S_2019_858_EA
Correct misalignment Change languages order
S/2019/858 1916960E.docx (ENGLISH)S/2019/858 1916960A.docx (ARABIC)
S/2019/858S/2019/858
United Nationsالأمــم المتحـدة
S/2019/858*S/2019/858*
Security Councilمجلس الأمن
Distr.: GeneralDistr.: General
1 November 20191 November 2019
Original: EnglishArabic Original: English
S/2019/858S/2019/858
/419-16960
19-16960/4
19-16960* (E) 141119141119 141119 19-16960 (A)
*1916960**1916960*
19-16960/4
/419-16960
Reissued for technical reasons on 14 November 2019.أعيد إصدارها لأسباب فنية في 14 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2019.
Letter dated 1 November 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Councilرسالة مؤرخة 1 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2019 موجهة إلى رئيسة مجلس الأمن من رئيس لجنة مجلس الأمن العاملة بموجب القرار 751 (1992) بشأن الصومال
On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, and in accordance with paragraph 54 of Security Council resolution 2444 (2018), I have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia.باسم لجنة مجلس الأمن العاملة بموجب القرار 751 (1992) بشأن الصومال، ووفقا للفقرة 54 من قرار مجلس الأمن 2444 (2018)، يشرفني أن أحيل طي هذه الرسالة التقرير النهائي لفريق الخبراء المعني بالصومال.
In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.وفي هذا الصدد، ترجو اللجنة ممتنة إطلاع أعضاء مجلس الأمن على هذه الرسالة والتقرير وإصدارهما باعتبارهما وثيقة من وثائق المجلس.
(Signed) Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve Chair Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia(توقيع) مارك بكستين دي بويتسويرف رئيس لجنة مجلس الأمن العاملة بموجب القرار 751 (1992) بشأن الصومال
Letter dated 27 September 2019 from the Panel of Experts on Somalia addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somaliaرسالة مؤرخة 27 أيلول/سبتمبر 2019 موجهة من فريق الخبراء المعني بالصومال إلى رئيس لجنة مجلس الأمن العاملة بموجب القرار 751 (1992) بشأن الصومال
In accordance with paragraph 54 of Security Council resolution 2444 (2018), we have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia.وفقا للفقرة 54 من قرار مجلس الأمن 2444 (2018)، نتشرف بأن نحيل طي هذه الرسالة التقرير النهائي لفريق الخبراء المعني بالصومال.
(Signed) Jay Bahadur Coordinator Panel of Experts on Somalia(توقيع) جاي بهادور منسق فريق الخبراء المعني بالصومال
(Signed) Mohamed Abdelsalam Babiker Humanitarian expert(توقيع) محمد عبد السلام بابكر خبير شؤون إنسانية
(Signed) Nazanine Moshiri Armed groups expert(توقيع) نازانين موشيري خبيرة في الجماعات المسلحة
(Signed) Brian O’Sullivan Armed groups/natural resources expert(توقيع) براين أو سوليفان خبير في الجماعات المسلحة/الموارد الطبيعية
(Signed) Matthew Rosbottom Finance expert(توقيع) ماثيو روسبوتوم خبير مالي
(Signed) Richard Zabot Arms expert(توقيع) ريتشارد زابوت خبير أسلحة
Summaryموجز
During the first reporting period of the Panel of Experts on Somalia, the use by Al-Shabaab of improvised explosive devices reached its greatest extent in Somali history, with a year-on-year increase of approximately one third.خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير الأول لفريق الخبراء المعني بالصومال، بلغ استخدام حركة الشباب للأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع أقصى حد له في تاريخ الصومال، بزيادة سنوية بلغت حوالي الثلث تقريبا.
Post-blast chemical analyses obtained by the Panel provided definitive evidence for the first time that Al-Shabaab had been manufacturing its own home-made explosives since at least July 2017, and likely before then.ولأول مرة، برهن ما حصل عليه الفريق من تحليلات كيميائية أُجريت بعد وقوع انفجارات، بالدليل القاطع على قيام حركة الشباب بصنع متفجرات محلية منذ تموز/يوليه 2017 على الأقل، وربما قبل ذلك التاريخ.
Al-Shabaab previously relied on military grade explosives, obtained principally from explosive remnants of war and munitions captured from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), to construct improvised explosive devices;وكانت حركة الشباب تعتمد في السابق على متفجرات منتجة في مصانع عسكرية حصلت عليها أساسًا من المتفجرات من مخلفات الحرب والذخائر التي استولت عليها من بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال لصنع أجهزة متفجرة يدوية الصنع؛
the manufacture of home-made explosives means that the group may now have access to far more readily available inputs for the construction of such devices.ويعني صنع متفجرات محلية أن المواد المستخدمة في صنع الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع ربما أصبحت الآن في متناول الجماعة بصورة أكثر يسرا بكثير من ذي قبل.
Nor is money a limiting factor for Al-Shabaab.كما لا يشكل المال عاملاً مقيدًا لحركة الشباب.
A report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea in 2018 (S/2018/1002) highlighted the efficiency, geographical diversity, predictability and ruthlessness of Al-Shabaab’s mafia-style “taxation” system in southern and central Somalia.فقد سلط تقرير لفريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا لعام 2018 (S/2018/1002) الضوء على كفاءة نظام ”فرض الضرائب“ الشبيه بنظام المافيا الذي تتبعه حركة الشباب في جنوب ووسط الصومال وعلى التنوع الجغرافي لذلك النظام وقابليته للتنبؤ به وما يتسم به من قسوة.
During the reporting period, the Panel identified a new trend in the expansion of Al-Shabaab’s revenue generation, namely the taxation of imports into Mogadishu port.وخلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، تبين الفريق اتجاهاً جديداً في توسيع حركة الشباب لنطاق توليد إيراداتها، يتمثل في فرض ضرائب على الواردات الآتية إلى ميناء مقديشو.
Al-Shabaab’s ongoing ability to generate revenues in areas the group does not physically control explains, to a degree, its resilience in the face of increased security operations by the Federal Government of Somalia and airstrikes by the United States of America.وتوفر قدرة حركة الشباب المستمرة على توليد إيرادات في المناطق التي لا تسيطر عليها الجماعة فعليا، بعضا من التفسير لقدرتها على الصمود في وجه العمليات الأمنية المتزايدة التي تقوم بها حكومة الصومال الاتحادية والغارات الجوية التي تشنها الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية.
Its ability to provide basic services, such as access to judicial recourse, may account for some of Al-Shabaab’s ongoing appeal in areas of Somalia where State institutions do not reach.ولربما تشكل قدرة حركة الشباب على تقديم الخدمات الأساسية، مثل توفير سبل اللجوء إلى القضاء، سببا في بعض الجاذبية التي تحظى بها في مناطق من الصومال لا تصل إليها مؤسسات الدولة.
In 2019, Al-Shabaab’s infiltration of Federal Government institutions reached as high as the Benadir Regional Administration when, on 24 July, an Al-Shabaab suicide bomber detonated herself at its headquarters in Mogadishu.وفي عام 2019، بلغ تسلل حركة الشباب إلى داخل مؤسسات حكومة الصومال الاتحادية حد وصولها إلى إدارة إقليم بنادر، عندما قامت مهاجمة انتحارية تابعة لحركة الشباب، في 24 تموز/يوليه، بتفجير نفسها في مقر الإدارة في مقديشو.
The Mayor of Mogadishu, Abdirahman Omar Osman “Yarisow”, and at least nine others, were killed.وقُتل في هذا الهجوم عمدة مقديشو، عبد الرحمن عمر عثمان ”يارسو“، وما لا يقل عن تسعة أشخاص آخرين.
It later emerged that the suicide bomber, as well as an accomplice, had both been employees of the Benadir Regional Administration under falsified identities.وتبين لاحقا أن الانتحارية، بالإضافة إلى شريكة لها، كانتا موظفتين في إدارة إقليم بنادر بهوية مزيفة.
Al-Shabaab also remains a potent threat to regional peace and security.ولا تزال حركة الشباب أيضا تشكل تهديدا قويا للسلام والأمن الإقليميين.
On 15 January 2019, Al-Shabaab carried out its first major attack in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi since 2013, in an assault on the DusitD2 Hotel complex that left 21 people dead.ففي 15 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019، شنت الحركة أول هجوم كبير لها في العاصمة الكينية نيروبي، منذ عام 2013، بتنفيذ عملية على المجمع الفندقي DusitD2 خلفت 21 قتيلاً.
The DusitD2 operation was notable for the wide discretion and autonomy given to the Kenyan cell leader, including the selection of the target.وكانت تلك العملية لافتة للنظر بحكم ما يتمتع به قائد الخلية الكينية التابعة للحركة من حرية تصرف واستقلالية كبيرتين، بما في ذلك اختيار الهدف.
The Panel’s investigation into the attack also revealed an expansive and well-resourced Al-Shabaab network in the region aimed at kidnapping foreign nationals.وكشفت أيضا التحقيقات التي أجراها الفريق في الهجوم عن وجود شبكة واسعة تابعة لحركة الشباب مزودة بموارد وفيرة في المنطقة تهدف إلى اختطاف رعايا أجانب.
Towards the end of 2018 and the beginning of 2019, Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) faction in Somalia engaged in an armed struggle, within both the ISIL faction’s heartland in Puntland and in Mogadishu.ومع اقتراب نهاية عام 2018 وبداية عام 2019، دخلت حركة الشباب في صراع مسلح مع فصيل تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام في الصومال، داخل معقل ذلك الفصيل في بونتلاند وفي مقديشو.
In Puntland, the faction underwent a violent change of leadership towards the end of 2018, and subsequently began a concerted campaign to extort “taxes” from Puntland-based businesses, employing tactics similar to those of Al-Shabaab.وفي بونتلاند، طرأ تغيير على قيادة هذا الفصيل باستخدام العنف في نهاية عام 2018، وبدأ بعد ذلك حملة منسقة لجباية ”الضرائب“ من الشركات التي تتخذ من بونتلاند مقراً لها، مستخدما أساليب مماثلة للأساليب التي كانت تتبعها حركة الشباب.
Most significantly, and for the first time since its establishment in 2015, the ISIL faction in Somalia was linked to a planned terror attack in another country.والأهم من ذلك أن فصيل التنظيم في الصومال قد رُبط، لأول مرة منذ إنشائه في عام 2015، بهجوم إرهابي مدبر وقع في بلد آخر.
In December 2018, Italian authorities arrested a Somali national, Omar Moshin Ibrahim, in Bari, Italy, in connection with an ISIL plot to bomb St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome on 25 December, Christmas Day.ففي كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018، قبضت السلطات الإيطالية على أحد الرعايا الصوماليين، هو عمر موشين إبراهيم، في باري، بإيطاليا، لضلوعه في مؤامرة حاك خيوطها تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية لتفجير كاتدرائية القديس بطرس في روما في يوم عيد ميلاد المسيح، 25 كانون الأول/ديسمبر.
Investigations by the Panel, with assistance from the Government of Italy, have uncovered connections between Ibrahim and ISIL elements in Somalia, Kenya and Libya.وكشفت التحقيقات التي أجراها فريق الخبراء، بمساعدة من حكومة إيطاليا، عن وجود صلات بين إبراهيم وعناصر تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في الصومال وكينيا وليبيا.
A deterioration in relations between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states during the reporting period represented a further threat to stability in Somalia.ومثّل تدهور العلاقات بين حكومة الصومال الاتحادية والولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير تهديدًا إضافيًا للاستقرار في الصومال.
Tensions between the centre and the regions were exacerbated by attempts by the Federal Government to direct the outcomes of federal member state electoral processes in Jubbaland, Puntland and, most notably, in South-West State in December 2018.وتفاقمت التوترات بين المركز والمناطق بسبب محاولات الحكومة الاتحادية توجيه نتائج العمليات الانتخابية التي أجرتها الولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد في جوبالاند وبونتلاند، وعلى الأخص في ولاية جنوب الغرب في كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018.
The decision by the Federal Government to arrest a South-West State presidential candidate, Mukhtar Robow, in the run-up to the electoral process resulted in widespread protests in Baidoa in December 2018, during which 15 civilians were killed by regional security forces.وأدى قرار الحكومة الاتحادية اعتقال المرشح لرئاسة ولاية جنوب الغرب، مختار روبوو، في الفترة السابقة للعملية الانتخابية، إلى اندلاع احتجاجات واسعة النطاق جرت في بيدوا في كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018، وقتلت خلالها قوات الأمن الإقليمية 15 مدنيا.
The electoral process was also marred by accusations of bribery, with members of the South-West State regional Parliament receiving between $20,000 and $30,000 to elect a preferred candidate.وشابت العملية الانتخابية أيضًا اتهامات بالرشوة، حيث حصل أعضاء البرلمان الإقليمي في ولاية جنوب الغرب على ما يتراوح بين 20 ألف دولار و 30 ألف دولار لانتخاب مرشح مفضل.
The Panel also obtained evidence that, prior to the South-West State election, several hundred thousand dollars were transferred to a South-West State cabinet official by a Federal Government financial clerk.وحصل فريق الخبراء أيضا على أدلة تفيد بأن كاتبا للشؤون المالية في الحكومة الاتحادية قام، قبل إجراء انتخابات ولاية جنوب الغرب، بتحويل مئات الآلاف من الدولارات إلى أحد كبار مسؤولي الحكومة في الولاية.
The breakdown in dialogue between the Federal Government and federal member states on key security matters also had an impact on the implementation of the country’s National Security Architecture as well as the Transition Plan, which aims for the handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces by 2021.وكان لتوقف الحوار بين الحكومة الاتحادية والولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد بشأن المسائل الأمنية الرئيسية أثرٌ أيضًا في تنفيذ هيكل الأمن الوطني في الصومال وفضلا عن خطة الانتقال، التي تهدف إلى نقل المسؤوليات الأمنية من بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال إلى قوات الأمن الصومالية بحلول عام 2021.
However, some initial goals of the Transition Plan have been achieved, such as the Somali National Army capturing the Lower Shabelle towns of Sabiid, Anole, Barire, and Awdheegle from Al-Shabaab – with assistance from AMISOM and the United States military – during the period from April to August 2019.ومع ذلك تحققت بعض الأهداف الأولية لخطة الانتقال، من قبيل استيلاء الجيش الوطني الصومالي على مدن سابيد وأنولي وبارييري وأوطيغلي في شبيلي السفلى، من حركة الشباب - بمساعدة من بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال والجيش الأمريكي - في الفترة من نيسان/أبريل إلى آب/أغسطس 2019.
A further development on the path to preparing Federal Government security forces to assume responsibilities from AMISOM was the biometric registration of the entire Somali National Army, the first phase of which the Federal Government announced it had completed by March 2019.وثمة تطور آخر في سبيل إعداد قوات الأمن التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية لتتولى المسؤوليات عوضا عن بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال، يتمثل في التسجيل البيومتري لجميع أفراد الجيش الوطني الصومالي، الذي أعلنت الحكومة الاتحادية أنها أنجزت المرحلة الأولى منه بحلول آذار/مارس 2019.
However, three case studies conducted by the Panel of the registration of hundreds of Somali National Army soldiers in Baidoa and Mogadishu concluded that fewer than half of those who appeared on Army registration documents obtained by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea in 2017 and 2018 were captured in the biometric registration of 2019.غير أن ثلاث دراسات حالة إفرادية أجراها فريق الخبراء بشأن تسجيل مئات من جنود الجيش الوطني الصومالي في بيدوا ومقديشو خلصت إلى أن أقل من نصف الذين أُدرجت أسماؤهم في وثائق التسجيل التابعة للجيش التي حصل عليها فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا في عامي 2017 و 2018 ذُكروا في التسجيل البيومتري لعام 2019.
Moreover, fewer than one fifth of Somali National Army sector 60 soldiers who had been issued Federal Government-marked weapons in late 2017 appeared on the 2019 biometric registration roll, raising questions as to why the Federal Government of Somalia had provided arms to individuals who were no longer considered members of the security forces one year later.وعلاوة على ذلك، ظهر أقل من خُمس جنود القطاع 60 للجيش الوطني الصومالي الذين سلمت لهم أسلحة تحمل وسم الحكومة الاتحادية في أواخر عام 2017 في قائمة التسجيل البيومترية لعام 2019، مما يثير تساؤلات حول سبب تسليح حكومة الصومال الاتحادية أفرادا لم يعودوا يعتبرون من عناصر قوات الأمن بعد ذلك بعام واحد.
The Panel was unable to determine the whereabouts of the former soldiers or of the weapons in their possession.ولم يتمكن الفريق من تحديد مكان وجود هؤلاء الجنود السابقين أو الأسلحة التي بحوزتهم.
The Federal Government made significant progress in the field of public financial management, having completed three staff-monitored programmes of the International Monetary Fund, a series of technical benchmarks aimed at improving domestic revenue generation and, eventually, enabling debt relief and access to international borrowing markets.وأحرزت الحكومة الاتحادية تقدماً ملحوظاً في مجال الإدارة المالية العامة، بعد أن أكملت ثلاثة برامج كان يتابعها خبراء صندوق النقد الدولي، وتمثل مجموعة من النقاط المرجعية التقنية التي تهدف إلى تحسين توليد الإيرادات المحلية، وفي نهاية المطاف إتاحة تخفيف عبء الديون وتيسير الوصول إلى الأسواق الدولية للاقتراض.
Among potential revenue streams highlighted by the programmes was the direct collection of air navigation charges, a responsibility assumed by the Federal Government following the handover from the International Civil Aviation Organization in June 2019.ومن بين تدفقات الإيرادات المحتملة التي أبرزتها البرامج التحصيل المباشر لرسوم الملاحة الجوية، وهي مسؤولية أخذتها الحكومة الاتحادية على عاتقها عقب تسلمها من منظمة الطيران المدني الدولي في حزيران/يونيه 2019.
An investigation by the Panel uncovered financial irregularities within the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorological Authority in relation to the collection of existing air navigation arrears, in which the Authority wrote off a $5.8 million debt owed by Jubba Airways Limited without collecting the funds from the airline.وكشف تحقيق أجراه فريق الخبراء عن وجود مخالفات مالية داخل الهيئة الصومالية للطيران المدني والأرصاد الجوية فيما يتعلق بتحصيل متأخرات الملاحة الجوية الحالية، حيث قامت الهيئة بشطب ديون قدرها 5.8 ملايين دولار مستحقة على شركة جوبا إيرويز المحدودة دون تحصيل الأموال من شركة الطيران.
The Panel noted an improvement in some aspects of the Federal Government’s compliance with the terms of the partial lifting of the arms embargo during the reporting period.ولاحظ فريق الخبراء حدوث تحسن في بعض جوانب امتثال الحكومة الاتحادية لأحكام الرفع الجزئي لحظر توريد الأسلحة خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير.
Five of the seven notifications submitted by the Federal Government to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) met Council requirements.فقد استوفت متطلباتِ مجلس الأمن خمسةٌ من الإخطارات السبعة التي قدمتها الحكومة الاتحادية إلى لجنة مجلس الأمن العاملة بموجب القرار 751 (1992).
However, the Federal Government’s reporting to the Committee on the structure and composition of its security forces pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) has been inconsistent and incomplete.بيد أن قيام الحكومة الاتحادية بإبلاغ اللجنة عن هيكل قوات الأمن وتشكيلها عملاً بالفقرة 9 من القرار 2182 (2014) كان غير متسق وغير مكتمل.
The Panel has also continued to document Federal Government arms and ammunition in the illicit sphere – including 38 weapons found in the possession of black-market dealers in Mogadishu and Baidoa – and in the possession of Al-Shabaab.وواصل الفريق أيضا توثيق أسلحة وذخائر تابعة للحكومة الاتحادية في نطاق الاستخدام غير المشروع - بما في ذلك 38 قطعة سلاح عثر عليها في حوزة تجار سوق سوداء في مقديشو وبيدوا - وفي حوزة حركة الشباب.
While supplies of military materiel to the Federal Government are subject to stringent notification requirements, regional administrations in Somalia have routinely received arms and ammunition in circumvention of the arms embargo.وعلى الرغم من أن إمدادات العتاد العسكري إلى الحكومة الاتحادية تخضع لشروط إخطار صارمة، فإن الإدارات الإقليمية في الصومال ما فتئت تتلقى الأسلحة والذخائر بصفة منتظمة في التفاف على الحظر المفروض على الأسلحة.
During the reporting period, the Panel viewed hundreds of documents detailing the systematic supply of weapons and ammunition by the Ethiopian State-owned Metals and Engineering Corporation to every regional administration in Somalia over the course of the preceding decade.وخلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، عاين الفريق مئات الوثائق التي تتناول بالتفصيل قيام شركة المعادن والهندسة الإثيوبية المملوكة للدولة بإمداد كل إدارة إقليم في الصومال بانتظام بالأسلحة والذخائر على مدار العقد السابق.
While the Security Council, in paragraph 11 (a) of its resolution 2111 (2013), allows Member States to supply materiel to “Somalia security institutions” other than the Federal Government of Somalia, subject to the Committee’s approval, the Government of Ethiopia has not once availed itself of that mechanism.وفي حين أن الفقرة 11 (أ) من قرار مجلس الأمن 2111 (2013) تسمح للدول الأعضاء بتوريد العتاد إلى ”مؤسسات أمنية في الصومال“ بخلاف حكومة الصومال الاتحادية، رهنا بموافقة اللجنة، فلم يسبق لحكومة إثيوبيا أن استفادت من تلك الآلية ولو مرة واحدة.
Given the prominence of the improvised explosive device as Al-Shabaab’s weapon of choice, the arms embargo should be simplified and updated to reflect the modalities of modern counter-insurgency warfare, for example by seeking to restrict Al-Shabaab’s access to chemical precursors and other components it uses to construct improvised explosive devices.وبالنظر إلى أهمية الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع بوصفها السلاح المفضل لدى حركة الشباب، ينبغي تبسيط حظر الأسلحة وتحديثه ليعكس طرائق الحرب الحديثة لمكافحة التمرد، من خلال السعي، على سبيل المثال، لتقييد حصول حركة الشباب على السلائف الكيميائية وغيرها من المواد التي تستخدمها لصنع الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع.
The potential threat to peace, security and stability in Somalia through the unregulated import of explosive materials was exemplified by the May 2019 import into Bosaso, Puntland, of 180 tons of ammonium nitrate/fuel oil and other explosives intended for the construction of the port of Garacad.وقد شكّل استيراد 180 طناً من مادة مزيج نترات الأمونيوم وزيت الوقود وغيرها من المتفجرات المخصصة لبناء ميناء جرعد في أيار/مايو 2019، إلى بوصاصو، في بونتلاند، مثالا على التهديد المحتمل للسلام والأمن والاستقرار في الصومال من خلال الاستيراد غير المنظم للمواد المتفجرة.
The high risk of the diversion of such materials in Somalia led the Committee to request in April 2019 that the Panel urgently recommend technical guidelines to ensure that such items are safely stored and accounted for in the future.ودفع ارتفاع خطر تحويل وجهة مواد من هذا القبيل في الصومال اللجنة إلى أن تطلب في نيسان/أبريل 2019 أن يوصي الفريق على وجه السرعة بمبادئ توجيهية تقنية لضمان تخزين تلك المواد بأمان والمعرفة بمآلها في المستقبل.
Al-Shabaab was once again responsible for the largest number of attacks against civilians in violation of international humanitarian law, which were concentrated in Mogadishu and other areas of southern and central Somalia.وكانت حركة الشباب مسؤولة مرة أخرى عن الهجمات الأكثر عددا ضد المدنيين في انتهاك للقانون الدولي الإنساني، التي استهدفت أساسا مقديشو ومناطق أخرى في جنوب ووسط الصومال.
The militant group employed improvised explosive devices to kill and injure civilians in internally displaced persons camps, restaurants, marketplaces, shopping centres, government offices and hotels.واستخدمت تلك الجماعة المقاتلة الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع لإيقاع قتلى وجرحى في صفوف المدنيين المقيمين في مخيمات النازحين وفي المطاعم والأسواق ومراكز التسوق والمكاتب الحكومية والفنادق.
Al-Shabaab also continued its campaign of targeting government officials and parliamentarians, as well as delegates who had been involved in the federal electoral process in 2016.وواصلت الحركة أيضا حملتها لاستهداف المسؤولين الحكوميين والبرلمانيين، وكذلك المندوبين الذين شاركوا في العملية الانتخابية الاتحادية في عام 2016.
Particularly in Bay region, Al-Shabaab also forcibly recruited and abducted hundreds of children – some as young as 8 years old – for enrolment in the group’s madrasa system.وفي منطقة باي بالخصوص، عمدت حركة الشباب أيضًا إلى تجنيد مئات الأطفال - بعضهم لا يتجاوز عمره 8 سنوات - قسرا، أو اختطافهم لتسجيلهم في نظام مدارس الحركة.
The Panel has also noted a new and worrying trend of humanitarian workers being targeted by Al-Shabaab in Gedo region, including the practice of kidnapping local aid workers for ransom.ولاحظ الفريق أيضا وجود اتجاه جديد يبعث على القلق وهو استهداف حركة الشباب للعاملين في المجال الإنساني في منطقة غدو، بما في ذلك ممارسة خطف عمال الإغاثة المحليين من أجل الحصول على فدية.
Federal Government and federal member state police and military actors also committed violations against civilians.كما ارتكبت الشرطة والجهات الفاعلة العسكرية التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية والولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد انتهاكات ضد المدنيين.
For instance, on 31 December 2018 the Somali National Army summarily executed six men suspected of being affiliated with Al-Shabaab in the town of Bardera, Gedo region.فعلى سبيل المثال، في 31 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018، أعدم الجيش الوطني الصومالي بإجراءات موجزة ستة رجال يشتبه في ارتباطهم بحركة الشباب في بلدة بارديرا، بمنطقة غدو.
In Puntland, the Panel investigated acts of torture and inhumane and degrading treatment by the Puntland Security Force, a United States-trained and -supported counter-terrorism unit based in Bosaso.وفي بونتلاند، حقق الفريق في أعمال تعذيب ومعاملة لاإنسانية ومهينة ارتكبتها قوة أمن بونتلاند، وهي وحدة مدربة ومدعومة من الولايات المتحدة ويقع مقرها في بوصاصو.
In addition, the Panel identified several areas of concern regarding the prosecution of terrorism cases, including those of children, through Puntland’s military courts, such as the use of confessions extracted under torture, lengthy pretrial detention, decisions issued without explanation, arbitrary sentences and limited rights to appeal.وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، حدد الفريق عدة مجالات مثيرة للقلق فيما يتعلق بالملاحقة القضائية في قضايا الإرهاب، بما في ذلك قضايا الأطفال، عن طريق المحاكم العسكرية في بونتلاند، مثل استخدام الاعترافات المنتزعة تحت التعذيب، والاحتجاز المطول قبل المحاكمة، والقرارات الصادرة دون تسبيب، والأحكام التعسفية، ومحدودية الحقوق في الاستئناف.
Sexual- and gender-based violence remained a persistent issue during the reporting period.وظل العنف الجنسي والجنساني يمثل مشكلة مستمرة خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير.
The prolonged conflict in Somalia has left government institutions with little capacity to record instances of, conduct investigations into and prosecute the perpetrators of sexual violence.فقد ترك النزاع الذي طال أمده في الصومال المؤسسات الحكومية دون قدرة تذكر على تسجيل حالات العنف الجنسي وإجراء تحقيقات فيها ومقاضاة مرتكبيها.
Many cases are handled through interventions by clan elders, where women – who make up the majority of survivors – do not participate in the negotiations, nor are they typically given a share of any funds paid in compensation.وتُعالج العديد من الحالات من خلال تدخلات شيوخ العشائر، حيث لا تشارك النساء - اللائي يشكلن غالبية الضحايا - في المفاوضات، ولا يمنحن عادةً حصة من أي أموال تُدفع كتعويض.
Since August 2018, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, and subsequently the Panel of Experts, have not documented any charcoal exports from Somalia in violation of the Security Council ban, in contrast with exports totalling approximately 3 million bags (75,000 tons) during the previous reporting period.ومنذ آب/أغسطس 2018، لم يوثق فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا وبعده فريق الخبراء أي عملية تصدير للفحم من الصومال في انتهاك للحظر الذي فرضه مجلس الأمن، على عكس الصادرات التي بلغ مجموعها قرابة 3 ملايين كيس (000 75 طن) خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير السابق.
A clampdown on charcoal imports by Member States, including the United Arab Emirates, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Oman and Kuwait, has forced charcoal traffickers into a hiatus, owing to the need to generate new forms of falsified paperwork and arrange alternative ports for the shipment of the charcoal.وأدى قيام دول أعضاء، من بينها الإمارات العربية المتحدة وجمهورية إيران الإسلامية وعُمان والكويت، بتضييق الخناق على واردات الفحم إلى إجبار المتجرين بالفحم على التوقف، بسبب الحاجة إلى استنباط أشكال جديدة من المستندات المزيفة والترتيب لإيجاد موانئ بديلة لشحن الفحم.
However, domestic production of charcoal is ongoing: stockpiles at Kismayo and Buur Gaabo stood at 600,000 to 900,000 bags at the time of writing, with a wholesale industry value of approximately $30 to $45 million.بيد أن الإنتاج المحلي للفحم لا يزال مستمرًا، حيث بلغت المخزونات في كيسمايو وبور غابو ما بين 000 600 و 000 900 كيس في وقت كتابة هذا التقرير، تتراوح تقريبا القيمة السوقية لبيعها بالجملة بين 30 و 45 مليون دولار.
The last recorded major export of charcoal from Somalia occurred in August 2018 when a cargo vessel transported 190,000 bags (4,750 tons) of charcoal from Kismayo to Khawr al-Zubayr port, Iraq.ووقعت آخر عملية تصدير كبرى مسجلة للفحم من الصومال في آب/أغسطس 2018 عندما نقلت سفينة شحن 000 190 كيس (750 4 طن) من الفحم من كيسمايو إلى ميناء خور الزبير، بالعراق.
The Somali charcoal shipment was rebagged and trans-shipped from Iraq to neighbouring Member States throughout 2019.وقد أُعيد تعبئة شحنة الفحم الصومالية ونقلها من العراق إلى دول أعضاء مجاورة طوال عام 2019.
While charcoal exports from Somalia have temporarily ceased, the international criminal networks involved in the trade remain active.وعلى الرغم من أن صادرات الفحم انطلاقا من الصومال قد توقفت مؤقتًا، فإن الشبكات الإجرامية الدولية الضالعة في هذا الاتجار ما زالت نشطة.
The Panel has also learned that Khawr al-Zubayr port may be used in the future as a transit hub for large shipments of charcoal transported by commercial cargo vessels, rather than by the typical Indian Ocean dhows.وعلم الفريق أيضا أن ميناء خور الزبير قد يُستخدم في المستقبل كمحور عبور لشحنات كبيرة من الفحم المنقول على متن سفن شحن تجارية، بدلاً من المراكب الشراعية التقليدية في المحيط الهندي.
The primary rationale behind the introduction of the Security Council ban on charcoal in resolution 2036 (2012) was to curtail Al-Shabaab revenue.والأساس المنطقي لفرض مجلس الأمن حظرا للفحم في قراره 2036 (2012) هو تقليص إيرادات حركة الشباب.
During the reporting period, Al-Shabaab increased its attacks on traders transporting charcoal from production sites inland to export points in Somalia, where historically the group had levied “taxes” on such shipments.وخلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، زادت حركة الشباب من هجماتها على التجار الذين ينقلون الفحم من مواقع الإنتاج الداخلية إلى نقاط التصدير في الصومال، حيث درجت الحركة على فرض ”ضرائب“ على هذه الشحنات.
Although Al-Shabaab may still generate some limited income from the charcoal trade, the group maintains a highly diversified revenue base from the “taxation” of virtually all trade in the south of the country.وعلى الرغم من أن حركة الشباب قد تظل تجني قدرا محدودا من الإيرادات المتأتية من تجارة الفحم، إلا أن الجماعة تحتفظ بقاعدة إيرادات متنوعة للغاية من ”فرض الضرائب“ على جميع العمليات التجارية تقريبًا في جنوب البلاد.
