crew of the MV Amin Darya was involved in smuggling of other goods into central Somalia, unconnected to Al-Shabaab.
Over the course of its mandate, the Monitoring Group has received numerous unconfirmed reports of Iran-flagged vessels involved in the transport of weapons and fuel to central Somalia.Over the course of its mandate, the Monitoring Group has received numerous unconfirmed reports of Iran-flagged vessels involved in the transport of weapons and fuel to central Somalia.
The Group also notes that Javed Ali, the Dubai businessman in contact with the traffickers, bears an Iranian name.The Group also notes that Javed Ali, the Dubai businessman in contact with the traffickers, bears an Iranian name.
34.34.
The Group is continuing its investigation into Al-Shabaab’s possible links to heroin trafficking.The Group is continuing its investigation into Al-Shabaab’s possible links to heroin trafficking.
Annex 5Annex 5
Obstruction of humanitarian assistanceObstruction of humanitarian assistance
Annex 5.1: Denial of humanitarian accessAnnex 5.1: Denial of humanitarian access
1.1.
This annex addresses both some of the most persistent and serious obstructions to humanitarian access observed during the mandate.This annex addresses both some of the most persistent and serious obstructions to humanitarian access observed during the mandate.
Implications of Al-Shabaab territorial retreat and transfer of authorityImplications of Al-Shabaab territorial retreat and transfer of authority
2.2.
Access by civilian populations to essential goods and services continued to be a battleground in the conflict between the FGS and its partners and Al-Shabaab.Access by civilian populations to essential goods and services continued to be a battleground in the conflict between the FGS and its partners and Al-Shabaab.
3.3.
Al-Shabaab actively obstructed access both inside and outside of its shrinking territory, driven by both ideological and strategic objectives, conducting attacks on humanitarian workers and operations but also on private entities providing basic necessities and services.Al-Shabaab actively obstructed access both inside and outside of its shrinking territory, driven by both ideological and strategic objectives, conducting attacks on humanitarian workers and operations but also on private entities providing basic necessities and services.
In areas where it remained the predominant authority it ensured a hostile environment for humanitarian operations, banning certain non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) agencies, restricting freedom of movement, and forcing the confinement of the civilian population.In areas where it remained the predominant authority it ensured a hostile environment for humanitarian operations, banning certain non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) agencies, restricting freedom of movement, and forcing the confinement of the civilian population.
In some instances, individuals and their families were punished for accessing humanitarian assistance outside of Al-Shabaab controlled territory.In some instances, individuals and their families were punished for accessing humanitarian assistance outside of Al-Shabaab controlled territory.
In others, threats by Al-Shabaab to prospective beneficiaries of assistance resulted in the postponement of distributions.In others, threats by Al-Shabaab to prospective beneficiaries of assistance resulted in the postponement of distributions.
4.4.
In many instances where it had officially ceded territory, Al-Shabaab continued to make its presence felt, creating a climate of fear which dissuaded humanitarian operations.In many instances where it had officially ceded territory, Al-Shabaab continued to make its presence felt, creating a climate of fear which dissuaded humanitarian operations.
In Dinsor for example, over a month after the official transfer of authority, in late August 2015 night time incursions by Al-Shabaab and phone threats to residents made the situation very tense and humanitarians reluctant to return.In Dinsor for example, over a month after the official transfer of authority, in late August 2015 night time incursions by Al-Shabaab and phone threats to residents made the situation very tense and humanitarians reluctant to return.
5.5.
The most significant obstruction to both humanitarian and basic livelihood activities, however, was Al-Shabaab’s violent enforcement of economic blockades on towns and key access routes in Bakol, Hiran and Lower Shabelle, involving the killing of civilians and livestock, and the burning of vehicles.The most significant obstruction to both humanitarian and basic livelihood activities, however, was Al-Shabaab’s violent enforcement of economic blockades on towns and key access routes in Bakol, Hiran and Lower Shabelle, involving the killing of civilians and livestock, and the burning of vehicles.
In Walag village, for example, six civilians and their donkeys were killed during one night alone on 31 May 2015, allegedly as punishment for transporting goods to Wajid town.In Walag village, for example, six civilians and their donkeys were killed during one night alone on 31 May 2015, allegedly as punishment for transporting goods to Wajid town.
The blockades against Buloburte and Hudur was also strictly policed, although by July 2015 it was being reported that there was an improved range and volume of food in the markets of the latter.The blockades against Buloburte and Hudur was also strictly policed, although by July 2015 it was being reported that there was an improved range and volume of food in the markets of the latter.
6.6.
Al-Shabaab blockades not only impacted movement of goods but also access to farmland and agricultural labour opportunities in the hinterland, directly as a result of checkpoints and restrictions of movement, but also indirectly, in terms of movement of fuel for farm machinery, tools and seeds.Al-Shabaab blockades not only impacted movement of goods but also access to farmland and agricultural labour opportunities in the hinterland, directly as a result of checkpoints and restrictions of movement, but also indirectly, in terms of movement of fuel for farm machinery, tools and seeds.
A month after Dinsor changed authority, for example, Al-Shabaab continued to impose a blockade and collect ‘taxation’, disrupting farming and other productive activities.A month after Dinsor changed authority, for example, Al-Shabaab continued to impose a blockade and collect ‘taxation’, disrupting farming and other productive activities.
These activities not only impacted their immediate target but had a cascade effect on security and markets in other towns.These activities not only impacted their immediate target but had a cascade effect on security and markets in other towns.
The populations in the surrounding villages also greatly suffered.The populations in the surrounding villages also greatly suffered.
Around Hudur, for example, not only were local farmers unable to sell their goods in the town, they were also forced to continue paying taxes on produce which they could not sell.Around Hudur, for example, not only were local farmers unable to sell their goods in the town, they were also forced to continue paying taxes on produce which they could not sell.
7.7.
The presence of Al-Shabaab near access routes presented an even greater threat as the third phase of the anti-Al-Shabaab offensive scaled up in early 2015.The presence of Al-Shabaab near access routes presented an even greater threat as the third phase of the anti-Al-Shabaab offensive scaled up in early 2015.
As main transport routes became increasingly dangerous, both humanitarian and commercial contractors suspended operations, particularly affecting Wajid and Hudur in Bakol.As main transport routes became increasingly dangerous, both humanitarian and commercial contractors suspended operations, particularly affecting Wajid and Hudur in Bakol.
It was noted by a number of interlocutors that the intensity of operations in Bakol, and the nature of the forces conducting them (many outside of the AMISOM concept of operations) had particularly dissuaded contractors.It was noted by a number of interlocutors that the intensity of operations in Bakol, and the nature of the forces conducting them (many outside of the AMISOM concept of operations) had particularly dissuaded contractors.
8.8.
As a result, and notwithstanding enhanced efforts to provide air support, vulnerable populations were exposed to acute food insecurity.As a result, and notwithstanding enhanced efforts to provide air support, vulnerable populations were exposed to acute food insecurity.
In Hudur in April 2015, one third of IDPs were assessed as reliant on one meal a day.In Hudur in April 2015, one third of IDPs were assessed as reliant on one meal a day.
By July 2015, following the commencement of Operation Jubba Valley, Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates in Hudur, were “very critical” at 32.7 per cent, with an “alarming three-fold increase” in Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) rates between June and July.By July 2015, following the commencement of Operation Jubba Valley, Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates in Hudur, were “very critical” at 32.7 per cent, with an “alarming three-fold increase” in Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) rates between June and July.
In Buloburte, six months after the change of authority, it was assessed that an estimated 8900 people were in acute food insecurity Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Emergency (IPC phase 4) in the town.In Buloburte, six months after the change of authority, it was assessed that an estimated 8900 people were in acute food insecurity Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Emergency (IPC phase 4) in the town.
By July 2015 GAM rates were at almost 25 per cent, although there had been a “significant improvement” in SAM levels from 21 per cent in June to 7.7 per cent between June in July, due to sustained humanitarian efforts.By July 2015 GAM rates were at almost 25 per cent, although there had been a “significant improvement” in SAM levels from 21 per cent in June to 7.7 per cent between June in July, due to sustained humanitarian efforts.
In Wajid in May 2015 it was reported that the price of food and essential items had doubled in two months.In Wajid in May 2015 it was reported that the price of food and essential items had doubled in two months.
To supplement World Food Program (WFP) air cargo the population had been depending on food brought in by donkey cart and “human back” and sold at an unaffordable price for vulnerable households.To supplement World Food Program (WFP) air cargo the population had been depending on food brought in by donkey cart and “human back” and sold at an unaffordable price for vulnerable households.
On 15 May 2015, two children reportedly died of malnutrition related conditions.On 15 May 2015, two children reportedly died of malnutrition related conditions.
9.9.
There was also evidence of small-scale attempts by pro-FGS forces to block the movement of goods to Al-Shabaab areas.There was also evidence of small-scale attempts by pro-FGS forces to block the movement of goods to Al-Shabaab areas.
In one incident in December 2014 in Seynilow in Bakol, for example, soldiers reportedly seized three trucks which were transporting commercial food to Al-Shabaab held areas.In one incident in December 2014 in Seynilow in Bakol, for example, soldiers reportedly seized three trucks which were transporting commercial food to Al-Shabaab held areas.
In the wake of a series of large scale attacks on civilians in Eastern Kenya the Kenyan authorities refused some NGOs permission to transfer humanitarian supplies to southern and central Somalia across the border at Mandera.In the wake of a series of large scale attacks on civilians in Eastern Kenya the Kenyan authorities refused some NGOs permission to transfer humanitarian supplies to southern and central Somalia across the border at Mandera.
Health clinics ran out of essential supplies and one closed as a result of the impasse.Health clinics ran out of essential supplies and one closed as a result of the impasse.
An airlift was eventually authorised.An airlift was eventually authorised.
10.10.
In resolution 2182 (2014) the Security Council described securing key supply routes as “imperative” in view of the “deteriorating humanitarian situation” and called on AMISOM and the SNA to give the “utmost priority” to the task.In resolution 2182 (2014) the Security Council described securing key supply routes as “imperative” in view of the “deteriorating humanitarian situation” and called on AMISOM and the SNA to give the “utmost priority” to the task.
Resolution 2232 (2015) reiterated this call.Resolution 2232 (2015) reiterated this call.
Efforts were made in August and September to clear access routes in Bakol, Hiran and Galgadud.Efforts were made in August and September to clear access routes in Bakol, Hiran and Galgadud.
In addition, AMISOM provided convoy protection for bilateral aid which alleviated the pressure on some towns such as Buloburte.In addition, AMISOM provided convoy protection for bilateral aid which alleviated the pressure on some towns such as Buloburte.
11.11.
In the context of the increasingly complex picture of armed activity in Somalia there is need for effective implementation of the Somalia Country Specific Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines, agreed at the end of 2014.In the context of the increasingly complex picture of armed activity in Somalia there is need for effective implementation of the Somalia Country Specific Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines, agreed at the end of 2014.
Although there has been some progress, support for training of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) officers in the sectors is needed alongside broader support for a more effective CIMIC component overall.Although there has been some progress, support for training of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) officers in the sectors is needed alongside broader support for a more effective CIMIC component overall.
At the same time, it is vital that military or ‘securitisation’ strategies are not the only ones pursued.At the same time, it is vital that military or ‘securitisation’ strategies are not the only ones pursued.
Space for humanitarian actors and local communities to freely and independently engage in acceptance and negotiation access strategies needs to be created: in some areas, for example, local authorities were able to negotiate around blockades, albeit through the payment of checkpoint taxation.Space for humanitarian actors and local communities to freely and independently engage in acceptance and negotiation access strategies needs to be created: in some areas, for example, local authorities were able to negotiate around blockades, albeit through the payment of checkpoint taxation.
No UN actors and increasingly few humanitarian actors negotiate access directly with Al-Shabaab.No UN actors and increasingly few humanitarian actors negotiate access directly with Al-Shabaab.
Use of bureaucratic impediments and misuse of official power to obstruct accessUse of bureaucratic impediments and misuse of official power to obstruct access
12.12.
In its 2014 report (S/2014/727), the Monitoring Group described how, with the formalisation of new layers of federal architecture, the number of bureaucratic impediments and revenue seeking efforts which complicated and sometimes prevented access had multiplied significantly.In its 2014 report (S/2014/727), the Monitoring Group described how, with the formalisation of new layers of federal architecture, the number of bureaucratic impediments and revenue seeking efforts which complicated and sometimes prevented access had multiplied significantly.
During the mandate not only did those practices intensify, but with new entities asserting legitimacy the number of authorities with which the humanitarian community was forced to negotiate also rose.During the mandate not only did those practices intensify, but with new entities asserting legitimacy the number of authorities with which the humanitarian community was forced to negotiate also rose.
The operational capability of non-governmental humanitarian organisations was particularly affected.The operational capability of non-governmental humanitarian organisations was particularly affected.
Annex 5.2 provides an overview of the scope and impact of these practices in the context of humanitarian obstruction.Annex 5.2 provides an overview of the scope and impact of these practices in the context of humanitarian obstruction.
Humanitarian principles and challenges of accessHumanitarian principles and challenges of access
13.13.
A number of senior UN and NGO staff expressed concern to the Monitoring Group that the erosion of space for humanitarian operations to abide by humanitarian principles had particularly endangered the quality and scope of humanitarian access to populations in need during this mandate.A number of senior UN and NGO staff expressed concern to the Monitoring Group that the erosion of space for humanitarian operations to abide by humanitarian principles had particularly endangered the quality and scope of humanitarian access to populations in need during this mandate.
14.14.
The Somalia Compact which was agreed between the FGS and international partners in 2013 firmly stated a commitment to “the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence endorsed in General Assembly resolutions 46/182 and 58/114”.The Somalia Compact which was agreed between the FGS and international partners in 2013 firmly stated a commitment to “the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence endorsed in General Assembly resolutions 46/182 and 58/114”.
It further asserted that the government would not interfere with “humanitarian actors’ neutrality, impartiality and independence from political, economic and military processes”.It further asserted that the government would not interfere with “humanitarian actors’ neutrality, impartiality and independence from political, economic and military processes”.
Since then there appears to have been a shift in the political optics.Since then there appears to have been a shift in the political optics.
The High-Level Partnership Forum draft documents produced in 2015, for example, emphasised that “services delivered by NGOs or the private sector on behalf of the government will fall under a government-led framework agreement”, intended to “increase the ownership and visibility of government in programme design and delivery”.The High-Level Partnership Forum draft documents produced in 2015, for example, emphasised that “services delivered by NGOs or the private sector on behalf of the government will fall under a government-led framework agreement”, intended to “increase the ownership and visibility of government in programme design and delivery”.
Other developments echoed this approach.Other developments echoed this approach.
Against a background of a significant decrease in humanitarian funds, some donors have encouraged humanitarians to seek support from development donors or donors with a political agenda for basic humanitarian projects, such as hospital services.Against a background of a significant decrease in humanitarian funds, some donors have encouraged humanitarians to seek support from development donors or donors with a political agenda for basic humanitarian projects, such as hospital services.
15.15.
NGOs have expressed concern that unless carefully managed, this new framework, including the proposed ‘branding’ of activities, could reinforce the politicisation of aid.NGOs have expressed concern that unless carefully managed, this new framework, including the proposed ‘branding’ of activities, could reinforce the politicisation of aid.
As one donor said, “change of authority is not an argument for action”.As one donor said, “change of authority is not an argument for action”.
In addition, especially in areas where there is lack of clear FGS control, it could put humanitarian workers in danger.In addition, especially in areas where there is lack of clear FGS control, it could put humanitarian workers in danger.
The rise in threats to, and attacks on, humanitarian workers during 2015 reflects the fragility of the environment: attacks on humanitarian workers came not just from Al-Shabaab but from other parties to the conflict which made assumptions about the presence and acquiesce of NGOs with Al-Shabaab’s former rule.The rise in threats to, and attacks on, humanitarian workers during 2015 reflects the fragility of the environment: attacks on humanitarian workers came not just from Al-Shabaab but from other parties to the conflict which made assumptions about the presence and acquiesce of NGOs with Al-Shabaab’s former rule.
Compounding the challenge are the increased numbers of armed actors taking part in the conflicts and the range of military assets apparently available to Al-Shabaab.Compounding the challenge are the increased numbers of armed actors taking part in the conflicts and the range of military assets apparently available to Al-Shabaab.
This makes the need for humanitarian distancing more acute.This makes the need for humanitarian distancing more acute.
As one senior NGO staff member put it: “principles are also tools to allow you to work.As one senior NGO staff member put it: “principles are also tools to allow you to work.
The problem of bending the neutrality principle in a conflict zone is that it will backfire”.The problem of bending the neutrality principle in a conflict zone is that it will backfire”.
16.16.
More broadly NGO and UN humanitarian workers told the Monitoring Group that they believed that the decision to integrate the political and humanitarian pillars of the UN mission in Somalia at the beginning of 2014 had complicated already polarised interpretations of the humanitarian role and may have both undermined access and increased the dangers faced by humanitarian workers.More broadly NGO and UN humanitarian workers told the Monitoring Group that they believed that the decision to integrate the political and humanitarian pillars of the UN mission in Somalia at the beginning of 2014 had complicated already polarised interpretations of the humanitarian role and may have both undermined access and increased the dangers faced by humanitarian workers.
Some cited the increase in abductions of local NGO staff on the ground and statements by Al-Shabaab during 2014 which conflated humanitarian actors with the United Nations as “invaders” that “do bad things”.Some cited the increase in abductions of local NGO staff on the ground and statements by Al-Shabaab during 2014 which conflated humanitarian actors with the United Nations as “invaders” that “do bad things”.
The Monitoring Group was not able, however, to identify particular incidents where a heightened threat or attack was casually linked to the new framework.The Monitoring Group was not able, however, to identify particular incidents where a heightened threat or attack was casually linked to the new framework.
Some agencies in fact reported by mid 2014 that staff on the ground had not seen any change in the security climate which could be linked to integration.Some agencies in fact reported by mid 2014 that staff on the ground had not seen any change in the security climate which could be linked to integration.
17.17.
In August 2015 a year long review of the consequences of the UN integrated mission in Somalia on humanitarian action and access to population in need was published by Action Contre la Faim (ACF).In August 2015 a year long review of the consequences of the UN integrated mission in Somalia on humanitarian action and access to population in need was published by Action Contre la Faim (ACF).
While ACF agreed that that it was difficult to disaggregate the effects of stabilization, integration and counter-terrorism policies, it did find that integration had resulted in: “a decreased focus on the public defense and application of humanitarian principles;While ACF agreed that that it was difficult to disaggregate the effects of stabilization, integration and counter-terrorism policies, it did find that integration had resulted in: “a decreased focus on the public defense and application of humanitarian principles;
an increased politicization and militarization of humanitarian aid and access strategies, with clear consequences for the population in need and for the humanitarian personnel;an increased politicization and militarization of humanitarian aid and access strategies, with clear consequences for the population in need and for the humanitarian personnel;
[and] a disappearance of attempts to gain access through acceptance and negotiation to rural areas of South Central Somalia, where needs are among the highest”.[and] a disappearance of attempts to gain access through acceptance and negotiation to rural areas of South Central Somalia, where needs are among the highest”.
Annex 5.2: Bureaucratic impediments and misuse of official power to obstruct accessAnnex 5.2: Bureaucratic impediments and misuse of official power to obstruct access
19.19.
During the mandate the number of entities with which the humanitarian community was forced to grapple with for access multiplied as two new interim regional administrations (IRAs) came into being, alongside declarations of legitimacy and control by rival putative states claiming the same territory.During the mandate the number of entities with which the humanitarian community was forced to grapple with for access multiplied as two new interim regional administrations (IRAs) came into being, alongside declarations of legitimacy and control by rival putative states claiming the same territory.
In 2014 for example, the United Nations (UN) recorded 76 incidents of interference by government authorities with humanitarian activities.In 2014 for example, the United Nations (UN) recorded 76 incidents of interference by government authorities with humanitarian activities.
71 per cent of these related to bureaucratic constraints with the other 29 per cent constituting direct operational interference.71 per cent of these related to bureaucratic constraints with the other 29 per cent constituting direct operational interference.
By the end of the first seven months of 2015 the number of incidents had already reached 51.By the end of the first seven months of 2015 the number of incidents had already reached 51.
This annex overviews some of the practices purportedly intended to regulate humanitarian action which often had the effect of obstructing and preventing it, across different layers of government.This annex overviews some of the practices purportedly intended to regulate humanitarian action which often had the effect of obstructing and preventing it, across different layers of government.
These practices not only immediately impacted operations but also exposed humanitarian operations to the perception that they had been co-opted in support of particular authorities.These practices not only immediately impacted operations but also exposed humanitarian operations to the perception that they had been co-opted in support of particular authorities.
The Federal levelThe Federal level
20.20.
There is still little coordination between Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) ministries in terms of regulation and facilitation of humanitarian operations.There is still little coordination between Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) ministries in terms of regulation and facilitation of humanitarian operations.
Although the existence of multiple interlocutors is not in itself problematic, the approach of these entities, including around efforts to gather revenue, made it difficult for the humanitarian community to mount a coordinated and consistent response.Although the existence of multiple interlocutors is not in itself problematic, the approach of these entities, including around efforts to gather revenue, made it difficult for the humanitarian community to mount a coordinated and consistent response.
A number of times, for example, duty free goods were held ‘hostage’ at Mogadishu port and airport as Ministry of Finance officials refused to issue tax exemptions.A number of times, for example, duty free goods were held ‘hostage’ at Mogadishu port and airport as Ministry of Finance officials refused to issue tax exemptions.
Meanwhile government officials from different Ministries attempted to extort payments from both non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and UN entities on various official pretexts.Meanwhile government officials from different Ministries attempted to extort payments from both non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and UN entities on various official pretexts.
On one occasion vital humanitarian supplies used in the treatment of severe acute malnutrition were held at port on the ground that employees at the importing NGO were not paying tax, and that an employee list had not been provided.On one occasion vital humanitarian supplies used in the treatment of severe acute malnutrition were held at port on the ground that employees at the importing NGO were not paying tax, and that an employee list had not been provided.
As an alternative, payment of import tax on the goods was demanded by the Ministry for Finance.As an alternative, payment of import tax on the goods was demanded by the Ministry for Finance.
Eventually the supplies were released upon the payment of a proportional percentage tax on the import.Eventually the supplies were released upon the payment of a proportional percentage tax on the import.
That these are not isolated incidents but systematic was reinforced by the fact that an agent approached the organization and offered to negotiate with the authorities to ensure that its next shipment would be treated as tax exempt—for a fee.That these are not isolated incidents but systematic was reinforced by the fact that an agent approached the organization and offered to negotiate with the authorities to ensure that its next shipment would be treated as tax exempt—for a fee.
21.21.
In mid 2015 the Ministry for Labour asked all NGOs working in Benadir to provide them with a list of all staff declaring that each staff member would be required to pay a 20 USD fee for an ID card from the Ministry.In mid 2015 the Ministry for Labour asked all NGOs working in Benadir to provide them with a list of all staff declaring that each staff member would be required to pay a 20 USD fee for an ID card from the Ministry.
Not only did this raise safety and security questions for individual staff, it also appeared to have no legal basis.Not only did this raise safety and security questions for individual staff, it also appeared to have no legal basis.
A number of organisations which did not comply received visits from the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and the Ministry of Labour, asking them to provide staff lists or risk being closed.A number of organisations which did not comply received visits from the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and the Ministry of Labour, asking them to provide staff lists or risk being closed.
Those who questioned the scheme were told that a draft law was been being developed which provided a framework for the scheme, but that it had not yet been approved by Parliament.Those who questioned the scheme were told that a draft law was been being developed which provided a framework for the scheme, but that it had not yet been approved by Parliament.
22.22.
Although an NGO Bill is still in draft form, national organizational registration is required through the Ministry of the Interior and Federalism upon the payment of fees of 1000 USD for an international organisation and 500 USD for a local organisation.Although an NGO Bill is still in draft form, national organizational registration is required through the Ministry of the Interior and Federalism upon the payment of fees of 1000 USD for an international organisation and 500 USD for a local organisation.
The Ministry asserts that federal level registration is all that is required, but, as discussed below, this is ignored at the regional level.The Ministry asserts that federal level registration is all that is required, but, as discussed below, this is ignored at the regional level.
The attempt to appoint regional focal points to help manage the impact of interaction between federal and regional regulation in August 2014 has had little effect.The attempt to appoint regional focal points to help manage the impact of interaction between federal and regional regulation in August 2014 has had little effect.
Regional authoritiesRegional authorities
23.23.
The replication of central government bureaucracy at the regional level resulted in the replication and multiplication of practices related to the regulation and control of humanitarian operations, some of which amounted to obstruction.The replication of central government bureaucracy at the regional level resulted in the replication and multiplication of practices related to the regulation and control of humanitarian operations, some of which amounted to obstruction.