Were exports of Somali charcoal to cease entirely, Al-Shabaab’s ability to wage its insurgency is unlikely to be significantly affected.وإذا توقفت صادرات الفحم الصومالي تمامًا، فمن غير المحتمل أن يكون لذلك أثر كبير على قدرة حركة الشباب على مواصلة تمردها.
The Panel of Experts has therefore recommended that the Council carry out a review of the charcoal ban, with a view to assessing its continued appropriateness.ومن ثم، يوصي فريق الخبراء بأن يجري المجلس استعراضًا لحظر الفحم بهدف تقييم مدى استمرار ملاءمته.
Contentsالمحتويات
Pageالصفحة
1.أولا -
Introductionمقدمة
810
A.ألف -
Mandateالولاية
810
B.بـــاء -
Methodologyالمنهجية
810
2.ثانيا -
Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somaliaالأفعال التي تهدد السلام والأمن والاستقرار في الصومال
911
A.ألف -
Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiinحركة الشباب المجاهدين
911
B.بـــاء -
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant factionالفصيل التابع لتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام
1722
C.جيم -
Explosives intended for commercial useالمتفجرات المزمع استخدامها لأغراض تجارية
2025
D.دال -
Federal-regional relationsالعلاقات الاتحادية - الإقليمية
2126
E.هاء -
Public financial managementالإدارة المالية العامة
2632
F.واو -
Oil and gas sectorقطاع النفط والغاز
2835
G.زاي -
Maritime piracyالقرصنة البحرية
2935
3.ثالثا -
Arms embargoحظر توريد الأسلحة
2936
A.ألف -
Compliance of the Federal Government of Somalia with obligations under the partial lifting of the arms embargoامتثال الحكومة الاتحادية للالتزامات المفروضة في إطار الرفع الجزئي لحظر توريد الأسلحة
2936
B.بـــاء -
Member State compliance with the arms embargoامتثال الدول الأعضاء لحظر توريد الأسلحة
3239
C.جيم -
Illicit flow of weapons into Somaliaالتدفق غير المشروع للأسلحة إلى الصومال
3341
4.رابعا -
Obstruction of humanitarian assistanceعرقلة المساعدات الإنسانية
3442
5.خامسا -
Violations of international humanitarian law involving the targeting of civiliansانتهاكات القانون الدولي الإنساني التي تنطوي على استهداف المدنيين
3644
A.ألف -
Al-Shabaabحركة الشباب
3644
B.بـــاء -
Federal and federal member state actorsالجهات الفاعلة التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية وللولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد
3746
C.جيم -
African Union Mission in Somalia and other international actorsبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال وغيرها من الجهات الفاعلة الدولية
3948
6.سادسا -
Violations of the charcoal banانتهاكات الحظر المفروض على الفحم
4252
A.ألف -
Production, transport and stockpilesالإنتاج والنقل والمخزونات
4353
B.بـــاء -
Illicit export, import and trans-shipmentعمليات التصدير والاستيراد وإعادة الشحن غير المشروعة
4454
C.جيم -
Criminal networksالشبكات الإجرامية
4555
D.دال -
Implementation of the banتنفيذ الحظر
4555
7.سابعا -
State and non-State cooperationالتعاون من جانب الدول والجهات من غير الدول
4656
8.ثامنا -
Recommendationsالتوصيات
4757
A.ألف -
Threats to peace, security and stability 47الأخطار التي تهدد السلام والأمن والاستقرار
B.57
Arms embargoبـــاء -
47 C. Charcoal banحظر توريد الأسلحة
4858
D.جيـــم -
Violations of international humanitarian lawالحظر المفروض على الفحم
4859
Annexes*دال -
49 Circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.انتهاكات القانون الدولي الإنساني
I.59
Introductionأولا - مقدمة
A.ألف -
Mandateالولاية
1.1 -
The Panel of Experts on Somalia is the successor to the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, the mandate of which was terminated by the Security Council on 16 December 2018 pursuant to paragraph 10 of its resolution 2444 (2018).فريق الخبراء المعني بالصومال هو خلف فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا، الذي أنهى مجلس الأمن ولايته في 16 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018 عملا بالفقرة 10 من قراره 2444 (2018).
In paragraph 11 of the same resolution, the Council established the Panel of Experts and decided that the Panel’s mandate shall include the tasks as set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014), paragraph 23 of resolution 2036 (2012) and paragraph 29 of resolution 2444 (2018) as they relate to Somalia.وفي الفقرة 11 من القرار نفسه، أنشأ المجلس فريق الخبراء وقرر أن تشمل ولايته المهام المبينة في الفقرة 13 من القرار 2060 (2012) والمستكملة في الفقرة 41 من القرار 2093 (2013) والفقرة 15 من القرار 2182 (2014) والفقرة 23 من القرار 2036 (2012) والفقرة 29 من القرار 2444 (2018) فيما يتعلق منها بالصومال.
2.2 -
In accordance with paragraph 54 of resolution 2444 (2018), the Panel of Experts provided the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia with a midterm update on 10 May 2019.ووفقا للفقرة 54 من القرار 2444 (2018)، قدم فريق الخبراء إلى لجنة مجلس الأمن العاملة بموجب القرار 751 (1992) بشأن الصومال معلومات عن مستجدات منتصف المدة في 10 أيار/مايو 2019.
The Panel also submitted monthly progress updates to the Committee throughout its mandate.كما قدم الفريق إلى اللجنة معلومات مستكملة مرحلية كل شهر طوال فترة ولايته.
3.3 -
In the course of their investigations, members of the Panel of Experts travelled to Canada, Ethiopia, France, Italy, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mauritius, the Netherlands, Qatar, Seychelles, Somalia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United Republic of Tanzania and the United States of America.وسافر أعضاء فريق الخبراء، خلال تحقيقاتهم، إلى إثيوبيا، والإمارات العربية المتحدة، وجمهورية إيران الإسلامية، وإيطاليا، وتركيا، وجمهورية إيران الإسلامية، وجمهورية تنزانيا المتحدة، وسيشيل، والصومال، وفرنسا، وقطر، وكندا، والمملكة المتحدة لبريطانيا العظمى وأيرلندا الشمالية، وموريشيوس، وهولندا، والولايات المتحدة الأمريكية.
The Panel’s travel within Somalia was restricted by the Federal Government of Somalia from March 2019 onward, and its members were only able to travel to Berbera, Bosaso, Garowe and Hargeisa during February 2019.وفرضت الحكومة الاتحادية قيودا على سفر الفريق داخل الصومال من آذار/مارس 2019 وما بعده، فلم يتمكن أعضاؤه من السفر إلا إلى بربرة، وبوصاصو، وغاروي، وهرجيسا خلال شهر شباط/فبراير 2019.
4.4 -
The Panel of Experts was based in Nairobi and comprised the following experts: Jay Bahadur (coordinator), Mohamed Babiker (humanitarian), Nazanine Moshiri (armed groups), Brian O’Sullivan (armed groups/natural resources), Matthew Rosbottom (finance) and Richard Zabot (arms).واستقر فريق الخبراء بنيروبي، وكان يتألف من الخبراء التالية أسماؤهم: جاي بهادور (المنسق)، ومحمد بابكر (الشؤون الإنسانية)، ونازانين موشيري (الجماعات المسلحة)، وبرايان أوسوليفان (الجماعات المسلحة/الموارد الطبيعية)، وماثيو روسبوتوم (الشؤون المالية)، وريتشارد زابوت (الأسلحة).
B.باء -
Methodologyالمنهجية
5.5 -
The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the reports of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea apply to work conducted by the Panel of Experts during the period under review, as follows:تنطبق معايير الإثبات وعمليات التحقق المبينة في تقارير فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا على العمل الذي اضطلع به فريق الخبراء في الفترة المشمولة بالاستعراض، على النحو التالي:
(a)(أ)
Collecting information on events and topics from multiple sources, where possible;جمع معلومات عن الأحداث والمواضيع من مصادر متعددة، كلما أمكن ذلك؛
(b)(ب)
Collecting information from sources with first-hand knowledge of events, where possible;جمع معلومات من مصادر لديها معرفة مباشرة بالأحداث، كلما أمكن ذلك؛
(c)(ج)
Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing existing knowledge with new information and emerging trends;تحديد أوجه الاتساق في أنماط المعلومات ومقارنة المعلومات الموجودة بالمعلومات الجديدة والاتجاهات المستجدة؛
(d)(د)
Continuously factoring in the expertise and judgment of the relevant expert of the Panel of Experts and the collective assessment of the Panel with regard to the credibility of information and the reliability of sources;أخذ خبرات وآراء الخبير المختص في فريق الخبراء في الحسبان على نحو مستمر ومراعاة التقييم الجماعي للفريق في ما يتعلق بمصداقية المعلومات وموثوقية المصادر؛
(e)(ه)
Obtaining physical, photographic, audio, video and/or documentary evidence in support of the information collected;الحصول على أدلة مادية و/أو فوتوغرافية و/أو سمعية و/أو مرئية و/أو مستندية لدعم المعلومات التي تم جمعها؛
(f)(و)
Analysing satellite imagery, where applicable.تحليل الصور الساتلية، حسب الاقتضاء.
6.6 -
The Panel of Experts made a deliberate and systematic effort to gain access to those involved in violations of the sanctions measures by way of individuals who had direct knowledge or who knew people who had direct knowledge about details of violations.وبذل فريق الخبراء جهدا متأنيا ومنهجيا للوصول إلى الضالعين في انتهاكات تدابير الجزاءات بواسطة أفراد يملكون معرفة مباشرة بتفاصيل الانتهاكات أو يعرفون أشخاصا لديهم معرفة مباشرة بتلك التفاصيل.
7.7 -
The Panel interviewed a wide range of sources with relevant information, including government officials and representatives of diplomatic missions, civil society organizations and aid agencies.وأجرى الفريق مقابلات مع طائفة واسعة من المصادر التي لديها معلومات ذات صلة، بما في ذلك مسؤولون حكوميون وممثلون عن البعثات الدبلوماسية، ومنظمات تابعة للمجتمع المدني، ووكالات معونة.
The Panel also met and communicated with officials from regional administrations, representatives of political and armed groups, and members of business communities and Somali civil society.كما التقى الفريق واتصل بمسؤولين من الإدارات الإقليمية، وممثلين للأحزاب السياسية والجماعات المسلحة، وأعضاء في أوساط الأعمال التجارية والمجتمع المدني الصومالي.
8.8 -
In accordance with the Secretary-General’s bulletin on information sensitivity, classification and handling (ST/SGB/2007/6), the Panel of Experts has submitted to the Committee, together with the present report, several strictly confidential annexes containing information whose disclosure may be detrimental to the proper functioning of the United Nations or to the welfare and safety of its staff or third parties or may violate the Organization’s legal obligations.ووفقا لنشرة الأمين العام بشأن حساسية المعلومات وتصنيفها والتعامل معها (ST/SGB/2007/6)، قدم فريق الخبراء إلى اللجنة، إلى جانب هذا التقرير، عدة مرفقات سرية للغاية تتضمن معلومات قد يمس الكشف عنها بالأداء السليم للأمم المتحدة أو برفاه وسلامة موظفيها أو أطراف ثالثة أو ينتهك الالتزامات القانونية للمنظمة.
Those annexes will not be issued as a document of the Security Council.ولن تصدر هذه المرفقات باعتبارها وثيقة من وثائق مجلس الأمن.
II.ثانيا -
Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somaliaالأفعال التي تهدد السلام والأمن والاستقرار في الصومال
A.ألف -
Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiinحركة الشباب المجاهدين
9.9 -
The extremist group Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab) remains the most immediate threat to peace and security in Somalia.لا تزال الجماعة المتطرفة حركة الشباب المجاهدين (حركة الشباب) تمثل أكبر تهديد مباشر للسلام والأمن في الصومال.
A significant escalation of United States airstrikes targeting Al-Shabaab militants and leaders during the reporting period has contributed to keeping the group off-balance and preventing the massing of large numbers of fighters but has had little effect on its ability to launch regular asymmetric attacks throughout Somalia.وقد ساهم التصعيد الكبير للضربات الجوية من جانب الولايات المتحدة ضد مقاتلي حركة الشباب وقادتها خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير في منع الجماعة من التقاط أنفاسها والحيلولة دون تجمع أعداد كبيرة من المقاتلين، ولكن لم يكن له أثر يذكر في قدرة الجماعة على شن هجمات غير نمطية بشكل منتظم في جميع أنحاء الصومال.
Al-Shabaab also remains capable of carrying out occasional conventional attacks against both Federal Government of Somalia and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, such as its ambush of the Burundian contingent of AMISOM at Balad on 29 July 2019.ولا تزال حركة الشباب قادرة أيضا على تنفيذ هجمات تقليدية من حين لآخر ضد قوات الحكومة الاتحادية وبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال، مثل الكمين الذي نصبته للوحدة البوروندية التابعة لبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في بلعد يوم 29 تموز/يوليه 2019.
10.10 -
During the reporting period, Al-Shabaab carried out an unprecedented number of improvised explosive device attacks.وخلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، نفذت حركة الشباب عددا غير مسبوق من الهجمات بالأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع.
Definitive evidence that Al-Shabaab is manufacturing its own explosives (see “Use of improvised explosive devices by Al-Shabaab”, below) means that the group now has at its disposal a readily available supply of improvised explosive device inputs.ويعني توافر أدلة قاطعة على أن حركة الشباب تصنع المتفجرات الخاصة بها (انظر ”استخدام حركة الشباب للأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع“ أدناه)، أن في متناول الجماعة الآن إمدادات جاهزة من مكونات الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع.
Al-Shabaab’s modus operandi remains the deployment of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device to breach the perimeter of a target, followed by an assault by up to half a dozen gunmen.ولا تزال طريقة عمل حركة الشباب تتمثل في نشر الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع المحمولة على مركبات لاختراق محيط الهدف، يلي ذلك هجوم يقوم به ما يصل إلى ستة مسلحين.
Al-Shabaab’s stated policy is to target hotels and restaurants frequented by Federal Government officials, though the majority of the group’s victims comprise other civilians.وتتمثل السياسة المعلنة للحركة في استهداف الفنادق والمطاعم التي يرتادها مسؤولو الحكومة الاتحادية، على الرغم من أن غالبية ضحايا الجماعة من المدنيين الآخرين.
11.11 -
As noted in multiple reports of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, Al-Shabaab has also infiltrated Federal Government of Somalia institutions.وكما أشير إليه في العديد من تقارير فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا، تسللت حركة الشباب أيضا إلى مؤسسات حكومة الصومال الاتحادية().
On 24 July 2019, at 16:55 UTC+3, a female Al-Shabaab suicide bomber detonated herself at the Benadir Regional Administration headquarters in Mogadishu.ففي 24 تموز/يوليه 2019، الساعة 16:55 بالتوقيت العالمي الموحد + 3، قامت مفجرة انتحارية منتمية إلى حركة الشباب بتفجير نفسها بمقر إدارة إقليم بنادر في مقديشو.
The attack killed at least 10 people, including the Mayor of Mogadishu, Abdirahman Omar Osman “Yarisow”, and three district commissioners.وأسفر الهجوم عن مقتل ما لا يقل عن 10 أشخاص، منهم عمدة مقديشو، عبد الرحمن عمر عثمان ”ياريسو“ وثلاثة من رؤساء المديريات.
It later emerged that the suicide bomber had been employed at the Benadir Regional Administration since May 2018, under an assumed identity.وتبين لاحقا أن الانتحارية كانت موظفة في إدارة إقليم بنادر منذ أيار/مايو 2018، تحت هوية منتحلة().
An accomplice, also an employee of the Benadir Regional Administration using a false name, had yet to be apprehended as of the time of writing.وفي وقت إعداد هذا التقرير، لم يكن قد ألقي القبض بعد على متواطئ في التفجير، وهو موظف أيضا في الإدارة كان يستخدم اسما مستعارا.
12.12 -
Al-Shabaab’s ability to generate domestic revenues through the “taxation” of all aspects of the Somali economy is undiminished, and has likely expanded during the reporting period, with preliminary evidence indicating that the group has begun taxing imports into Mogadishu port (see “Al-Shabaab financing”, below).ولم تتناقص قدرة حركة الشباب على جني إيرادات داخلية بفرض ”ضرائب“ على جميع جوانب الاقتصاد الصومالي، ومن المرجح أنها توسعت خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، حيث تشير الأدلة الأولية إلى أن الجماعة بدأت فرض ضرائب على الواردات إلى ميناء مقديشو (انظر ”تمويل حركة الشباب“ أدناه).
The group also continues to take advantage of virtually unregulated mobile money and domestic banking services to collect and transfer revenues throughout the country.وتواصل الجماعة أيضا استغلال الخدمات النقدية المتنقلة التي لا تخضع تقريباً لأي تنظيم، والخدمات المصرفية المحلية لجمع الإيرادات ونقلها في جميع أنحاء البلد.
While the operationalization of the Federal Government’s Financial Reporting Center in November 2018 represented a positive step in countering terrorism financing within Somalia, compliance by domestic financial institutions must be further strengthened (see section VIII, below).ولئن كان تفعيل مركز الإبلاغ المالي التابع للحكومة الاتحادية في تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018 يمثل خطوة إيجابية في مكافحة تمويل الإرهاب داخل الصومال، فيجب تعزيز امتثال المؤسسات المالية المحلية (انظر الفرع الثامن أدناه).
13.13 -
The assault by Al-Shabaab on 15 January 2019 on a commercial business complex in Nairobi containing the DusitD2 Hotel illustrates the danger the group continues to pose to regional peace and security.ويبين الهجوم التي شنته حركة الشباب في 15 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019 على مجمع للأعمال التجارية في نيروبي يضم فندق DusitD2 أن الجماعة لا تزال تهدد السلام والأمن في المنطقة.
Al-Shabaab also carried out an unprecedented number of improvised explosive device and other attacks across the Kenya-Somalia border in June and July 2019, possibly in an effort to exploit strained relations between the two countries.وقد نفذت الحركة أيضا عددا غير مسبوق من الهجمات باستخدام أجهزة متفجرة يدوية الصنع والهجمات الأخرى عبر الحدود بين الصومال وكينيا في حزيران/يونيه وتموز/يوليه 2019، ربما في محاولة لاستغلال توتر العلاقات بين البلدين.
Extent of Al-Shabaab control within Somaliaمدى سيطرة حركة الشباب على المناطق داخل الصومال
14.14 -
Since the cessation of major AMISOM offensive operations in July 2015, the scope of Al-Shabaab’s territorial control in Somalia has remained largely unchanged.منذ وقف العمليات الهجومية الرئيسية لبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في تموز/يوليه 2015، ظل نطاق سيطرة حركة الشباب على الأراضي في الصومال دون تغيير إلى حد كبير.
While AMISOM and the Somali National Army hold the majority of urban centres, Al-Shabaab maintains direct control or influence over vast swathes of the hinterland and is able to cut off main supply routes and effectively isolate AMISOM- and government-controlled pockets.وعلى الرغم من سيطرة بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي والجيش الوطني الصومالي على معظم المراكز الحضرية، فلا تزال لحركة الشباب سيطرة مباشرة أو نفوذ مباشر على مساحات شاسعة من الأراضي الداخلية، وتستطيع أن تقطع طرق الإمداد الرئيسية وتعزل بالفعل الجيوب التي تسيطر عليها بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي والحكومة.
15.15 -
Al-Shabaab’s zones of influence can be broadly divided into three categories: territory directly administered by the group, where Al-Shabaab serves as the de facto government;ويمكن تصنيف مناطق نفوذ حركة الشباب عموما في ثلاث فئات هي: الإقليم الذي تديره الجماعة مباشرة، حيث تشكل حركة الشباب حكومة الأمر الواقع؛
territory where it maintains a significant military presence;والإقليم الذي تحتفظ فيه بوجود عسكري كبير؛
and areas the group does not control but where it is nonetheless able to levy “taxes”.والمناطق التي لا تسيطر عليها ولكنها تستطيع فرض ”ضرائب“ فيها.
Areas administered by Al-Shabaabالمناطق التي تديرها حركة الشباب
16.16 -
Al-Shabaab remains in administrative control of most of the Juba Valley, including the major urban centres of Bu’ale, Sakow and the Al-Shabaab “capital” of Jilib.لا تزال حركة الشباب تسيطر إداريا على معظم وادي جوبا، بما في ذلك المركزان الحضريان الرئيسيان، بؤالي وساكو، و ’عاصمة‘ حركة الشباب، جِلِب.
Qunyo Barrow, in Lower Juba, is the headquarters of Al-Shabaab’s finance department, and likely contains a significant proportion of the group’s physical cash reserves.وتشكل بلدةكونيو برو، في إقليم جوبا السفلى، مقر إدارة الشؤون المالية للحركة، ومن المرجح أنها تضم نسبة كبيرة من الاحتياطيات النقدية المادية للجماعة.
The group also administers areas of Lower Shabelle, centred around the town of Sablale, and maintains the majority of its training camps in the forested area around Bulo Fulay, Bay region, where it routinely carries out graduation ceremonies for new recruits.كما تدير الجماعة مناطق من إقليم شبيلي السفلى، تتمحور حول بلدة سبلالي، وتقيم معظم معسكراتها التدريبية في المنطقة المغطاة بالغابة حول قرية بولو فولاي، في منطقة باي، حيث تقيم بصورة روتينية حفلات تخرج للمجندين الجدد.
Areas of significant Al-Shabaab military presenceالمناطق التي فيها وجود عسكري كبير لحركة الشباب
17.17 -
Al-Shabaab maintains a significant military presence, but does not administer, large swathes of territory centred around Harardhere, in Mudug region, and Adan Yabal, in Middle Shabelle region.تحافظ حركة الشباب على وجود عسكري كبير في مساحات واسعة من الأراضي التي تتمحور حول حرر طيري، في منطقة مدغ، وآدن يبال، في منطقة شبيلي الوسطى.
In addition, the group is waging an active insurgency based in the Golis Mountains of Puntland, 30 km south-west of Bosaso, as well as in parts of Gedo region, around the town of El Adde.وإضافة إلى ذلك، تشن الجماعة تمردا نشطا ينطلق من جبال غوليس في بونتلاند، على بعد 30 كيلومترا جنوب غرب بوصاصو، وفي أجزاء من منطقة غدو، حول بلدة العدي.
Al-Shabaab taxation catchmentجمع حركة الشباب للضرائب
18.18 -
Al-Shabaab functions as a shadow government even in areas that it does not physically control, collecting “taxes” and providing some basic services.تعمل حركة الشباب بمثابة حكومة موازية حتى في المناطق التي لا تسيطر عليها فعليا، فتجمع ”ضرائب“ وتقدم بعض الخدمات الأساسية.
As detailed in a report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea in 2018 (S/2018/1002, annex 2.4), Al-Shabaab routinely taxes trade, livestock and agricultural production through a series of checkpoints throughout central and southern Somalia, enforcing compliance through the threat of violence.وعلى النحو المفصل في تقرير فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا لعام 2018 (S/2018/1002، المرفق 2-4)، تفرض حركة الشباب ضرائب بشكل اعتيادي على التجارة، والماشية، والإنتاج الزراعي بواسطة مجموعة من نقاط التفتيش في جميع أنحاء وسط الصومال وجنوبه وتقوم بإنفاذ الامتثال عن طريق التهديد بالعنف.
19.19 -
Annex 1.1 to the present document contains a map illustrating Al-Shabaab’s varying degrees of control within Somalia.ويتضمن المرفق 1-1 خريطة توضح درجات التحكم المتفاوتة للحركة داخل الصومال.
Use of improvised explosive devices by Al-Shabaabاستخدام حركة الشباب للأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع
20.20 -
For the first time, the Panel obtained definitive evidence that Al-Shabaab has been manufacturing home-made explosives since at least 20 July 2017.للمرة الأولى، حصل فريق الخبراء على دليل قاطع يثبت أن حركة الشباب تنتج متفجرات مصنوعة محلياً، منذ 20 تموز/يوليه 2017 على الأقل().
Post-blast laboratory analyses, carried out by the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and provided to the Panel, have established that Al-Shabaab has carried out at least 11 improvised explosive device attacks in Somalia using home-made explosives.وأثبتت التحاليل المختبرية التالية للانفجار التي أجراها مركز تحليلات الأجهزة المتفجرة الإرهابية التابع لمكتب التحقيقات الاتحادي، والتي قُدمت إلى الفريق، أن حركة الشباب قد نفذت على الأقل 11 هجوما بالأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع في الصومال باستخدام متفجرات مصنوعة محليا.
The analyses found evidence of mixtures of nitroglycerin, a highly sensitive explosive;وكشفت التحليلات أدلة على وجود مخاليط من مادة النتروغليسرين المتفجرة الشديدة الحساسية؛
potassium nitrate, which is used as an oxidizer; and charcoal, a fuel element.ونترات البوتاسيوم، التي تستخدم كعنصر مؤكسِد، والفحم، المستخدم كعنصر وقود().
The confirmed use of home-made explosives by Al-Shabaab represents a diversification of Al-Shabaab’s improvised explosive device construction methods, which have traditionally utilized military-grade explosives, obtained principally from explosive remnants of war, captured AMISOM munitions and illicit transfers from Yemen.والاستخدام المؤكد للمتفجرات المصنوعة محليا على أيدي حركة الشباب يمثل تنويعا لأساليب صنع الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع، التي تُستخدم فيها عادة متفجرات مطورة في مصانع عسكرية مأخوذة أساسا من المتفجرات المخلفة من الحروب، وذخائر مستولى عليها من بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي، ومواد منقولة بصورة غير مشروعة من اليمن().
21.21 -
Information received by the Panel from a range of explosive ordnance disposal experts suggests a probable connection between the development of home-made explosives by Al-Shabaab and the increased frequency of improvised explosive device attacks in Somalia in recent years.وتشير المعلومات التي تلقاها فريق الخبراء من مجموعة من خبراء إبطال الذخيرة المتفجرة إلى وجود صلة محتملة بين صنع حركة الشباب للمتفجرات المصنوعة محليا وزيادة تواتر الهجمات بالأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع في الصومال خلال السنوات الأخيرة().
From July 2018 to July 2019, Al-Shabaab carried out 548 improvised explosive device attacks in Somalia, compared with 413 over the corresponding period the previous year, an increase of 32 per cent.ففي الفترة من تموز/يوليه 2018 إلى تموز/يوليه 2019، نفذت حركة الشباب 548 هجوما بالأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع في الصومال، مقابل 413 هجوما في نفس الفترة من السنة السابقة، ويمثل ذلك زيادة نسبتها 32 في المائة().
There was also a 36 per cent increase in improvised explosive device incidents in Benadir region, which includes Mogadishu, over the same period (see annex 1.2).كما زادت الحوادث التي استخدمت فيها أجهزة متفجرة يدوية الصنع بنسبة 36 في المائة في إقليم بنادر، الذي يضم مقديشو، خلال نفس الفترة (انظر المرفق 1-2)().
22.22 -
Al-Shabaab’s use of home-made explosives also appears to be geographically diverse within Somalia.ويبدو استخدام حركة الشباب للمتفجرات المصنوعة محليا استخداما متنوعا أيضا من الناحية الجغرافية داخل الصومال.
Explosive ordnance disposal experts have noted the presence of home-made explosives in Jubbaland in smaller devices, as well as in a twin vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack against the Somali National Army, Ethiopian National Defence Forces and United States forces in Bar Sanguni (40 km north of Kismayo) on 19 January 2019.ولاحظ خبراء في إبطال الذخيرة المتفجرة وجود متفجرات مصنوعة محليا في جوبالاند في عبوات أصغر، وكذلك في هجوم مزدوج بالأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع المحمولة على مركبات ضد الجيش الوطني الصومالي وقوات الدفاع الوطنية الإثيوبية وقوات الولايات المتحدة في بار سانغوني (40 كيلومترا شمال كيسمايو) في 19 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019.
Initial reports from the 12 July 2019 complex attack at the Medina Hotel in Kismayo also indicated the use of home-made explosives.كما تشير التقارير الأولية عن الهجوم المعقد الذي وقع في 12 تموز/يوليه 2019 على فندق مدينة في كيسمايو إلى استخدام متفجرات مصنوعة محليا().
23.23 -
Although Al-Shabaab’s use of home-made explosives is a significant development, the group also continues to use military-grade explosives in many of its improvised explosive device attacks.وعلى الرغم من أن استخدام حركة الشباب للمتفجرات المصنوعة محليا يشكل تطورا هاما، فلا تزال الجماعة تستخدم متفجرات مطورة في مصانع عسكرية أيضا في العديد من الهجمات التي تشنها بالأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع().
On 9 November 2018, for instance, Al-Shabaab used military-grade explosives to attack the Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu (see “Sahafi Hotel attack”, below), which resulted in the deaths of at least 50 people.ففي 9 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018، على سبيل المثال، استخدمت الحركة متفجرات مطورة في مصانع عسكرية للهجوم على فندق الصحفي في مقديشو (انظر ”الهجوم على فندق الصحفي“ أدناه)، الذي أسفر عن مقتل ما لا يقل عن 50 شخصا.
Supply of improvised explosive device components to Somaliaتوريد مكونات الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع إلى الصومال
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In paragraph 29 of its resolution 2444 (2018), the Security Council decided that the Panel of Experts would continue the investigations started by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea related to the export to Somalia of chemicals used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices.في الفقرة 29 من قرار مجلس الأمن 2444 (2018)، قرر المجلس أن يواصل فريق الخبراء تحقيقاته المتصلة بتصدير المواد الكيميائية المستخدمة في صنع الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع إلى الصومال.
In consultation with explosive ordnance disposal experts and chemists, the Panel compiled a list of chemicals and other common components that could be used by Al-Shabaab to construct improvised explosive devices and that might yield the laboratory analysis results described above.وبالتشاور مع خبراء في إبطال الذخيرة المتفجرة وكيميائيين، قام الفريق بتجميع قائمة بالمواد الكيميائية والعناصر العادية الأخرى التي يمكن أن تستخدمها حركة الشباب لصنع أجهزة متفجرة يدوية الصنع، والتي يمكن أن تسفر عن نتائج التحليل المختبري المبينة أعلاه().
The Panel contacted shipping companies that routinely conduct transits to major Somali ports, as well as relevant Member States, requesting information on consignments containing potential improvised explosive device inputs.واتصل الفريق بشركات النقل البحري التي تجري عادة عمليات النقل العابر إلى الموانئ الصومالية الرئيسية، كما اتصل بالدول الأعضاء المعنية، لطلب معلومات عن الشحنات التي تحتوي على مدخلات محتمل استخدامها في إنتاج أجهزة متفجرة يدوية الصنع.
So far, the Panel has not received any practicable information from those inquiries.وحتى الآن، لم يتلق الفريق أي معلومات عملية من هذه الاستفسارات.
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On 5 April 2019, Federal Government security forces recovered empty bottles of nitric acid from an underground Al-Shabaab hideout near Elasha Biyaha, a suburb of Mogadishu (see annex 1.2).وفي 5 نيسان/أبريل 2019، عثرت قوات الأمن التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية على زجاجات فارغة من حمض النتريك في مخبأ تحت الأرض لحركة الشباب بالقرب من إلاشا بياها، إحدى ضواحي مقديشو (انظر المرفق 1-2).
Nitric acid can be mixed with sulfuric acid and glycerine to produce nitroglycerin, which has been detected in multiple laboratory analyses of Al-Shabaab home-made explosives.ويمكن خلط حمض النتريك بحمض الكبريتيك والغليسرين لإنتاج مادة النتروغليسرين، التي اكتشفت في تحاليل مختبرية متعددة للمتفجرات المصنوعة محليا التي تستخدمها حركة الشباب.
Explosive ordnance specialists consulted by the Panel have indicated that there is no legitimate industrial demand for concentrated nitric acid in Somalia.وأشار المتخصصون في الذخائر المتفجرة الذين استشارهم فريق الخبراء إلى أنه لا يوجد طلب صناعي مشروع على حامض النتريك المرّكز في الصومال().