24.24.
Echoing the approach of Somaliland and Puntland, the new IRAs also attempted to demand payment of registration fees by humanitarian organisations.Echoing the approach of Somaliland and Puntland, the new IRAs also attempted to demand payment of registration fees by humanitarian organisations.
Instructions from the Interim Jubba Administration (IJA) Ministry of Planning and International Relations and Humanitarian Programs, for example, advise that payment of an annual fee of 1000 USD for an INGO and 500 USD for an NGO for registration—a sum equal to the federal requirement.Instructions from the Interim Jubba Administration (IJA) Ministry of Planning and International Relations and Humanitarian Programs, for example, advise that payment of an annual fee of 1000 USD for an INGO and 500 USD for an NGO for registration—a sum equal to the federal requirement.
If these practices spread, an NGO intending to operate across the country could find itself forced to pay considerable fees in registration alone.If these practices spread, an NGO intending to operate across the country could find itself forced to pay considerable fees in registration alone.
There was also evidence that registration and taxation was being demanded at local district levels throughout southern and central Somalia, and in Puntland.There was also evidence that registration and taxation was being demanded at local district levels throughout southern and central Somalia, and in Puntland.
25.25.
Amidst competing authorities, the experience of NGOs operating under IJA claimed territory was particularly confusing.Amidst competing authorities, the experience of NGOs operating under IJA claimed territory was particularly confusing.
Although a Non-governmental Organizations Coordination Act (2015) was developed, different approaches to regulation both in Kismayo and in the districts made adherence difficult.Although a Non-governmental Organizations Coordination Act (2015) was developed, different approaches to regulation both in Kismayo and in the districts made adherence difficult.
In Dhobley, for two days in March 2015, for example, field activities by local NGOs had to be suspended when the local administration ordered that only vehicles hired from it could be used.In Dhobley, for two days in March 2015, for example, field activities by local NGOs had to be suspended when the local administration ordered that only vehicles hired from it could be used.
Five vehicles were subsequently impounded.Five vehicles were subsequently impounded.
In Luq in Gedo, a 30 per cent tax demand was issued to local NGOs by the local District Commissioner in August 2015 and three organisations were forced to temporarily suspend operations.In Luq in Gedo, a 30 per cent tax demand was issued to local NGOs by the local District Commissioner in August 2015 and three organisations were forced to temporarily suspend operations.
Although in most of these situations the matter was ultimately resolved either through strong local representations or support from the UN, it made for a very difficult environment.Although in most of these situations the matter was ultimately resolved either through strong local representations or support from the UN, it made for a very difficult environment.
26.26.
The final form of regulation of humanitarian activity in the Interim South West Administration (ISWA) was under discussion at time of writing.The final form of regulation of humanitarian activity in the Interim South West Administration (ISWA) was under discussion at time of writing.
Although a letter from the ISWA Ministry for Humanitarian and Disability Affairs on 12 April 2015 invited “all humanitarian agencies [in] ISWA regions” to “come forward for registration between 14th and 30th April”, the authorities subsequently entered into dialogue with NGOs on how registration will operate, including on the question of fees.Although a letter from the ISWA Ministry for Humanitarian and Disability Affairs on 12 April 2015 invited “all humanitarian agencies [in] ISWA regions” to “come forward for registration between 14th and 30th April”, the authorities subsequently entered into dialogue with NGOs on how registration will operate, including on the question of fees.
How the registration question is managed will also have implications for other issues such as work permits for foreign staff members and staff taxation.How the registration question is managed will also have implications for other issues such as work permits for foreign staff members and staff taxation.
27.27.
Although as noted in the Monitoring Group’s 2014 report (S/2014/726) Somaliland presented one of the least obstructive environments for humanitarian operations, increased political and security instability provided the backdrop to some new challenges.Although as noted in the Monitoring Group’s 2014 report (S/2014/726) Somaliland presented one of the least obstructive environments for humanitarian operations, increased political and security instability provided the backdrop to some new challenges.
In terms of bureaucratic constraints, efforts by local administrative entities to exert control on operation and contracting were the main obstacles encountered.In terms of bureaucratic constraints, efforts by local administrative entities to exert control on operation and contracting were the main obstacles encountered.
In both Somaliland and Puntland, issues around the taxation of local UN staff saw the UN ultimately being constrained to share lists of its national employees with local authorities in June 2015.In both Somaliland and Puntland, issues around the taxation of local UN staff saw the UN ultimately being constrained to share lists of its national employees with local authorities in June 2015.
28.28.
In Puntland the range of obstructive practices described by the Monitoring Group in its 2014 report (S/2014/727) continued to be experienced, including layers of registration at district level.In Puntland the range of obstructive practices described by the Monitoring Group in its 2014 report (S/2014/727) continued to be experienced, including layers of registration at district level.
Nevertheless, both UN agencies and NGOs reported during the mandate that there was greater willingness to discuss and negotiate these impediments.Nevertheless, both UN agencies and NGOs reported during the mandate that there was greater willingness to discuss and negotiate these impediments.
In terms of clarifying the framework, an NGO Bill is under discussion and NGOs have been able to submit views on the text.In terms of clarifying the framework, an NGO Bill is under discussion and NGOs have been able to submit views on the text.
At the same time, efforts by the Government to direct the involvement of the Puntland Tender Board in the award of contracts worth over 5000 USD are causing significant tension.At the same time, efforts by the Government to direct the involvement of the Puntland Tender Board in the award of contracts worth over 5000 USD are causing significant tension.
The Government asserts that engagement is necessary to prevent corruption in the granting of contracts.The Government asserts that engagement is necessary to prevent corruption in the granting of contracts.
NGOs claim that involving the Tender Board is unlikely to have that effect.NGOs claim that involving the Tender Board is unlikely to have that effect.
In addition, it is unclear that a public procurement law, intended to govern the award of public contracts, can apply to NGOs which are private entities.In addition, it is unclear that a public procurement law, intended to govern the award of public contracts, can apply to NGOs which are private entities.
The UN has also been embroiled in this issue.The UN has also been embroiled in this issue.
In January 2015 a letter to the UN from the Puntland Minister for Finance and Minister for Planning and International Cooperation advised, inter alia, that income tax would be due from rental properties and vehicles leased to or hired by the UN”.In January 2015 a letter to the UN from the Puntland Minister for Finance and Minister for Planning and International Cooperation advised, inter alia, that income tax would be due from rental properties and vehicles leased to or hired by the UN”.
The letter also declared that “a registration tax” would be levied on “vehicle hire contract by the UN before the contractual amount is paid”.The letter also declared that “a registration tax” would be levied on “vehicle hire contract by the UN before the contractual amount is paid”.
It also purported to order that “contracts awarded and funded by the UN” would be required to pay “registration tax of 2.5% on total gross contract value”.It also purported to order that “contracts awarded and funded by the UN” would be required to pay “registration tax of 2.5% on total gross contract value”.
The National Tender Board of Puntland would also collect “a service charge of 0.5% on total gross contract value”.The National Tender Board of Puntland would also collect “a service charge of 0.5% on total gross contract value”.
Beyond ensuring that contractors present evidence of tax compliance, the humanitarian community has attempted to resist involvement of the Tender Board.Beyond ensuring that contractors present evidence of tax compliance, the humanitarian community has attempted to resist involvement of the Tender Board.
At the time of writing the situation remained at a stalemate.At the time of writing the situation remained at a stalemate.
29.29.
Finally, although not constituting deliberate humanitarian obstruction, in the absence of funding being found for construction of a parallel runway, the planned closure of Garowe airport to facilitate a major renovation funded by the Government of Kuwait was expected to have a huge impact on UN access from the beginning of October 2015.Finally, although not constituting deliberate humanitarian obstruction, in the absence of funding being found for construction of a parallel runway, the planned closure of Garowe airport to facilitate a major renovation funded by the Government of Kuwait was expected to have a huge impact on UN access from the beginning of October 2015.
Other authoritiesOther authorities
30.30.
It was not just the formally recognised IRAs and Al-Shabaab which attempted to use administrative regulation and ‘taxation’ to leverage the resources of the humanitarian community for their own purposes.It was not just the formally recognised IRAs and Al-Shabaab which attempted to use administrative regulation and ‘taxation’ to leverage the resources of the humanitarian community for their own purposes.
On 22 March 2015, for example, after the take over of Guriel by Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ), the “Office of Humanitarian Assistant” of the Guriel District Commissioner issued a statement entitled, “Conduct of International Organisations and Local NGOs operating in Guriel”.On 22 March 2015, for example, after the take over of Guriel by Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ), the “Office of Humanitarian Assistant” of the Guriel District Commissioner issued a statement entitled, “Conduct of International Organisations and Local NGOs operating in Guriel”.
Among the instructions given were that international and local NGOs should “register from the local municipality office”, pay “registration fees” and obtain an “acceptance letter”.Among the instructions given were that international and local NGOs should “register from the local municipality office”, pay “registration fees” and obtain an “acceptance letter”.
Agencies were also purportedly required to submit “the number of staff, number of houses and rented vehicles they are going to hire and all necessary needs”, in order that, “the government fairly allocate the resources”.Agencies were also purportedly required to submit “the number of staff, number of houses and rented vehicles they are going to hire and all necessary needs”, in order that, “the government fairly allocate the resources”.
It is understood that the matter was resolved locally.It is understood that the matter was resolved locally.
NGOs did not report that they acceded to the payment request, but did register.NGOs did not report that they acceded to the payment request, but did register.
In June 2015 with the declaration of a parallel state in Dhusamareb.In June 2015 with the declaration of a parallel state in Dhusamareb.
ASWJ authorities also told the humanitarian community that they were the new authority and called on them to register with them.ASWJ authorities also told the humanitarian community that they were the new authority and called on them to register with them.
31.31.
In Sool and Sanaag, political and ideologically grounded access impediments rooted in contestation of authority remained a challenge.In Sool and Sanaag, political and ideologically grounded access impediments rooted in contestation of authority remained a challenge.
As noted in the Monitoring Group’s 2014 report (S/2014/727) there was very little humanitarian access to the area, with UN standard operating procedures preventing travel of UN staff and restricting the forms of aid which could be transferred.As noted in the Monitoring Group’s 2014 report (S/2014/727) there was very little humanitarian access to the area, with UN standard operating procedures preventing travel of UN staff and restricting the forms of aid which could be transferred.
In November 2014 approximately 300 tons of food aid donated from the Turkish Government intended for Salax Dheer were diverted to Garowe in the wake of disagreement between pro-Puntland politicians who had secured the delivery and the self-declared Khatumo state administration.In November 2014 approximately 300 tons of food aid donated from the Turkish Government intended for Salax Dheer were diverted to Garowe in the wake of disagreement between pro-Puntland politicians who had secured the delivery and the self-declared Khatumo state administration.
Against the background of intensifying armed engagement between the parties, Khatumo officials increasingly attempted to control revenues in its areas of control including those of the humanitarian community.Against the background of intensifying armed engagement between the parties, Khatumo officials increasingly attempted to control revenues in its areas of control including those of the humanitarian community.
A statement by the Minister of the Interior of Khatumo state in March 2015, for example, warned that the administration “would not be responsible for the security of agencies coming from Puntland or Somaliland and that NGOs should contact the administration for their presence to be recorded”.A statement by the Minister of the Interior of Khatumo state in March 2015, for example, warned that the administration “would not be responsible for the security of agencies coming from Puntland or Somaliland and that NGOs should contact the administration for their presence to be recorded”.
32.32.
As the number of regional entities increases, and both they and parallel authorities jockey for control of power, resources and political legitimacy, humanitarian organisations will come under greater pressure.As the number of regional entities increases, and both they and parallel authorities jockey for control of power, resources and political legitimacy, humanitarian organisations will come under greater pressure.
In the short term, it is vital that the humanitarian community takes a coordinated approach to challenging efforts by regional and local authorities to ‘regulate’ access where such purported ‘regulation’ in fact amounts to co-option by extortion/diversion and obstruction of access.In the short term, it is vital that the humanitarian community takes a coordinated approach to challenging efforts by regional and local authorities to ‘regulate’ access where such purported ‘regulation’ in fact amounts to co-option by extortion/diversion and obstruction of access.
This should include agreement on ‘lines in the sand’.This should include agreement on ‘lines in the sand’.