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The Panel also documented the availability of two types of fertilizer containing potassium in Kismayo and Mogadishu, in July and August 2019 (see annex 1.2).ووثق الفريق أيضا توافر نوعين من الأسمدة المحتوية على البوتاسيوم في كيسمايو ومقديشو، في تموز/يوليه وآب/أغسطس 2019 (انظر المرفق 1-2).
However, the potassium content of the documented fertilizers (5 per cent and 10 per cent) fell below the 40 per cent threshold required to be suitable for improvised explosive device construction.بيد أن محتوى الأسمدة الموثقة من البوتاسيوم (5 و 10 في المائة) لم يبلغ الحد الأدنى اللازم كي يصبح مناسبا لإنتاج أجهزة متفجرة يدوية الصنع وهو 40 في المائة()،
Australian seizureالمضبوطات الأسترالية
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On 25 June 2019, the Australian Navy vessel HMAS Ballarat seized 697 bags of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, as well as approximately 475,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, from a stateless dhow in the Arabian Sea.في 25 حزيران/يونيه 2019، قامت سفينة القوات البحرية الأسترالية HMAS Ballarat بضبط 697 كيسا من سماد نترات الأمونيوم، إضافة إلى حوالي 000 475 طلقة من ذخيرة الأسلحة الصغيرة، من مركب شراعي غير تابع لدولة معينة في بحر العرب().
Additional information received by the Panel from the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) indicated that the seizure had taken place proximate to the coast of Oman, suggesting that northern Somalia was a possible destination of the dhow.وتشير المعلومات الإضافية التي تلقاها الفريق من القوة البحرية للاتحاد الأوروبي إلى أن الضبط قد جرى قرب ساحل عمان الشمالي، مما يوحي بأن شمال الصومال كان الوجهة المحتملة للمركب().
Sahafi Hotel attackالهجوم على فندق الصحفي
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On 9 November 2018, Al-Shabaab detonated three vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices outside the Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu.في 9 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018، فجرت حركة الشباب ثلاثة أجهزة متفجرة يدوية الصنع محمولة على مركبات خارج فندق الصحفي في مقديشو().
Five gunmen then assaulted the compound, dressed in what appeared to be newly issued Somali security forces uniforms and matching berets.ثم هاجم المجمع خمسة مسلحين يرتدون ما يبدو أنه الزي الرسمي الصادر حديثا لقوات الأمن الصومالية والقبعات الحمراء التي توافقه().
At least 50 people were killed and 100 injured in the attack, making it the deadliest since attack on 14 October 2017, which killed almost 600 (see S/2018/1002, annex 2.2).وقُتل في هذا الهجوم ما لا يقل عن 50 شخصا وأصيب 100 بجروح، مما جعل منه أدمى هجوم منذ هجوم 14 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2017، الذي أسفر عن مقتل حوالي 600 شخص (انظر S/2018/1002، المرفق 2-2).
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In addition, an AK-pattern assault rifle recovered from one of the gunmen had markings consistent with materiel imported in July 2017 by the Federal Government of Somalia.وإضافة إلى ذلك، كانت بندقية هجومية من طراز كالاشنيكوف مأخوذة من أحد المسلحين تحمل علامات متسقة مع العتاد الذي استوردته حكومة الصومال الاتحادية في تموز/يوليه 2017().
At least two unexploded hand grenades captured from the gunmen bore markings almost identical to those on several hand grenades seized from Al-Shabaab in Bulo Mareer by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces in March 2018 (see annexes 1.3 and 2.6).وكانت اثنتان على الأقل من القنابل اليدوية غير المتفجرة التي أُخذت من المسلحين تحملان علامات مماثلة تقريبا للعلامات الموجودة على عدة قنابل يدوية استولت عليها قوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية من حركة الشباب في بولو مرير في آذار/مارس 2018 (انظر المرفقين 1-3 و 2-6)().
Al-Shabaab financingتمويل حركة الشباب
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A 2018 report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea found that Al-Shabaab derived its revenue from a variety of domestic sources, primarily taxation on transiting vehicles and goods, agricultural taxation, business extortion and forced zakat (alms) levies (see S/2018/1002, annex 2.4).توصل تقرير صادر عن فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا في عام 2018 إلى أن حركة الشباب كانت تستمد إيراداتها من مجموعة متنوعة من المصادر المحلية، ولا سيما الضرائب على المركبات والبضائع العابرة والضرائب الزراعية وابتزاز الأعمال التجارية وفرض الزكاة جبرا (انظر S/2018/1002 المرفق 2-4).
Throughout the reporting period, the Panel found that Al-Shabaab continued to employ a system of extortion across southern and central Somalia, despite specific targeting of Al-Shabaab checkpoints by international forces.وتبين للفريق أن حركة الشباب ظلت، طوال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، تستخدم نظاما للابتزاز في جميع أنحاء جنوب ووسط الصومال، على الرغم من استهداف القوات الدولية لنقاط التفتيش التابعة لحركة الشباب بشكل محدد().
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In 2019, the Panel’s investigations established that Al-Shabaab further expanded its revenue base by incorporating the systematic taxation of goods imported into Mogadishu port.وفي عام 2019، أكدت التحقيقات التي أجراها فريق الخبراء أن حركة الشباب واصلت توسيع نطاق قاعدة إيراداتها عن طريق فرض ضرائب بصورة منهجية على البضائع المستوردة إلى ميناء مقديشو.
According to the Panel’s interviews with members of Mogadishu’s business community, Al-Shabaab has infiltrated Mogadishu’s port institutions as well as commercial shipping agents operating in the city.واستنادا إلى المقابلات التي أجراها الفريق مع أعضاء مجتمع الأعمال في مقديشو، فقد اخترقت حركة الشباب مؤسسات ميناء مقديشو، فضلا عن وكلاء النقل التجاري العاملين في المدينة().
Consequently, Al-Shabaab has obtained access to cargo manifests, which detail the nature, value and ownership of imported goods.وبناء على ذلك، تمكنت حركة الشباب من الحصول على قوائم الشحن، التي تورد بالتفصيل طبيعة السلع المستوردة وقيمتها وملكيتها().
From 1 to 7 April 2019, Al-Shabaab contacted business owners in Mogadishu, informing them that all imports into Mogadishu port would from that point on be subject to Al-Shabaab taxation.وفي الفترة من 1 إلى 7 نيسان/أبريل 2019، اتصلت حركة الشباب بأصحاب الأعمال التجارية في مقديشو، وأبلغتهم بأن جميع الواردات إلى ميناء مقديشو ستخضع منذ ذلك الوقت فصاعدا لنظام حركة الشباب للضرائب().
Al-Shabaab further demanded that Mogadishu businesses declare all imports to the group’s finance department prior to import, warning that all declarations would be corroborated by cross-referencing cargo manifests.كما طالبت حركة الشباب أصحاب الأعمال التجارية في مقديشو بالإعلان لإدارة الشؤون المالية التابعة للحركة عن جميع الواردات قبل الاستيراد، محذرة بأنه سيتم التحقق من جميع الإعلانات من خلال مطابقتها بقوائم الشحن().
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As an example, in late July 2019, a business entity based in a Gulf Cooperation Council country imported several thousand tons of building materials into Mogadishu port.فعلى سبيل المثال، استورد كيان تجاري في أواخر تموز/يوليه 2019 مقره في أحد بلدان مجلس التعاون الخليجي عدة آلاف من الأطنان من مواد البناء إلى ميناء مقديشو.
In early August 2019, Al-Shabaab contacted the business’s representative in Mogadishu by telephone, ordering him to immediately present himself at Al-Shabaab’s court at Mubarak, Lower Shabelle region.وفي أوائل آب/ أغسطس 2019، اتصلت حركة الشباب هاتفيا بالممثل التجاري في مقديشو وأمرته بالحضور فوراً إلى محكمة حركة الشباب في مبارك بإقليم شبيلي السفلى().
Upon arrival at the court, Al-Shabaab presented the representative with the cargo manifest from Mogadishu port, which highlighted the company’s consignments during the calendar year.وعند وصوله إلى المحكمة، عرضت حركة الشباب على الممثل قائمة الشحن الصادرة من ميناء مقديشو، والمبين فيها شحنات الشركة خلال السنة التقويمية.
Al-Shabaab demanded that the agent make a payment in excess of $70,000 in taxes to the group.وطلبت حركة الشباب من الوكيل دفع مبلغ تتجاوز قيمته 000 70 دولار كضريبة للحركة.
They further warned the agent that tax payments on future shipments should be made in advance.وعلاوة على ذلك، أنذروه بوجوب دفع الضرائب على الشحنات المستقبلية مقدماً.
Following consultation with the company’s management, the agent made the payment using an inter-account transfer with a Somali banking institution.وعقب التشاور مع إدارة الشركة، دفع الوكيل المبلغ عن طريق تحويل بين حسابات عميل مع مؤسسة مصرفية صومالية().
Al-Shabaab provided a receipt to the company for the transaction, a copy of which is contained in annex 1.4 (strictly confidential).وقدمت حركة الشباب إيصالًا للشركة عن المعاملة، وتوجد نسخة منه في المرفق 1-4 (سري للغاية).
Al-Shabaab’s justice systemنظام العدالة لحركة الشباب
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In addition to its ability to raise taxes, Al-Shabaab also provides some basic services typically associated with government, even in areas it does not physically control.بالإضافة إلى قدرة حركة الشباب على تحصيل الضرائب، فهي تقدم أيضا بعض الخدمات الأساسية المرتبطة عادة بالحكومة، حتى في المناطق التي لا تسيطر عليها بشكل فعلي.
In an environment where State institutions are limited or in some cases absent entirely, Al-Shabaab’s provision of rudimentary courts and access to judicial recourse – and the group’s ability to enforce its judgments through the threat of violence – may account for its appeal among certain segments of the population.وفي بيئةٍ ليس فيها لمؤسسات الدولة إلا وجود محدود أو تغيب فيها تلك المؤسسات تماما في بعض الحالات، فإن توفير حركة الشباب لمحاكم بدائية وإتاحتها اللجوء إلى القضاء - وقدرة الحركة على إنفاذ أحكامها عن طريق التهديد بالعنف - ربما وفر سببا لاجتذابها لبعض شرائح السكان.
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Al-Shabaab justice is often sought in relation to disputes over land ownership, most notably in Mogadishu.وغالباً ما يتم اللجوء إلى نظام حركة الشباب للعدالة فيما يتعلق بالمنازعات على ملكية الأراضي، ولا سيما في مقديشو.
As State justice is often costly, protracted and unpredictable, concerned parties often initiate dialogue with Al-Shabaab and request the group’s mediation in issues related to conflict over land ownership.ولأن التقاضي لدى الدولة غالبا ما يكون باهظ التكلفة وطويل الأمد ولا يمكن التنبؤ به، كثيرا ما تبدأ الأطراف المعنية بحوارٍ مع حركة الشباب وتطلب الوساطة في المسائل المتعلقة بالنزاع على ملكية الأراضي().
Al-Shabaab justice officials interview neighbours and other witnesses and call both the plaintiff and respondent to the group’s court at Tortoroow, near Afgoye, in order to render judgment.ويجري المسؤولون في نظام العدالة لدى الحركة مقابلات مع الجيران وغيرهم من الشهود، ويستدعون المدعي والمدعى عليه إلى محكمة الحركة في تورتورو بالقرب من أفغوي، من أجل إصدار الحكم.
The Panel has obtained a copy of an Al-Shabaab summons to a respondent in a land dispute case (see annex 1.5).وحصل فريق الخبراء على نسخة من استدعاء حركة الشباب لمدعى عليه في قضية نزاع على أرض (انظر المرفق 1-5).
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Al-Shabaab’s justice mechanisms may have appeal for disadvantaged groups who have limited or no access to State justice institutions.وقد تجتذب آليات العدالة لحركة الشباب الفئات المحرومة ذات القدرة المحدودة، أو المنعدمة، على اللجوء إلى مؤسسات الدولة القضائية.
For instance, in the absence of functioning family courts in rural areas, Al-Shabaab offers some women their only opportunity for financial compensation from ex-husbands and male relatives.فعلى سبيل المثال، في غياب محاكم أسرة يعول عليها في المناطق الريفية، توفر حركة الشباب لبعض النساء الفرصة الوحيدة للتعويض المالي من الأزواج السابقين والأقارب الذكور().
Notebooks recovered from deceased Al-Shabaab officials in 2018 in Bay region contained examples of Al-Shabaab judicial rulings on a diverse range of topics, including divorce and child support, theft, possession of weapons and the sale of livestock.وكانت الحواسيب المحمولة التي تم الحصول عليها من مسؤولين متوفين في حركة الشباب في منطقة باي عام 2018 تتضمن أمثلة على الأحكام القضائية لحركة الشباب بشأن طائفة متنوعة من المواضيع، بما في ذلك الطلاق وإعالة الأولاد والسرقة وحيازة الأسلحة وبيع الماشية.
Annex 1.5 contains documentation related to Al-Shabaab justice mechanisms.ويتضمن المرفق 1-5 وثائق بشأن آليات العدالة لحركة الشباب.
Regional operationsالعمليات الإقليمية
DusitD2 attack in Nairobiالهجوم على فندقDusitD2 في نيروبي
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On 15 January 2019, Al-Shabaab militants attacked a commercial business complex in Nairobi containing the DusitD2 Hotel.في 15 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019، هاجم مقاتلو حركة الشباب في نيروبي مجمعاً تجارياً يضم فندق DusitD2.
The attack began at approximately 15:25 UTC+3, commencing with a detonation of a suicide bomber.وبدأ الهجوم حوالي الساعة 15:25 بالتوقيت العالمي الموحد + 3 بتفجير انتحاري.
Four gunmen then proceeded to storm the compound using AK-pattern rifles and grenades, targeting people within the DusitD2 Hotel and surrounding businesses.واقتحم أربعة مسلحين المجمع باستخدام بنادق من طراز كلاشنيكوف وقنابل يدوية، مستهدفين الأشخاص داخل فندق 2DusitD والأعمال التجارية المحيطة.
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The attack resulted in 21 victims, as well as the 4 gunmen.وأسفر الهجوم عن وقوع 21 ضحية، فضلا عن أربعة مسلحين.
The date of the attack was significant, coinciding with the third anniversary of Al-Shabaab’s deadliest attack on AMISOM forces, when on 15 January 2016 militants overran a Kenyan Defence Forces AMISOM base at El Adde, Somalia, resulting in the deaths of approximately 150 Kenyan Defence Forces soldiers (S/2016/919, paras. 15–20).وكان لتاريخ الهجوم مغزى هام، فقد تزامن مع الذكرى السنوية الثالثة لأشد الهجمات فتكا لحركة الشباب على قوات بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال، عندما اقتحم مقاتلون في 15 كانون الثاني/يناير 2016 قاعدة لقوات الدفاع الكينية في بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في العدي بالصومال، مما أسفر عن مقتل حوالي 150 من جنود قوات الدفاع الكينية (انظر S/2016/919، الفقرات من 15 إلى 20).
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In a detailed statement released the day after the attack, Al-Shabaab announced that the operation – codenamed Al-Qudsu Lan Tuhawwad (“Jerusalem will never be Judaized”) – had targeted “western and Zionist interests worldwide and in support of our Muslim families in Palestine”.وفي بيان مفصل صدر في اليوم التالي للهجوم، أعلنت حركة الشباب أن العملية - التي أطلق عليها الاسم الرمزي القدس لن تُهوَّد - استهدفت ”المصالح الغربية والصهيونية في جميع أنحاء العالم لدعم أسرنا المسلمة في فلسطين“.
The rhetoric was atypical for Al-Shabaab, which in the past has justified its attacks against foreign actors, such as AMISOM troop-contributing countries, based upon their presence on Somali soil.وليس من عادة حركة الشباب إصدار هذه التبريرات، إذ كانت في الماضي تبرر هجماتها على الجهات الفاعلة الخارجية، مثل البلدان المساهمة بقوات في بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي، بتواجدها على الأراضي الصومالية.
Al-Shabaab’s pivot towards a focus on Western targets and the “liberation” of Jerusalem may be viewed in the context of the militant group’s ongoing competition within Somalia with ISIL, whose ideology has traditionally been more globalist than that of Al-Shabaab.وهذا التحوُّل لحركة الشباب باتجاه التركيز على الأهداف الغربية و ”تحرير“ القدس يمكن أن ينظر إليه في سياق منافسة الجماعة المقاتلة المستمرة داخل الصومال مع تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية، الذي درج على أن تكون أيديولوجيته أكثر عالميةً من أيديولوجية حركة الشباب.
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Almost one year prior to the DusitD2 attack, an Al-Shabaab vehicle-borne improvised explosive device operation, likely scheduled to take place on the second anniversary of the El Adde incident, was disrupted by Kenyan security forces in Merti, Isiolo County, Kenya (S/2018/1002, paras. 75–81).وقبل عام تقريبا من الهجوم على فندق DusitD2، أفشلت قوات الأمن الكينية في ميرتي، بمقاطعة إيزيولو، بكينيا عملية لحركة الشباب بالسيارات المفخخة كان مقرراً القيام بها على الأرجح في الذكرى السنوية الثانية لحادثة العدي (S/2018/1002، الفقرات من 75 إلى 81).
Evidence reviewed by the Panel indicates a likely overlap between the networks involved in the Merti and DusitD2 plots, including a financing middleman based in Mandera, Kenya (see “Financing of the attack”, below), as well as a Type 56-2 rifle used by one of the DusitD2 gunmen.وتشير الأدلة التي استعرضها فريق الخبراء إلى احتمال التداخل بين الشبكات الضالعة في التخطيط لعمليتي ميرتي و DusitD2، بما في ذلك وسيط تمويل مقره في منديرا، كينيا (انظر ”تمويل الهجوم“ أدناه)، وكذلك استخدام بندقية من طراز 56-2 من جانب أحد المسلحين المشاركين في الهجوم على فندق DusitD2.
Attacking teamالفريق المهاجم
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The Al-Shabaab attacking team consisted of four gunmen as well as a suicide bomber, Mahir Khalid Riziki.كان الفريق المهاجم التابع لحركة الشباب يتألف من أربعة مسلحين ومفجر انتحاري يدعى ماهر خالد الرزيقي.
Riziki was the only long-standing member of Al-Shabaab, having been known to Kenyan police due to his involvement in attacks along the Kenyan coast.والرزيقي هو العضو الوحيد منذ فترة طويلة في حركة الشباب، وكان معروفا لدى الشرطة الكينية بسبب ضلوعه في هجمات على طول الساحل الكيني().
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The leader and operator of the cell’s safehouse on the outskirts of Nairobi, Ali Salim Gichunge, was born in 1995 in Isiolo, Kenya.وقد ولد علي سالم غيتشونغي، وهو قائد ومشغل المخبأ السري للخلية المهاجِمة في ضواحي نيروبي، عام 1995 في إيزيولو بكينيا.
Unusually for a Kenyan operative within Al-Shabaab, Gichunge was given wide discretion and autonomy over the particulars of the plot – including the selection of the target – rather than being directly overseen from within Somalia.وبخلاف المعتاد بالنسبة لعنصر كيني في حركة الشباب، مُنِح غيتشونغي سلطة تقديرية واسعة واستقلالا ذاتيا فيما يتعلق بتفاصيل المخطط - بما في ذلك اختيار الهدف - بدلا من الخضوع للإشراف المباشر من داخل الصومال.
The three additional gunmen consisted of Osman Ibrahim Gedi, a Kenyan national;وضم المسلحون الإضافيون الثلاثة عثمان إبراهيم جيدي، وهو مواطن كيني؛
Siyat Omar Abdi, a refugee from Dadaab camp in Kenya;وسياط عمر عبدي، وهو لاجئ من معسكر داداب بكينيا؛
and an unknown Somali national who travelled from the Dadaab refugee camp.ومواطن صومالي مجهول الهوية، وقد سافروا من مخيم داداب للاجئين.
Each of the attackers were found to be in possession of multiple identification documents, some of which were genuine, and others which had been obtained through corruption or were entirely manufactured.ووجد في حوزة كل من المهاجمين وثائق هوية متعددة، بعضها أصلي، أما الوثائق الأخرى فقد تم الحصول عليها بالرشوة أو كانت مزورة بالكامل.
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In order to mislead law enforcement, members of the attacking cell travelled separately and came together in Nairobi only two days prior to the attack.وبغية تضليل هيئات إنفاذ القانون، سافر أعضاء الخلية كل منهم على حدة واجتمعوا في نيروبي قبل يومين فقط من الهجوم.
One day before the attack the selection of the target had yet to be finalized, with members of the cell conducting reconnaissance at an alternative location in northern Nairobi.وقبل الهجوم بيوم واحد، لم يكن أمر الهدف قد حسم نهائياً، وقام أعضاء الخلية باستطلاع موقع بديل في شمال نيروبي.
Financing of the attackتمويل الهجوم
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A key financing link between Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the attacking cell in Kenya was Abdi Ali Mohamed, a Kenyan national based in Mandera.كان عبدي علي محمد، وهو مواطن كيني مقيم في منديرا، بمثابة حلقة الوصل التمويلية الأساسية بين حركة الشباب في الصومال والخلية المهاجمة في كينيا.
Mohamed subsequently used three phone numbers to send almost K Sh 700,000 ($7,000) – typically structured in transfers of K Sh 70,000 ($700) – to cell leader Ali Salim Gichunge, using M-PESA, the principal mobile phone money service in Kenya.وقد استخدم محمد في وقت لاحق ثلاثة أرقام هاتفية لإرسال ما يقارب 000 700 شلن كيني (000 7 دولار) - مقسمة حسب المعتاد إلى تحويلات كل تحويل منها بقيمة 000 70 شلن كيني (700 دولار) - إلى زعيم الخلية علي سالم غيتشونغي، عبر خدمة M-PESA، وهي الخدمة المالية الرئيسية عبر الهاتف المحمول في كينيا.
One of Mohamed’s phone numbers had also been used in early 2018 to transfer funds to Abdimajit Adan, an Al-Shabaab operative arrested by Kenyan security forces in February 2018 in connection with a planned vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack in Nairobi (see S/2018/1002, annex 2.3), indicating an overlap in the planning of the two operations.وقد تم استخدام أحد أرقام محمد الهاتفية أيضاً في أوائل عام 2018 لتحويل أموال إلى عبد المجيد عدن، وهو عنصر تابع لحركة الشباب ألقت القبض عليه قوات الأمن الكينية في شباط/فبراير 2018 على خلفية تدبير هجوم بسيارة مفخخة بمتفجرات يدوية الصنع في نيروبي (انظر S/2018/1002، المرفق 2-3)، مما يشير إلى حدوث تداخل في التخطيط للعمليتين.
A conservative estimate of the total cost of the DusitD2 operation was between $45,000 and $50,000 (see annex 1.6.1 (strictly confidential)).وتشير تقديرات متحفظة إلى أن إجمالي تكلفة عملية فندق DusitD2 تترواح بين 000 45 و 000 50 دولار (انظر المرفق 1-6-1 (سري للغاية)).
Type 56-2 rifleالبندقية طراز 56-2
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The serial number and additional markings on the weapon used by one of the DusitD2 gunmen indicate the strong likelihood that the rifle was part of a consignment of 3,500 Type 56-2 rifles purchased by the Federal Government of Somalia from the Government of Ethiopia in 2013 immediately following the partial lifting of the arms embargo.يشير الرقم المتسلسل للسلاح الذي استخدمه أحد المسلحين الذين هاجموا فندق DusitD2 والعلامات الإضافية التي يحملها السلاح إلى قوة احتمال أن تكون تلك البندقية جزءا من شحنة تتألف من 500 3 بندقية من طراز 56-2 اشترتها حكومة الصومال الاتحادية من حكومة إثيوبيا في عام 2013 فور الرفع الجزئي للحظر المفروض على الأسلحة().
The Al-Shabaab operatives arrested by Kenyan police in February 2018 were found in possession of four Type 56-2 rifles that had also formed part of the 2013 consignment (see S/2018/1002, annex 2.3).ووجدت الشرطة الكينية في حوزة عناصر حركة الشباب الذين ألقت القبض عليهم في شباط/فبراير 2018 أربع بنادق من طراز 56-2، تمثل أيضا جزءا من شحنة عام 2013 (انظر S/2018/1002، المرفق 2-3).
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Annex 1.6 contains a detailed case study of the DusitD2 attack.ويتضمن المرفق 1-6 دراسة حالة مفصلة عن الهجوم على فندق DusitD2.
Additional Al-Shabaab networks in East Africaشبكات حركة الشباب الإضافية في شرق أفريقيا
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Evidence gathered from the DusitD2 investigation revealed the existence of additional Al-Shabaab cells in the region, connected through at least two cell coordinators located in the Al-Shabaab stronghold of Jilib.كشفت الأدلة التي جمعت من التحقيق في الهجوم على فندق DusitD2 عن وجود خلايا إضافية لحركة الشباب في المنطقة، متصل بعضها ببعض من خلال اثنين على الأقل من منسقي الخلايا موجوديْن في معقل الحركة في جِلِب().
Electronic communications, conducted for the most part in fluent English, indicated evidence of planned operations to kidnap foreign nationals in the area around Naivasha and Nakuru, Kenya, in February 2019;وأشارت اتصالات إلكترونية، كانت تتم في معظم الأحيان بلغة إنكليزية طلقة، إلى وجود أدلة على عمليات مدبرة لاختطاف رعايا أجانب في المنطقة المحيطة بنيفاشا وناكورو بكينيا، في شباط/فبراير 2019؛
the plots were successfully foiled by the Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Police Unit.وقد أحبطت وحدة شرطة مكافحة الإرهاب الكينية بنجاح هذه المخططات().
Local cell leaders (“emirs”) were required to submit monthly reports to Jilib on the cell’s activities.وكان قادة الخلايا المحليون (”الأمراء“) ملزمين بتقديم تقارير شهرية إلى جِلِب بشأن أنشطة خلية كل منهم.
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The Jilib-based cell coordinators provided funds to operatives in Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania upon request, with the emir of each cell required to submit a list of estimated expenditures, including a monthly salary of $700 for each operative.وكان منسقو الخلايا المتمركزون في جِلِب يقدمون أموالا لعناصر تابعة للحركة في كينيا وتنزانيا عند الطلب، وكان على أمير كل خلية تقديم قائمة بالنفقات المقدرة، بما في ذلك المرتبات الشهرية البالغة 700 دولار لكل عنصر.
Upon the receipt of a request, the coordinator would instruct Al-Shabaab’s finance department to transfer funds to a phone number provided by the operative, using M-PESA mobile money.وعند تلقي الطلب، كان المنسق يوعز لإدارة الشؤون المالية بحركة الشباب بتحويل الأموال إلى رقم هاتف يوفره العنصر، باستخدام خدمة M-PESA النقالة لتحويل الأموال.
Financial requests were readily forthcoming and rarely questioned;وكانت الطلبات المالية تلبى بيسر ونادرا ما كان يشكك بها؛
in one case, a cell coordinator provided $6,000 – including $1,000 to pay for a wedding – to a sleeper agent in the United Republic of Tanzania in order to establish a bakery in Dar es Salaam and obtain Tanzanian identification documents.وفي إحدى الحالات، قدم أحد منسقي الخلايا 000 6 دولار - بما في ذلك 000 1 دولار كدفعة لحفلة زفاف - لعميل من الخلايا النائمة في جمهورية تنزانيا المتحدة من أجل إنشاء مخبز في دار السلام والحصول على وثائق هوية تنزانية.
On the occasions when cell coordinators rejected operatives’ requests, it was due to operational concerns rather than the amount requested.وفي الحالات التي كان منسقو الخلايا يرفضون فيها طلبات العناصر، كان يعزى ذلك إلى شواغل عملياتية وليس إلى المبلغ المطلوب.
For instance, a cell coordinator rejected an operative’s request to purchase a Toyota Surf four-wheel-drive vehicle because such a vehicle would not fit his cover profile as a university student.فعلى سبيل المثال، رفض منسق خلية طلباً لأحد العناصر بشراء مركبة رباعية الدفع من طراز Toyota Surf لأنها غير مناسبة لتغطي صفته كطالب جامعي.
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Based on analyses of the communications, the Panel estimates that Al-Shabaab operatives in Somalia transferred approximately $100,000 to four cells based in East Africa from March 2018 to February 2019.واستنادا إلى تحليل لمحتوى هذه الاتصالات، يقدر الفريق أن عناصر حركة الشباب في الصومال قد حولوا ما يقارب 000 100 دولار إلى أربع خلايا تتمركز في شرق أفريقيا في الفترة بين آذار/ مارس 2018 وشباط/فبراير 2019.
49.49 -
See annex 1.7 (strictly confidential) for a detailed account of Al-Shabaab operations in East Africa.انظر المرفق 1-7 (سري للغاية) للاطلاع على سرد مفصل لعمليات حركة الشباب في شرق أفريقيا.
Recruitment within Kenyaالتجنيد داخل كينيا
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Electronic communications between the cell coordinators in Jilib and their field operatives also provided a unique insight into Al-Shabaab’s recruitment techniques within Kenya.توفر أيضاً الاتصالات الإلكترونية بين منسقي الخلايا في جِلِب وعناصرهم في الميدان نظرة فريدة في أساليب التجنيد التي تستخدمها حركة الشباب في كينيا.
Operatives in Kenya on several occasions suggested possible recruits, individuals usually known to them through criminal associations.وقد اقترحت عناصر في كينيا في عدة مناسبات تجنيدا محتملا لأفراد يعرفونهم عادة من خلال عصابات إجرامية.
In one instance, an operative suggested recruiting “AH”, a Kenyan national of non-Somali ethnicity with whom he had conducted past robberies.وفي إحدى الحالات، اقترح عنصر تجنيد ”AH“، وهو مواطن كيني من إثنية غير صومالية اشترك معه في عمليات سطو في السابق.
The Jilib-based cell coordinator facilitated the travel of “AH” to Somalia at El Wak in December 2018, where “AH” underwent training in Gedo region for only 24 days before returning to Kenya in January 2019.وسهل منسق خلية جِلِب سفر ”AH“ إلى الصومال في الواك في كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018، حيث خضع ”AH“ لتدريب في منطقة غدو لفترة 24 يوماً فقط قبل العودة إلى كينيا في كانون الثاني/يناير 2019.
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The case of “AH” was typical in terms of the route taken by Kenyan recruits to reach Somalia – through Al-Shabaab’s preferred transit point at El Wak – as well as the conduct of his training in Gedo region.وحالة ”AH“ تندرج في إطار المعتاد من حيث الطريق الذي يسلكه المجندون الكينيون للوصول إلى الصومال - من خلال نقاط العبور المفضلة لحركة الشباب في الواك - وكذلك من حيث تدريبه في منطقة غدو.
In other facets, however, the case represents a newly observed dimension of Al-Shabaab’s recruitment strategy, whereby the possession of criminal skills, including knowledge of evading law enforcement, are privileged over ideology or affiliation with certain mosques or religious networks.غير أن القضية تمثل من جوانب أخرى بعداً جديداً لاستراتيجية حركة الشباب للتجنيد، حيث يتم تفضيل امتلاك مهارات إجرامية، بما في ذلك معرفة كيفية الهروب من هيئات إنفاذ القانون، على الأيديولوجية أو الانتماء لبعض المساجد أو الشبكات الدينية.
Cross-border attacks into Kenyaالهجمات العابرة للحدود إلى داخل كينيا
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During the reporting period Al-Shabaab stepped up hit-and-run and improvised explosive device attacks along the Somalia-Kenya border, particularly during the months of June and July 2019, which saw a total of 30 incidents.خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، كثفت حركة الشباب الهجمات التي تتميز بالكر والفر وتستخدم الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع على حدود الصومال - كينيا، ولا سيما خلال فترة شهري حزيران/يونيه وتموز/يوليه 2019، التي شهدت ما مجموعه 30 حادثاً.
The geographical scope of the attacks ranged from the northernmost border point with Somalia, at Mandera, Kenya, to the southern border in Lamu County, spanning almost 700 km.وتراوح النطاق الجغرافي لهذه الهجمات من أقصى نقطة حدودية مع الصومال في الشمال، في منديرا، إلى الحدود الجنوبية في مقاطعة لامو، بما يغطي حوالي 700 كم.
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The most serious cross-border incident occurred on 15 June 2019 in Konton, Wajir County, Kenya, when eight Kenyan police officers were killed and several others injured by an improvised explosive device.ووقع أخطر حادث عبر الحدود في 15 حزيران/يونيه 2019 في كونتون بمقاطعة واجير، كينيا، عندما قُتل ثمانية عناصر من الشرطة الكينية، وجُرح عدد آخر بواسطة جهاز متفجر يدوي الصنع.
The attack occurred just one day after three Kenyan police reservists were kidnapped, also in the Konton area.وقد وقع الهجوم بعد يوم واحد فقط من خطف ثلاثة من أفراد الاحتياط في الشرطة الكينية، وذلك في منطقة كونتون أيضاً.
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The increased frequency of Al-Shabaab’s attacks into Kenya may be a result of heightened diplomatic tensions between the two countries (see “Maritime border dispute with Kenya”, below) which the militant group may be seeking to exploit.وقد تكون زيادة تواتر هجمات حركة الشباب باتجاه كينيا ناتجة عن اشتداد التوترات الدبلوماسية بين البلدين (انظر ”النزاع بشأن الحدود البحرية مع كينيا“ أدناه) التي يحتمل أن الجماعة المسلحة تسعى حاليا لاستغلالها.
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Annex 1.8 contains additional information on Al-Shabaab’s cross-border attacks into Kenya.ويتضمن المرفق 1-8 معلومات إضافية عن هجمات حركة الشباب عبر الحدود باتجاه كينيا.
B.باء -
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant factionالفصيل التابع لتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام
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In 2018, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported that the ISIL faction based in the Bari region of Puntland, headed by Abdulqader Mu’min, had entered a period of retrenchment and reorganization, and also detailed the emergence of an ISIL assassination network based in Mogadishu and Afgoye (S/2018/1002, paras. 93–97).في عام 2018، أفاد فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا بأن الفصيل التابع لتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام الموجود في منطقة باري في بونتلاند، والذي يقوده عبد القادر مؤمن، قد دخل فترة من تقليص أنشطته وإعادة تنظيم صفوفه، كما أورد بالتفصيل ظهور شبكة اغتيالات تابعة لتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في مقديشو وأفغوي (S/2018/1002، الفقرات 93 إلى 97).
During the reporting period the Panel of Experts noted a violent upheaval in the faction’s leadership, and an apparently concerted effort by the group to build a revenue base using extortion tactics against businesses and individuals similar to those employed by Al-Shabaab.وخلال الفترة المشمولة بتقرير فريق الخبراء، لاحظ الفريق اضطرابا عنيفا في قيادة الفصيل، وجهودا تبدو متضافرة تبذلها الجماعة لبناء قاعدة إيرادات باستخدام أساليب الابتزاز ضد المؤسسات التجارية والأفراد على غرار الأساليب التي تستخدمها حركة الشباب.
An internal assessment by the United States-trained Puntland Security Force, obtained by the Panel in late November 2018, estimated that the group may comprise as many as 340 militants, which, if accurate, would represent a significant increase from the Monitoring Group’s previous estimate of up to 200 fighters (S/2017/924, para. 32).وتشير التقديرات التي وردت في تقييم داخلي أجرته قوة أمن بونتلاند المدربة من الولايات المتحدة وحصل عليه فريق الخبراء في أواخر تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018 إلى أن الفصيل قد يناهز عدد أفراده 340 مقاتلا، ويشكل هذا العدد، إذا كان دقيقا، زيادة كبيرة عن التقديرات السابقة لفريق الرصد التي وصلت إلى 200 مقاتل (S/2017/924، الفقرة 32).
Leadership struggleالصراع على القيادة
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The end of 2018 saw a violent leadership contest between Abdirashid Luqmaan and ISIL deputy leader Mahad Moalim and his supporters, principally Mohamed Ahmed Qahiye and Abdihakim Dhuqub.شهدت نهاية عام 2018 سباقا عنيفا لتولي القيادة بين عبد الرشيد لقمان ونائب قائد تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية مهد معلم() ومؤيديه، وبصورة أساسية محمد أحمد كاهيي() وعبد الحكيم ذوقوب().
On 13 October, Moalim was found shot dead in Mogadishu’s Hodan district.وفي 13 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر، عثر على معلم مقتولا بطلق ناري في مديرية هُدَن في مقديشو.
Around 18 November, Qahiye received an amnesty from the then President of Puntland, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gass”, and thereafter left Puntland for Ethiopia in fear for his safety.وفي 18 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر تقريبا، تلقى كاهيي عفوا من رئيس بونتلاند آنذاك عبد الولي محمد علي ”غاس“ ثم غادر بونتلاند متجها إلى إثيوبيا خوفا على سلامته().
On 14 April 2019, Abdihakim Dhuqub was killed by a United States airstrike in the vicinity of the town of Xiriiro in north-east Puntland.وفي 14 نيسان/ أبريل 2019، قتل عبد الحكيم ذوقوب في غارة جوية للولايات المتحدة في محيط بلدة حريرو في شمال شرق بونتلاند().
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Following the purge, Abdirashid Luqmaan (Darod/Leelkase) emerged as the de facto leader of the ISIL faction, although Abdulqader Mu’min maintains his role as the group’s emir and spiritual head.وفي أعقاب التطهير، أصبح عبد الرشيد لقمان (دارود/ليلكسي) هو الزعيم الفعلي لفصيل تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية، على الرغم من احتفاظ عبد القادر مؤمن بصفته كأمير الجماعة وزعيمها الروحي.
Luqmaan is likely the same individual identified in the final report of 2017 of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea report as Abdiqani “Luqmaan” (Darod/Leelkase), the head of ISIL military operations (see S/2017/924, annex 2.2).ويرجح أن يكون لقمان هو نفس الشخص المحدد في التقرير النهائي لفريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا لعام 2017 بوصفه Abdiqani “Luqmaan” (Darod/Leelkase) رئيس العمليات العسكرية لتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية (انظر S/2017/924، المرفق 2-2).
Unconfirmed intelligence from an internal report of the Puntland Security Force indicates that Luqmaan is between 40 and 48 years of age and had been a religious leader within Al-Shabaab in Galkayo before defecting to the ISIL faction in 2015.وتشير معلومات استخباراتية غير مؤكدة مستقاة من تقرير داخلي أعدته قوة أمن بونتلاند إلى أن لقمان يتراوح عمره بين 40 و 48 عاما، وكان زعيما دينيا داخل حركة الشباب في غالكعيو قبل انشقاقه وانضمامه إلى فصيل تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في عام 2015.
Conflict with Al-Shabaab in Bari regionالصراع مع حركة الشباب في منطقة باري
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In December 2018, fighting broke out between the ISIL faction and Al-Shabaab in Bari region for the first time since early 2016, centred on crucial water sources in the mountainous areas of Bari region (see annex 1.9).في كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018، اندلع القتال بين فصيل تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية وحركة الشباب في منطقة باري للمرة الأولى منذ مطلع عام 2016، وتمحور القتال حول مصادر المياه الحيوية في المناطق الجبلية من منطقة باري (انظر المرفق 1-9).
Intense conflict between the ISIL faction and Al-Shabaab had been ongoing since November 2018, when both groups appear to have begun competing to extort businesses in Mogadishu and Puntland.وكان الصراع العنيف بين فصيل تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية وحركة الشباب مستمرا منذ تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018، عندما بدأت الجماعتان على ما يبدو في التنافس لابتزاز المؤسسات التجارية في مقديشو وبونتلاند.
Eleven employees of Hormuud Somalia Inc., the largest telecommunications company in Somalia, were killed during November 2018 in Mogadishu by gunmen reportedly affiliated with ISIL and Al-Shabaab.وكان أحد عشر موظفا من العاملين في شركة هرمود الصومال المحدودة، أكبر شركة للاتصالات السلكية واللاسلكية في الصومال، قد لقوا مصرعهم خلال شهر تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018 في مقديشو على يد مسلحين أفيد بأنهم ينتمون إلى كل من فصيل تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية وحركة الشباب.
Financing of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant factionتمويل فصيل تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام
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After the ISIL faction emerged in October 2015, investigations by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea concluded that the financial resources at the group’s disposal were minimal, and that it was unlikely to have received significant support from outside of Somalia;بعد ظهور فصيل تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2015، توصلت التحقيقات التي أجراها فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا إلى أن الموارد المالية المتاحة للفصيل كانت ضئيلة، وأنه من غير المرجح أن يكون قد تلقى دعما كبيرا من خارج الصومال؛
interviews with former ISIL members suggested that the group was barely capable of paying its own personnel (S/2017/924, paras. 36–42).وفُهم من مقابلات أجريت مع أعضاء سابقين في تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية أن الفصيل كان بالكاد قادرا على دفع الأموال لأفراده (انظر S/2017/924، الفقرات من 36 إلى 42).
However, during the reporting period, the faction launched efforts to generate domestic revenues, using extortion methods similar to those of Al-Shabaab.بيد أن الفصيل قد شرع، خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، في بذل جهود لتوليد إيرادات محلية، باستخدام أساليب الابتزاز المماثلة لأساليب حركة الشباب.
In October 2018, for instance, the ISIL faction successfully extorted the Puntland-based telecommunications company Amtel into making a payment totalling several hundred thousand dollars.ففي تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2018، على سبيل المثال، نجح فصيل تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في ابتزاز شركة أمتل للاتصالات السلكية واللاسلكية في بونتلاند لدفع مبلغ مالي مجموعه عدة مئات من الآلاف من الدولارات.
Employees of other companies in Puntland were assassinated in August and November 2018 after they reportedly refused to accede to the ISIL faction’s “taxation” demands.واغتيل عاملون في شركات أخرى في بونتلاند في آب/أغسطس وتشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018 بعد ما أفيد عنه من رفضهم الانصياع لمطالب دفع ”الضرائب“ إلى فصيل تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية.
Annex 1.9 contains further information on the ISIL faction’s attempts to create a revenue base in Puntland.ويتضمن المرفق 1-9 مزيدا من المعلومات عن محاولات فصيل تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية إنشاء قاعدة إيرادات في بونتلاند.
Plot to attack the Vaticanمخطط شن هجوم على الفاتيكان
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On 17 December 2018, Somali national and ISIL affiliate Omar Moshin Ibrahim, also known as Anas Khalil, was arrested in Bari, Italy, in connection with a planned attack on the Vatican and other targets in Italy, to coincide with the Christmas celebrations on December 25.في 17 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018، ألقي القبض على المواطن الصومالي المنتسب لتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية عمر محسن إبراهيم، المعروف أيضا باسم أنس خليل، في باري، إيطاليا، على خلفية هجوم مدبر على الفاتيكان وعلى أهداف أخرى في إيطاليا، بالتزامن مع الاحتفالات بعيد الميلاد في 25 كانون الأول/ديسمبر.
While the plot was rudimentary and had little chance of success, the Panel’s investigations, assisted by Italian authorities, revealed links between “Anas Khalil” and prominent ISIL operatives in Somaliland, Puntland, Libya and Kenya.وفي حين كان المخطط بدائيا وكانت حظوظه في النجاح ضئيلة، كشفت التحقيقات التي أجراها الفريق، بمساعدة السلطات الإيطالية، عن وجود صلات بين ”أنس خليل“ وعناصر بارزة في تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في صوماليلاند وبونتلاند وليبيا وكينيا.
The Vatican plot represents the first instance in which ISIL elements in Somalia were directly linked to an attempted terrorist attack outside the country.ويمثل مخطط شن هجوم على الفاتيكان الحالة الأولى التي يرتبط فيها عناصر تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في الصومال ارتباطا مباشرا بمحاولة تنفيذ هجوم إرهابي خارج البلد.
Omar Moshin Ibrahimعمر محسن إبراهيم
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Omar Moshin Ibrahim, also known as Anas Khalil, was born in Qardho, Puntland, in October 1998.ولد عمر محسن إبراهيم، المعروف أيضا باسم أنس خليل، في قرطو، بونتلاند، في تشرين الأول/ أكتوبر 1998.
He entered Italy at the end of 2016 through Sicily, on humanitarian grounds.ودخل إيطاليا في نهاية عام 2016 عن طريق صقلية لدواعٍ إنسانية().
Prior to his arrival in Italy, “Anas Khalil” lived in Nairobi and subsequently travelled to Libya in 2016, where he received training for the better part of a year.وقبل وصوله إلى إيطاليا، كان ”أنس خليل“ يعيش في نيروبي، ثم سافر إلى ليبيا في عام 2016 حيث تلقى التدريب طوال الجزء الأكبر من العام.
In Libya, “Anas Khalil” was affiliated with Abu Ayman Al Kinye, an ISIL officer reportedly responsible for “logistics and immigration” whose nom de guerre suggests a Kenyan connection.وفي ليبيا، ارتبط ”أنس خليل“ بأبي أيمن الكيني، وهو مسؤول في تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية أفيد بتوليه مسؤولية ”اللوجستيات والهجرة“()، ويشير اسمه الحركي إلى أن له ارتباطات كينية.
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“Anas Khalil” was domiciled in Bari, in southern Italy, from March 2017 to December 2018.وكان ”أنس خليل“ مقيما في باري في جنوب إيطاليا في الفترة بين آذار/مارس 2017 وكانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018.
During his time in Italy, he maintained communication with ISIL affiliates in Somalia and Kenya.وخلال الفترة التي قضاها في إيطاليا، استمر اتصاله بجهات منتسبة لتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في الصومال وكينيا.
However, intercepted communications indicate that “Anas Khalil” devised the plan to plant a bomb in St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome on 25 December, Christmas Day, of his own accord and was not directly tasked by ISIL operatives outside the country.بيد أن الاتصالات التي جرى اعتراضها تشير إلى أن ”أنس خليل“ وضع الخطة لزرع قنبلة في كاتدرائية القديس بطرس في روما في يوم عيد الميلاد، 25 كانون الأول/ديسمبر، من تلقاء نفسه، ولم يتلقَّ تكليفا مباشرا بذلك من عناصر تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية خارج البلد.
Following those communications, Italian authorities arrested “Anas Khalil” as a pre-emptive measure before the plot could be further developed.وعقب هذه الاتصالات، ألقت السلطات الإيطالية القبض على ”أنس خليل“ كتدبير استباقي قبل أن يتسنى له المضي قدما في الخطة.
Affiliates in Somalia and Kenyaالمنتسبون في الصومال وكينيا
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Stored in “Anas Khalil’s” mobile phone contacts was an entry corresponding to Abdullahi Mohamud Yusuf (also known as Abu Hatim, Mad Mullah and Majerteni), a Puntland-born global ISIL recruiter and facilitator who was arrested and imprisoned in Somaliland in 2018.تضمنت جهات الاتصال المخزنة في هاتف ”أنس خليل“ المحمول عبد الله محمود يوسف (المعروف أيضا باسم أبو حاتم؛ والملا المجنون؛ ومجرتيني)، وهو مجنِّد ووسيط لتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية مولود في بونتلاند وألقي القبض عليه وسجن في صوماليلاند في عام 2018.
Upon his arrest Yusuf was found with documents outlining the overall strategy of ISIL for expansion in East Africa.وعند إلقاء القبض على يوسف، وجد بحوزته وثائق تبين الاستراتيجية العامة لتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية للتوسع في شرق أفريقيا().
According to information received from Somaliland authorities, Yusuf had visited 12 countries across Africa and the Middle East, including South Africa, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kenya.ووفقا للمعلومات الواردة من سلطات صوماليلاند، قام يوسف بزيارة 12 بلدا في أفريقيا والشرق الأوسط، بما في ذلك جنوب أفريقيا والسودان والمملكة العربية السعودية والعراق وكينيا().
In addition, in 2015 Yusuf was located in Libya, where he worked in the ISIL “immigration department”.وإضافة إلى ذلك، كان يوسف موجودا في ليبيا في عام 2015، حيث كان يعمل في ”إدارة الهجرة“ التابعة لتنظيم الدولة الإسلامية().
He also reportedly previously fought with ISIL forces near Tikrit, Iraq.كما أفيد بأنه سبق أن قاتل مع قوات تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية بالقرب من تكريت، العراق().
While initially affiliated with the leader of the ISIL faction in Puntland, Abdulqader Mu’min, Yusuf later broke with Mu’min over their divergent visions for ISIL in East Africa.وبينما كان يوسف مرتبطا في البداية بزعيم فصيل تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في بونتلاند، عبد القادر مؤمن، فقد حدثت قطيعة بينهما لاحقا بسبب تبنيهما رؤى متباينة بخصوص تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في شرق أفريقيا().
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Another frequent contact of “Anas Khalil” was his brother based in Somaliland, Abdirauf Omar Ibrahim (also known as Abdirashid Khalil, Abdirauf Khalil and Big Debro), who as of the time of writing was also imprisoned in Hargeisa on terrorism charges, but was scheduled to be released in December 2019.ومن بين جهات الاتصال المتكررة الأخرى لأنس خليل أخوه المقيم في صوماليلاند، عبد الرؤوف عمر إبراهيم (المعروف أيضا باسم عبد الرشيد خليل؛ وعبد الرؤوف خليل؛ و Big Debro)، الذي كان أيضا، وقت كتابة هذا التقرير، مسجونا في هرجيسا بتهم تتعلق بالإرهاب، ولكن كان من المقرر الإفراج عنه في كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2019.
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See annex 1.10 (strictly confidential) for a link chart of the ISIL plot.انظر المرفق 1-10 (سري للغاية) للاطلاع على رسم بياني للاتصالات المتعلقة بمخطط هجوم تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية.
C.جيم -
Explosives intended for commercial useالمتفجرات المزمع استخدامها لأغراض تجارية
MV Oriental Queenالسفينة التجارية Oriental Queen MV
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On 10 March 2019, the United Republic of Tanzania-flagged general cargo vessel MV Oriental Queen (IMO No. 8200797) departed the port of Mersin, Turkey, transporting 180 tons of explosives, including 165 tons of ammonium nitrate/fuel oil, as well as detonators.في 10 آذار/مارس 2019، غادرت سفينة البضائع العامة التي ترفع علم جمهورية تنزانيا المتحدة MV Oriental Queen (رقم تسجيل المنظمة البحرية الدولية: 8200797) ميناء مرسين، تركيا، وعلى متنها 180 طنا من المتفجرات، بما في ذلك 165 طنا من مزيج نترات الأمونيوم وزيت الوقود، فضلا عن أجهزة تفجير.
The explosives were offloaded at Bosaso port on 17 May and subsequently transported to a storage site in the village of Jariiban, located approximately 65 km north-west of the littoral town of Garacad, Puntland.وأفرغت المتفجرات في ميناء بوصاصو في 17 أيار/مايو، ونقلت لاحقا إلى موقع تخزين في قرية جارييبان التي تقع حوالي 65 كيلومترا إلى الشمال الغربي من بلدة غرعد الساحلية، في بونتلاند.
The explosives were intended to be used for blasting related to the construction of a port in Garacad, as well as the corresponding road to the capital of Puntland, Garowe.وكان من المزمع استخدام المتفجرات في عمليات تفجير متصلة بتشييد ميناء في غرعد، وبالطريق المقابل لغاروي عاصمة بونتلاند.
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In a letter dated 28 March 2019 addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992), the Panel expressed concern that the materiel contained in the consignment could be diverted for the construction of improvised explosive devices by Al-Shabaab or the ISIL faction based in Puntland, and requested the Committee’s guidance.وفي رسالة مؤرخة 28 آذار/مارس 2019 موجهة إلى رئيس لجنة مجلس الأمن العاملة بموجب القرار 751 (1992)، أعرب الفريق عن القلق من أن المواد الموجودة في الشحنة يمكن تحويل مسار استخدامها لتركيب أجهزة متفجرة يدوية الصنع من جانب حركة الشباب أو فصيل تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية الموجوديْن في بونتلاند، وطلب الفريق توجيهات اللجنة في هذا الصدد.
The Committee subsequently determined that explosives intended for commercial use fell outside the scope of the arms embargo but shared the Panel’s view that the shipment represented a threat to peace, security and stability in Somalia.وقررت اللجنة لاحقا أن المتفجرات المزمع استخدامها لأغراض تجارية تقع خارج نطاق حظر توريد الأسلحة، غير أنها شاطرت رأي الفريق القائل إن هذه الشحنة تمثل تهديدا للسلام والأمن والاستقرار في الصومال.
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There is currently no requirement under the arms embargo regime for transfers of commercial explosives to Somalia to be notified to the Committee.ولا يوجد حاليا أي اشتراط بموجب نظام حظر توريد الأسلحة يقضي بإخطار اللجنة بعمليات نقل المتفجرات المزمع استخدامها لأغراض تجارية إلى الصومال.
Accordingly, the Panel of Experts recommends that future deliveries of commercial explosives be subject to, at minimum, a notification for the Committee’s information, and that Member States exercise vigilance over entities under their jurisdiction that supply commercial explosives to Somalia (see section VIII, below).ومن ثم، يوصي فريق الخبراء أن تخضع عمليات التسليم المقبلة للمتفجرات المزمع استخدامها لأغراض تجارية، كحد أدنى، لإخطار اللجنة لغرض العلم، وأن تتوخى الدول الأعضاء اليقظة حيال الكيانات الخاضعة لولايتها التي تورد المتفجرات المزمع استخدامها لأغراض تجارية إلى الصومال (انظر الفرع الثامن أدناه).
D.دال -
Federal-regional relationsالعلاقات الاتحادية - الإقليمية
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During the reporting period, political relations between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states deteriorated.أثناء الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، تدهورت العلاقات السياسية بين حكومة الصومال الاتحادية والولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد.
Federal-regional tensions also highlighted the absence of appropriate constitutional mechanisms that clearly delineate the respective roles of Federal Government and federal member state authorities in regional electoral processes.كما أبرزت التوترات الاتحادية - الإقليمية غياب آليات دستورية مناسبة تحدد بوضوح أدوار كل من سلطات الحكومة الاتحادية والولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد في العمليات الانتخابية الإقليمية.
South-West State electoral processالعملية الانتخابية في ولاية جنوب الغرب
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In late 2018, the regional presidential electoral process in South-West State was marred by multiple postponements, resignations, allegations of excessive interference by the Federal Government and a deterioration in the security environment that resulted in the killing of 15 civilians.في أواخر عام 2018، شابت عملية الانتخابات الرئاسية الإقليمية في ولاية جنوب الغرب عدة تأجيلات واستقالات وادعاءات متعلقة بالإفراط في التدخل من جانب الحكومة الاتحادية، وشهدت تدهورا في البيئة الأمنية أسفر عن مقتل 15 مدنيا.
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In November and December 2018, the South-West State electoral process was postponed on three separate occasions owing to the resignation of the original South-West State electoral committee, the withdrawal of key candidates and a lack of consensus on the eligibility of presidential candidates.ففي تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر وكانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018، أُجلت العملية الانتخابية لولاية جنوب الغرب في ثلاث مناسبات منفصلة بسبب استقالة اللجنة الانتخابية الأصلية لولاية جنوب الغرب، وانسحاب مرشحين رئيسيين من العملية، وعدم التوصل إلى توافق آراء بشأن أهلية الترشح للرئاسة().
The majority of candidates accused the Federal Government of providing political and financial support to its preferred nominee, Abdiaziz Mohamed “Laftagareen”.واتهمت أغلبية المرشحين الحكومة الاتحادية بتوفير الدعم السياسي والمالي لمرشحها المفضل، عبد العزيز محمد ”لفتاغرين“().
Candidacy of Mukhtar Robowترشح مختار روبوو
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On 4 October 2018, Mukhtar Robow, a former deputy leader of Al-Shabaab who had defected from the group in August 2017, announced his candidacy for the South-West State presidency.في 4 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2018، أعلن مختار روبوو، النائب السابق لزعيم حركة الشباب الذي انشق عن الجماعة في آب/أغسطس 2017، ترشحه لرئاسة ولاية جنوب الغرب().
In response, the Federal Government Ministry of Security declared Robow ineligible to run, stating that he had yet to fulfil unspecified preconditions that would allow him to apply for political office.وردا على ذلك، أعلنت وزارة الأمن في الحكومة الاتحادية أن روبوو غير مؤهل للترشح، قائلةً إنه لم يفِ بعد بما يتيح له التقدم لشغل المناصب السياسية من شروط مسبقة لم تحددها().
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On 30 November 2018, an aircraft landed in Baidoa carrying 130 armed Federal Government police officers from Mogadishu.وفي 30 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018، هبطت طائرة في بيدوا وعلى متنها 130 ضابطا مسلحا من الشرطة التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية قادمين من مقديشو.
The South-West State Minister for Security, Hassan Hussein Elay, defended the deployment, stating that additional security was required for the electoral process.ودافع وزير الأمن لولاية جنوب الغرب، حسن حسين إيلاي، عن نشر الضباط قائلا إن هناك حاجة إلى تعزيز الأمن من أجل العملية الانتخابية().
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On 13 December 2018, Mukhtar Robow was invited by South-West State officials to attend a meeting at the South-West State Presidential Palace in the AMISOM-protected area in Baidoa.وفي 13 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018، وجه مسؤولون في ولاية جنوب الغرب دعوة إلى مختار روبوو لحضور اجتماع في القصر الرئاسي للولاية الذي يقع في المنطقة المشمولة بحماية بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال في بيدوا.
Upon his arrival, Somali security forces, supported by the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, detained him.ولدى وصوله، اعتقلته قوات الأمن الصومالية مدعومةً بقوات الدفاع الوطنية الإثيوبية().
During his arrest, a number of armed individuals loyal to Robow opened fire on Ethiopian National Defence Forces soldiers within the protected compound, resulting in casualties on both sides.وخلال اعتقال روبوو، قام عدد من الأفراد المسلحين الموالين له بإطلاق النار على جنود قوات الدفاع الوطنية الإثيوبية داخل المجمع المشمول بالحماية، مما أسفر عن سقوط ضحايا من كلا الجانبين().
Robow was flown to Mogadishu under the supervision of the National Intelligence and Security Agency of the Federal Government, where he remains as of the time of writing.ونُقل روبوو جوا إلى مقديشو تحت إشراف وكالة الاستخبارات والأمن الوطنية التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية، حيث بقي حتى وقت كتابة هذا التقرير.
The role of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces in the arrest of Robow has the potential to inflame anti-Ethiopian sentiment among local communities in the region, who were previously known to share information on Al-Shabaab movements with them.ومن شأن الدور الذي قامت به قوات الدفاع الوطنية الإثيوبية في اعتقال روبوو أن يؤجج المشاعر المناهضة لإثيوبيا في أوساط المجتمعات المحلية في المنطقة، التي كانت معروفة في السابق بتقديم معلومات عن حركة الشباب إلى تلك القوات().
Killing of demonstratorsقتل المتظاهرين
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Following the detention of Mukhtar Robow, from 13 to 15 December 2018 Federal Government and regional Somali security forces responded to public protests in Baidoa with lethal force, resulting in 15 civilian deaths.عقب اعتقال مختار روبوو، وخلال الفترة بين 13 و 15 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018، تعاملت قوات الأمن الصومالية للحكومة الاتحادية وقوات الأمن الصومالية الإقليمية مع الاحتجاجات العامة في بيدوا باستخدام القوة المميتة، مما أسفر عن مقتل 15 من المدنيين.
One day prior to the outbreak of demonstrations, the South-West State Police Commissioner, Colonel Mahat Abdirahman, had advocated for the use of lethal force against demonstrators.وقبل اندلاع المظاهرات بيوم واحد، دعا مفوض الشرطة في ولاية جنوب الغرب، العقيد مهد عبد الرحمن، إلى استخدام القوة المميتة ضد المتظاهرين().
In August 2019, Colonel Abdirahman was appointed as the head of the Custodial Corps of the Federal Government.وفي آب/أغسطس 2019، عُين العقيد عبد الرحمن رئيسا لحرس السجون التابع للحكومة الاتحادية.
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On 5 January 2019, South-West State authorities appointed a fact-finding committee to investigate the killings of the demonstrators.وفي 5 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019، عينت سلطات ولاية جنوب الغرب لجنة لتقصي الحقائق للتحقيق في عمليات قتل المتظاهرين().
The committee issued its findings in February 2019, acknowledging the deaths of four individuals, but failed to identify the perpetrators involved.وقدمت اللجنة استنتاجاتها في شباط/فبراير 2019، وأقرت في الوقت ذاته بمقتل أربعة أشخاص، غير أنها أخفقت في تحديد هوية الجناة المتورطين().
Conversely, the Panel verified the names of 15 civilian victims.وفي المقابل، تحقق الفريق من أسماء 15 شخصا من الضحايا المدنيين().
Financial paymentsالمبالغ المالية المدفوعة
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Financial payments to South-West State regional Members of Parliament were a significant factor in influencing the outcome of the regional electoral process.كانت المبالغ المالية المدفوعة إلى أعضاء البرلمان الإقليمي لولاية جنوب الغرب أحد العوامل الهامة في التأثير على نتائج العملية الانتخابية الإقليمية().
The Panel received multiple reports indicating that 82 South-West State Members of Parliament were flown to Mogadishu in early November 2018 to receive an initial payment of approximately $5,000 each, in exchange for their support for particular presidential candidates.وتلقى الفريق عدة تقارير تفيد بأن 82 عضوا في برلمان ولاية جنوب الغرب قد نُقلوا جوا إلى مقديشو في أوائل تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018 ليتقاضى كل منهم دفعة مالية أولية قدرها حوالي 000 5 دولار، مقابل دعمهم لمرشحين رئاسيين محددين().
Interviews conducted with South-West State Members of Parliament confirmed that they were offered a further $20,000 to $30,000 to support specific candidates upon the successful conclusion of the electoral process.وأكدت المقابلات التي أجريت مع أعضاء في برلمان ولاية جنوب الغرب أنهم تلقوا عروضا بمبالغ إضافية تتراوح بين 000 20 دولار و 000 30 دولار لدعم مرشحين محددين لدى إنهاء العملية الانتخابية بنجاح().
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Furthermore, significant payments were made to senior South-West State officials in the weeks preceding the election.وعلاوة على ذلك، دُفعت مبالغ ضخمة إلى مسؤولين كبار في ولاية جنوب الغرب في الأسابيع التي سبقت إجراء الانتخابات.
The Panel has reviewed financial information demonstrating that a prominent South-West State Minister received transfers totalling several hundred thousand dollars prior to the election.واستعرض الفريق المعلومات المالية التي تبين تلقي وزير بارز في ولاية جنوب الغرب تحويلات بلغ مجموعها عدة مئات من الآلاف من الدولارات قبل الانتخابات.
The payments to the Minister were made by three individuals based in Mogadishu, one of whom the Panel identified as a financial clerk in a senior Federal Government office.وقام بدفع المبالغ إلى الوزير ثلاثة أفراد في مقديشو، حدد فريق الخبراء أحدهم بصفته كاتبا ماليا في أحد مكاتب المسؤولين الكبار بالحكومة الاتحادية().
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On 19 December 2018, the South-West State presidential electoral process concluded with the regional Parliament voting to elect the candidate backed by the Federal Government, Abdiaziz Mohamed “Laftagareen”.وفي 19 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018، اختتمت عملية الانتخابات الرئاسية لولاية جنوب الغرب بتصويت البرلمان الإقليمي على انتخاب المرشح المدعوم من الحكومة الاتحادية، عبد العزيز محمد ”لفتاغرين“.
Puntland electoral processالعملية الانتخابية في بونتلاند
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The Puntland election was also marred by reports of the bribery of Members of Parliament, as well as the manipulation of their initial selection process.شابت انتخابات بونتلاند، هي الأخرى، تقارير تفيد بتقديم رشاوى إلى أعضاء البرلمان، فضلا عن التلاعب بعملية الاختيار الأولي لأعضاء البرلمان.