In the absence of such collaboration, the ‘divide, threaten and control’ strategy of many entities, will continue to suck scarce financial and human resources.In the absence of such collaboration, the ‘divide, threaten and control’ strategy of many entities, will continue to suck scarce financial and human resources.
In the longer term, coordinated authority over humanitarian access throughout Somalia is needed through a transparent regulatory framework which clarifies the requirements for operations and supports independent and impartial humanitarian action.In the longer term, coordinated authority over humanitarian access throughout Somalia is needed through a transparent regulatory framework which clarifies the requirements for operations and supports independent and impartial humanitarian action.
Annex 5.3: Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistanceAnnex 5.3: Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance
34.34.
This annex details particular categories of perpetrator, and particular areas of diversion which contributed to the obstruction of humanitarian assistance during the mandate.This annex details particular categories of perpetrator, and particular areas of diversion which contributed to the obstruction of humanitarian assistance during the mandate.
Developments in the approaches taken by the humanitarian community to prevent and respond to diversion and misappropriation are also described.Developments in the approaches taken by the humanitarian community to prevent and respond to diversion and misappropriation are also described.
Al-ShabaabAl-Shabaab
35.35.
In areas of its direct control Al-Shabaab continued to systematically divert humanitarian aid through registration fees, “taxation” of projects and non-governmental organisation (NGO) staff, and control of sub-contracting.In areas of its direct control Al-Shabaab continued to systematically divert humanitarian aid through registration fees, “taxation” of projects and non-governmental organisation (NGO) staff, and control of sub-contracting.
As the Monitoring Group noted in its 2014 report (S/2014/276), the contraction of Al-Shabaab territory during 2014 added to the difficulties faced by humanitarian entities on the ground in resisting the practice.As the Monitoring Group noted in its 2014 report (S/2014/276), the contraction of Al-Shabaab territory during 2014 added to the difficulties faced by humanitarian entities on the ground in resisting the practice.
This pressure increased during 2015.This pressure increased during 2015.
Agencies operating in areas still fully controlled by Al-Shabaab were under greater pressure to contribute to a resource-stretched campaign.Agencies operating in areas still fully controlled by Al-Shabaab were under greater pressure to contribute to a resource-stretched campaign.
In areas officially ‘recovered’ from Al-Shabaab, the group continued to extort, facilitated by mobile money and other forms of remittance services.In areas officially ‘recovered’ from Al-Shabaab, the group continued to extort, facilitated by mobile money and other forms of remittance services.
The complexity and oscillations of authority noted in by the Monitoring Group in 2014 (S/2014/276) as having emerged in recovered areas during 2013 and 2014 only deepened during the current mandate.The complexity and oscillations of authority noted in by the Monitoring Group in 2014 (S/2014/276) as having emerged in recovered areas during 2013 and 2014 only deepened during the current mandate.
Al-Shabaab was adept at exploiting these security and political vulnerabilities.Al-Shabaab was adept at exploiting these security and political vulnerabilities.
36.36.
In some Al-Shabaab controlled areas there were indications that the Amniyat was superseding local responsibility and authority to negotiate humanitarian space (including management of taxation) and overruling previous agreements.In some Al-Shabaab controlled areas there were indications that the Amniyat was superseding local responsibility and authority to negotiate humanitarian space (including management of taxation) and overruling previous agreements.
If this indeed is a new development it would further contribute to expanding the distance between humanitarian actors, Al-Shabaab and communities on the ground.If this indeed is a new development it would further contribute to expanding the distance between humanitarian actors, Al-Shabaab and communities on the ground.
It may also constitute a new threat to the safety and viability of humanitarian activities in Somalia.It may also constitute a new threat to the safety and viability of humanitarian activities in Somalia.
37.37.
Operating in areas directly, and sometimes, indirectly controlled by Al-Shabaab presented a huge challenge to the humanitarian community not only programmatically, but also with respect to risk management and donor accountability.Operating in areas directly, and sometimes, indirectly controlled by Al-Shabaab presented a huge challenge to the humanitarian community not only programmatically, but also with respect to risk management and donor accountability.
Despite the ‘humanitarian carve out’ extended by the Security Council in paragraph 41 of resolution 2182 (2104), the impact of national and other international sanctions regimes tended to undermine its effectiveness.Despite the ‘humanitarian carve out’ extended by the Security Council in paragraph 41 of resolution 2182 (2104), the impact of national and other international sanctions regimes tended to undermine its effectiveness.
Diversion by regional and local administrationsDiversion by regional and local administrations
38.38.
In its 2014 report (S/2014/727), the Monitoring Group described how the process of federalisation had increased the layers of bureaucratic impediments which both complicated and prevented access.In its 2014 report (S/2014/727), the Monitoring Group described how the process of federalisation had increased the layers of bureaucratic impediments which both complicated and prevented access.
Those holding power saw humanitarian streams of finance as a source of income.Those holding power saw humanitarian streams of finance as a source of income.
In some areas demands for access to humanitarian resources—whether directly through ‘taxation’ or additional ‘registration’ of organisations, projects, or contracts, or indirectly, through efforts to control tendering or gather information on staffing—made access negotiations and operations more complex, and, in some cases, impossible.In some areas demands for access to humanitarian resources—whether directly through ‘taxation’ or additional ‘registration’ of organisations, projects, or contracts, or indirectly, through efforts to control tendering or gather information on staffing—made access negotiations and operations more complex, and, in some cases, impossible.
In Gedo, for example, and during August 2015 alone, three local NGOs were forced to close temporarily as a result of repeated unacceptable demands for taxation.In Gedo, for example, and during August 2015 alone, three local NGOs were forced to close temporarily as a result of repeated unacceptable demands for taxation.
The situation was particularly acute in areas newly ‘recovered’ from Al-Shabaab authority.The situation was particularly acute in areas newly ‘recovered’ from Al-Shabaab authority.
Annex 5.2 on bureaucratic constraints and misuse of official authority offers a more detailed overview of these practices.Annex 5.2 on bureaucratic constraints and misuse of official authority offers a more detailed overview of these practices.
39.39.
Regional authorities also attempted to misuse their authority to wield power over donor decision-making on funding and grant making and derive a benefit from humanitarian inputs.Regional authorities also attempted to misuse their authority to wield power over donor decision-making on funding and grant making and derive a benefit from humanitarian inputs.
In one case documented by the Group, for example, it was implied strongly by the administration that a funder would find operating in the state extremely difficult if funding was not granted to a particular NGO with which a senior advisor to the administration had close connections.In one case documented by the Group, for example, it was implied strongly by the administration that a funder would find operating in the state extremely difficult if funding was not granted to a particular NGO with which a senior advisor to the administration had close connections.
40.40.
Regional administration and security officials also directly diverted humanitarian inputs.Regional administration and security officials also directly diverted humanitarian inputs.
In one case reported to the Monitoring Group local administration officials and regional security forces threatened IDPs not to occupy shelters which had been constructed for them, later dismantling the structures and sharing out the materials.In one case reported to the Monitoring Group local administration officials and regional security forces threatened IDPs not to occupy shelters which had been constructed for them, later dismantling the structures and sharing out the materials.
In another instance security force personnel took control of wells dug for the community and demanded payment for access to water.In another instance security force personnel took control of wells dug for the community and demanded payment for access to water.
Evictions were also strategically arranged to take place just after inputs by humanitarian agencies had rendered the land occupied by the IDPs more valuable.Evictions were also strategically arranged to take place just after inputs by humanitarian agencies had rendered the land occupied by the IDPs more valuable.
Local businessmen connected with the administration then took possession.Local businessmen connected with the administration then took possession.
Diversion of food aid, including emergency aid from bilateral donorsDiversion of food aid, including emergency aid from bilateral donors
41.41.
The arrival into Somalia’s ports of large amounts of food and non-food emergency aid from bilateral donors created a ripe context for diversion.The arrival into Somalia’s ports of large amounts of food and non-food emergency aid from bilateral donors created a ripe context for diversion.
The Monitoring Group received a series of allegations from credible sources that some of this aid was misappropriated at the point of entry and either sold directly in the markets or exchanged in kind.The Monitoring Group received a series of allegations from credible sources that some of this aid was misappropriated at the point of entry and either sold directly in the markets or exchanged in kind.
Aid was used, for example, to pay members of the Regional Assembly and officials in one interim regional administration (IRA).Aid was used, for example, to pay members of the Regional Assembly and officials in one interim regional administration (IRA).
Meanwhile, the FGS also began to investigate food aid diversion by Government officials, particularly through the efforts of the Office of the Attorney General (AG).Meanwhile, the FGS also began to investigate food aid diversion by Government officials, particularly through the efforts of the Office of the Attorney General (AG).
Seven people were arrested further to the AG’s investigations into allegations of diversion of Turkish food aid in Buloburte, including senior administration officials.Seven people were arrested further to the AG’s investigations into allegations of diversion of Turkish food aid in Buloburte, including senior administration officials.
42.42.
The Monitoring Group received extensive documentation from the Ministry for Interior and Federalism and from donor states on the delivery and distribution of emergency bilateral aid at the end of the mandate.The Monitoring Group received extensive documentation from the Ministry for Interior and Federalism and from donor states on the delivery and distribution of emergency bilateral aid at the end of the mandate.
Investigations are ongoing.Investigations are ongoing.
Meanwhile, in the light of its preliminary findings, the Group urges bilateral donors to require greater levels of accountability from both the Somali federal or regional entity responsible for receiving and distributing the aid, and the implementing NGO.Meanwhile, in the light of its preliminary findings, the Group urges bilateral donors to require greater levels of accountability from both the Somali federal or regional entity responsible for receiving and distributing the aid, and the implementing NGO.
It would also be important for donors to consider providing support for the process of distribution and monitoring.It would also be important for donors to consider providing support for the process of distribution and monitoring.
Donors frequently do not arrange for distribution costs or other in-kind assistance to support distribution.Donors frequently do not arrange for distribution costs or other in-kind assistance to support distribution.
Although lack of resources for distribution is not the cause of aid diversion it can be considered an enabling factor.Although lack of resources for distribution is not the cause of aid diversion it can be considered an enabling factor.
Diversion and non-governmental organisationsDiversion and non-governmental organisations
43.43.
As noted above diversion occurs at all points of the aid distribution cycle.As noted above diversion occurs at all points of the aid distribution cycle.
During the last three years diversion by local NGOs has been the main focus of a number of United Nations (UN) investigative bodies.During the last three years diversion by local NGOs has been the main focus of a number of United Nations (UN) investigative bodies.
Similar patterns, scale and methodologies as those reported by the Monitoring Group in 2014 (S/2014/726) continued to be identified in cases of systematic diversion shared with the Monitoring Group this mandate.Similar patterns, scale and methodologies as those reported by the Monitoring Group in 2014 (S/2014/726) continued to be identified in cases of systematic diversion shared with the Monitoring Group this mandate.
With respect to the latter these include the manufacture of false documentation—whether through invention of false vendors or collusion—false reporting and absence of implementation.With respect to the latter these include the manufacture of false documentation—whether through invention of false vendors or collusion—false reporting and absence of implementation.
44.44.
In terms of scale, in one project implemented by an international organisation, 100 per cent of costs incurred were found to be unaccounted for or unsubstantiated;In terms of scale, in one project implemented by an international organisation, 100 per cent of costs incurred were found to be unaccounted for or unsubstantiated;
other projects saw a rate of 80 per cent.other projects saw a rate of 80 per cent.
Although local NGOs have tended to be the focus of investigations, this year saw the beginning of a number of enquires into allegations of diversion or misappropriation involving international NGOs.Although local NGOs have tended to be the focus of investigations, this year saw the beginning of a number of enquires into allegations of diversion or misappropriation involving international NGOs.
Separate to these findings the Group received a variety of testimonies throughout the year from staff of local NGOs describing how routine diversion was in some operations.Separate to these findings the Group received a variety of testimonies throughout the year from staff of local NGOs describing how routine diversion was in some operations.
One former staff member of a local NGO for example described how only 5 per cent of hygiene kits in a Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) project were given to the intended beneficiaries and how other inputs were regularly redirected to the local security forces.One former staff member of a local NGO for example described how only 5 per cent of hygiene kits in a Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) project were given to the intended beneficiaries and how other inputs were regularly redirected to the local security forces.
45.45.
Jurisdictional tensions between accountability and investigative entities in the UN system can impede investigations.Jurisdictional tensions between accountability and investigative entities in the UN system can impede investigations.
Going forward there will be an increasingly small number of local and international NGOs which enjoy support from the international community, resulting in multiple entities funding the same NGO or private contractor.Going forward there will be an increasingly small number of local and international NGOs which enjoy support from the international community, resulting in multiple entities funding the same NGO or private contractor.
There is a need for a multi-agency approach to investigations within the UN and greater openness to collaborating on enquires and sharing findings.There is a need for a multi-agency approach to investigations within the UN and greater openness to collaborating on enquires and sharing findings.
Although cross notification of investigations does occur at the moment there is duplication in investigative activities which sometimes leads to interference with evidence and greater opportunity for the target of the investigation to conceal information.Although cross notification of investigations does occur at the moment there is duplication in investigative activities which sometimes leads to interference with evidence and greater opportunity for the target of the investigation to conceal information.
Links between conflict and the diversion or manipulation of humanitarian assistanceLinks between conflict and the diversion or manipulation of humanitarian assistance
46.46.
In resolution 2111 (2013) the Security Council condemned “any politicization of humanitarian assistance, misuse or misappropriation” and called upon the UN and Member States to “take all feasible steps to mitigate these […] practices in Somalia”.In resolution 2111 (2013) the Security Council condemned “any politicization of humanitarian assistance, misuse or misappropriation” and called upon the UN and Member States to “take all feasible steps to mitigate these […] practices in Somalia”.
A key characteristic of Somalia’s humanitarian aid model, however, is that NGOs or particular branches of INGOs or UN agencies are generally associated with—and viewed as a source of income for—particular communities and clan networks.A key characteristic of Somalia’s humanitarian aid model, however, is that NGOs or particular branches of INGOs or UN agencies are generally associated with—and viewed as a source of income for—particular communities and clan networks.
Allegations that aid inputs are used to fund conflicts or political positions or campaigns go hand and hand with this reality.Allegations that aid inputs are used to fund conflicts or political positions or campaigns go hand and hand with this reality.
47.47.
Over the last two years, as areas have been ‘recovered’ from Al-Shabaab control, clan conflicts and political violence, frequently overlaid with involvement of government administration and security entities, have escalated.Over the last two years, as areas have been ‘recovered’ from Al-Shabaab control, clan conflicts and political violence, frequently overlaid with involvement of government administration and security entities, have escalated.
Claims that the place and power of humanitarian organisations in local communities have been used and manipulated by parties to these conflicts have increased.Claims that the place and power of humanitarian organisations in local communities have been used and manipulated by parties to these conflicts have increased.
During the mandate the Monitoring Group received credible information that humanitarian actors abused humanitarian principles and misused humanitarian inputs in the pursuit of clan dominance, including through use of violence, in a number of places, but in particular in Lower Shabelle and in Hiran.During the mandate the Monitoring Group received credible information that humanitarian actors abused humanitarian principles and misused humanitarian inputs in the pursuit of clan dominance, including through use of violence, in a number of places, but in particular in Lower Shabelle and in Hiran.
In some communities, the allegiance of particular NGOs with particular militia/SNA units and direct funding of the latter operations have been open secrets in the humanitarian community and indeed accepted as the price of access in highly militarised and polarised contexts.In some communities, the allegiance of particular NGOs with particular militia/SNA units and direct funding of the latter operations have been open secrets in the humanitarian community and indeed accepted as the price of access in highly militarised and polarised contexts.
48.48.
At the same time, UN and other entities are increasingly asking questions about clan make-up and networks of current and potential partners.At the same time, UN and other entities are increasingly asking questions about clan make-up and networks of current and potential partners.
It may be that single clan affiliated organizations are appropriate interlocutors in some circumstances.It may be that single clan affiliated organizations are appropriate interlocutors in some circumstances.
The majority of those consulted by the Monitoring Group were of the view, however, that clan capture of an NGO’s operations could be best mitigated by insisting on mixed clan management in NGOs.The majority of those consulted by the Monitoring Group were of the view, however, that clan capture of an NGO’s operations could be best mitigated by insisting on mixed clan management in NGOs.
49.49.
Assessment of how power dynamics in a community, including clan and other socio-economic dynamics, are engaged with and understood, prior to deciding to move forward with a particular partner or input, should be more regularly conducted.Assessment of how power dynamics in a community, including clan and other socio-economic dynamics, are engaged with and understood, prior to deciding to move forward with a particular partner or input, should be more regularly conducted.
In making such assessments, however, it is essential that channels other than traditional interlocutors be considered.In making such assessments, however, it is essential that channels other than traditional interlocutors be considered.
Powerful and convincing gatekeepers can prevent even diligent humanitarian actors from fully comprehending the context, especially in situations where victim and potential beneficiary communities are severely marginalized, and often fearful.Powerful and convincing gatekeepers can prevent even diligent humanitarian actors from fully comprehending the context, especially in situations where victim and potential beneficiary communities are severely marginalized, and often fearful.
Efforts should be made therefore to reach out to traditionally excluded communities to ensure their voices are heard and that they can function as partners in humanitarian activity.Efforts should be made therefore to reach out to traditionally excluded communities to ensure their voices are heard and that they can function as partners in humanitarian activity.
50.50.
Special capacity building efforts may need to be made in this regard.Special capacity building efforts may need to be made in this regard.
Communities which have had historically very limited dialogue with the international community may find it difficult to provide the ‘right’ inputs in the ‘right’ form, whether in terms of needs assessments or project proposals.Communities which have had historically very limited dialogue with the international community may find it difficult to provide the ‘right’ inputs in the ‘right’ form, whether in terms of needs assessments or project proposals.
There will be significant resistance from those who currently control the Somali aid enterprise, similar to the dangers associated with challenging hegemonies in any area of Somali business.There will be significant resistance from those who currently control the Somali aid enterprise, similar to the dangers associated with challenging hegemonies in any area of Somali business.
Defying one of the foundations of—and in some case even the raison d’être for—NGO operations in Somalia will be difficult.Defying one of the foundations of—and in some case even the raison d’être for—NGO operations in Somalia will be difficult.
It is a long-term project involving sustained civic education and inter-community dialogue.It is a long-term project involving sustained civic education and inter-community dialogue.
Measures to enhance complianceMeasures to enhance compliance
51.51.
The humanitarian aid community continued to pursue the positive steps identified by the Monitoring Group in its 2014 report (S/2014/276) both with respect to acknowledging the scale of diversion, and continuing to develop the effectiveness of risk management mechanisms.The humanitarian aid community continued to pursue the positive steps identified by the Monitoring Group in its 2014 report (S/2014/276) both with respect to acknowledging the scale of diversion, and continuing to develop the effectiveness of risk management mechanisms.
52.52.
Within the UN Country Team, the Risk Working Group facilitated exchange of information and the development of common standards and procedures to mitigate risk and respond to diversion.Within the UN Country Team, the Risk Working Group facilitated exchange of information and the development of common standards and procedures to mitigate risk and respond to diversion.
Reflecting previous Monitoring Group recommendations, in January 2015 an NGO focal point was appointed to the UN Risk Management Unit (RMU), setting the stage for enhanced cooperation and information sharing between UN entities and the NGO humanitarian community.Reflecting previous Monitoring Group recommendations, in January 2015 an NGO focal point was appointed to the UN Risk Management Unit (RMU), setting the stage for enhanced cooperation and information sharing between UN entities and the NGO humanitarian community.
Among the other key developments since the Monitoring Group’s last report were:Among the other key developments since the Monitoring Group’s last report were:
(a)(a)
agreement on standards on information collection (UN Minimum Information Collection Standards);agreement on standards on information collection (UN Minimum Information Collection Standards);
(b)(b)
the adoption of a Common Working Agreement on Risk Management by the UN Country Team;the adoption of a Common Working Agreement on Risk Management by the UN Country Team;
(c)(c)
initiation of a Civil Servant and Ministry Payment Tracking system and increased use of the Contract Information Management System (CIMS) databases with contracts of approximately USD 3.8 billion now recorded with information on risk occurrences.initiation of a Civil Servant and Ministry Payment Tracking system and increased use of the Contract Information Management System (CIMS) databases with contracts of approximately USD 3.8 billion now recorded with information on risk occurrences.
53.53.
More broadly there was enhanced, although uneven, collaboration between various UN analytic units and across functions—political, security and programmatic—to share information on persons of interest, context and networks.More broadly there was enhanced, although uneven, collaboration between various UN analytic units and across functions—political, security and programmatic—to share information on persons of interest, context and networks.
The RMU also convened a regular Multi Party Risk Management Forum, which brought together the UN, the World Bank, donors and NGOs in a strategic dialogue on issues such as fraud management, capacity assessments, and collective solutions.The RMU also convened a regular Multi Party Risk Management Forum, which brought together the UN, the World Bank, donors and NGOs in a strategic dialogue on issues such as fraud management, capacity assessments, and collective solutions.
54.54.
To some extent, more conscious engagement with the realities of diversion in Somalia and improved risk management efforts are minimising losses.To some extent, more conscious engagement with the realities of diversion in Somalia and improved risk management efforts are minimising losses.
Against the background of an overall diminishing aid budget, however, increasingly risk averse donors, coupled with increased bureaucracy and administration, are creating unintended consequences whether in terms of costs or program focus.Against the background of an overall diminishing aid budget, however, increasingly risk averse donors, coupled with increased bureaucracy and administration, are creating unintended consequences whether in terms of costs or program focus.
In this regard, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator initiated a ‘structured dialogue’ with international partners which attempted to parse out the ‘cost of delivery’ in Somalia.In this regard, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator initiated a ‘structured dialogue’ with international partners which attempted to parse out the ‘cost of delivery’ in Somalia.
The dialogue was designed “to bridge the gap between level of ambition and discourse” with respect to the year of “delivery” and the levels of investment needed to achieve this, including in the context of risk management.The dialogue was designed “to bridge the gap between level of ambition and discourse” with respect to the year of “delivery” and the levels of investment needed to achieve this, including in the context of risk management.
55.55.
Finally, with increased focus on risk management, monitoring and due diligence, third party monitors and external auditors have become an increasing part of the humanitarian aid landscape, adding significantly to program costs.Finally, with increased focus on risk management, monitoring and due diligence, third party monitors and external auditors have become an increasing part of the humanitarian aid landscape, adding significantly to program costs.
Although this new layer of accountability is welcome, there is a danger that they in turn may be co-opted by the pervasive elements of the system.Although this new layer of accountability is welcome, there is a danger that they in turn may be co-opted by the pervasive elements of the system.
Annex 6Annex 6
Violations of international law involving the targeting of civiliansViolations of international law involving the targeting of civilians
Annex 6.1 Violations of international law involving the targeting of civiliansAnnex 6.1 Violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians
1.1.
This annex provides an overview of key areas of concern and investigations conducted by the Monitoring Group with respect to responsibility for violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians during the mandate.This annex provides an overview of key areas of concern and investigations conducted by the Monitoring Group with respect to responsibility for violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians during the mandate.
Al-ShabaabAl-Shabaab
2.2.
Although the two anti-Al-Shabaab offensives which got underway during the mandate period significantly reduced the territory officially held by the group, they also forced a change in tactics and operations both inside and outside of its areas of control.Although the two anti-Al-Shabaab offensives which got underway during the mandate period significantly reduced the territory officially held by the group, they also forced a change in tactics and operations both inside and outside of its areas of control.
This had a significant impact on civilians, intensifying trends identified by the Monitoring Group in 2014 (S/2014/726).This had a significant impact on civilians, intensifying trends identified by the Monitoring Group in 2014 (S/2014/726).
Greater numbers of civilians were affected by Al-Shabaab direct attacks, including across the border in Kenya where civilians have been the group’s primary targets.Greater numbers of civilians were affected by Al-Shabaab direct attacks, including across the border in Kenya where civilians have been the group’s primary targets.
One assessment of available data shows that Al-Shabaab almost doubled its share of responsibility for overall violence against civilians in 2014.One assessment of available data shows that Al-Shabaab almost doubled its share of responsibility for overall violence against civilians in 2014.
3.3.
Suicide attacks on civilian targets in urban areas, particularly hotels and public institutions, resulted in significant causalities.Suicide attacks on civilian targets in urban areas, particularly hotels and public institutions, resulted in significant causalities.
Although the expected peak of annual violence by Al-Shabaab during Ramadan did not occur, eleven civilians were killed at least 20 injured in Mogadishu alone during the period.Although the expected peak of annual violence by Al-Shabaab during Ramadan did not occur, eleven civilians were killed at least 20 injured in Mogadishu alone during the period.