In one case, the Panel received evidence that a prospective Member of Parliament was offered $15,000 to turn down the appointment in favour of another individual who supported a specific presidential candidate.وفي إحدى الحالات، تلقى الفريق أدلة على أن أحد أعضاء البرلمان المحتملين قد تلقى عرضا بمبلغ 000 15 دولار لكي يرفض التعيين لصالح شخص آخر يدعم مرشحا رئاسيا محددا.
In addition, candidates reportedly made payments to Members of Parliament ranging from $30,000 to $70,000 in order to secure votes.وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، وردت تقارير عن قيام مرشحين بدفع مبالغ مالية لأعضاء في البرلمان، تتراوح بين 000 30 دولار و 000 70 دولار، من أجل الحصول على الأصوات().
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The Puntland electoral process was also subject to accusations of attempted interference by the Federal Government.كما شهدت العملية الانتخابية في بونتلاند اتهامات للحكومة الاتحادية بمحاولة التدخل في العملية.
For instance, a Member of the Upper House of the Federal Parliament alleged that the Federal Government had attempted to influence the outcome of the Puntland election by financially supporting candidates allied with the Federal Government.فعلى سبيل المثال، زعم أحد أعضاء مجلس الشيوخ في البرلمان الاتحادي أن الحكومة الاتحادية حاولت التأثير على نتائج الانتخابات في بونتلاند من خلال تقديم دعم مالي لمرشحين متحالفين مع الحكومة الاتحادية().
However, such attempts do not appear to have successfully affected the outcome of the process.بيد أن هذه المحاولات للتأثير على نتائج العملية الانتخابية يبدو أنها قد باءت بالفشل.
On 9 January 2019, the Puntland Parliament elected Said Abdullahi Mohamed “Deni” to the presidency of Puntland, who assumed the role from Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gass” in a peaceful transition of power.وفي 9 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019، انتخب برلمان بونتلاند سعيد عبد الله محمد ”دني“ رئيسا لبونتلاند، فتولى الدور الذي كان يضطلع به عبد الولي محمد علي ”غاس“ في عملية انتقال سلمي للسلطة.
Jubbaland electoral processالعملية الانتخابية في جوبالاند
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In July and August 2019, the Jubbaland presidential electoral process in Kismayo was characterized by heightened political tensions among the Federal Government, the Jubbaland administration and local opposition stakeholders.في تموز/يوليه وآب/أغسطس 2019، اتسمت العملية الانتخابية الرئاسية لولاية جوبالاند في كيسمايو باشتداد التوترات السياسية بين الحكومة الاتحادية وإدارة جوبالاند والجهات المحلية صاحبة المصلحة في صفوف المعارضة.
As observed in the South-West State and Puntland regional electoral processes, diverging interpretations of the Somali Provisional Constitution over the role of the Federal Government in regional electoral processes were central to political discord.وكما لوحظ في العمليات الانتخابية الإقليمية في ولايتي جنوب الغرب وبونتلاند، كانت التفسيرات المتباينة لدستور الصومال المؤقت بشأن دور الحكومة الاتحادية في العمليات الانتخابية الإقليمية محور الخلاف السياسي.
On 12 July, the charged political climate was exploited by Al-Shabaab, who carried out a complex attack at the Medina Hotel in Kismayo, resulting in at least 26 fatalities and more than 50 injured, the first attack of its kind in the city.وفي 12 تموز/يوليه، استغلت حركة الشباب المناخَ السياسي المشحون ونفذت هجوما مركبا على فندق مدينة في كيسمايو، هو الأول من نوعه في المدينة، مما خلف ما لا يقل عن 26 قتيلا وأكثر من 50 جريحا.
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On 4 July 2019, the Jubbaland Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission announced that representatives of Jubbaland’s traditional elders would appoint 75 Members of Parliament to elect the regional President.وفي 4 تموز/يوليه 2019، أعلنت اللجنة المستقلة المعنية بالانتخابات وبتحديد الدوائر الانتخابية في جوبالاند أن ممثلي الشيوخ التقليديين في جوبالاند سيعينون 75 عضوا بالبرلمان لانتخاب الرئيس الإقليمي.
The Federal Government and some local stakeholders expressed concerns over the opaqueness of the selection of elders, and on 6 July the Federal Government issued a statement that the process would require the approval of its Ministry of the Interior and Federal Affairs.وأعربت الحكومة الاتحادية وبعض الجهات المحلية صاحبة المصلحة عن شواغلها إزاء الغموض الذي اكتنف اختيار الشيوخ، وفي 6 تموز/يوليه 2019، أصدرت الحكومة الاتحادية بيانا يفيد بأن العملية تتطلب موافقة وزارة الداخلية والشؤون الاتحادية في الحكومة.
In response, Jubbaland authorities accused the Federal Government of attempting to unduly influence the outcome, and on 25 July banned Federal Government officials from travelling to Jubbaland until the conclusion of the process.وردا على ذلك، اتهمت سلطات جوبالاند الحكومة الاتحادية بمحاولة التأثير بغير وجه حق على النتائج، وحظرت على مسؤولي الحكومة الاتحادية في 25 تموز/يوليه 2019 السفر إلى جوبالاند إلى حين الانتهاء من هذه العملية.
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The political environment in Kismayo was further strained by tensions between Kenya and Ethiopia over the support by Kenya for incumbent President of Jubbaland, Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe”, and the perceived backing by Ethiopia of the Federal Government of Somalia.وازداد توتر البيئة السياسية في كيسمايو نتيجة للتوترات بين كينيا وإثيوبيا بشأن الدعم الذي تقدمه كينيا إلى الرئيس الحالي لجوبالاند أحمد محمد إسلام ”مذوبيه“، ودعم إثيوبيا المتصور لحكومة الصومال الاتحادية.
On 19 August 2019, Jubbaland authorities forcibly prevented the landing of an aircraft carrying Ethiopian representatives at Kismayo airport, resulting in an armed standoff between Kenyan and Ethiopian troops at the airport.وفي 19 آب/أغسطس 2019، منعت سلطات جوبالاند قسرا هبوط طائرة تحمل ممثلين إثيوبيين في مطار كيسمايو، مما أفضى إلى مواجهة مسلحة بين القوات الكينية والإثيوبية في المطار().
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On 22 August 2019, Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe” was declared President of Jubbaland by the Jubbaland Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission.وفي 22 آب/أغسطس 2019، أعلنت اللجنة المستقلة المعنية بالانتخابات وبتحديد الدوائر الانتخابية في جوبالاند أحمد محمد إسلام ”مذوبيه“ رئيسا لجوبالاند().
On the same day, an opposition-led shadow parliament elected a Federal Government of Somalia Member of Parliament, Abdirashid Mohamed Hiddig, as President.وفي نفس اليوم، انتخب برلمان ظل تقوده المعارضة عبد الرشيد محمد حجي، عضو البرلمان في حكومة الصومال الاتحادية، رئيسا().
Also on 22 August, the Federal Government of Somalia rejected the outcomes of both electoral processes.وفي 22 آب/أغسطس أيضا، رفضت حكومة الصومال الاتحادية نتائج العمليتين الانتخابيتين.
Security sectorقطاع الأمن
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Security sector reforms during the reporting period were focused on the implementation of the Transition Plan for Somalia, adopted in April 2018, which envisions the handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces by 2021, coinciding with the withdrawal of AMISOM.تركز إصلاح قطاع الأمن خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير على تنفيذ ”خطة الانتقال الخاصة بالصومال“، المعتمدة في نيسان/أبريل 2018، والتي تتوخى نقل المسؤوليات الأمنية من بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي إلى قوات الأمن الصومالية بحلول عام 2021، وذلك بالتزامن مع انسحاب البعثة.
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While some initial goals of the Transition Plan have been achieved, the medium-term goals of clearing and securing the main supply routes have yet to be completed.وفي حين تحقق بعض الأهداف الأولية لخطة الانتقال، لا يزال يتعين إنجاز الأهداف المتوسطة الأجل المتمثلة في تطهير طرق الإمداد الرئيسية وتأمينها.
Senior AMISOM officials expressed to the Panel that Federal Government forces “were not playing their part well” and had routinely failed to fill vacuums left by AMISOM, citing the strategic town of Leego, Bay region, as well as the lack of adequate holding forces by the Federal Government of Somalia to secure the main supply routes.وصرّح مسؤولون كبار في بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي لفريق الخبراء بأن قوات الحكومة الاتحادية ”لم تكن تضطلع بدورها على نحو جيد“، وقد درجت على عدم ملء الفراغ الذي كانت تتركه البعثة، مستشهدين ببلدة ليغو الاستراتيجية بمنطقة باي، فضلا عن عدم كفاية قوات حكومة الصومال الاتحادية اللازمة لتأمين طرق الإمداد الرئيسية().
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Moreover, AMISOM, in a regional operational readiness assessment conducted from March 2018 to January 2019, concluded that there were more than 20,000 federal member state forces that did not fall under Federal Government command and control structures.وعلاوة على ذلك، خلص تقييم للتأهب العملياتي الإقليمي أُجري في الفترة بين آذار/مارس 2018 وكانون الثاني/يناير 2019 إلى وجود أكثر من 000 20 من قوات الولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد خارج إطار هياكل القيادة والمراقبة التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية.
In its report, AMISOM further stated that although regional forces had received some training, they were not paid regularly and lacked basic equipment and vehicles.وذكرت بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي كذلك في تقريرها أنه على الرغم من أن القوات الإقليمية قد تلقت بعض التدريب، فإنها لا تتقاضى أجرها بانتظام وتفتقر إلى المعدات الأساسية والمركبات.
The successful integration of federal member state forces into the National Security Architecture will be vital to enable the planned drawdown of AMISON.وسيكون الإدماج الناجح لقوات الولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد في هيكل الأمن الوطني أمرا حيويا للتمكين من التخفيض التدريجي المقرر للبعثة.
The Panel of Experts currently assesses that it is unlikely that the envisaged AMISOM withdrawal will be possible by 2021.ويرى فريق الخبراء حاليا أنه من غير المرجح أن تنسحب البعثة على النحو المتوخى بحلول عام 2021.
Transition Plan and drawdown of the African Union Mission in Somaliaخطة الانتقال وتخفيض بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال
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On 16 February 2019, AMISOM military commanders reached a consensus regarding the operational activities to be conducted under the aegis of the concept of operations for 2018–2021, which had been previously approved on 26 November 2018 and endorsed by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 9 February 2019.في 16 شباط/فبراير 2019، توصل القادة العسكريون لبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال إلى توافق في الآراء بشأن الأنشطة التنفيذية التي ستجري في إطار مفهوم العمليات للفترة 2018-2021، والتي سبق أن اعتمدت في 26 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018، وأقرها مجلس السلم والأمن التابع للاتحاد الأفريقي في 9 شباط/فبراير 2019().
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In accordance with the concept of operations, AMISOM has continued its withdrawals and handovers to Somali security forces over the course of the reporting period:ووفقا لمفهوم العمليات، واصلت بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي عمليات انسحابها وتسليمها المهام إلى قوات الأمن الصومالية على مدى الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير على النحو التالي:
(a)(أ)
A military academy in Mogadishu was handed over to the Federal Government on 28 February 2019.جرى تسليم أكاديمية عسكرية في مقديشو إلى الحكومة الاتحادية في 28 شباط/فبراير 2019.
The 500 Burundian troops stationed there were relocated: 200 were moved to Maslah, 20 km east of Mogadishu, and 300 to Jowhar and forward operating bases in sector 5;ونُقلت القوات البوروندية المتمركزة هناك البالغة 500 فرد، كما يلي: 200 فرد إلى المصلح، على مسافة 20 كم إلى الشرق من مقديشو، و 300 فرد إلى جوهر وقواعد عمليات أمامية في القطاع 5؛
(b)(ب)
In February 2019, approximately 1,000 Burundian troops stationed in HirShabelle began their scheduled repatriation, pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2431 (2018).في شباط/فبراير 2019، بدأت إعادة حوالي 000 1 فرد من القوات البوروندية المتمركزة في هيرشبيلي إلى الوطن حسب الموعد المقرر، وذلك عملا بمقتضيات الفقرة 5 من قرار مجلس الأمن 2431 (2018).
The withdrawal was completed by 5 April 2019.وأنجزت عملية الانسحاب بحلول 5 نيسان/أبريل 2019.
Capture of Lower Shabelle villages by the Danab battalionاستيلاء كتيبة الدناب على قرى في شبيلي السفلى
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From May to August 2019, AMISOM and the Somali National Army, supported by United States special forces, launched an offensive to capture strategic villages in Lower Shabelle controlled by Al-Shabaab.في الفترة من أيار/مايو إلى آب/أغسطس 2019، شنت بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي والجيش الوطني الصومالي، بدعم من قوات خاصة تابعة للولايات المتحدة، هجوما للاستيلاء على قرى استراتيجية في منطقة شبيلي السفلى كانت تسيطر عليها حركة الشباب.
Security operations successfully recaptured the villages of Barire, Sabiid, Anole and Awdheegle, all located within 50 km of Mogadishu.ونجحت العمليات الأمنية في استعادة قرى باريري وسابيد وأنولي وأوطيغلي، التي تقع جميعها في محيط 50 كيلومترا من مقديشو.
The operations represented a significant development for ensuring the security of Mogadishu, as the captured locations were waypoints on a key transport corridor used by Al-Shabaab to move fighters and improvised explosive devices into Mogadishu.وشكلت العمليات تطورا هاما لضمان أمن مقديشو، نظرا لأن المواقع التي تم الاستيلاء عليها كانت نقاط وسيطة على أحد ممرات النقل الرئيسية التي تستخدمها حركة الشباب من أجل نقل المقاتلين والأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع إلى مقديشو.
However, on 14 August, Al-Shabaab carried out a coordinated attack on the Awdheegle forward operating base, using three vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, mortars and gunmen.ومع ذلك، نفذت حركة الشباب هجوما منسقا، في 14 آب/أغسطس 2019، على قاعدة عمليات أوطيغلي الأمامية باستخدام ثلاث مركبات مفخخة بمتفجرات يدوية الصنع ومدافع هاون ومسلحين().
The attack was repelled by AMISOM and Somali National Army forces, but the base remains vulnerable due to the ongoing presence of Al-Shabaab in the nearby town of Mubarak, which was previously identified as an area for improvised explosive device construction for vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices entering Mogadishu.وصدت الهجوم قوات تابعة لبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي والجيش الوطني الصومالي، ولكن لا تزال القاعدة منكشفة بسبب استمرار وجود حركة الشباب في مدينة مبارك القريبة، التي سبق تحديدها كمنطقة لإنشاء أجهزة متفجرة يدوية الصنع للمركبات المفخخة التي تدخل مقديشو.
The long-term success of the Lower Shabelle security operations will be contingent on the ability of the Federal Government to provide effective holding forces, governance and the supply of services to local residents.وسيكون النجاح الطويل الأجل للعمليات الأمنية في شبيلي السفلى مشروطا بقدرة الحكومة الاتحادية على توفير قوات تثبيت فعالة وعلى حسن الإدارة وتوفير خدمات للسكان المحليين().
Integration of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a forces into the Somali National Armyدمج قوات أهل السنة والجماعة في الجيش الوطني الصومالي
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In the last week of June 2019, the Federal Government announced that a major faction of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) – an Ethiopian-backed militant Sufi group established in 1991, and a potent counterweight to Al-Shabaab – would be integrated into the federal security forces.في الأسبوع الأخير من حزيران/يونيه 2019، أعلنت الحكومة الاتحادية أن فصيلا رئيسيا من جماعة أهل السنة والجماعة، وهي جماعة صوفية مقاتلة مدعومة من إثيوبيا أنشئت في عام 1991، وقوة فتية موازِنة لحركة الشباب، سيدمج في قوات الأمن الاتحادية.
The integration of ASWJ into the federal structures represented an important step in Somali forces assuming security responsibilities from AMISOM.وشكل إدماج جماعة أهل السنة والجماعة في الهياكل الاتحادية خطوة هامة في اضطلاع القوات الصومالية بالمسؤوليات الأمنية بدلا عن بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي.
The successful integration of ASWJ forces will depend on the Federal Government accommodating the group’s demands for power and resources without affecting the ability of ASWJ to counter Al-Shabaab or alienating other political factions in Galmudug.وسيتوقف الإدماج الناجح لقوات جماعة أهل السنة والجماعة على استيعاب الحكومة الاتحادية لطلبات الجماعة فيما يخص السلطة والموارد، دون التأثير على قدرة الجماعة على مواجهة حركة الشباب أو إسخاط الفصائل السياسية الأخرى في غلمدغ.
Biometric registration of the Somali National Armyالتسجيل البيومتري للجيش الوطني الصومالي
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According to documentation provided by the Federal Government to the Committee, it completed the first phase of the biometric registration of the Somali National Army by the end of March 2019 – a positive step towards security sector reform and ensuring the payment of salaries.تفيد الوثائق التي قدمتها الحكومة الاتحادية إلى اللجنة أن الحكومة الاتحادية قد أنجزت المرحلة الأولى من التسجيل البيومتري للجيش الوطني الصومالي بحلول نهاية آذار/مارس 2019، وهي خطوة إيجابية نحو إصلاح قطاع الأمن، وكفالة دفع المرتبات().
The Panel independently obtained a Somali National Army payroll document containing 15,962 registered soldiers as of February 2019.وحصل الفريق بصورة مستقلة على وثيقة كشوف مرتبات تتضمن 962 15 جنديا مسجلين بالجيش الوطني الصومالي في شباط/فبراير 2019.
However, it is unclear to what degree the current composition of the Army reflects those previously considered to be members of the Army by the Federal Government.غير أنه ليس من الواضح إلى أي مدى يعكس التكوين الحالي للجيش الوطني الصومالي الأفراد الذين سبق أن اعتبرتهم الحكومة الاتحادية أفرادا في الجيش.
The Panel of Experts conducted three case studies of Somali National Army registration, in sector 60, sector 12 April and General Gordon military base, which concluded that fewer than one half (315 of 678) of Somali National Army soldiers whose names appeared in logbooks from 2017 and 2018 were captured in the biometric registration process of 2019.وأجرى فريق الخبراء ثلاث دراسات حالة إفرادية لتسجيل الجيش الوطني الصومالي، في القطاع 60 وقطاع 12 نيسان/أبريل وقاعدة الجنرال غوردون العسكرية، خلصت إلى أن أقل من نصف جنود الجيش الوطني الصومالي (315 من أصل 678)، الذين وردت أسماؤهم في سجلات متابعة من عام 2017 وعام 2018، أدرجوا في عملية التسجيل البيومتري لعام 2019.
Whether the discrepancy is due to defections, demobilizations, deaths, injuries or soldiers who have yet to be registered by the Army, is unclear.ومن غير الواضح ما إذا كان هذا التباين يعزى إلى حالات انشقاق أو تسريح أو وفيات أو إصابات، أو إلى جنود لم يسجلهم الجيش بعد.
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Annex 1.12 contains the Panel’s three cases studies of the biometric registration of the Somali National Army.ويتضمن المرفق 1-12 ثلاث دراسات حالة إفرادية للتسجيل البيومتري للجيش الوطني الصومالي.
E.هاء -
Public financial managementالإدارة المالية العامة
Collection of air navigation chargesتحصيل رسوم الملاحة الجوية
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By May 2019, the Federal Government of Somalia had made significant progress in public financial management by completing three staff-monitored programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – a series of technical benchmarks related to broadening the Federal Government’s domestic tax base.بحلول أيار/مايو 2019، أحرزت الحكومة الاتحادية تقدما كبيرا في الإدارة المالية العامة عن طريق استكمال ثلاثة برامج كان يتابعها خبراء صندوق النقد الدولي، وهي سلسلة نقاط مرجعية تقنية متصلة بتوسيع الوعاء الضريبي المحلي للحكومة الاتحادية.
One revenue stream highlighted by the programmes was the direct collection of air navigation charges, a responsibility assumed by the Federal Government following the handover from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in June 2019.ومن بين مصادر الإيرادات التي أبرزتها تلك البرامج الجمع المباشر لرسوم الملاحة الجوية، وهي مسؤولية تسلمتها الحكومة الاتحادية من منظمة الطيران المدني الدولي في حزيران/يونيه 2019.
However, an investigation by the Panel revealed previous financial irregularities within the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorological Authority in relation to the collection of air navigation charges, in which the Authority wrote off a $5.8 million debt owed by Jubba Airways Limited without collecting the funds from the airline.ومع ذلك، كشف تحقيق أجراه الفريق عن وجود مخالفات مالية سابقة داخل هيئة الطيران المدني والأرصاد الجوية الصومالية فيما يتعلق بتحصيل رسوم ملاحة جوية، حيث قامت الهيئة بشطب ديون قدرها 5.8 ملايين دولار مستحقة على خطوط جوبا الجوية المحدودة دون تحصيل الأموال منها.
Backgroundمعلومات أساسية
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Soon after the collapse of the Government of Somalia in 1991, ICAO assumed responsibility for the management of the country’s airspace in a 1994 agreement.بعد انهيار حكومة الصومال مباشرة في عام 1991، تولت منظمة الطيران المدني الدولي (الإيكاو) المسؤولية عن إدارة المجال الجوي الصومالي بموجب اتفاق أبرم في عام 1994.
According to ICAO guidelines, all aircraft transiting through Somali airspace were required to pay $275 per flight in air navigation charges.ووفقا للمبادئ التوجيهية للمنظمة، تلتزم جميع الطائرات التي تعبر المجال الجوي الصومالي بدفع 275 دولارا عن كل رحلة في شكل رسوم ملاحة جوية.
In 1995, ICAO signed an agreement with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to collect those air navigation charges on behalf of Somalia and deposit all revenues into an ICAO-managed trust fund account, which was utilized to fund and support the safe operation of Somalia airspace.وفي عام 1995، وقعت الإيكاو اتفاقا مع اتحاد النقل الجوي الدولي لجمع رسوم الملاحة الجوية هذه باسم الصومال وإيداع جميع الإيرادات في حساب صندوق استئماني تديره الإيكاو، والذي استخدم لتمويل ودعم التشغيل الآمن للمجال الجوي الصومالي.
According to IATA, approximately $112 million was collected from August 2008 to July 2019 and transferred to the ICAO trust fund.واستنادا إلى اتحاد النقل الجوي الدولي، جُمع نحو 112 مليون دولار في الفترة من آب/أغسطس 2008 إلى تموز/يوليه 2019، وحولت إلى الصندوق الاستئماني للإيكاو().
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Following the international recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia in 2012, preparations were begun to transfer control of Somali airspace from ICAO to the Federal Government, as well as to transfer the $6.5 million balance remaining in the ICAO trust fund.وفي أعقاب الاعتراف الدولي بحكومة الصومال الاتحادية في عام 2012، بدأت الأعمال التحضيرية لنقل مراقبة المجال الجوي الصومالي من الإيكاو إلى الحكومة الاتحادية، فضلا عن تحويل الرصيد البالغ 6.5 ملايين دولار المتبقي في الصندوق الاستئماني للإيكاو.
The handover was completed through an agreement signed in June 2019 between ICAO, IATA and the Federal Government of Somalia.وقد تمت عملية النقل بموجب اتفاق موقع في حزيران/يونيه 2019 بين الإيكاو واتحاد النقل الجوي الدولي والحكومة الاتحادية.
Historical uses of the International Civil Aviation Organization trust fund by the Federal Government of Somaliaاستخدامات الحكومة الاتحادية التاريخية للصندوق الاستئماني لمنظمة الطيران المدني الدولي
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Prior to the handover of the ICAO trust fund in 2019, ICAO transferred funds to Federal Government-designated bank accounts upon request to fund specific projects.قبل تسليم الصندوق الاستئماني للإيكاو في عام 2019، حولت تلك المنظمة الأموال إلى حسابات مصرفية حددتها الحكومة الاتحادية بناء على طلب بتمويل مشاريع محددة.
While the Federal Government has utilized the trust fund for several legitimate projects, there have been incidents of irregular use.وعلى الرغم من أن الحكومة الاتحادية قد استخدمت الصندوق الاستئماني في عدة مشاريع مشروعة، حدثت حالات استخدام غير نظامي.
For instance, on 29 May 2014, ICAO transferred $350,000 to a money transfer bureau account based in Djibouti, provided by the Federal Government of Somalia, purportedly to carry out a series of training sessions for staff of the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorological Authority in Mogadishu.فعلى سبيل المثال، في 29 أيار/مايو 2014، حولت الإيكاو مبلغ 000 350 دولار إلى حساب مكتب تحويل أموال موجود في جيبوتي وفرته حكومة الصومال الاتحادية، بزعم القيام بسلسلة دورات تدريبية لموظفي هيئة الطيران المدني والأرصاد الجوية الصومالية في مقديشو.
ICAO was doubtful that the funds were ever allocated to training for the staff of the Authority, and it referred the case for internal investigation.وساورت الإيكاو الشكوك في أن تكون الأموال قد خصصت أصلا لتدريب موظفي الهيئة، وأحالت القضية إلى تحقيق داخلي().
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In 2015, a Federal Government delegation headed by the then Federal Government Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation travelled to ICAO headquarters in Montreal to request the withdrawal of $150,000 from the trust fund.وفي عام 2015، سافر وفد تابع للحكومة الاتحادية برئاسة وزير النقل والطيران المدني للحكومة الاتحادية آنذاك إلى مقر الإيكاو في مونتريال كي يطلب سحب 000 150 دولار من الصندوق الاستئماني().
The transfer request could not be completed because the delegation had designated a private bank account to receive the funds.ولم يتسن إنجاز طلب التحويل لأن الوفد عيّن حسابا مصرفيا خاصا لتلقي الأموال().
The delegation then requested that the funds be provided in cash, which ICAO was also unable to accommodate.ثم طلب وفد الحكومة الاتحادية بعد ذلك توفير الأموال نقدا، وهو ما لم تتمكن الإيكاو من تلبيته أيضا().
Air navigation fees owed by Somali airlinesرسوم الملاحة الجوية المستحقة على الخطوط الجوية الصومالية
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A previous ICAO internal audit noted that airlines based in Somalia or owned by Somali nationals routinely refused to pay the $275 per flight for air navigation charges.أشارت مراجعة حسابات داخلية سابقة أجرتها الإيكاو إلى أن الخطوط الجوية المتمركزة في الصومال أو المملوكة له كانت ترفض بشكل روتيني دفع مبلغ 275 دولارا عن كل رحلة كرسوم ملاحة جوية().
As at 31 July 2019, the total owed to IATA in air navigation charges was $25.5 million.وحتى 31 تموز/يوليه 2019، وصل مجموع المبالغ المستحقة لاتحاد النقل الجوي الدولي في شكل رسوم ملاحة جوية 25.5 مليون دولار().
Over $20 million of that debt was owed by airlines registered in Somalia or owned by Somali nationals.وكان أكثر من 20 مليون دولار من هذه الديون مستحقا على شركات طيران مسجلة في الصومال أو يمتلكها مواطنون صوماليون.
The largest arrears have accrued to Bluebird Aviation Ltd., which owed $5.2 million as of July 2019.والحصة الأكبر من هذه المتأخرات مستحقة على شركة بلوبيرد آفيشان ليمتد Bluebird Aviation Ltd، التي كانت مدينة بمبلغ 5.2 ملايين دولار في تموز/يوليه 2019().
Clearing of Jubba Airways debtشطب دين خطوط جوبا الجوية
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Prior to February 2018, the largest single air navigation debt – at $5.8 million – was owed by Jubba Airways Limited, whose Chief Executive Officer is also a Member of Parliament of the Federal Government.قبل شباط/فبراير 2018، كان أكبر دين من ديون الملاحة الجوية، وقدره 5.8 ملايين دولار، مستحقا على خطوط جوبا الجوية المحدودة، وهي شركة رئيسها التنفيذي عضو أيضا في برلمان الحكومة الاتحادية.
In a December 2017 letter, the then Director General of the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorological Authority informed ICAO and IATA that Jubba Airways Limited had “settled all the invoices pertaining to air navigation charges with [the Authority]”.وفي رسالة مؤرخة كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2017، أبلغ المدير العام لهيئة الطيران المدني والأرصاد الجوية الصومالية آنذاك الإيكاو واتحاد النقل الجوي الدولي بأن خطوط جوبا الجوية المحدودة قد ”سوت جميع الفواتير المتعلقة برسوم الملاحة الجوية مع [الهيئة]“().
Internal accounts for February 2018, obtained by the Panel, show that Jubba Airway’s $5.8 million debt had been cleared from the accounts.وتبين حسابات داخلية عن شباط/فبراير 2018، حصل عليها الفريق، أن دين خطوط جوبا الجوية البالغ 5.8 ملايين دولار شُطب من الحسابات.
However, according to the Minister for Transport and Aviation of the Federal Government, neither Jubba Airways nor any other Somalia-based airline has directly settled its navigation debt with the Authority or any other Federal Government institution.ومع ذلك، ووفقا لما ذكره وزير النقل والطيران بالحكومة الاتحادية، لم تسو خطوط جوبا الجوية أو غيرها من الخطوط الجوية التي يوجد مقرها في الصومال، ديونها الملاحية تسوية مباشرة مع الهيئة أو غيرها من مؤسسات الحكومة الاتحادية().
Jubba Airways did not provide the Panel with the requested proof of payment.ولم تزود خطوط جوبا الجوية فريق الخبراء بدليل الدفع المطلوب().
Designation of the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorological Authority account to receive air navigation feesتحديد حساب هيئة الطيران المدني والأرصاد الجوية الصومالية المخصص لتلقي رسوم الملاحة الجوية
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On 27 June 2019, ICAO, IATA and the Minister for Transport and Aviation of the Federal Government signed an agreement terminating the role of ICAO in the collection of air navigation charges.في 27 حزيران/يونيه 2019، وقعت الإيكاو واتحاد النقل الجوي الدولي ووزير النقل والطيران بالحكومة الاتحادية اتفاقا ينهي دور الإيكاو في جمع رسوم الملاحة الجوية.
The agreement designated the account of the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorological Authority (account No. 1040) at the Central Bank of Somalia to receive future air navigation charges.وحدد الاتفاق حساب هيئة الطيران المدني والأرصاد الجوية الصومالية في المصرف المركزي للصومال (حساب رقم 1040) لتلقي رسوم الملاحة الجوية في المستقبل().
According to Federal Government financial management standards – as well as IMF staff-monitored programme benchmarks – that revenue should have been channelled through the Treasury Single Account at the Central Bank.ووفقا لمعايير الإدارة المالية للحكومة الاتحادية، وكذلك النقاط المرجعية للبرامج التي كان يتابعها خبراء صندوق النقد الدولي، كان ينبغي توجيه هذه الإيرادات عن طريق الحساب الوحيد للخزانة العامة في المصرف المركزي.
The Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation stated that, notwithstanding the contractual text, future collection of airspace navigation charges would accrue directly to the Treasury Single Account.وذكر وزير النقل والطيران المدني أن تحصيل رسوم الملاحة في المجال الجوي في المستقبل سيعود مباشرة إلى الحساب الوحيد للخزانة العامة على الرغم من النص التعاقدي().
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Subsequent to the June 2019 agreement, ICAO remitted the $6.5 million balance remaining in the ICAO trust fund to the Federal Government of Somalia;وفي أعقاب اتفاق حزيران/يونيه 2019، حولت الإيكاو الرصيد المتبقي في صندوقها الاستئماني البالغ 6.5 ملايين دولار إلى الحكومة الاتحادية؛
the account of the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorological Authority (account No. 1040) was used to receive the funds.واستُخدم حساب هيئة الطيران المدني والأرصاد الجوية الصومالية (حساب رقم 1040) لتلقي الأموال().
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Annex 1.13 contains supporting documentation pertaining to collection of air navigation charges and the writing off of the Jubba Airways debt.ويتضمن المرفق 1-13 الوثائق الداعمة المتعلقة بجمع رسوم الملاحة الجوية وبشطب الدين المستحق على خطوط جوبا الجوية.