At the end of July 2015 Al-Shabaab again warned civilians to stay away from Government and United Nations (UN) facilities and from hotels.At the end of July 2015 Al-Shabaab again warned civilians to stay away from Government and United Nations (UN) facilities and from hotels.
Violence meted out by Al-Shabaab in its policing of blockades on towns where there had been changes of authority saw arrests, killings and destruction of property.Violence meted out by Al-Shabaab in its policing of blockades on towns where there had been changes of authority saw arrests, killings and destruction of property.
4.4.
In the context of the anti-Al-Shabaab military offensive AMISOM, the Somali National Army (SNA) and its partners were often overstretched and forced to relinquish captured areas.In the context of the anti-Al-Shabaab military offensive AMISOM, the Somali National Army (SNA) and its partners were often overstretched and forced to relinquish captured areas.
Al-Shabaab subsequently committed violent reprisals on the civilian population perceived to have acquiesced in the transfer of power.Al-Shabaab subsequently committed violent reprisals on the civilian population perceived to have acquiesced in the transfer of power.
In Qoryoley in Lower Shabelle, for example, the Monitoring Group received testimony of how the withdrawal of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) after four days of occupation, saw killings and torture of civilians, with bodies “hung up on trees” as a warning to “collaborators”.In Qoryoley in Lower Shabelle, for example, the Monitoring Group received testimony of how the withdrawal of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) after four days of occupation, saw killings and torture of civilians, with bodies “hung up on trees” as a warning to “collaborators”.
Many fled the area.Many fled the area.
Similar incidents occurred elsewhere, including in Hiran and Gedo.Similar incidents occurred elsewhere, including in Hiran and Gedo.
The situation in Al-Shabaab controlled areasThe situation in Al-Shabaab controlled areas
5.5.
Al-Shabaab imposed violent punishments and severe restriction of rights on civilians still residing it its areas of control.Al-Shabaab imposed violent punishments and severe restriction of rights on civilians still residing it its areas of control.
Extrajudicial killings, torture, detention—for purposes of extortion and punishment—and denial of life-saving assistance were among the tactics deployed to both maintain its grip on the population and generate resources for an intensified military campaign.Extrajudicial killings, torture, detention—for purposes of extortion and punishment—and denial of life-saving assistance were among the tactics deployed to both maintain its grip on the population and generate resources for an intensified military campaign.
Execution of spies was a frequent practice.Execution of spies was a frequent practice.
Annex 6.2.a and strictly confidential annex 6.2.b describe commission of violations of international law by Al-Shabaab against members of the Bantu/Wagosha community in the Juba Valley.Annex 6.2.a and strictly confidential annex 6.2.b describe commission of violations of international law by Al-Shabaab against members of the Bantu/Wagosha community in the Juba Valley.
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) security forcesFederal Government of Somalia (FGS) security forces
6.6.
The conduct of extrajudicial executions were among the allegations received by the Monitoring Group with respect to FGS security forces, against the background of huge operational and command challenges, including non payments of salaries and stipends.The conduct of extrajudicial executions were among the allegations received by the Monitoring Group with respect to FGS security forces, against the background of huge operational and command challenges, including non payments of salaries and stipends.
7.7.
As the Monitoring Group described in its 2014 report (S/2014/726), personnel of the SNA – and sometimes the Somali Police Force (SPF), alongside assets of the security forces, including vehicles, weapons and ammunition, were also deployed in attacks on civilian areas in pursuit of clan agendas or resources.As the Monitoring Group described in its 2014 report (S/2014/726), personnel of the SNA – and sometimes the Somali Police Force (SPF), alongside assets of the security forces, including vehicles, weapons and ammunition, were also deployed in attacks on civilian areas in pursuit of clan agendas or resources.
During the current mandate the Monitoring Group examined allegations with respect to specific cases in Hiran and Lower Shabelle.During the current mandate the Monitoring Group examined allegations with respect to specific cases in Hiran and Lower Shabelle.
Annex 6.3.a and strictly confidential annex 6.3.b contain the Monitoring Group’s findings with respect to allegations of the commission of violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians in the villages of Kabxanley and Defow, Hiran, between December 2013 and June 2015.Annex 6.3.a and strictly confidential annex 6.3.b contain the Monitoring Group’s findings with respect to allegations of the commission of violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians in the villages of Kabxanley and Defow, Hiran, between December 2013 and June 2015.
Lower ShabelleLower Shabelle
8.8.
In some areas, the complexity of interaction and engagement between clan militia, the SNA and Al-Shabaab both on the ground and in local perception created a highly uncertain environment, including in terms of attribution of responsibility for violations.In some areas, the complexity of interaction and engagement between clan militia, the SNA and Al-Shabaab both on the ground and in local perception created a highly uncertain environment, including in terms of attribution of responsibility for violations.
There was evidence that Al Shabaab (both in itself, and in terms of the threat it represents) was leveraged, and in turn was leveraged by, those progressing clan conflict for broader political and resource goals.There was evidence that Al Shabaab (both in itself, and in terms of the threat it represents) was leveraged, and in turn was leveraged by, those progressing clan conflict for broader political and resource goals.
The Monitoring Group particularly examined two such incidents during the mandate.The Monitoring Group particularly examined two such incidents during the mandate.
9.9.
In Lower Shabelle, for example, the Monitoring Group continues to investigate individual responsibility for a series of attacks on civilians in Qoryoley district, in particular on the villages of Buulo Sheikh, Hadoman and Farhano in early January, February and March 2015.In Lower Shabelle, for example, the Monitoring Group continues to investigate individual responsibility for a series of attacks on civilians in Qoryoley district, in particular on the villages of Buulo Sheikh, Hadoman and Farhano in early January, February and March 2015.
Conducted by a combination of SNA personnel (with SNA assets), clan militia and elements of Al-Shabaab, the attacks demonstrate the complexity of alliances and cross cutting interests emerging between Somalia’s conflict parties at the local level.Conducted by a combination of SNA personnel (with SNA assets), clan militia and elements of Al-Shabaab, the attacks demonstrate the complexity of alliances and cross cutting interests emerging between Somalia’s conflict parties at the local level.
The violations unfolded against the backdrop of an ongoing conflict between the Salaax militia and Hawiye (primarily Haber Gedir, but also Hawadle and Murosade) militia in the area and the broader conflict with Al-Shabaab.The violations unfolded against the backdrop of an ongoing conflict between the Salaax militia and Hawiye (primarily Haber Gedir, but also Hawadle and Murosade) militia in the area and the broader conflict with Al-Shabaab.
The Salaax militia are a defensive militia created by the Bantu community and led by a Bantu Digil-Mirifle/Dube, Shiekh Salaax.The Salaax militia are a defensive militia created by the Bantu community and led by a Bantu Digil-Mirifle/Dube, Shiekh Salaax.
10.10.
Credible information received by the Monitoring Group indicates that the attack of 3 January 2015 on Buulo Sheikh and Hadoman resulted in the extrajudicial killing of at least five civilians, the rape of four women and the torture of three young men.Credible information received by the Monitoring Group indicates that the attack of 3 January 2015 on Buulo Sheikh and Hadoman resulted in the extrajudicial killing of at least five civilians, the rape of four women and the torture of three young men.
Hostages were taken but later released.Hostages were taken but later released.
Many civilians fled their homes.Many civilians fled their homes.
This pattern of conduct was repeated in the subsequent attacks carried out later in January, February and March 2015.This pattern of conduct was repeated in the subsequent attacks carried out later in January, February and March 2015.
One of the characteristics of these combined forces attacks was the taking of hostages and their transfer to Al-Shabaab custody.One of the characteristics of these combined forces attacks was the taking of hostages and their transfer to Al-Shabaab custody.
One hostage captured in an attack on Hadoman village and handed over to Al-Shabaab was subsequently beheaded.One hostage captured in an attack on Hadoman village and handed over to Al-Shabaab was subsequently beheaded.
A large-scale hostage-taking incident confirmed from different sources involved the kidnap of 30 Bantu community members from outside of a mosque in Bandar village on 20 March 2015, and their transfer to Al-Shabaab’s Donburale village base.A large-scale hostage-taking incident confirmed from different sources involved the kidnap of 30 Bantu community members from outside of a mosque in Bandar village on 20 March 2015, and their transfer to Al-Shabaab’s Donburale village base.
Community outcry subsequently forced the release of 25 or 27 of the hostages.Community outcry subsequently forced the release of 25 or 27 of the hostages.
At the time of writing, the fate of the remaining hostages is not known.At the time of writing, the fate of the remaining hostages is not known.
11.11.
The killing of then District Commissioner (DC) of Janale, Garad Ibrahim Sid Ali, in early August, also occurred in unclear circumstances.The killing of then District Commissioner (DC) of Janale, Garad Ibrahim Sid Ali, in early August, also occurred in unclear circumstances.
A Biomaal Bantu recently returned from diaspora, the DC was particularly renowned for his assistance to Biomaal and Bantu farmers in the area, including with respect to resisting pressure to sell or relinquish land in the context of ongoing inter-clan conflict in the area.A Biomaal Bantu recently returned from diaspora, the DC was particularly renowned for his assistance to Biomaal and Bantu farmers in the area, including with respect to resisting pressure to sell or relinquish land in the context of ongoing inter-clan conflict in the area.
The killing of the DC on 3 August 2015 at his home, alongside his colleagues Abdule Barre and Hassan Abdille, was reported widely as attributable to Al-Shabaab.The killing of the DC on 3 August 2015 at his home, alongside his colleagues Abdule Barre and Hassan Abdille, was reported widely as attributable to Al-Shabaab.
The Monitoring Group’s enquiries, including in interviews with the DC’s family and in accounts received of the circumstances of the killing itself, suggest that although the particular individuals who carried out the attack were indeed affiliated with Al-Shabaab, the motivation related to the ongoing conflict over land ownership and control in the area.The Monitoring Group’s enquiries, including in interviews with the DC’s family and in accounts received of the circumstances of the killing itself, suggest that although the particular individuals who carried out the attack were indeed affiliated with Al-Shabaab, the motivation related to the ongoing conflict over land ownership and control in the area.
As one local activist described it: “Al-Shabaab did it, but he was stopping Hawiye businesses”.As one local activist described it: “Al-Shabaab did it, but he was stopping Hawiye businesses”.
Interim Regional Administration forcesInterim Regional Administration forces
12.12.
The Monitoring Group also received allegations against regional security forces outside the control of the FGS.The Monitoring Group also received allegations against regional security forces outside the control of the FGS.
In this regard, the unlawful use of force attributed to the forces of the Interim Jubaa administration (IJA), including detentions, unlawful killings and torture, were the most frequently alleged.In this regard, the unlawful use of force attributed to the forces of the Interim Jubaa administration (IJA), including detentions, unlawful killings and torture, were the most frequently alleged.
The most common allegation from clan representatives, non-governmental organisation (NGO) staff members and members of the government was of assassinations of members of particular clans not allied to the government structure (particularly Bantu, Adjuran and Marehan), often disguised as Al-Shabaab killings.The most common allegation from clan representatives, non-governmental organisation (NGO) staff members and members of the government was of assassinations of members of particular clans not allied to the government structure (particularly Bantu, Adjuran and Marehan), often disguised as Al-Shabaab killings.
13.13.
As part of its preliminary investigations, the Monitoring Group was able to investigate and corroborate information on the killing of Sheikh Nadir Sokorow in late June 2014.As part of its preliminary investigations, the Monitoring Group was able to investigate and corroborate information on the killing of Sheikh Nadir Sokorow in late June 2014.
Sheikh Nadir’s body was found dumped in a sack on the morning of 24 June 2014 at the site of the Kismayo hospital, which at the time was under construction.Sheikh Nadir’s body was found dumped in a sack on the morning of 24 June 2014 at the site of the Kismayo hospital, which at the time was under construction.
His body bore 9 bullet wounds and signs of torture.His body bore 9 bullet wounds and signs of torture.
Credible testimony received by the Monitoring Group indicates that he had been taken into custody the previous night from his father’s home by the then-Head of the Intelligence Service.Credible testimony received by the Monitoring Group indicates that he had been taken into custody the previous night from his father’s home by the then-Head of the Intelligence Service.
The arrest came further to an explosion in the Shangala District near the madrasa at which Sheikh Nadir taught, and subsequent to the torture of one of his colleagues by security forces.The arrest came further to an explosion in the Shangala District near the madrasa at which Sheikh Nadir taught, and subsequent to the torture of one of his colleagues by security forces.