F.واو -
Oil and gas sectorقطاع النفط والغاز
Maritime border dispute with Kenyaالنزاع على الحدود البحرية مع كينيا
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Since August 2014, a maritime border dispute between Kenya and Somalia, concerning an area in the Indian Ocean of over 100,000 km2, has been pending before the International Court of Justice.منذ آب/أغسطس 2014، ما زال نزاع على الحدود البحرية بين كينيا والصومال، بشأن منطقة بالمحيط الهندي تزيد مساحتها عن 000 100 كيلومتر مربع، قيد النظر أمام محكمة العدل الدولية().
On 7 February 2019, the Federal Government of Somalia, in partnership with Spectrum Geo (now TGS), a seismic oil data company, hosted a petroleum conference in London that aimed to present the results of the seismic study completed offshore Somalia in 2016.وفي 7 شباط/فبراير 2019، استضافت حكومة الصومال الاتحادية، في شراكة مع مجموعة جيو سبيكترام (تسمى الآن TGS)، وهي شركة معنية ببيانات موجات النفط الزلزالية، مؤتمرا معنيا بالنفط في لندن كان هدفه تقديم نتائج دراسة الموجات الزلزالية التي أنجزت قبالة ساحل الصومال في عام 2016.
One week later, the Government of Kenya temporarily recalled its ambassador to Somalia, claiming that the Federal Government of Somalia had auctioned off oil and gas blocks located within the Kenyan exclusive economic zone at the conference.وبعد أسبوع من ذلك، استدعت حكومة كينيا مؤقتا سفيرها لدى الصومال، بزعم أن حكومة الصومال الاتحادية قد عرضت للبيع بالمزاد العلني في المؤتمر مجمعات لإنتاج النفط والغاز موجودة في المنطقة الاقتصادية الخالصة لكينيا.
The conference, however, focused on the presentation of data unrelated to the disputed area, and no auctions or bidding processes related to oil blocks occurred.بيد أن المؤتمر ركز على عرض بيانات لا علاقة لها بالمنطقة المتنازع عليها، ولم تجر مزادات أو عمليات تقديم عطاءات لها علاقة بمجمعات النفط.
Nonetheless, the ongoing maritime dispute has fuelled tensions between Kenya and the Federal Government of Somalia, creating a potential space for Al-Shabaab to exploit, as well as possible divisions between Kenya and other AMISOM troop-contributing countries more supportive of the Federal Government of Somalia.ومع ذلك، فإن النزاع البحري المستمر قد أجج التوترات بين كينيا وحكومة الصومال الاتحادية، مما أفسح مجالا من المحتمل أن تستغله حركة الشباب()، فضلا عن انقسامات ممكنة بين كينيا وغيرها من البلدان المساهمة بقوات في بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي الأكثر دعما لحكومة الصومال الاتحادية.
Positive relations between the two countries are crucial to regional security, particularly in relation to Al-Shabaab operations across their shared border (see “Cross-border attacks into Kenya”, above).وتكتسي العلاقات الإيجابية بين البلدين أهمية حاسمة بالنسبة للأمن الإقليمي، ولا سيما فيما يتعلق بالعمليات التي تنفذها حركة الشباب عبر الحدود المشتركة بينهما (انظر ”الهجمات العابرة للحدود إلى داخل كينيا“ أعلاه).
G.زاي -
Maritime piracyالقرصنة البحرية
107.107 -
There was one successful act of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia during the reporting period.شهدت الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير نجاح عمل واحد من أعمال القرصنة البحرية قبالة سواحل الصومال.
On 19 April 2019, the Yemen-flagged dhow Al Ahzam was seized by armed pirates in the vicinity of Adale, north of Mogadishu.ففي 19 نيسان/أبريل 2019، استولى قراصنة مسلحون على المركب الشراعي المدعو بـ ”الأحزم“ الذي يرفع علم اليمن بالقرب من عذلي، شمالَ مقديشو.
The dhow was subsequently used as a mother ship to conduct unsuccessful pirate attacks on the fishing vessels Adria, Txori Argi and Shin Shuen Far 889 on 21 April.واستُخدم المركب لاحقا كسفينة رئيسية لتنفيذ هجمات قرصنة غير ناجحة على سفن الصيد ”Adria“، و ”Txori Argi“، و ”Shin Shuen Far 889“، في 21 نيسان/أبريل.
108.108 -
On 23 April, forces from the counter-piracy EUNAVFOR mission intercepted and boarded the Al Ahzam.وفي 23 نيسان/أبريل، اعترضت قوات من بعثة القوة البحرية لمكافحة القرصنة التابعة للاتحاد الأوروبي مركب ”الأحزم“ وصعدت إلى متنه.
Five pirates, three of whom had been wounded by gunfire, were transferred to Seychelles for prosecution.ونُقل خمسة قراصنة، ثلاثة منهم أصيبوا بجراح جراء إطلاق النار، إلى سيشيل لمحاكمتهم.
According to EUNAVFOR, one of the captured pirates had previously been prosecuted in Seychelles for involvement in the attempted hijacking of the fishing vessel Galerna III on 18 November 2017 (S/2018/1002, para. 135) but had subsequently been released on a legal technicality.ووفقا لما أفادت به القوة البحرية للاتحاد الأوروبي، فإن أحد القراصنة المقبوض عليهم كان قد حوكم سابقا في سيشيل على خلفية ضلوعه في محاولة اختطاف سفينة الصيد ”Galerna III“، في 18 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2017 (S/2018/1002، الفقرة 135)، ولكن أفرج عنه لاحقا بسبب شكلية قانونية().
Subsequent biometric evidence received from the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) confirmed that a pirate arrested following the hijacking of the Al Ahzam in April 2019, Mohamed Dahir Wehliye, had been previously detained in 2017 in connection with the attempted hijackings of the Galerna III as well as the Panama-flagged merchant vessel Ever Dynamic (see annex 1.14 for additional details).وأثبتت الأدلة البيومترية اللاحقة الواردة من المنظمة الدولية للشرطة الجنائية (الإنتربول) أن قرصانا ألقي القبض عليه عقب اختطاف ”الأحزم“ في نيسان/أبريل 2019، ويدعى محمد ضاهر وهليّة (Mohamed Dahir Wehliye)، كان قد احتُجز سابقا في عام 2017 على خلفية الضلوع في محاولة اختطاف السفينة ”Galerna III“، وكذلك محاولة اختطاف السفينة التجارية ”Ever Dynamic“ التي ترفع علم بنما (انظر المرفق 1-14 للمزيد من التفاصيل)().
III.ثالثا -
Arms embargoحظر توريد الأسلحة
A.ألف -
Compliance of the Federal Government of Somalia with obligations under the partial lifting of the arms embargoامتثال الحكومة الاتحادية للالتزامات المفروضة في إطار الرفع الجزئي لحظر توريد الأسلحة
109.109 -
During the current reporting period, the compliance of the Federal Government of Somalia with the Security Council’s notification requirements improved, with five of the seven notifications received by the Committee meeting the Federal Government’s obligations pursuant to the partial lifting of the arms embargo.خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير الحالي، تحسّن امتثال حكومة الصومال الاتحادية لشروط الإخطار التي فرضها مجلس الأمن، حيث أوفى خمسة من أصل الإخطارات السبعة التي تلقتها اللجنة بالتزامات الحكومة الاتحادية عملا بالرفع الجزئي لحظر توريد الأسلحة.
110.110 -
However, the Federal Government’s refusal to grant access to its military storage facilities during the current reporting period impaired the ability of the Panel of Experts to adequately monitor the Federal Government’s overall compliance with the terms of the partial lifting.ومع ذلك، أدى رفض الحكومة الاتحادية السماح بدخول مرافق تخزينها العسكرية خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير إلى إضعاف قدرة فريق الخبراء على القيام بالرصد الكافي لامتثال الحكومة الاتحادية عموما لشروط الرفع الجزئي لحظر الأسلحة.
However, pursuant to the Security Council’s request in paragraph 32 of its resolution 2444 (2018), from 22 to 28 June 2019, a technical assessment mission was conducted by the Secretary-General to Nairobi and Mogadishu to undertake a review aimed at improving implementation of the arms embargo.غير أنه، عملا بطلب مجلس الأمن، في الفقرة 32 من قراره 2444 (2018)، زارت في الفترة من 22 إلى 28 حزيران/يونيه 2019 بعثة للتقييم التقني أوفدها الأمين العام نيروبي ومقديشو لإجراء استعراض بهدف تحسين تنفيذ حظر الأسلحة.
The assessment team received access from the Federal Government to military storage facilities.وحصل فريق التقييم من الحكومة الاتحادية على إذن بدخول مرافق التخزين العسكرية.
While acknowledging internal coordination issues as a contributing factor in past instances of missed or late notifications, the Federal Government conveyed to the assessment team that supplying Member States, when arranging deliveries, often bypassed the Office of the National Security Adviser of Somalia.ومع تسليم الحكومة الاتحادية بأن مسائل التنسيق الداخلي من العوامل التي يعزى إليها عدم تقديم الإخطارات أو التأخر في تقديمها، فقد أبلغت فريق التقييم بأن الدول الأعضاء الموردة كثيرا ما تتجاوز، عند ترتيب عمليات التسليم، مكتب مستشار الأمن القومي في الصومال().
111.111 -
Annex 2.1 provides details on notifications to the Committee by the Federal Government during the current reporting period, and annexes 2.2 and 2.3 (strictly confidential) show the consignments of weapons and ammunition notified to the Committee and the total amount delivered to the Federal Government since the partial lifting of the arms embargo, in 2013.وترد في المرفق 2-1 تفاصيل عن إخطارات الحكومة الاتحادية الموجهة إلى اللجنة خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، ويعرض المرفقان 2-2 و 2-3 (السريان للغاية) شحنات الأسلحة والذخيرة التي أخطرت بها اللجنة والكمية الكلية التي سُلمت إلى الحكومة الاتحادية منذ الرفع الجزئي لحظر توريد الأسلحة في عام 2013.
Weapons and ammunition managementإدارة الأسلحة والذخيرة
112.112 -
Following the technical assessment mission, the Secretary-General concluded that the Federal Government had made significant advancements in strengthening accountability of newly imported materiel but that challenges remained, in particular in the areas of coordination and capacity.عقب انتهاء بعثة التقييم التقني، خلص الأمين العام إلى أن الحكومة الاتحادية أحرزت تقدما كبيرا في تعزيز المساءلة بشأن الأعتدة المستوردة حديثا ولكن لا تزال هناك تحديات، في مجالي التنسيق والقدرات على وجه الخصوص().
The assessment team’s conclusions largely accorded with the 2018 findings of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, namely that, while visibility of weapons entering Halane Central Armoury is generally adequate, record-keeping with respect to distribution of materiel to field units remains deficient (S/2018/1002, paras. 17–20).وجاءت استنتاجات فريق التقييم متوافقة توافقا كبيرا مع النتائج التي توصل إليها فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا في عام 2018، وهي أنه على الرغم من أن إمكانية الوقوف على الأسلحة التي تدخل مستودع الأسلحة المركزي في هالاني كافية عموما، فإن حفظ السجلات فيما يتعلق بتوزيع العتاد على الوحدات الميدانية ما زال غير كافٍ (انظر S/2018/1002، الفقرات من 17 إلى 20).
Annex 2.4 provides additional details on weapons and ammunition management by the Federal Government and federal member states.وترد في المرفق 2-4 تفاصيل إضافية بشأن إدارة الأسلحة والذخيرة قدمتها الحكومة الاتحادية والولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد.
Federal Government of Somalia weapons found in the possession of arms dealersأسلحة حكومة الصومال الاتحادية التي وجدت في حوزة تجار الأسلحة
113.113 -
Utilizing local sources, from January to August 2019, the Panel of Experts documented 38 weapons found in the possession of black-market arms dealers with markings consistent with those imported by the Federal Government: 7 AK-pattern rifles and 6 9-mm pistols in Mogadishu, and 25 AK-pattern rifles in Baidoa.في الفترة من كانون الثاني/يناير إلى آب/أغسطس 2019، وثّق فريق الخبراء، مستعينا بمصادر محلية، 38 قطعة سلاح عُثر عليها في حوزة تجار أسلحة في السوق السوداء تحمل علامات متوافقة مع العلامات الخاصة بالأسلحة التي استوردتها الحكومة الاتحادية()، وبيانها كالتالي: 7 بنادق من طراز كالاشنيكوف و 6 مسدسات عيار 9 ملم في مقديشو و 25 بندقية من طراز كالاشنيكوف في بيدوا().
Using their serial numbers, the Panel was able to trace some of the weapons to consignments delivered to the Federal Government in September 2014, June 2017 and July 2017.واستنادا إلى الأرقام التسلسلية للأسلحة، استطاع الفريق تعقب بعض الأسلحة حتى شحنات مُسلَّمة إلى الحكومة الاتحادية في أيلول/سبتمبر 2014 وحزيران/يونيه 2017 وتموز/يوليه 2017().
One pistol documented in Mogadishu showed evidence of an attempt to remove apparent Federal Government markings, the first time that practice had been observed by the Panel.وأظهر مسدس واحد موثق في مقديشو أدلة على محاولة لإزالة علامات يبدو أنها تخص الحكومة الاتحادية، وهذه هي أول مرة يلاحظ فيها الفريق تلك الممارسة.
114.114 -
Weapons bearing apparent Federal Government markings constituted 12 per cent of the total number of weapons observed by the Panel’s local sources over the period of investigation.وشكلت الأسلحة التي تحمل علامات يبدو أنها تخص الحكومة الاتحادية ما نسبته 12 في المائة من العدد الإجمالي للأسلحة التي شاهدتها المصادر المحلية للفريق خلال فترة التحقيق.
Testimonies received from three arms dealers in Mogadishu confirmed that weapons bearing Federal Government markings had been purchased mostly from low-ranking members of the Somali security forces, as well as from junior and senior officers and Federal Government officials.وأكدت شهادات وردت من ثلاثة تجار أسلحة في مقديشو أن الأسلحة التي تحمل علامات الحكومة الاتحادية تم شراؤها، في معظمها، من أفراد منخفضي الرتب في قوات الأمن الصومالية، وكذلك من ضباط في رتب صغرى وكبرى، ومن مسؤولين تابعين للحكومة الاتحادية.
Those testimonies were consistent with the findings presented in the final report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea for 2018 (S/2018/1002, paras. 24–25).وجاءت تلك الإفادات متسقة مع النتائج الواردة في التقرير النهائي لفريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا لعام 2018 (S/2018/1002، الفقرتان 24 و 25).
115.115 -
In March 2018, the Somali National Army Deputy Commander of sector 60, headquartered in Baidoa, provided the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea with logbooks detailing the distribution of weapons, including serial numbers, to 277 soldiers.وفي آذار/مارس 2018، زوّد نائب قائد القطاع 60 في الجيش الوطني الصومالي، الذي يوجد مقره في بيدوا، فريقَ الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا بدفاتر سجلات تبين بالتفصيل توزيع الأسلحة، بما في ذلك الأرقام التسلسلية، على 277 جنديا().
By cross-referencing the serial numbers of the 25 weapons found in the possession of arms dealers in Baidoa, the Panel determined that 17 weapons had previously been issued to Somali National Army soldiers in sector 60.وبمقارنة الأرقام التسلسلية لقطع السلاح الـ 25 التي عثر عليها في حوزة تجار الأسلحة في بيدوا، خلص الفريق إلى أن 17 قطعة منها سبق أن وزعت على جنود الجيش الوطني الصومالي، في القطاع 60.
Only 8 of the 17 soldiers to whom those weapons had been issued were officially registered as Somali National Army soldiers as of February 2019 (see “Biometric registration of the Somali National Army”, above).ولم يكن سوى 8 من هؤلاء الجنود الـ 17 الذين وزعت عليهم الأسلحة مسجلين رسميا في الجيش الوطني الصومالي، في شباط/فبراير 2019 (انظر ”التسجيل البيومتري للجيش الوطني الصومالي“ أعلاه)().
116.116 -
Further details on the weapons and ammunition found in the possession of arms dealers are contained in annexes 2.5 and 2.5.1 for Mogadishu and in annex 2.5.2 (strictly confidential) for Baidoa.ويرد مزيد من التفاصيل عن الأسلحة والذخيرة التي وجدت في حوزة تجار الأسلحة في المرفقين 2-5 و 2-5-1 بالنسبة لمقديشو، وفي المرفق 2-5-2 (السري للغاية) بالنسبة لبيدوا.
Federal Government of Somalia reporting pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018)التقارير المقدمة من حكومة الصومال الاتحادية عملا بالفقرة 21 من القرار 2444 (2018)
117.117 -
The periodic report pursuant to paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 2444 (2018) was received from the Federal Government on 15 March 2019, in accordance with the mandated deadline.ورد التقرير الدوري المقدم عملا بالفقرة 21 من قرار مجلس الأمن 2444 (2018)، من الحكومة الاتحادية في 15 آذار/مارس 2019، وفقا للموعد المقرر.
In the report, the Federal Government announced several measures that would constitute progress regarding the accountability of the Somali national security forces, including the finalization of the biometric registration of the Somali National Army and the promulgation of a presidential decree outlining standard operating procedures concerning the weapons and ammunition management framework.وأعلنت الحكومة الاتحادية في التقرير عن عدة تدابير تشكل تقدما بشأن مساءلة قوات الأمن الوطنية الصومالية، بما في ذلك إنجاز التسجيل البيومتري للجيش الوطني الصومالي، وإصدار مرسوم رئاسي يحدد إجراءات التشغيل الموحدة بشأن إطار إدارة الأسلحة والذخيرة.
However, the report lacked elements of the mandatory reporting originally stipulated in paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014), particularly as regards the structure, composition, strength and disposition of Federal Government security forces, including the status of regional and militia forces.غير أن التقرير لا يتضمن عناصر مشمولة بالإبلاغ الإجباري منصوص عليها أولَ الأمر في الفقرة 9 من القرار 2182 (2014)، ولا سيما فيما يتعلق بهيكل قوات الأمن التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية وتكوين تلك القوات وقوامها ونشرها، بما في ذلك حالة القوات الإقليمية وقوات الميليشيات.
Annex 2.7 contains further analysis of Federal Government reporting pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018).ويتضمن المرفق 2-7 تحليلا إضافيا للتقارير المقدمة من الحكومة الاتحادية عملا بالفقرة 21 من القرار 2444 (2018).
118.118 -
The Federal Government’s second periodic report was due to be submitted to the Committee on 15 September 2019 and was expected to contain notifications regarding the distribution of imported arms and ammunition to the Federal Government security forces, in accordance with paragraphs 21 and 24 of Security Council resolution 2444 (2018).وكان يُفترض تقديم التقرير الدوري الثاني للحكومة الاتحادية إلى اللجنة في 15 أيلول/سبتمبر 2019، وكان يُتوقع أن يتضمن إخطارات بشأن توزيع الأسلحة والذخيرة المستوردة على قوات الأمن التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية، وفقا للفقرتين 21 و 24 من قرار مجلس الأمن 2444 (2018).
As of the time of writing, the Federal Government had not submitted the report to the Committee.وحتى تاريخ إعداد هذا التقرير، لم تقدم الحكومة الاتحادية التقرير إلى اللجنة.
Military equipment in the possession of Al-Shabaabالمعدات العسكرية الموجودة في حوزة حركة الشباب
119.119 -
The Panel of Experts documented several instances of the capture and use of arms, ammunition and vehicles by Al-Shabaab during the reporting period, including at least fourteen 81-mm mortar rounds and a Federal Government armoured personnel carrier.وثّق فريق الخبراء، خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، عدة حالات استولت فيها حركة الشباب على أسلحة وذخيرة ومركبات واستخدمتها، بما في ذلك ما لا يقل عن 14 قذيفة هاون عيار 81 ملم وناقلة جند مصفحة تابعة للحكومة الاتحادية.
In addition, a 9-mm Luger pistol imported by the Federal Government in 2014 was used in the killing of a Federal Government police officer by Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu on 27 January 2019.وإضافة إلى ذلك، استُخدم مسدس من طراز Luger عيار 9 ملم استوردته الحكومة الاتحادية في عام 2014 في قتل ضابط من ضباط الشرطة التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية على أيدي حركة الشباب، في مقديشو، في 27 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019.
Al-Shabaab captured military vehicles, anti-aircraft guns and large quantities of ammunition during two attacks on Somali National Army bases at El Salini, Lower Shabelle region, and Moqokori, Hiran region, on 22 September 2019 and 1 June 2018.واستولت حركة الشباب على مركبات عسكرية ومدافع مضادة للطائرات، وعلى كميات كبيرة من الذخيرة خلال هجومين على قواعد للجيش الوطني الصومالي في الساليني، الواقعة في منطقة شبيلي السفلى، وفي موكاكوري، الواقعة في منطقة هيران، في 22 أيلول/سبتمبر 2019 و 1 حزيران/يونيه 2018.
Annexes 2.6 and 2.6.1 contain additional details on military equipment and ammunition seized by Al-Shabaab.ويتضمن المرفقان 2-6 و 2-6-1 تفاصيل إضافية بشأن المعدات العسكرية والذخيرة التي استولت عليها حركة الشباب.
B.باء -
Member State compliance with the arms embargoامتثال الدول الأعضاء لحظر توريد الأسلحة
Supply of weapons and ammunition from the Metals and Engineering Corporationتوريد الأسلحة والذخيرة من مؤسسة المعادن والهندسة
120.120 -
The Panel of Experts has obtained evidence that the Ethiopian State-owned Metals and Engineering Corporation – an engineering and arms manufacturing company based in Addis Ababa – systematically violated the arms embargo over the course of at least a decade.حصل فريق الخبراء على أدلة تثبت أن مؤسسة المعادن والهندسة الإثيوبية المملوكة للدولة، وهي شركة للهندسة وتصنيع الأسلحة مقرها أديس أبابا، كانت تنتهك بشكل ممنهج حظر توريد الأسلحة على مدى ما لا يقل عن عقد من الزمن.
In a meeting with Metals and Engineering Corporation executives on 4 April 2019, the Panel viewed hundreds of documents detailing the supply of weapons and ammunition to every regional administration in Somalia, including at the district level.وفي اجتماع مع مديرِين تنفيذيِّين من تلك المؤسسة، عقد في 4 نيسان/أبريل 2019، اطّلع الفريق على مئات الوثائق التي تبين بالتفصيل إمدادات الأسلحة والذخيرة إلى كل إدارة من الإدارات الإقليمية في الصومال، بما في ذلك على مستوى المديريات.
The officials stated that the Corporation had not considered the supply of arms and ammunition to Somali regional administrations to be a violation of the arms embargo, and that it had viewed Puntland and Somaliland as “sovereign states”.وذكر المسؤولون أنه المؤسسة لا تعتبر إمدادات الأسلحة والذخيرة إلى الإدارات الإقليمية الصومالية انتهاكا للحظر المفروض على توريد الأسلحة، وأنها كانت تعتبر بونتلاند وصوماليلاند ”دولتين ذواتي سيادة“().
121.121 -
Although the Metals and Engineering Corporation officials indicated that the documentation would be made available to the Panel by the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry subsequently declined to provide it, citing ongoing court proceedings.وفي حين أشار مسؤولو مؤسسة المعادن والهندسة إلى أن الوثائق ستتاح للفريق من قِبل وزارة الخارجية الإثيوبية، فقد رفضت الوزارة لاحقا تزويده بها، قائلة إن إجراءات قضائية جارية حاليا بهذا الخصوص().
However, the Panel was permitted to take two photographs of the documentation during its meeting with Metals and Engineering Corporation executives, which are provided in annex 2.8.بيد أنه سُمح للفريق بالتقاط صورتين للوثائق خلال اجتماعه مع مؤسسة المعادن والهندسة، وهما واردتان في المرفق 2-8.
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In November 2018, the Government of Ethiopia arrested dozens of senior Metals and Engineering Corporation officials on corruption charges.وفي تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018، اعتقلت حكومة إثيوبيا عشرات من كبار المسؤولين في مؤسسة المعادن والهندسة بتهم الفساد().
As of February 2019, the Corporation is no longer engaged in military production, and its arm manufacturing wing has been subsumed by the Ethiopian Ministry of National Defense.ومنذ شباط/فبراير 2019، لم تعد تلك المؤسسة تشارك في الإنتاج الحربي، وأُدمج جناحها الخاص بتصنيع الأسلحة في وزارة الدفاع الوطني الإثيوبية().
Notifications for the provision of training, stipends, infrastructure and military equipmentالإخطار عند توفير تدريب ومنح دراسية ومرافق أساسية ومعدات عسكرية
123.123 -
The Security Council requires that a notification to the Committee, for its information, be made at least five days in advance of any deliveries of military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training.يشترط مجلس الأمن إخطار اللجنة، لغرض العلم بأي عمليات لتسليم معدات عسكرية أو إسداء المشورة أو تقديم المساعدة أو التدريب، وذلك قبل إتمامها بخمسة أيام على الأقل.
In paragraph 26 of its resolution 2444 (2018), the Council noted that support for the development of the Somali national security forces might include building infrastructure and provision of salaries and stipends provided to the Somali national security forces.فقد أشار مجلس الأمن، في الفقرة 26 من قراره 2444 (2018)، إلى أن الدعم المقدم لتطوير قوات الأمن الوطني الصومالية قد يشمل بناء الهياكل الأساسية وتوفير المرتبات والأجور المدفوعة لقوات الأمن الوطنية الصومالية.
124.124 -
Notwithstanding these requirements, the Committee remains largely unnotified with regard to the provision of training, stipends and infrastructure development;وعلى الرغم من تلك الاشتراطات، فإن توفير التدريب والأجور وتطوير الهياكل الأساسية لا تزال تتم، إلى حد كبير، دون الإخطار بها إلى اللجنة؛
the Panel is aware that a number of Member States, international agencies and other organizations have failed to notify it of some combination of the above during the current reporting period.والفريق على علم بأن عددا من الدول الأعضاء والوكالات الدولية والمنظمات الأخرى لم تخطر اللجنة بتوليفة ما من البنود المذكورة أعلاه، خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير الحالي.
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Meanwhile, some Member States have routinely notified the Committee of deliveries of non-lethal items such as slippers, socks and pyjamas to the Somali national security forces, considering these to be “military equipment” or “assistance” and therefore subject to notification.وفي الوقت نفسه، دأبت بعض الدول الأعضاء على إخطار اللجنة بعمليات تسليم أصناف غير فتاكة، من قبيل النعال والجوارب والمنامات، إلى قوات الأمن الوطني الصومالية، معتبرة أن تلك الأصناف هي ”معدات عسكرية“ أو ”مساعدة“، ولذلك فهي خاضعة للإخطار.
The Panel has therefore made two recommendations to the Security Council to clarify and simplify requirements under the arms embargo, namely modifying the provisions to remove the need for notifications relating to the delivery of advice, assistance or training and including an annex to its next resolution explicitly setting forth the categories of military equipment subject to Committee notification (see “Recommendations”, below).ومن ثم، قدم الفريق توصيتين إلى مجلس الأمن بتوضيح وتبسيط الشروط المفروضة بموجب حظر توريد الأسلحة، أي تعديل الأحكام بما يفيد انتفاء الحاجة إلى الإخطارات المتعلقة بتقديم المشورة أو المساعدة أو التدريب وإدراج مرفق لقراره المقبل يحدد صراحة فئات المعدات العسكرية التي يتعين إخطار اللجنة بها (انظر ”التوصيات“ أدناه).
African Union Mission in Somaliaبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال
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In paragraph 6 of its resolution 2182 (2014), the Security Council requested AMISOM to document and register all military equipment captured as part of offensive operations and to facilitate inspection by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea of all military items before their redistribution or destruction.طلب مجلس الأمن، في الفقرة 6 من قراره 2182 (2014)، إلى بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال أن توثق وتسجل بدقة جميع المعدات العسكرية التي استولت عليها في إطار عمليات هجومية، وأن تيسر قيام فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا بفحص كل الأصناف العسكرية قبل إعادة توزيعها أو تدميرها().
The Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea and, subsequently, the Panel of Experts has requested information on six significant seizures of weapons and ammunition from Al-Shabaab in the five years since that request was made;وطلب فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا وبعده فريق الخبراء معلومات عن ست ضبطيات كبيرة من الأسلحة والذخيرة من حركة الشباب في السنوات الخمس التي تلت هذا الطلب؛
however, despite expressions of willingness to cooperate, AMISOM has provided practicable information on only one of those seizures.بيد أنه رغم إعراب البعثة عن رغبتها في التعاون، فإنها لم تقدم معلومات عملية إلاّ لواحدة من تلك الضبطيات().
The Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea sought to support AMISOM in fulfilling its obligations in this regard, including by supplying logbook templates for captured materiel in 2017.وسعى فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا إلى دعم بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الوفاء بالتزاماتها في هذا الصدد، بوسائل منها تقديم نماذج دفاتر السجلات للأعتدة المضبوطة في عام 2017.
Although the logbooks were distributed to every AMISOM sector, they were never operationalized.وعلى الرغم من توزيع دفاتر السجلات تلك على كل قطاع من قطاعات بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي، فإنها لم توضع قط موضع التنفيذ.
However, the Panel understands that a draft AMISOM policy on recovered weapons is awaiting adoption by the African Union.غير أن الفريق يدرك أن مشروع سياسة لبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي بشأن الأسلحة المضبوطة ينتظر اعتماد الاتحاد الأفريقي له.
Improved information-sharing by AMISOM will greatly strengthen the Panel’s capacity to assess the origin of Al-Shabaab weapons, ammunition and equipment, and therefore to provide recommendations to the Council on how to limit Al-Shabaab’s access to such items.وسيسهم تحسين تقديم المعلومات من جانب بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي إسهاما كبيرا في تعزيز قدرة الفريق على تحديد منشأ أسلحة حركة الشباب وذخيرتها ومعداتها، ومن ثم تقديم توصيات إلى المجلس بشأن كيفية الحد من قدرة حركة الشباب على الحصول على تلك الأعتدة.
United Arab Emirates military base in Berberaالقاعدة العسكرية للإمارات العربية المتحدة في بربرة
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In reports from 2017 and 2018, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported on the ongoing construction of a military base in Berbera by the United Arab Emirates, in violation of the arms embargo (S/2017/924, paras. 146–150, and S/2018/1002, paras. 40–43).أبلغ فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا، في تقريريه لعامي 2017 و 2018، عن مواصلة تشييد الإمارات العربية المتحدة قاعدةً عسكرية في بربرة في انتهاك لحظر الأسلحة (S/2017/924، الفقرات من 146 إلى 150 و S/2018/1002، الفقرات من 40 إلى 43).
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The Panel of Experts notes that the United Arab Emirates has repeatedly declined to provide substantive responses to previous Monitoring Group enquiries requesting details on the exact nature of the materiel transferred to Somaliland and on the contractual agreement governing the hosting of the base.ويلاحظ فريق الخبراء أن الإمارات العربية المتحدة رفضت مرارا وتكرارا تقديم ردود تتضمن معلومات جوهرية على استفسارات سابقة طلب فيها فريق الرصد تقديم تفاصيل عن الطبيعة الدقيقة للأعتدة المنقولة إلى صوماليلاند، وعن الاتفاق التعاقدي الناظم لاستضافة القاعدة.
During the Panel’s mission to Berbera on 12 and 13 February 2019, Somaliland authorities denied its request to visit the base.وخلال بعثة الفريق إلى بربرة يومي 12 و 13 شباط/فبراير 2019، رفضت سلطات صوماليلاند طلب الفريق زيارة القاعدة.
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Satellite imagery of the military base (presented in annex 2.9) from September 2018 and August 2019 shows significant progress in construction, including the completion of the runway and the construction of an adjacent hangar and/or barracks facility.وتُظهر صور ساتلية للقاعدة العسكرية (واردة في المرفق 2-9) ملتقطة في أيلول/سبتمبر 2018 وفي آب/أغسطس 2019، تقدما كبيرا في التشييد، بما في ذلك استكمال مدرج المطار وتشييد حظيرة طائرات متاخمة له و/أو مرفق متاخم له للثكنات.
C.جيم -
Illicit flow of weapons into Somaliaالتدفق غير المشروع للأسلحة إلى الصومال
Puntlandبونتلاند
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Puntland remains the primary entry point for illicit arms into Somalia;لا تزال بونتلاند نقطة الدخول الرئيسية للأسلحة غير المشروعة إلى الصومال؛
the arms are typically shipped using small-scale speedboats from Yemen.وتُشحن الأسلحة عادة باستخدام قوارب صغيرة سريعة من اليمن.
On 4 March 2019, for instance, a skiff from Yemen transporting weapons and ammunition reached the Puntland coast, between Bosaso and Qandala.ففي 4 آذار/مارس 2019، مثلا، وصل زورق على متنه أسلحة وذخيرة قادما من اليمن إلى ساحل بونتلاند بين بوصاصو وقندلا.
According to information provided by a Puntland security source, the shipment consisted of 6 RPG-7s, 8 PKM machine guns, 15 AK-pattern assault rifles, 3 DShK heavy machine guns, more than 50 hand grenades and an indeterminate quantity of ammunition.ووفقا لمعلومات مقدمة من مصدر أمني في بونتلاند، كانت الشحنة تتألف من 6 قواذف لقنابل صاروخية طراز RPG-7، و 8 رشاشات من طراز كالاشنيكوف المطور، و 15 بندقية هجومية من طراز كالاشنيكوف، و 3 رشاشات ثقيلة من طراز دوشكا، وأكثر من 50 قنبلة يدوية، وكمية غير محددة من الذخيرة.
The Bosaso Port Maritime Police Unit led an unsuccessful operation to intercept the shipment.وقامت وحدة الشرطة البحرية في ميناء بوصاصو بعملية لاعتراض الشحنة لم تكلل بالنجاح.
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On 17 April 2019, a small vessel carrying weapons from Yemen arrived at the shoreline adjacent to Bosaso airport.وفي 17 نيسان/أبريل 2019، وصلت سفينة صغيرة تحمل أسلحة من اليمن إلى خط الشاطئ المجاور لمطار بوصاصو.
The weapons were offloaded and transported to a private residence, bypassing security forces through the intercession of the former Deputy Commander of the Bosaso police, Ahmed Bashir Ahmed “Jaraale”.وأُفرغت شحنة الأسلحة على اليابسة ونُقلت إلى مسكن خاص، من دون المرور على قوات الأمن من خلال تدخل نائب قائد شرطة بوصاصو السابق، أحمد بشير أحمد ”جرالي“ (Jaraale)().
The following day, Puntland forces secured the area where the weapons were being held and subsequently seized 19 AK-pattern assault rifles, although authorities believe that they may represent only a portion of the total illicit shipment.وفي اليوم التالي، أمّنت قوات بونتلاند المنطقة التي كان يُحتفظ فيها بالأسلحة، ثم ضبطت 19 بندقية هجومية من طراز كالاشنيكوف، رغم أن السلطات تعتقد أن تلك الكمية لا تمثل سوى جزء من إجمالي الشحنة غير المشروعة().
While the Puntland administration initially indicated that it would provide the Panel with photographs and the serial numbers of the rifles, that documentation was ultimately not forthcoming.وفي حين أشارت إدارة بونتلاند في بداية الأمر إلى أنها ستزود الفريق بصور البنادق وأرقامها التسلسلية، فإن تلك الوثائق لم تقدَّم في نهاية المطاف.
Annex 2.10 (strictly confidential) contains additional information on the arms shipment into Puntland in April 2019.ويتضمن المرفق 2-10 (سري للغاية) معلومات إضافية عن شحنة الأسلحة إلى بونتلاند التي تمت في نيسان/أبريل 2019.
Arms smuggling networks between Yemen and Puntlandشبكات تهريب الأسلحة بين اليمن وبونتلاند
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During the reporting period, the Panel continued the previous investigations of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea into the communication and financial links between Puntland arms dealers and their suppliers based in Yemen (see S/2018/1002, annex 1.9 (strictly confidential)).خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، واصل الفريق التحقيقات السابقة لفريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا في الاتصالات والصلات المالية بين تجار الأسلحة في بونتلاند والجهات الموردة لهم المتواجدة في اليمن (انظر S/2018/1002، المرفق 1-9 (سري للغاية)).
Annex 2.11 (strictly confidential) contains an update on the Panel’s investigations.ويتضمن المرفق 2-11 (سري للغاية) معلومات مستكملة عن تحقيقات الفريق.
IV.رابعا -
Obstruction of humanitarian assistanceعرقلة المساعدات الإنسانية
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations project to supply seeds and fertilizer in Somalilandمشروع منظمة الأغذية والزراعة للأمم المتحدة لتوفير البذور والأسمدة في صوماليلاند
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The cumulative impact of two consecutive poor rainy seasons and dry conditions in Somaliland led to a sharp deterioration in the food security situation in 2019 and resulted in widespread crop failures.أدى الأثر التراكمي لضعف الأمطار في موسمين متتاليين وظروف الجفاف في صوماليلاند إلى تدهور حاد في حالة الأمن الغذائي في عام 2019، وأسفر عن تردي المحاصيل على نطاق واسع().
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In January 2018, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) launched a project in Somaliland to import and supply farmers with 10,000 tons of seeds and fertilizers by May 2018.وفي كانون الثاني/يناير 2018، أطلقت منظمة الأغذية والزراعة للأمم المتحدة مشروعا في صوماليلاند لاستيراد 000 10 طن من البذور والأسمدة وتوفيرها للمزارعين بحلول أيار/مايو 2018.
In February 2018, FAO selected 20 agro-traders to import the material, who were then approved by the Ministry of Agriculture of Somaliland.وفي شباط/فبراير 2018، اختارت منظمة الأغذية والزراعة 20 تاجرا من تجار المواد الزراعية لاستيراد المواد، ووافقت عليهم بعد ذلك وزارة الزراعة في صوماليلاند.
However, the Ministry declined to provide all but one of the approved traders with clearance letters and import permits.غير أن الوزارة رفضت في وقت لاحق منح خطابات الترخيص وتصاريح الاستيراد لجميع التجار الموافق عليهم باستثناء واحد منهم.
The Ministry and FAO subsequently reached an agreement that four of the agro-traders would be allowed to import the materials but, in May and June 2018, the Ministry again blocked the importation by refusing to supply three of the four agreed-upon traders with permits.وتوصلت الوزارة ومنظمة الأغذية والزراعة بعد ذلك إلى اتفاق يقضي بالسماح لأربعة من تجار المواد الزراعية باستيراد المواد، ولكن في أيار/مايو وحزيران/يونيه 2018، منعت الوزارة مرة أخرى الاستيراد برفضها منح التصاريح لثلاثة من التجار الأربعة المتفق عليهم.
A proposal to allow the Ministry’s preferred agro-trader to import and distribute the entire 10,000 tons of seeds required for the project was rejected by FAO.ورفضت منظمة الأغذية والزراعة اقتراحا بالسماح لتاجر المواد الزراعية المفضل لدى الوزارة باستيراد وتوزيع كامل كمية البذور اللازمة للمشروع والبالغة 000 10 طن.
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In June 2018, FAO sent a comprehensive letter to the Ministry of Agriculture regarding concerns over the Ministry’s interference in the project.وفي حزيران/يونيه 2018، وجهت منظمة الأغذية والزراعة رسالة شاملة إلى وزارة الزراعة بشأن الشواغل المتصلة بتدخل الوزارة في المشروع.
Owing to obstruction by the Ministry, the seeds and fertilizers were not imported in time for the agricultural season and, consequently, FAO cancelled the project in July 2018.ونظرا للعرقلة التي سببتها الوزارة، لم تُستورد البذور والأسمدة في الوقت المناسب للموسم الزراعي، ونتيجة لذلك، ألغت منظمة الأغذية والزراعة المشروع في تموز/يوليه 2018.
Targeting of humanitarian workersاستهداف العاملين في المجال الإنساني
Gedo regionمنطقة غدو
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Between November 2018 and August 2019, the Panel recorded 12 attacks against humanitarian workers, the majority of which were abductions for ransom carried out by Al-Shabaab in Gedo region, a new trend observed during the current reporting period.في الفترة بين تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018 وآب/أغسطس 2019، سجل الفريق 12 هجوما على العاملين في المجال الإنساني، كان معظمها عمليات اختطاف للحصول على فدية قامت بها حركة الشباب في منطقة غدو، ويمثل ذلك اتجاها جديدا لوحظ خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير().
In addition, on 2 July 2019, Al-Shabaab killed an aid worker from the non-governmental organization (NGO) Lifeline in Buulo Cadey, Gedo region.وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، قتلت حركة الشباب في 2 تموز/يوليه 2019 أحد العاملين في مجال تقديم المعونة من المنظمة غير الحكومية Lifeline في بولو عدي في منطقة غدو.
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On 8 November 2018, two aid workers from an international NGO were abducted by Al-Shabaab in the village of Tuulo Jibril, 5 km east of Belet Hawo, Gedo region.وفي 8 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018، اختطفت حركة الشباب اثنين من العاملين في مجال تقديم المعونة من إحدى المنظمات غير الحكومية الدولية في قرية تولو جبريل، الواقعة على بعد 5 كلم إلى الشرق من بلد حواء في منطقة غدو().
On 27 February 2019, five employees from a local NGO providing nutrition support were abducted by Al-Shabaab near Gura, in Garbaharey district.وفي 27 شباط/فبراير 2019، اختطفت حركة الشباب خمسة موظفين من منظمة غير حكومية محلية تقدم الدعم الغذائي بالقرب من غورا في مديرية غاربهاري().
On 14 May 2019, Al-Shabaab abducted two employees from two NGOs that had been delivering essential humanitarian assistance in the village of Geedweyne, located between the towns of Dolow and Luq.وفي 14 أيار/مايو 2019، اختطفت حركة الشباب اثنين من موظفي منظمتين غير حكوميتين كانتا تعملان في إيصال المساعدات الإنسانية الأساسية في قرية غيدويني، الواقعة بين مدينتي دولو ولوق().
They were taken to the Al-Shabaab-controlled village of El Adde.واقتيدا إلى قرية العدي التي تسيطر عليها حركة الشباب.
On 26 May, the two humanitarian aid workers were fined $55,000 and $32,000, respectively, by an Al-Shabaab court.وفي 26 أيار/مايو، قضت محكمة تابعة لحركة الشباب بتغريم أحد العاملَين في مجال المعونة الإنسانية بمبلغ 000 55 دولار وتغريم الآخر بمبلغ 000 32 دولار.
On 20 July, one of the aid workers was released after a fine of $21,000 was paid.وفي 20 تموز/يوليه، أفرج عن أحد العاملين في مجال تقديم المعونة بعد دفع غرامة قدرها 000 21 دولار.
As of the time of writing, at least six local humanitarian workers were still held captive by Al-Shabaab captivity.وحتى كتابة هذا التقرير، لا يزال ما لا يقل عن ستة من العاملين في المجال الإنساني المحلي في الأسر لدى حركة الشباب.
International humanitarian workersالموظفون الدوليون العاملون في المجال الإنساني
138.138 -
Al-Shabaab also targeted international humanitarian workers during the current reporting period.استهدفت حركة الشباب أيضا الموظفين الدوليين العاملين في المجال الإنساني خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير.
On 20 November 2018, an Italian volunteer aid worker working for the NGO Africa Milele Onlus was abducted from the town of Malindi, Kenya, by suspected Al-Shabaab gunmen.ففي 20 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018، اختُطفت متطوعة إيطالية تعمل في مجال تقديم المعونة لدى المنظمة غير الحكومية Africa Milele Onlus من بلدة ماليندي في كينيا، على أيدي مسلحين يشتبه في انتمائهم إلى حركة الشباب.
The Panel has received confirmation that she was taken to Lower Juba region, Somalia.وتلقى الفريق تأكيدا بأنها اقتيدت إلى منطقة جوبا السفلى في الصومال().
On 12 April 2019, two Cuban doctors working for the Ministry of Health of Kenya were abducted in Mandera by gunmen suspected of being members of Al-Shabaab.وفي 12 نيسان/أبريل 2019، اختُطف في منديرا طبيبان كوبيان يعملان في وزارة صحة كينيا، على أيدي مسلحين يشتبه في انتمائهم إلى حركة الشباب.
One police officer guarding the doctors was killed instantly and a second was injured.وقُتل شرطي كان يحرس الطبيبين على الفور، في حين أصيب ثان.
The gunmen crossed the border into Somalia with the doctors and reportedly took them to El Adde or Belet Hawo, Gedo region.وعبر المسلحون الحدود إلى الصومال مع الطبيبين، وأفيد أنهم اقتادوهما إلى العدي أو بلد حواء في منطقة غدو.
As of the time of writing, the doctors were still being held captive.وحتى كتابة هذا التقرير، لا يزال الطبيبان في الأسر.
V.خامسا -
Violations of international humanitarian law involving the targeting of civiliansانتهاكات القانون الدولي الإنساني التي تنطوي على استهداف المدنيين
A.ألف -
Al-Shabaabحركة الشباب()
139.139 -
Al-Shabaab continued to be responsible for the largest number of systematic and widespread attacks against civilians in violation of international humanitarian law in Somalia.لا تزال حركة الشباب تتحمل المسؤولية عن أكبر عدد من الهجمات المنهجية الواسعة النطاق ضد المدنيين في انتهاك للقانون الدولي الإنساني في الصومال().
The attacks were largely committed in southern Somalia, in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Lower Shabelle, Bakool, Lower Juba and Bay regions.وارتكبت معظم هذه الهجمات في جنوب الصومال، في مناطق مقديشو، وبيدوا، وشبيلي السفلى، وبكول، وجوبا السفلى، وباي.
The militant group employed improvised explosive devices to kill and injure civilians in camps for internally displaced persons, restaurants, marketplaces, shopping centres, government offices and hotels.واستخدمت هذه الجماعة المقاتلة الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع لقتل وإصابة المدنيين في مخيمات المشردين داخليا والمطاعم والأسواق ومراكز التسوق والمكاتب الحكومية والفنادق.
A major attack during the reporting period took place on 28 February 2019, when at least 31 civilians were killed and 112 others injured, when Al-Shabaab attacked the area around the Maka al-Mukarama Hotel in Mogadishu.ووقع أحد الهجمات الرئيسية خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير في 28 شباط/فبراير 2019، حيث قتل ما لا يقل عن 31 مدنيا، وأصيب 112 آخرون، عندما هاجمت حركة الشباب المنطقة المحيطة بفندق مكة المكرمة في مقديشو.
On 23 March, a Deputy Minister and an additional 16 civilians were killed and 26 injured by Al-Shabaab improvised explosive devices when the group attacked the Ministries of Labour and Public Works in Shangani district, Mogadishu.وفي 23 آذار/مارس، قُتل نائب وزير و 16 مدنيا آخر وأصيب 26 آخرون بفعل الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع التي استخدمتها حركة الشباب عندما هاجمت الجماعة وزارتي العمل والأشغال العامة في مديرية شنغاني بمقديشو.
On 8 May, the Head of the Production Department at the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation was killed by an improvised explosive device in Dharkenley district in Mogadishu.وفي 8 أيار/مايو، قُتل رئيس قسم الإنتاج بوزارة الزراعة والري بفعل جهاز متفجر يدوي الصنع في مديرية طركينلي في مقديشو.
During June and July 2019, Al-Shabaab further intensified its use of improvised explosive devices and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, killing at least 68 civilians and injuring more than 119 in Mogadishu and Kismayo.وخلال شهري حزيران/يونيه وتموز/يوليه 2019، زادت حركة الشباب من تكثيف استخدامها الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع والأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع المحمولة على مركبة، مما أسفر عن مقتل ما لا يقل عن 68 مدنيا وإصابة أكثر من 119 آخرين في مقديشو وكيسمايو.
On 12 July 2019, the group targeted the Medina Hotel in Kismayo, killing at least 26 civilians and injuring 56 others.وفي 12 تموز/يوليه 2019، استهدفت الجماعة فندق مدينة في كيسمايو، مما أسفر عن مقتل ما لا يقل عن 26 مدنيا وإصابة 56 آخرين.
140.140 -
Al-Shabaab continued its policy of assassinating government officials and parliamentarians, primarily in Mogadishu.وواصلت حركة الشباب سياستها المتمثلة في اغتيال المسؤولين الحكوميين والبرلمانيين، ولا سيما في مقديشو.
On 24 December 2018, Al-Shabaab killed an employee of the Federal Government Ministry of Religious Affairs in the Haanta Dheer area of Dayniile district.ففي 24 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018، قتلت حركة الشباب أحد موظفي وزارة الشؤون الدينية التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية في منطقة هانتا ضهير في مديرية دينيلي.
On 20 February 2019, a prosecutor working for the Attorney General’s Office was killed in Hodan district, and a Member of the Federal Parliament was killed on 23 February 2019 in Karan district.وقُتل مدع عام يعمل في مكتب النائب العام في مديرية هدن في 20 شباط/فبراير 2019، وقتل أحد أعضاء البرلمان الاتحادي في 23 شباط/فبراير 2019 في مديرية كاران.
141.141 -
Al-Shabaab routinely executed civilians accused of espionage and of providing information leading to airstrikes by the United States.وكانت حركة الشباب تعدم بشكل روتيني مدنيين متهمين بالتجسس وبتوفير معلومات تفضي إلى ضربات جوية من الولايات المتحدة.
On 31 March 2019, for instance, Al-Shabaab publicly executed four men accused of espionage in Kamsuuma village, Lower Juba.ففي 31 آذار/مارس 2019، على سبيل المثال، أعدمت حركة الشباب علنا أربعة رجال متهمين بالتجسس في قرية كمسوما في جوبا السفلى.
On 18 December 2018, the group also publicly executed a civilian accused of cooperating with AMISOM in Gamboole village, west of Jowhar town, Middle Shabelle region.وأعدمت الجماعة أيضا علنا في 18 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018 شخصا مدنيا متهما بالتعاون مع بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في قرية غامبول غرب مدينة جوهر، في منطقة شبيلي الوسطى.
On 3 and 4 July 2019, in Hagar and in Salagle, Middle Juba region, Al-Shabaab publicly executed, by firing squad, 10 civilians accused of spying for foreign and Somali security forces.وفي 3 و 4 تموز/يوليه 2019، أعدمت حركة الشباب علنا 10 مدنيين رميا بالرصاص في هاغار وفي سالاجلي، في منطقة جوبا الوسطى، بتهمة التجسس لصالح قوات الأمن الأجنبية والصومالية.
On 7 July 2019, the group executed four civilians in Jamame, Lower Juba region, accused of spying for the Governments of Kenya and Somalia.وفي 7 تموز/يوليه 2019، أعدمت الجماعة أربعة مدنيين في جمامه، في منطقة جوبا السفلى، بتهمة التجسس لصالح حكومتي الصومال وكينيا.
142.142 -
Al-Shabaab continued to target delegates who had been involved in the federal electoral process in 2016.وواصلت حركة الشباب استهداف المندوبين الذين شاركوا في العملية الانتخابية الاتحادية في عام 2016.
Most of the attacks took place in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Bosaso and Lower Shabelle region.ووقعت معظم تلك الهجمات في مقديشو وبيدوا وبوصاصو وفي منطقة شبيلي السفلى.
On 31 May 2019, three former political delegates were killed in separate incidents in Hodan and Dharkenley districts in Mogadishu.وفي 31 أيار/مايو 2019، قتل ثلاثة مندوبين سياسيين سابقين في حوادث منفصلة في مديريتي هدن وطركينلي في مقديشو.
On 29 June 2019, another delegate of the 2016 federal electoral process was killed by an improvised explosive device attached to his car in Mogadishu.وفي 29 حزيران/يونيه 2019، قُتل مندوب آخر من مندوبي العملية الانتخابية الاتحادية لعام 2016 بواسطة جهاز متفجر يدوي الصنع ثُبّت على سيارته في مقديشو.
In a confirmation of its policy, on 15 July 2019, Al-Shabaab issued a statement calling upon elders who had participated in the electoral process in 2016 to repent publicly to Allah and to register and confirm their repentance with Al-Shabaab governorates by 1 September 2019.وفي تأكيد لسياستها، أصدرت حركة الشباب في 15 تموز/يوليه 2019 بيانا تدعو فيها الشيوخ الذين شاركوا في العملية الانتخابية في عام 2016 إلى التوبة إلى الله علنا، وتسجيل توبتهم وتأكيدها لدى المحافظات التابعة لحركة الشباب بحلول 1 أيلول/سبتمبر 2019.
If they failed to comply, the group threatened that they would not be able to lead a peaceful life in Somalia or enjoy protection from Al-Shabaab.وهددت الجماعة بأنهم إذا لم يمتثلوا لذلك، فلن يعيشوا بسلام في الصومال، ولن يتمتعوا بحماية حركة الشباب.
Recruitment and abduction of childrenتجنيد الأطفال واختطافهم
143.143 -
During the reporting period, Al-Shabaab continued its policy of abducting children for recruitment purposes, particularly in Bay, Middle Shabelle and Bakool regions.خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، واصلت حركة الشباب سياستها المتمثلة في اختطاف الأطفال لأغراض التجنيد، لا سيما في مناطق باي وشبيلي الوسطى وبكول.
In December 2018, Al-Shabaab abducted 18 adult civilians and 7 children from a Sufi religious camp in Ceel Muluq village, east of Adale town, Middle Shabelle region.ففي كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018، اختطفت حركة الشباب 18 مدنيا بالغا و 7 أطفال من معسكر ديني صوفي في قرية عيل ملوك شرق بلدة عذلي، بمنطقة شبيلي الوسطى().
A similar incident was reported in 17 January 2019, when Al-Shabaab abducted 15 boys aged between 8 and 15 from Qur’anic schools in Eedkiyal, Dino, and Sarmaan villages in Hudur district, Bakool region.وأبلغ عن حادثة مماثلة في 17 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019 عندما اختطفت حركة الشباب 15 صبيا تتراوح أعمارهم بين 8 و 15 عاما من مدارس قرآنية في قرى أدكيال ودينو وسرمان في مديرية حدر بمنطقة بكول.
In February 2019, Al-Shabaab also forcibly recruited 17 children aged between 10 and 14 in Misire village, Bay region, after community elders failed to surrender the children for military training.وفي شباط/فبراير 2019، قامت حركة الشباب أيضا بتجنيد 17 طفلا تتراوح أعمارهم بين 10 و 14 عاما بصورة قسرية في قرية ميسيري بمنطقة باي، بعد عدم قيام الشيوخ العشائريين بتسليم الأطفال للتدريب العسكري.
In March 2019, Al-Shabaab similarly abducted 70 boys aged between 10 and 12 from the villages of Tuugsoy, Lowi Saab, Esow, Raydable and Omar llaan in Bay region after community elders refused to give them up for military training.وفي آذار/مارس 2019، اختطفت حركة الشباب بطريقة مماثلة 70 صبيا تتراوح أعمارهم بين 10 و 12 عاما من قرى توغسوي ولوي صعب وإيساو ورايدابلي وعمر إلان في منطقة باي بعد أن رفض الشيوخ العشائريون تسليمهم للتدريب العسكري.
144.144 -
Analysis by the Panel of Experts indicates that the majority of Al-Shabaab’s new recruits are children from rural areas in Bay region that are under control of the militant group and where children have been previously exposed to Al-Shabaab’s religious educational system.ويشير تحليل فريق الخبراء إلى أن غالبية المجندين الجدد لدى حركة الشباب هم أطفال من مناطق ريفية في منطقة باي خاضعة لسيطرة الجماعة المقاتلة، وهي مناطق تعرض فيها الأطفال من قبل لنظام التعليم الديني لحركة الشباب().
Attacks on United Nations personnelالهجمات على موظفي الأمم المتحدة
145.145 -
During the reporting period, Al-Shabaab conducted direct attacks against United Nations personnel.نفذت حركة الشباب، خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، هجمات مباشرة ضد موظفي الأمم المتحدة.
On 1 January 2019, the group fired seven mortar rounds at the United Nations compound within the Aden Adde International Airport complex in Mogadishu, injuring two United Nations staff members and one contractor.ففي 1 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019، أطلقت الجماعة سبع قذائف هاون على تجمع مباني الأمم المتحدة الواقع ضمن مجمع مطار آدم عدي الدولي في مقديشو، مما أدى إلى إصابة اثنين من موظفي الأمم المتحدة وأحد المتعاقدين.
The attacks also damaged United Nations infrastructure and facilities, in violation of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.وألحقت الهجمات كذلك أضرارا بالهياكل الأساسية للأمم المتحدة ومرافقها، في انتهاك للاتفاقية المتعلقة بسلامة موظفي الأمم المتحدة والأفراد المرتبطين بها.
The previous such attack targeting the United Nations in Mogadishu had occurred on 3 December 2014, when Al-Shabaab attacked a United Nations convoy near the airport, killing 15 persons (S/2015/801, para. 116).وكان الهجوم السابق من هذا النوع الذي استهدف الأمم المتحدة في مقديشو قد وقع في 3 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2014، عندما هاجمت حركة الشباب قافلة تابعة للأمم المتحدة بالقرب من المطار، مما أسفر عن مقتل 15 شخصا (S/2015/801، الفقرة 116).
146.146 -
On 31 May 2019, a United Nations staff member working with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security was killed in Galkayo, Mudug region, by unidentified armed men suspected of being affiliated with Al-Shabaab.وفي 31 أيار/مايو 2019، قُتل أحد موظفي الأمم المتحدة العاملين مع إدارة الأمم المتحدة لشؤون السلامة والأمن في غالكعيو بمنطقة مدغ على أيدي رجال مسلحين مجهولي الهوية يشتبه في انتمائهم إلى حركة الشباب.
B.باء -
Federal and federal member state actorsالجهات الفاعلة التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية وللولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد
147.147 -
During the reporting period, military actors of the Federal Government and the federal member states committed serious violations throughout Somalia, including extrajudicial killings by Somali National Army commanders in Bardera, Gedo region, killings of demonstrators during the South-West State presidential electoral process, torture and prolonged detention and military trials of detainees, including children, by the Puntland Security Force and prolonged and illegal detention of prisoners by Somaliland authorities.خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، ارتكبت جهات عسكرية تابعة للحكومة الاتحادية والولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد انتهاكات خطيرة في جميع أنحاء الصومال، بما في ذلك عمليات الإعدام خارج نطاق القضاء التي نفذها قادة الجيش الوطني الصومالي في بارطيري بمنطقة غدو، وعمليات قتل المتظاهرين خلال العملية الانتخابية الرئاسية في ولاية جنوب الغرب، وتعذيب المحتجزين واحتجازهم لفترات طويلة ومحاكمتهم عسكريا، بمن فيهم الأطفال، على يد قوة أمن بونتلاند، واحتجاز السجناء المطول وغير القانوني من جانب سلطات صوماليلاند.
Somali National Army extrajudicial killingsعمليات الإعدام خارج نطاق القضاء التي نفذها الجيش الوطني الصومالي
148.148 -
On 31 December 2018, the Somali National Army summarily executed by firing squad six men suspected of being affiliated with Al-Shabaab in the town of Bardera, Gedo region, on the alleged orders of the Somali National Army senior leadership.في 31 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018، أعدم الجيش الوطني الصومالي رميا بالرصاص ودون محاكمة ستة رجال للاشتباه في ارتباطهم بحركة الشباب في بلدة بارطيري، بمنطقة غدو، وذلك بناء على أوامر مزعومة صادرة عن القيادة العليا للجيش الوطني الصومالي.
The accused had been in prison for five months before their execution, having been accused of being part of an Al-Shabaab assassination unit responsible for killing a Federal Government soldier.وكان المتهمون قد أودعوا السجن لمدة خمسة أشهر قبل إعدامهم، استنادا إلى اتهامهم بالانتماء إلى وحدة الاغتيال التابعة لحركة الشباب المسؤولة عن قتل أحد جنود الحكومة الاتحادية().
The suspects were not charged or offered the right to a fair trial or due process of law, in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law.ولم توجه تهم إلى المشتبه فيهم، ولم يمنحوا الحق في محاكمة عادلة أو الإجراءات القانونية الواجبة، في انتهاك للقانون الدولي الإنساني والقانون الدولي لحقوق الإنسان().
There has been no official statement from the Federal Government Ministry of Defence or the Somali National Army on those executions.ولم يصدر أي بيان رسمي عن وزارة الدفاع التابعة للحكومة الاتحادية أو الجيش الوطني الصومالي بشأن هذه الإعدامات.
Bosaso military court trials and alleged torture by the Puntland Security Forceمحاكمات بوصاصو العسكرية ومزاعم التعذيب على أيدي قوة أمن بونتلاند
149.149 -
During the reporting period, civilians, including children, continued to be detained and subjected to military trials by Puntland military courts.خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، تواصَل احتجاز مدنيين، بينهم أطفال، وإخضاعهم لمحاكمات عسكرية في محاكم بونتلاند العسكرية.
Many of the defendants had been detained on terrorism-related charges following security sweeps in Bosaso and Galkayo in February and March 2019.وكان العديد من المتهمين قد احتُجزوا بتهم تتصل بالإرهاب في أعقاب عمليات تمشيط أمنية في بوصاصو وغالكعيو في شباط/فبراير وآذار/مارس 2019.
Some defendants, including four children aged 16 and 17, were sentenced by military courts in Puntland.وصدرت الأحكام على بعض المتهمين، بمن فيهم أربعة أطفال تتراوح أعمارهم بين 16 و 17 عاما، من محاكم عسكرية في بونتلاند().
As of September 2019, the four children were still imprisoned.وفي أيلول/سبتمبر 2019، كان أربعة أطفال لا يزالون في السجن.
150.150 -
The regulation of military courts does not fall under the authority of the Puntland civil judiciary.ولا يخضع تنظيم المحاكم العسكرية لسلطة القضاء المدني في بونتلاند.
Rather, military personnel without legal qualifications sit as judges.وبدلا من ذلك، يشغل أفراد عسكريون بدون مؤهلات قانونية مناصب القضاة.
The military courts have broad jurisdiction over civilians, including cases involving espionage, treason, unlawful contact with the enemy and terrorism.وتتمتع المحاكم العسكرية بولاية قضائية واسعة على المدنيين، بما في ذلك القضايا المتعلقة بالتجسس والخيانة والاتصال غير المشروع مع العدو والإرهاب.
151.151 -
Interviews with lawyers indicated that terrorism suspects were not afforded due process before the military courts: they were subjected to interrogations without the presence of a lawyer and to lengthy pretrial detention, confessions were extracted under torture and used against them, decisions were issued without an explanation, arbitrary sentences were handed down and they had limited right to appeal.وأشارت مقابلات أجريت مع محامين إلى أن الأشخاص المشتبه في ارتكابهم أعمالا إرهابية لم تطبق عليهم الإجراءات القانونية الواجبة عند مثولهم أمام المحاكم العسكرية: إذ تعرضوا للاستجواب دون حضور محام وللاحتجاز المطول قبل المحاكمة، وانتزعت منهم اعترافات تحت التعذيب واستخدمت ضدهم، وصدرت القرارات دون تسبيب، وأُصدرت أحكام تعسفية، وكان حقهم في الاستئناف محدودا.
Puntland Security Forceقوة أمن بونتلاند
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The Puntland Security Force – a 600-strong elite counter-terrorism unit mentored and supported by the United States – wields significant influence over the military courts in Puntland and has exceptional or special jurisdiction under the Puntland Anti-Terrorism Act of 2011.تتمتع قوة أمن بونتلاند - وهي وحدة من قوات النخبة لمكافحة الإرهاب مكونة من 600 فرد تتلقى التوجيه والدعم من الولايات المتحدة - بنفوذ كبير على المحاكم العسكرية في بونتلاند، كما تتمتع بولاية استثنائية أو خاصة بموجب قانون بونتلاند لمكافحة الإرهاب لعام 2011().