Information on five other cases which involved the death of individuals subsequent to their arrest by security forces, including photographs of the deceased and testimony, are under examination by the Monitoring Group.Information on five other cases which involved the death of individuals subsequent to their arrest by security forces, including photographs of the deceased and testimony, are under examination by the Monitoring Group.
International forcesInternational forces
14.14.
A significant development during the mandate was the increasing scale of engagement—both in terms of personnel numbers and means and methods deployed—of international forces in Somalia, including forces which appeared to operate outside the AMISOM Concept of Operations.A significant development during the mandate was the increasing scale of engagement—both in terms of personnel numbers and means and methods deployed—of international forces in Somalia, including forces which appeared to operate outside the AMISOM Concept of Operations.
Various entities operated in different combinations alongside SNA, clan militia, and regional forces, including engaging in armed action which was not always connected with the conflict against Al-Shabaab.Various entities operated in different combinations alongside SNA, clan militia, and regional forces, including engaging in armed action which was not always connected with the conflict against Al-Shabaab.
A variety of credible allegations, including from eyewitnesses, were brought to the attention of the Monitoring Group, particularly towards the end of the investigative phase of the mandate when Operation Juba Corridor got underway.A variety of credible allegations, including from eyewitnesses, were brought to the attention of the Monitoring Group, particularly towards the end of the investigative phase of the mandate when Operation Juba Corridor got underway.
Nevertheless, the preliminary findings of the Monitoring Group’s enquiries into the conduct and operation of AMISOM troops and of the Liyiu police in a number of incidents are highlighted here.Nevertheless, the preliminary findings of the Monitoring Group’s enquiries into the conduct and operation of AMISOM troops and of the Liyiu police in a number of incidents are highlighted here.
AMISOMAMISOM
15.15.
July and August 2015 saw a major uptick in civilian casualties attributable to AMISOM.July and August 2015 saw a major uptick in civilian casualties attributable to AMISOM.
Twenty-two people were killed by AMISOM in Merka in the last ten days of July 2015, coming against the background of almost of a year of rising tensions and casualties.Twenty-two people were killed by AMISOM in Merka in the last ten days of July 2015, coming against the background of almost of a year of rising tensions and casualties.
The events in Merka were followed by the killing of five civilians by AMISOM personnel in Halgan in Hiran on 8 August.The events in Merka were followed by the killing of five civilians by AMISOM personnel in Halgan in Hiran on 8 August.
In addition there were 13 reported civilians casualties suffered as a result of Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) air strikes in July.In addition there were 13 reported civilians casualties suffered as a result of Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) air strikes in July.
16.16.
AMISOM Boards of Enquiry were established to investigate the Merka and Halgan incidents.AMISOM Boards of Enquiry were established to investigate the Merka and Halgan incidents.
It is understood that the Board of Enquiry for the 21 July 2015 killings had reported by the time of finalisation of this report although the outcome is not known.It is understood that the Board of Enquiry for the 21 July 2015 killings had reported by the time of finalisation of this report although the outcome is not known.
Further, a joint investigation into the events in Halgan and Merka was announced after a meeting between the FGS Parliamentary Defence Committee and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC) and his Deputy.Further, a joint investigation into the events in Halgan and Merka was announced after a meeting between the FGS Parliamentary Defence Committee and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC) and his Deputy.
A delegation subsequently conducted a visit to Merka.A delegation subsequently conducted a visit to Merka.
Meanwhile Human Rights Watch conducted its own investigation which determined that six members of the Moalim Iidey family who were preparing for their daughter’s wedding were deliberately shot inside the Iidey home by AMISOM soldiers.Meanwhile Human Rights Watch conducted its own investigation which determined that six members of the Moalim Iidey family who were preparing for their daughter’s wedding were deliberately shot inside the Iidey home by AMISOM soldiers.
The Monitoring Group spoke with members of the Bendadiri community and, via an interlocutor, with an Iidey family member.The Monitoring Group spoke with members of the Bendadiri community and, via an interlocutor, with an Iidey family member.
The information they provided reflected UN and NGO accounts of the event, including the allegation that two of those shot died from their injuries at the house subsequent to the shooting as they were prevented from seeking medical assistance.The information they provided reflected UN and NGO accounts of the event, including the allegation that two of those shot died from their injuries at the house subsequent to the shooting as they were prevented from seeking medical assistance.
A number of interlocutors, including one eyewitness to the event, however, also mentioned that Somali security personnel or militia were also present alongside the AMISOM unit at the time of the killings.A number of interlocutors, including one eyewitness to the event, however, also mentioned that Somali security personnel or militia were also present alongside the AMISOM unit at the time of the killings.
17.17.
It is clear that the operational situation for AMISOM in Merka was, and is, extremely difficult with a long-standing complex inter-clan conflict affecting the town and an isolated SNA contingent co-located at the AMISOM base.It is clear that the operational situation for AMISOM in Merka was, and is, extremely difficult with a long-standing complex inter-clan conflict affecting the town and an isolated SNA contingent co-located at the AMISOM base.
Al-Shabaab has been able to carry out numerous IED and grenade attacks on AMISOM in the town.Al-Shabaab has been able to carry out numerous IED and grenade attacks on AMISOM in the town.
At the same time retaliatory and disproportionate responses to these attacks from AMISOM have resulted in death and injury of civilians and ever-increasing isolation from the community.At the same time retaliatory and disproportionate responses to these attacks from AMISOM have resulted in death and injury of civilians and ever-increasing isolation from the community.
In this context, the escalated gravity and the community impact of the recent incidents suggests that a Board of Enquiry – with its inherently restricted jurisdiction, capacity and ‘insider’ nature – may not be the most effective mechanism to address the violence.In this context, the escalated gravity and the community impact of the recent incidents suggests that a Board of Enquiry – with its inherently restricted jurisdiction, capacity and ‘insider’ nature – may not be the most effective mechanism to address the violence.
In this regard it should be noted that the killings of the Iidey family occurred less than a week after the Board of Enquiry for the first incident had visited Merka in the course of its investigations.In this regard it should be noted that the killings of the Iidey family occurred less than a week after the Board of Enquiry for the first incident had visited Merka in the course of its investigations.
The Monitoring Group believes that consideration must be given to a more independent and transparent mode of investigation and venue for redress.The Monitoring Group believes that consideration must be given to a more independent and transparent mode of investigation and venue for redress.
18.18.
More broadly, there is also a need for AMISOM to examine the larger implications of the situation in Merka in terms of its operations and disposition.More broadly, there is also a need for AMISOM to examine the larger implications of the situation in Merka in terms of its operations and disposition.
In mid 2015 the AMISOM Civilian Casualty Tracing, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) was finally established.In mid 2015 the AMISOM Civilian Casualty Tracing, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) was finally established.
It would be important that troop contribution countries urgently scale up collaboration and information sharing with the CCTARC in order that lessons learned from these and other incidents are swiftly integrated into operations.It would be important that troop contribution countries urgently scale up collaboration and information sharing with the CCTARC in order that lessons learned from these and other incidents are swiftly integrated into operations.
The Liyiu policeThe Liyiu police
19.19.
The Liyiu police, an Ethiopian paramilitary force based in Region 5 of Ethiopia, has been increasingly active in Somalia.The Liyiu police, an Ethiopian paramilitary force based in Region 5 of Ethiopia, has been increasingly active in Somalia.
Allegations of serious violations have accompanied their engagements, including with respect to killing, sexual violence and disappearances.Allegations of serious violations have accompanied their engagements, including with respect to killing, sexual violence and disappearances.
One source of the Monitoring Group asserted that at least 4800 Liyiu police were operating in Bay and Bakol alone by the end of August 2015.One source of the Monitoring Group asserted that at least 4800 Liyiu police were operating in Bay and Bakol alone by the end of August 2015.
During July 2015, the UN received reports of civilian killings in Bay (Buur Hakaba) and in Bakol (Tieflow) during July.During July 2015, the UN received reports of civilian killings in Bay (Buur Hakaba) and in Bakol (Tieflow) during July.
In addition, as noted in annex 6.3.b the Liyiu police were also alleged to have become involved in, or operated alongside, the Surre/Hawdle conflict in Hiran in June 2015.In addition, as noted in annex 6.3.b the Liyiu police were also alleged to have become involved in, or operated alongside, the Surre/Hawdle conflict in Hiran in June 2015.
20.20.
The Monitoring Group received a variety of allegations relating to the conduct of the Liyiu police.The Monitoring Group received a variety of allegations relating to the conduct of the Liyiu police.
The most serious related to a large-scale attack on villages, inter alia, in Galgadud on the Somali/Ethiopia border where it was alleged that over 50 people were killed.The most serious related to a large-scale attack on villages, inter alia, in Galgadud on the Somali/Ethiopia border where it was alleged that over 50 people were killed.
The Monitoring Group began an investigation into the attack and ascertained that the attack on the border villages, in particular Garsaale and Laba Ceel, appears to have been launched in retaliation for a large attack by hundreds of Haber Gedir militia from across the region on the Liyiu police in which as many as 30 officers reportedly died.The Monitoring Group began an investigation into the attack and ascertained that the attack on the border villages, in particular Garsaale and Laba Ceel, appears to have been launched in retaliation for a large attack by hundreds of Haber Gedir militia from across the region on the Liyiu police in which as many as 30 officers reportedly died.
It was the culmination of an escalated conflict between the Haber Gedir and the Liyiu police, which had initially erupted following a dispute over access to a water point.It was the culmination of an escalated conflict between the Haber Gedir and the Liyiu police, which had initially erupted following a dispute over access to a water point.
Although the units and command of the Liyiu police involved have been identified, the Monitoring Group is continuing to investigate the circumstances of the attack and impact of the attack on civilians.Although the units and command of the Liyiu police involved have been identified, the Monitoring Group is continuing to investigate the circumstances of the attack and impact of the attack on civilians.
The information available to the Monitoring Group suggests that the number of people killed in the attack was been 30 and 40.The information available to the Monitoring Group suggests that the number of people killed in the attack was been 30 and 40.
Torture, unlawful killing and kidnappingTorture, unlawful killing and kidnapping
21.21.
Notwithstanding the 2011 commitment declaring a moratorium, there was a rise across Somalia in the number of death penalty sentences passed, and executions carried out during the mandate.Notwithstanding the 2011 commitment declaring a moratorium, there was a rise across Somalia in the number of death penalty sentences passed, and executions carried out during the mandate.
In Somaliland, where no executions had been carried out for for a number of years, six executions were conducted.In Somaliland, where no executions had been carried out for for a number of years, six executions were conducted.
Particularly in southern and central Somalia, the circumstances in which some of these individuals in the military court system were tried, sentenced, and executed cumulatively raised questions of compliance with customary international law relating to the conduct of non-international armed conflict, and thus violations of the mandate.Particularly in southern and central Somalia, the circumstances in which some of these individuals in the military court system were tried, sentenced, and executed cumulatively raised questions of compliance with customary international law relating to the conduct of non-international armed conflict, and thus violations of the mandate.
These included, inter alia, lack of effective access to legal representation, charge sheets and evidence, and extensive reliance on confessions as the basis of convictions.These included, inter alia, lack of effective access to legal representation, charge sheets and evidence, and extensive reliance on confessions as the basis of convictions.
In one case being followed closely by the Monitoring Group the military court passed two death sentences for murder after a trial which appeared to lack fundamental fairness.In one case being followed closely by the Monitoring Group the military court passed two death sentences for murder after a trial which appeared to lack fundamental fairness.
In all the circumstances of the arrest of the accused, and in combination with the nature of the prosecution witnesses presented before the court, it is likely that the case was hijacked by clan interests.In all the circumstances of the arrest of the accused, and in combination with the nature of the prosecution witnesses presented before the court, it is likely that the case was hijacked by clan interests.
An appeal was allowed, however, and the case is ongoing.An appeal was allowed, however, and the case is ongoing.
22.22.
Further to its reporting in S/2014/726 the Monitoring Group continued to receive allegations, although fewer in number, of the use of torture during interrogations by the security forces, particularly at Godka Jilicow.Further to its reporting in S/2014/726 the Monitoring Group continued to receive allegations, although fewer in number, of the use of torture during interrogations by the security forces, particularly at Godka Jilicow.
One case is currently under investigation.One case is currently under investigation.
The Monitoring Group also continued to receive credible allegations relating to the phenomenon of arrest, detention and beating of individuals at secret locations by NISA officers as a form of extortion, especially of those perceived as coming from the diaspora.The Monitoring Group also continued to receive credible allegations relating to the phenomenon of arrest, detention and beating of individuals at secret locations by NISA officers as a form of extortion, especially of those perceived as coming from the diaspora.
The SPF was also reported to be involved in this practice, however the conduct and ill treatment generally involved only unlawful arrest and detention.The SPF was also reported to be involved in this practice, however the conduct and ill treatment generally involved only unlawful arrest and detention.
23.23.
In February 2015 the Monitoring Group began to receive reports that an SNA paramilitary unit referred to by communities as, “Alpha 4” was “systematically abducting and arresting Barawani teen age boys and accusing them for being members of Al-Shabab, and demand money of up to USD 500 per person for their release”.In February 2015 the Monitoring Group began to receive reports that an SNA paramilitary unit referred to by communities as, “Alpha 4” was “systematically abducting and arresting Barawani teen age boys and accusing them for being members of Al-Shabab, and demand money of up to USD 500 per person for their release”.
A Barawanese elder confirmed to the Monitoring Group that between nine and ten incidents of abduction of young Barawanese men residing in Barawe or in Mogadishu had been recorded by families of his acquaintance.A Barawanese elder confirmed to the Monitoring Group that between nine and ten incidents of abduction of young Barawanese men residing in Barawe or in Mogadishu had been recorded by families of his acquaintance.
He recounted how on one occasion in 2015 his nephew had visited Barawe from abroad and had been abducted from his home by armed security officers in full-face masks.He recounted how on one occasion in 2015 his nephew had visited Barawe from abroad and had been abducted from his home by armed security officers in full-face masks.
No reason for the arrest was given.No reason for the arrest was given.
Further to his abduction—as is the practice which has allegedly developed since the phenomenon began—the family contacted an “agent” in Mogadishu who made arrangements for the young man’s elder brother to travel to Mogadishu and be given sight of the “prisoner” where he was being held in an ordinary house in an area of Mogadishu.Further to his abduction—as is the practice which has allegedly developed since the phenomenon began—the family contacted an “agent” in Mogadishu who made arrangements for the young man’s elder brother to travel to Mogadishu and be given sight of the “prisoner” where he was being held in an ordinary house in an area of Mogadishu.
Payment terms were agreed and upon the handover of 2000 USD cash to the armed “agent” the young man was released immediately to his brother.Payment terms were agreed and upon the handover of 2000 USD cash to the armed “agent” the young man was released immediately to his brother.
Two other Barawanese elders contacted by the Monitoring Group expressed the view that there was deliberate targeting of families who were understood to have access to resources either directly or through supportive relatives abroad.Two other Barawanese elders contacted by the Monitoring Group expressed the view that there was deliberate targeting of families who were understood to have access to resources either directly or through supportive relatives abroad.
The young men who were abducted and later released reportedly told the elders that they were questioned very simply at the time of arrest, transferred to Mogadishu and then simply held until their release.The young men who were abducted and later released reportedly told the elders that they were questioned very simply at the time of arrest, transferred to Mogadishu and then simply held until their release.
No ill treatment was described.No ill treatment was described.
In no case of which the elders were aware were individuals charged with any offence after their abduction;In no case of which the elders were aware were individuals charged with any offence after their abduction;
the extortion of payments was the primary objective of the arrests.the extortion of payments was the primary objective of the arrests.
The Monitoring Group is continuing its investigation into this phenomenon.The Monitoring Group is continuing its investigation into this phenomenon.
Annex 6.1.a: Arrest of 11 members of the Salaax militia, 20 May 2015Annex 6.1.a: Arrest of 11 members of the Salaax militia, 20 May 2015
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)
Annex 6.2.a: The situation of the Bantu/Wagosha community in Al-Shabaab held areas of Lower and Middle JubaAnnex 6.2.a: The situation of the Bantu/Wagosha community in Al-Shabaab held areas of Lower and Middle Juba
26.26.
Since Al-Shabaab seized control of the Juba Valley members of the Bantu/Wagosha farming community who inhabit the riverine villages and key towns have become increasingly subject to systematic violations of international law, including killing, maiming, torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of civilians, and sexual and gender-based violence.Since Al-Shabaab seized control of the Juba Valley members of the Bantu/Wagosha farming community who inhabit the riverine villages and key towns have become increasingly subject to systematic violations of international law, including killing, maiming, torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of civilians, and sexual and gender-based violence.
The violations have increased in number and ferocity as pressure on resources and territory from an ongoing offensive see Al-Shabaab prepare for a ‘final stand’.The violations have increased in number and ferocity as pressure on resources and territory from an ongoing offensive see Al-Shabaab prepare for a ‘final stand’.
27.27.
The range of persistent and serious violations experienced by the community as documented by the Monitoring Group may constitute war crimes in non-international armed conflict and also crimes against humanity, including with respect to the underlying acts of persecution, murder, torture and sexual slavery.The range of persistent and serious violations experienced by the community as documented by the Monitoring Group may constitute war crimes in non-international armed conflict and also crimes against humanity, including with respect to the underlying acts of persecution, murder, torture and sexual slavery.
The nature and scale of the persecution and forced displacement of the community, coupled with allegations of inward transfer of population to lands from which the community has been displaced (yet to be investigated by the Monitoring Group) may also be understood as ethnic cleansing.The nature and scale of the persecution and forced displacement of the community, coupled with allegations of inward transfer of population to lands from which the community has been displaced (yet to be investigated by the Monitoring Group) may also be understood as ethnic cleansing.
28.28.
Members of the community interviewed perceived their current treatment by Al-Shabaab as an escalation in a continuum of persecution by dominant groups and clans who have viewed the Bantu as second class “adoons” (slaves).Members of the community interviewed perceived their current treatment by Al-Shabaab as an escalation in a continuum of persecution by dominant groups and clans who have viewed the Bantu as second class “adoons” (slaves).
There is a long history of severe persecution of the community, including, as well-documented, by Hawive and Darood militia in the wake of the fall of Siyaad Bare regime.There is a long history of severe persecution of the community, including, as well-documented, by Hawive and Darood militia in the wake of the fall of Siyaad Bare regime.
This led some of those interviewed to describe Al-Shabaab as the new face of a continuum of oppressors: Al-Shabaab was “the worst of the colonial entities”.Yet another called the collective experience of persecution and displacement as “genocide”.This led some of those interviewed to describe Al-Shabaab as the new face of a continuum of oppressors: Al-Shabaab was “the worst of the colonial entities”.Yet another called the collective experience of persecution and displacement as “genocide”.
29.29.
The Monitoring Group’s focus therefore not only highlights that this community is the current target of systematic violations of the mandate.The Monitoring Group’s focus therefore not only highlights that this community is the current target of systematic violations of the mandate.
It is also intended to warn that it is potentially vulnerable in the context of any change of authority.It is also intended to warn that it is potentially vulnerable in the context of any change of authority.
One elder described the situation in Al-Shabaab-held areas as the latest episode in a “long term strategy” to “get rid of” the Bantu from the Juba Valley.One elder described the situation in Al-Shabaab-held areas as the latest episode in a “long term strategy” to “get rid of” the Bantu from the Juba Valley.
Grave concern was expressed that patterns of killing, extortion, forced displacement and violent land-grabbing experienced under Al-Shabaab would continue if local power elites were permitted to continue to assert control in a new ‘liberated’ framework.Grave concern was expressed that patterns of killing, extortion, forced displacement and violent land-grabbing experienced under Al-Shabaab would continue if local power elites were permitted to continue to assert control in a new ‘liberated’ framework.
It was claimed that the senior leadership of Al-Shabaab in the region were from dominant clans and that many had ongoing business and security relationships with clan, business and military/security networks of the Interim Jubbaland Administration (IJA) and Kenyan and Ethiopian military structures.It was claimed that the senior leadership of Al-Shabaab in the region were from dominant clans and that many had ongoing business and security relationships with clan, business and military/security networks of the Interim Jubbaland Administration (IJA) and Kenyan and Ethiopian military structures.
Indeed as this report was being finalised in late August 2015 reports were being received that Ethiopian and Somali security forces were removing Bantu farmers from their lands around Bardhere (south towards Sakow) in order ostensibly to clear mines.Indeed as this report was being finalised in late August 2015 reports were being received that Ethiopian and Somali security forces were removing Bantu farmers from their lands around Bardhere (south towards Sakow) in order ostensibly to clear mines.
Refusal to leave was being met with beatings.Refusal to leave was being met with beatings.
Members of the community told Monitoring Group sources that they were fearful that this clearing was in fact a land-grab.Members of the community told Monitoring Group sources that they were fearful that this clearing was in fact a land-grab.
The Group was unable to corroborate these reports, but they do reflect the level of fear of the community.The Group was unable to corroborate these reports, but they do reflect the level of fear of the community.
30.30.
With the community effectively held hostage and subject to forced recruitment by Al-Shabaab, the anticipated military offensive was a major concern to all those interviewed with family members in the area.With the community effectively held hostage and subject to forced recruitment by Al-Shabaab, the anticipated military offensive was a major concern to all those interviewed with family members in the area.
In addition to the expected deaths of children who had been conscripted, members of the community were fearful that the Bantu/Wagosha community more broadly would be scapegoated and persecuted in the context of any transfer of power.In addition to the expected deaths of children who had been conscripted, members of the community were fearful that the Bantu/Wagosha community more broadly would be scapegoated and persecuted in the context of any transfer of power.
MethodologyMethodology
31.31.
Over eighty individual and focus group interviews were conducted in person and on the telephone with recent direct victims of violations allegedly committed during 2014 and 2105, indirect victims, and with individuals in the diaspora with family members currently living in areas of the Juba Valley under the control of Al-Shabaab, including those with family members who are low-ranking members of Al-Shabaab.Over eighty individual and focus group interviews were conducted in person and on the telephone with recent direct victims of violations allegedly committed during 2014 and 2105, indirect victims, and with individuals in the diaspora with family members currently living in areas of the Juba Valley under the control of Al-Shabaab, including those with family members who are low-ranking members of Al-Shabaab.
The majority of testimonies were collected from family members of victims and victims from rural communities and small villages outside the big towns.The majority of testimonies were collected from family members of victims and victims from rural communities and small villages outside the big towns.
Although the majority of those interviewed had left Somalia up to ten years previously, some had been able to return to meet family members in Kenya or Kismayo more recently.Although the majority of those interviewed had left Somalia up to ten years previously, some had been able to return to meet family members in Kenya or Kismayo more recently.
Other interviews were conducted with refugees who had fled villages in the Juba Valley during the last twelve months.Other interviews were conducted with refugees who had fled villages in the Juba Valley during the last twelve months.
Journalists, UN and international non-governmental organisation (NGO) and local NGO staff members, and academics were also consulted.Journalists, UN and international non-governmental organisation (NGO) and local NGO staff members, and academics were also consulted.
32.32.
The testimonies contained in this report relate to events which allegedly unfolded in villages between and around Jilib and Jamame in Middle and Lower Juba between 2013 and 2015.The testimonies contained in this report relate to events which allegedly unfolded in villages between and around Jilib and Jamame in Middle and Lower Juba between 2013 and 2015.
The precise names of the places where the events occurred are not used in the report for reason of the safety of those interviewed and their families.The precise names of the places where the events occurred are not used in the report for reason of the safety of those interviewed and their families.
It was not possible to investigate and corroborate individually the over one hundred incidents described.It was not possible to investigate and corroborate individually the over one hundred incidents described.
The main focus therefore was on identifying case patterns both in terms of prohibited conduct and geography and corroborating the information with reliable UN and non-governmental organisation (NGO) sources.The main focus therefore was on identifying case patterns both in terms of prohibited conduct and geography and corroborating the information with reliable UN and non-governmental organisation (NGO) sources.
Due to the highly isolated nature of the community efforts were made to reflect as much as possible of the individual experiences for the record.Due to the highly isolated nature of the community efforts were made to reflect as much as possible of the individual experiences for the record.
33.33.
The details of the findings of the Monitoring Group’s investigation are presented in strictly confidential annex 6.2.b.The details of the findings of the Monitoring Group’s investigation are presented in strictly confidential annex 6.2.b.
A note on the origins of the Bantu/Wagosha communityA note on the origins of the Bantu/Wagosha community
34.34.
Although all histories of identity in Somalia are highly contested, Somali and international academics consulted by the Monitoring Group suggest that there is consensus around the Bantu community having two roots: the first is in indigenous communities who were the first inhabitants of south and central Somalia along the Shabelle and Juba valley and elsewhere;Although all histories of identity in Somalia are highly contested, Somali and international academics consulted by the Monitoring Group suggest that there is consensus around the Bantu community ha