The Puntland Security Force has limited accountability mechanisms;وهناك آليات محدودة لمساءلة قوة أمن بونتلاند؛
its personnel conduct security operations, make arrests and manage detention centres in Bosaso with impunity and without independent civilian oversight.وينفذ موظفوها عمليات أمنية، ويجرون اعتقالات، ويديرون مراكز احتجاز في بوصاصو دون مساءلة ودون رقابة مدنية مستقلة.
After being held at Puntland Security Force detention centres for indeterminate periods, suspects are handed over to military courts for prosecution.وبعد احتجاز المشتبه بهم في مراكز احتجاز تابعة لقوة أمن بونتلاند لفترات غير محددة، يجري تسليمهم إلى محاكم عسكرية لمحاكمتهم.
Lawyers and their clients also reported to the Panel that military courts fined accused persons or witnesses $1,500 if they criticized the Puntland Security Force in the court.وأبلغ محامون وموكلوهم فريق الخبراء أيضا أن المحاكم العسكرية كانت تفرض غرامة على المتهمين أو الشهود بقيمة 500 1 دولار إذا ما انتقدوا قوة أمن بونتلاند في المحكمة().
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The Panel has conducted interviews with former detainees, lawyers and families of victims, who all claimed that detainees held by the Puntland Security Force had been exposed to systematic forms of torture and to inhumane and degrading treatment.وأجرى فريق الخبراء مقابلات مع محتجزين سابقين ومحامين وأسر ضحايا، ادعوا جميعا أن المحتجزين لدى قوة أمن بونتلاند تعرضوا لأشكال منهجية من التعذيب ولمعاملة لاإنسانية مهينة().
On 30 August 2019, the Panel sent correspondence to the Puntland administration regarding the allegations of torture by the Puntland Security Force and the trial of children by military court but had not received a response as of the time of writing.وفي 30 آب/أغسطس 2019، بعث الفريق رسالة إلى إدارة بونتلاند بخصوص الادعاءات التي تتصل بما تقوم به قوة أمن بونتلاند من تعذيب ومحاكمة الأطفال أمام محاكم عسكرية، ولكنه لم يتلق ردا حتى وقت كتابة هذا التقرير.
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Annex 3 contains a detailed account of the Puntland military courts and alleged torture of suspects in Puntland Security Force detention.ويتضمن المرفق 3 عرضا مفصلا للمحاكم العسكرية في بونتلاند والتعذيب المزعوم للمشتبه بهم في مراكز الاحتجاز التابعة لقوة أمن بونتلاند.
Prolonged imprisonment of terrorism offenders in Somalilandالسجن المطول لمرتكبي جرائم الإرهاب في صوماليلاند
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On 31 May 2007, the then president of Somaliland, Dahir Riyale Kahin, commuted the prison terms of 14 prisoners in Hargeisa who had been sentenced over terrorism offences in 2004.في 31 أيار/مايو 2007، قام رئيس صوماليلاند آنذاك، ضاهر ريالي كاهن، بتخفيف أحكام السجن الصادرة بحق 14 سجينا في هرجيسا ممن حُكم عليهم بتهم تتعلق بالإرهاب في عام 2004().
As a result of the commutations, five of the prisoners were released and the sentences of the remaining nine were commuted from life imprisonment to 24 years (in the case of two inmates) and to 15 years (in the case of seven inmates).ونتيجة لتخفيف الأحكام، أفرج عن خمسة من السجناء، في حين خُففت أحكام التسعة الباقين من السجن المؤبد إلى 24 سنة (في حالة اثنين من السجناء)، وإلى 15 سنة (في حالة سبعة سجناء)().
On 2 November 2008, the President issued a letter revoking the pardon owing to “terrorist attacks” that took place in Somaliland on 29 October 2008, incidents unrelated to the inmates.وفي 2 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2008، أصدر الرئيس أمرا يلغي العفو بسبب ”هجمات إرهابية“ وقعت في صوماليلاند في 29 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2008، وهي حوادث لا علاقة لها بالسجناء().
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In 2016, the inmates submitted a petition for release to the Somaliland Constitutional Court.وفي عام 2016، قدم السجناء التماسا إلى المحكمة الدستورية في صوماليلاند للإفراج عنهم.
The lawyers for the inmates argued that the President’s pardon was legally binding and that he had had no legal power to reverse it.ودفع محامو السجناء بأن العفو الذي أصدره الرئيس ملزم من الناحية القانونية، وأنه لا يتمتع بأي سلطة قانونية للرجوع عنه.
As of the time of writing, the Constitutional Court had not issued a decision.وحتى وقت كتابة هذا التقرير، لم تصدر المحكمة الدستورية قرارا.
The Somaliland Attorney General contends that the decision of the President to withdraw his pardon was legally binding and therefore the prisoners’ jail terms have not been served.ويدعي النائب العام في صوماليلاند أن قرار الرئيس بسحب عفوه ملزم من الناحية القانونية، وبالتالي فإن السجناء لم يقضوا فترات حبسهم().
On 30 August 2019, the Panel sent correspondence to the Somaliland administration requesting the legal basis for revoking the presidential pardon and the details of the prisoners’ petition, but as of the time of writing had not received a response.وفي 30 آب/أغسطس 2019، وجه فريق الخبراء رسالة إلى إدارة صوماليلاند يطلب فيها الأساس القانوني لإلغاء العفو الرئاسي وتفاصيل الالتماس الذي قدمه السجناء، ولكنه لم يتلق ردا حتى وقت كتابة هذا التقرير.
C.جيم -
African Union Mission in Somalia and other international actorsبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال وغيرها من الجهات الفاعلة الدولية
Killings of civilians by African Union Mission in Somalia forcesضلوع بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال في مقتل مدنيين
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During the reporting period, AMISOM forces were reportedly responsible for the deaths of five civilians.خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، أفيد بأن قوات بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي تسببت في وفاة خمسة مدنيين().
On 6 November 2018, four civilians were killed when the Burundian contingent of AMISOM allegedly opened indiscriminate fire in Huriwa district, near the Balad exit checkpoint in Mogadishu, following the explosion of an improvised explosive device near the road where the AMISOM convoy was passing.ففي 6 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018، قُتل أربعة مدنيين عندما أطلقت الوحدة البوروندية في البعثة نيراناً عشوائية، حسبما أُفيد، في مديرية هوريوا على مقربة من نقطة تفتيش خروج بلعد في مقديشيو، إثر انفجار بجهاز متفجر يدوي الصنع وقع قرب طريق كانت تمر منها قافلة البعثة().
The following day, AMISOM stated it had opened a full-scale investigation, in cooperation with the Federal Government, to determine the circumstances leading to the loss of life.وفي اليوم التالي، أعلنت البعثة أنها فتحت تحقيقاً واسع النطاق، بالتعاون مع الحكومة الاتحادية، من أجل تحديد الظروف التي أدت إلى خسائر في الأرواح().
However, as of the time of writing, the findings of the investigation had not been publicly released.بيد أنه إلى حدود كتابة هذا التقرير، لم تُنشر نتائج هذا التحقيق للعموم بعدُ().
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On 17 February 2019, the Panel received reports that the Ethiopian contingent of AMISOM had allegedly arrested, tortured and killed a mentally impaired 17-year-old boy at Baidoa airport.وفي 17 شباط/فبراير 2019، تلقى فريق الخبراء تقارير زُعم فيها أن الوحدة الإثيوبية في بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي اعتقلت صبياً مختلاً عقلياً يبلغ من العمر 17 عاماً وعذبته وقتلته في مطار بيدوا().
In an email to the Panel on 14 April 2019, the AMISOM Head of Police claimed that the individual had been shot dead by unknown gunmen a few metres away from the outer perimeter of the airport, which is manned by Ethiopian troops, and that South-West State Police were conducting investigations.وفي رسالة إلكترونية موجهة إلى فريق الخبراء في 14 نيسان/أبريل 2019، صرح قائد شرطة البعثة أن الشخص المعني قُتل رمياً بالرصاص على يد مسلحين مجهولين على بعد بضعة أمتار من المحيط الخارجي للمطار حيث توجد القوات الإثيوبية، وأن شرطة ولاية جنوب الغرب تجري تحقيقات في الموضوع().
In a letter to the Panel on 8 September 2019, AMISOM stated that a Board of Inquiry report on the November 2018 incident would be shared with the Panel in due course, but that AMISOM had no information on the killing of the mentally impaired boy.وفي رسالة موجهة إلى فريق الخبراء في 8 أيلول/سبتمبر 2019، أفادت البعثة بأنها ستطلع الفريق في الوقت المناسب على تقرير ستصدره هيئة التحقيق بشأن حادث تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018، وأن البعثة ليس لديها أي معلومات عن مقتل الصبي المختل عقلياً.
Targeting of Hormuud and Safaricom infrastructure and employeesاستهداف البنى التحتية لشركتي هورمود وسفاريكوم وموظفيهما
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The Panel of Experts has received reports of attacks by the Kenya Defence Forces on 12 communications masts operated by Hormuud Telecom Somalia since 2017, almost all of them in Gedo region.تلقى فريق الخبراء تقارير تفيد بوقوع هجمات شنتها قوات الدفاع الكينية على 12 برجاً للاتصالات تشغّلها شركة Hormuud Telecom Somalia (شركة هورمود) منذ عام 2017، ومعظمها في منطقة غدو.
The Panel has been able to independently corroborate five of those attacks, including three that took place during the current reporting period, which resulted in the deaths of two civilians.وتمكن الفريق من التثبت بشكل مستقل من خمسة من هذه الهجمات، بما في ذلك ثلاثة هجمات وقعت خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، أسفرت عن مقتل مدنيَّيْن.
The Panel also received photographic evidence depicting an unexploded cluster munition, prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as well as customary international law, at the scene of an attack on a Hormuud mast on 2 March 2019 in El Wak district, Gedo region.وحصل الفريق أيضاً على أدلة فوتوغرافية تبين وجود ذخائر عنقودية غير منفجرة محظورة بموجب اتفاقية الذخائر العنقودية وأيضاً بموجب القانون الدولي العرفي، في مكان الهجوم في 2 آذار/مارس 2019 على برج تشغّله شركة هورمود في مديرية الواك، بمنطقة غدو().
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On 24 July 2018, a Hormuud watchman and his relative were killed when Kenya Defence Forces allegedly shelled a Hormuud communications mast in the Hiis Ugur area of El Wak district.وفي 24 تموز/يوليه 2018، قُتل خفير في شركة هورمود وأحد أقربائه في قصف مزعوم لقوات الدفاع الكينية على برج للاتصالات تشغّله الشركة في منطقة هيس أوغور، في مديرية الواك().
On 15 January 2019, Kenya Defence Forces allegedly destroyed a Hormuud communication mast in Alibuley village, Afmadow district, Lower Juba region, and physically assaulted a Hormuud watchman.وفي 15 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019، دمرت قوات الدفاع الكينية - وفق ما زُعم - برجاً للاتصالات تشغّله شركة هورمود، في قرية أليبولي، بمديرية أفْمَدَو، بمنطقة جوبا السفلى، واعتدت جسدياً على خفير للشركة نفسها().
On 27 March 2019, a Hormuud communications mast in Jaldeyse village, Afmadow district, was allegedly destroyed by Kenya Defence Forces aircraft.وفي 27 آذار/مارس 2019، دمرت طائرة تابعة لقوات الدفاع الكينية - وفق ما زُعم - برجاً للاتصالات تشغّله شركة هورمود في قرية جالديسي، بمديرية أفْمَدَو().
On 22 August 2019, Kenya Defence Forces allegedly destroyed a telecommunications mast in Caws-Quran, El Wak district.وفي 22 آب/أغسطس 2019، دمرت قوات الدفاع الكينية - وفق ما زُعم - برجاً للاتصالات اللاسلكية في قوس قران، بمديرية الواك().
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The Kenya Defence Forces denied involvement in any attacks on Hormuud infrastructure.ونفت قوات الدفاع الكينية تورطها في أي هجمات ضد البنى التحتية لشركة هورمود.
In a meeting with the Panel, the Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces stated that, since 2015, 29 Safaricom PLC installations had been attacked within Kenya, largely by Al-Shabaab, resulting in numerous civilian and police reservist casualties.وفي اجتماع مع فريق الخبراء، صرح رئيس قوات الدفاع الكينية أنه منذ عام 2015، استهدفت الهجمات 29 منشأة من أجهزة التحكم المنطقية القابلة للبرمجة (PLC) التابعة لشركة سفاريكوم في كينيا، ومعظمها هجمات نفذتها حركة الشباب، مما أسفر عن وقوع إصابات عديدة في صفوف المدنيين وأفراد الشرطة الاحتياطيين().
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The destruction of telecommunications infrastructure by both parties may be aimed at curtailing the transmission of intelligence on troop movements or militant operations.وربما يهدف الطرفان بتدميرهما للبنى التحتية للاتصالات السلكية واللاسلكية إلى عرقلة نقل المعلومات الاستخباراتية بشأن تحركات القوات أو عمليات المتمردين.
On the part of the Kenya Defence Forces, it may also prevent Al-Shabaab from triggering improvised explosive devices using mobile telephone signals.وبالنسبة لقوات الدفاع الكينية، يمكن أن تكون تلك وسيلة أيضاً لمنع حركة الشباب من تفعيل الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع باستخدام إشارات الهواتف المحمولة.
However, there are humanitarian implications to the long-term loss of telecommunications coverage within Somalia, including impeding the coordination of relief efforts, the transfer of food vouchers and the receipt of remittances from outside the country.ومع ذلك، تترتب آثار إنسانية على الانقطاع الطويل المدة للتغطية بالاتصالات السلكية واللاسلكية داخل الصومال، بما في ذلك إعاقة تنسيق جهود الإغاثة، ونقل القسائم الغذائية، وتلقي التحويلات المالية من خارج البلد.
United States of America airstrikesالغارات الجوية التي تنفذها الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية
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From 1 January to 17 September 2019, the United States conducted 50 publicly acknowledged airstrikes in Somalia, compared with 47 in all of 2018 and 35 in 2017.في الفترة ما بين 1 كانون الثاني/يناير و 17 أيلول/سبتمبر 2019، نفذت الولايات المتحدة 50 غارة جوية في الصومال اعترفت بها علناً، مقارنة بما مجموعه 47 غارة في عام 2018 و 35 غارة في عام 2017.
In February 2019 alone, the United States conducted 15 publicly acknowledged airstrikes – reportedly killing 97 Al-Shabaab fighters – representing the highest number in a single month in Somalia since data have been available.وفي شباط/فبراير 2019 وحده، شنت الولايات المتحدة 15 غارة جوية اعترفت بها علناً - زُعم أنها قتلت فيها 97 من مقاتلي حركة الشباب - وهو أعلى رقم مسجل في الصومال في شهر واحد منذ أن أصبحت البيانات متاحة بهذا الصدد().
United States Africa Command has consistently reported that no civilians have been injured or killed in those airstrikes.ولم تنفك قيادة الولايات المتحدة في أفريقيا تصرح بعدم وقوع أي حالات وفاة أو جرح في صفوف المدنيين في هذه الغارات الجوية.
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On 20 March 2019, Amnesty International published a report alleging that 14 civilians had been killed and 8 more had been injured in five airstrikes conducted by the United States in the previous two years in Lower Shabelle region;وفي 20 آذار/مارس 2019، نشرت منظمة العفو الدولية تقريراً تزعم فيه أن 14 مدنياً قتلوا وأن 8 آخرين أصيبوا بجروح في خمس غارات جوية نفذتها الولايات المتحدة في العامين الماضيين في منطقة شبيلي السفلى()؛
United States Africa Command subsequently denied the allegations.ونفت قيادة الولايات المتحدة في أفريقيا هذه الادعاءات لاحقاً.
However, on 5 April 2019, the United States acknowledged that two civilians had been killed in one of its airstrikes, not referenced in the Amnesty International report, on 1 April 2018 near the town of El Bur, Galgadud region.ومع ذلك، في 5 نيسان/أبريل 2019، أقرت الولايات المتحدة بأن مدنيَّيْن قُتلا في إحدى غاراتها الجوية، وهي غارة غير مذكورة في تقرير منظمة العفو الدولية، وقعت في 1 نيسان/أبريل 2018 بالقرب من بلدة عيل بور، منطقة غلغدود().
Sexual- and gender-based violenceالعنف الجنسي والجنساني
165.165 -
Sexual violence against women, girls, men and boys was a persistent problem in Somalia during the reporting period, with women and girls at greater risk.كان العنف الجنسي ضد النساء والفتيات والرجال والصِبية مشكلة مستمرة في الصومال، خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير، وتتعرض النساء والفتيات لخطر هذا العنف بدرجة أكبر.
The prolonged conflict in Somalia has left government institutions with little capacity to record, conduct investigations into and prosecute perpetrators of sexual violence.وتسبب النزاع الذي طال أمده في الصومال في إضعاف قدرات المؤسسات الحكومية على تسجيل حالات العنف الجنسي وإجراء تحقيقات بشأنها وملاحقة مرتكبيها قضائيا.
As a result, survivors of sexual violence and their families have little faith in the formal sector’s ability to deliver justice.ونتيجةً لذلك، لا يثق ضحايا العنف الجنسي وأسرهم بما فيه الكفاية في قدرة القطاع الرسمي على تحقيق العدالة.
Many cases are handled through interventions by clan elders. Women – who make up the majority of survivors – do not participate in the negotiations, nor are they typically given a share of any money that is paid as compensation.ويتم التعامل مع العديد من الحالات من خلال تدخلات شيوخ العشائر، حيث لا تشارك النساء - اللواتي يشكلن أغلبية الضحايا - في المفاوضات، ولا يحصلن عادة على أي حصة من أي مبالغ مدفوعة على سبيل التعويض.
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In 2018, the United Nations verified cases of conflict-related sexual violence against 20 women, 250 girls and 1 boy.وفي عام 2018، تحققت الأمم المتحدة من حالات عنف جنسي متصل بالنزاع تعرضت لها 20 امرأة و 250 فتاة وصبي واحد().
Dominant patterns of sexual- and gender-based violence include the abduction of women and girls for forced marriage and rape perpetrated primarily by non-State armed groups, and incidents of rape and gang rape committed by State agents, clan militias and unidentified armed men.وتشمل الأنماط السائدة للعنف الجنسي والجنساني حوادث اختطاف النساء والفتيات لأغراض الزواج القسري والاغتصاب، وترتكبها في المقام الأول جماعات مسلحة غير تابعة للدولة، وحوادث الاغتصاب والاغتصاب الجماعي التي ترتكبها العناصر التابعة للدولة ومليشيات العشائر ورجال مسلحون مجهولو الهوية().
Cases of abduction for the forced marriage and rape of 34 girls were attributed to members of Al-Shabaab.ونُسبت إلى أعضاء في حركة الشباب 34 حالة اختطاف فتيات لأغراض الزواج القسري والاغتصاب.
The fragile justice system, ongoing security concerns and limited access to areas controlled by Al-Shabaab place women and girls in a state of acute vulnerability.وبسبب هشاشة النظام القضائي، واستمرار الشواغل الأمنية، ومحدودية إمكانية الوصول إلى المناطق التي تسيطر عليها حركة الشباب، تعيش النساء والفتيات في حالة من الضعف الشديد().
VI.سادسا -
Violations of the charcoal banانتهاكات الحظر المفروض على الفحم
167.167 -
Since August 2018, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea and, subsequently, the Panel of Experts have not documented any export of charcoal from Somalia in violation of the Security Council ban, compared with approximately 3 million bags (75,000 tons) exported during the previous reporting period.منذ آب/أغسطس 2018، لم يوثق فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا، وبعده فريق الخبراء، أي حالة لتصدير الفحم من الصومال تنتهك الحظر الذي فرضه مجلس الأمن، مقارنة بتصدير حوالي 3 ملايين كيس (000 75 طن) خلال الفترة السابقة المشمولة بالتقرير.
Increasingly stringent measures implemented by Member States have likely contributed to forcing charcoal traffickers into a hiatus, owing to a need to generate new forms of falsified paperwork and/or arrange alternative ports for the shipment of the charcoal (see “Implementation of the ban”, below).ويرجح أن ما تنفذه الدول الأعضاء من تدابير متزايدة الصرامة أسهم في إرغام مهربي الفحم على التوقف بسبب الحاجة إلى إيجاد أساليب جديدة لتزوير الأوراق و/أو ترتيب موانئ بديلة لشحن الفحم (انظر ”تنفيذ الحظر“ أدناه).
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Initiatives taken by Somali authorities may also have resulted in the reduction of the illicit trade of charcoal in 2019.وربما أسفرت المبادرات التي اتخذتها السلطات الصومالية أيضاً عن الحد من الاتجار غير المشروع بالفحم في عام 2019.
On 16 May 2019, the Federal Government issued a press release informing international partners that three dhows were travelling from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Kismayo, with the intention of loading Somali charcoal for export.ففي 16 أيار/مايو 2019، أصدرت الحكومة الاتحادية نشرة صحفية تبلغ فيها الشركاء الدوليين بأن ثلاثة مراكب شراعية قد أبحرت من دبي، الإمارات العربية المتحدة، إلى كيسمايو بهدف شحن فحم صومالي من أجل تصديره().
The dhows arrived in Kismayo in May 2019 but departed without loading any charcoal.ووصلت المراكب الشراعية إلى كيسمايو في أيار/ مايو 2019 لكنها غادرت دون أي شحنة من الفحم.
The electoral process in Jubbaland in August 2019 also had an impact on charcoal exports as the Jubbaland administration wished to avert negative publicity.وأثرت العملية الانتخابية في جوبالاند في آب/ أغسطس 2019 أيضاً على صادرات الفحم، لأن إدارة جوبالاند كانت تسعى إلى تجنب الدعاية السلبية.
However, the Jubbaland administration remains dependent on taxation revenues gained from the trade, and charcoal exports are expected to resume.ومع ذلك، لا تزال إدارة جوبالاند تعتمد على إيرادات الضرائب المتأتية من التجارة ومن المرتقب أن تُستأنف صادرات الفحم().
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The last major export of charcoal from Somalia departed Kismayo in August 2018, destined for Khawr al-Zubayr port, Iraq.وقد غادرت آخر شحنة فحم كبيرة مصدرة من الصومال ميناء كيسمايو في آب/ أغسطس 2018، متجهة إلى ميناء خور الزبير، العراق.
The cargo vessel transported 190,000 bags (4,750 tons) of charcoal, which were rebagged and trans-shipped from Iraq to neighbouring Member States between January and April 2019 (see “Illicit export, import and trans-shipment”, below).وكان على متن سفينة البضائع 000 190 كيس (750 4 طناً) من الفحم، أعيدت تعبئتها في أكياس أخرى ونُقلت من سفينة إلى أخرى من العراق إلى دول أعضاء مجاورة في الفترة ما بين كانون الثاني/يناير ونيسان/أبريل 2019 (انظر ”عمليات التصدير والاستيراد وإعادة الشحن غير المشروعة“ أدناه).
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However, mass production of charcoal in Somalia is ongoing and the international criminal networks involved in the trade are still active.ومع ذلك، يستمر الإنتاج الواسع النطاق للفحم في الصومال ولا تزال الشبكات الإجرامية الدولية الضالعة في تجارته نشطةً.
The Panel understands from sources within the trade that the trans-shipment through Iraq in early 2019 represented a “test case” for the charcoal traffickers.وعلم فريق الخبراء من مصادر داخل قطاع التجارة أن عملية النقل بين سفينة وأخرى مرورا بالعراق في أوائل عام 2019 كانت ”عملية تجريبية“ نفذها مهربو الفحم.
The use of a large cargo vessel to export charcoal from Somalia, rather than multiple dhow shipments, reduces the requirement for multiple exports throughout the year and diminishes the impact of unfavourable sea conditions during the Indian Ocean monsoon season.وإن استخدام سفينة بضائع كبيرة لتصدير الفحم من الصومال، بدلاً من مراكب شراعية متعددة، يقلص الحاجة إلى عمليات تصدير متعددة طوال السنة ويقلل من تأثير الظروف البحرية غير المواتية خلال موسم الرياح الموسمية في المحيط الهندي.
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Although Al-Shabaab may still generate some income from the “taxation” of vehicles transporting charcoal in Somalia, the group maintains a diversified revenue base and is not financially dependent on the charcoal trade.وعلى الرغم من أن حركة الشباب لا تزال تحصل على بعض الإيرادات من ”الضرائب“ المفروضة على المركبات التي تنقل الفحم في الصومال، تحافظ الحركة على قاعدة إيرادات متنوعة ولا تعتمد ماليا على تجارة الفحم().
In the view of the Panel, were the Somali charcoal trade to collapse entirely, Al-Shabaab’s ability to wage its insurgency would not be meaningfully affected (see “Al-Shabaab financing”, above).ويرى فريق الخبراء أنه حتى لو انهارت تجارة الفحم الصومالي برمتها، فلن يلحق ضرر ملموس بقدرة حركة الشباب على تمويل عملياتها التمردية (انظر ”تمويل حركة الشباب“ أعلاه).
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Annex 4 contains supporting documentation relating to the charcoal investigations outlined below, including satellite imagery, photographic evidence, falsified certificates of origin, bills of lading and information on the criminal networks involved.ويتضمن المرفق 4 وثائق داعمة ذات صلة بالتحقيقات المتعلقة بالفحم المبينة أدناه، بما في ذلك صور ساتلية، وأدلة فوتوغرافية، وشهادات منشأ مزورة، وسندات شحن، ومعلومات عن شبكات إجرامية ضالعة في ذلك.
A.ألف -
Production, transport and stockpilesالإنتاج والنقل والمخزونات
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Despite an interruption in exports, large-scale charcoal production continued in Middle Juba and Lower Juba throughout the reporting period.على الرغم من توقف الصادرات، استمر إنتاج الفحم على نطاق واسع في جوبا الوسطى وجوبا السفلى طيلة الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير.
Charcoal is primarily produced in Badhadhe district, Lower Juba, and transported by road to the ports of Buur Gaabo and Kismayo.ويتم إنتاج الفحم أساساً في مديرية بطاطي، جوبا السفلى، ويُنقل براً إلى مينائي بور غابو وكيسمايو.
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In August 2019, charcoal industry sources informed the Panel there were approximately 600,000 to 900,000 bags of charcoal located in Lower Juba awaiting export.وفي آب/أغسطس 2019، علم فريق الخبراء من مصادر في قطاع الفحم أن ما يقرب من 000 600 إلى 000 900 كيس من الفحم موجودة في جوبا السفلى في انتظار تصديرها().
Based on the wholesale price of $50 per bag in Dubai, the aggregate value of the stockpiles is approximately $30 million to $45 million.واستناداً إلى سعر البيع بالجملة البالغ 50 دولاراً للكيس في دبي، تصل القيمة الإجمالية للمخزونات تقريباً إلى ما بين 30 و 45 مليون دولار.
With wholesale prices reportedly rising in Dubai and local prices falling in Somalia, the economic incentive for charcoal traffickers will only increase over time.وفي ضوء تقارير مفادها تزايد أسعار الجملة في دبي، وتناقص الأسعار المحلية في الصومال، سيرتفع حتما مع مرور الوقت الحافز الاقتصادي لمهربي الفحم().
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As detailed in a 2018 report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, Al-Shabaab derives significant domestic revenue though the “taxation” of transiting goods and vehicles using a network of hinterland checkpoints.وعلى نحو ما جاء بالتفصيل في تقرير فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا لعام 2018، تجني حركة الشباب إيرادات محلية هائلة من خلال ”الضرائب“ المفروضة على السلع والمركبات العابرة باستخدام شبكة نقاط تفتيش داخلية().
As the charcoal is transported from production sites in Badhadhe to export sites in Kismayo, charcoal may be subject to such “taxation” by Al-Shabaab.وبالنظر إلى أن الفحم يُنقل من مواقع الإنتاج في بطاطي إلى مواقع التصدير في كيسمايو، يمكن أن يخضع الفحم لهذا النوع من ”الضرائب“ التي تفرضها حركة الشباب.
However, throughout 2019, the Panel noted an increase in the number of Al-Shabaab attacks on charcoal traders in Somalia when compared with previous reporting periods.ومع ذلك، لاحظ فريق الخبراء خلال عام 2019 زيادةً في عدد الهجمات التي تشنها حركة الشباب على تجار الفحم في الصومال مقارنة بالفترات المشمولة بالتقارير السابقة().
Al-Shabaab attacks on charcoal traders may represent an attempt by the group to disrupt the trade and undercut the finances of the Jubbaland administration, as the regional authority has historically derived significant profit ($7 per bag) from the taxation of charcoal exports through the Kismayo and Buur Gaabo ports.وربما تمثل الهجمات التي تشنها حركة الشباب على تجار الفحم محاولة منها لعرقلة التجارة وإضعاف موارد إدارة جوبالاند، لأن السلطة الإقليمية جنت على مر السنين أرباحاً كبيرة (7 دولارات للكيس) من فرض الضرائب على صادرات الفحم عبر مينائي كيسمايو وبور غابو().
B.باء -
Illicit export, import and trans-shipmentعمليات التصدير والاستيراد وإعادة الشحن غير المشروعة
Trans-shipment of charcoal through Khawr al-Zubayr port, Iraqإعادة شحن الفحم عن طريق ميناء خور الزبير، العراق
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In August 2018, a large cargo vessel, MV Best, operated by Oryx Shipping Ltd., departed Kismayo carrying 190,000 bags (4,750 tons) of charcoal in violation of the Security Council ban.في آب/أغسطس 2018، غادرت سفينة شحن كبيرة، تحمل اسم MV Best، وتديرها شركة Oryx Shipping Ltd، كيسمايو وعلى متنها 000 190 كيس (750 4 طنا) من الفحم، في انتهاك للحظر الذي فرضه مجلس الأمن.
The vessel carried falsified certificates of origin indicating that the charcoal consignment had originated in Ghana and identifying the exporter as the Blue Whale Shipping and Cargo Company.وكانت السفينة تحمل شهادات منشأ مزورة تشير إلى أن شحنة الفحم كان مصدرها غانا وحددت الْمُصدّر بأنه شركة Blue Whale Shipping and Cargo.
In late October 2018, the MV Best arrived at Khawr al-Zubayr port, Iraq.وفي أواخر تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2018، وصلت السفينة MV Best إلى ميناء خور الزبير بالعراق.
The charcoal was unloaded at the port and transported by road to a local consignee identified as Bayta Akdhar Trading in Basra, Iraq.وجرى تفريغ الفحم في الميناء ثم نُقل براً إلى الشركة المحلية المرسل إليها التي حُددت باسم ”بيت الأقدار للتجارة“ (Bayta Akdhar Trading) في البصرة بالعراق.
In early January 2019, the charcoal was repackaged at a warehouse in Basra as a product of the Baghdad-based company, Dar Alahbab.وفي أوائل كانون الثاني/يناير 2019، أعيدت تعبئة الفحم في مستودع في البصرة كمنتج لشركة ”دار الأحباب“ في بغداد.
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The charcoal was subsequently trans-shipped to neighbouring Member States on at least five separate occasions between January and April 2019.بعد ذلك، أُعيد شحن الفحم إلى دول أعضاء مجاورة في خمس مناسبات منفصلة على الأقل بين كانون الثاني/يناير ونيسان/أبريل 2019.
For example, on 26 January 2019, the vessel Northern Dedication loaded approximately 29,000 bags of charcoal and departed Umm Qasr, Iraq, for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.فعلى سبيل المثال، في 26 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019، حُمّلت السفينة Northern Dedication بحوالي 000 29 كيس من الفحم وغادرت ميناء أم قصر بالعراق متجهة إلى كل من الكويت والمملكة العربية السعودية.
The vessel initially unloaded 9,600 bags of charcoal at Shuwaikh port, Kuwait, to a local consignee identified as Frontline Logistics.وقامت السفينة في البداية بتفريغ 600 9 كيس من الفحم في ميناء الشويخ بالكويت، لصالح شركة محلية مرسل إليها حُددت باسم Frontline Logistics.
Thereafter, the vessel transited to Dammam port, Saudi Arabia, where 19,242 bags of charcoal were delivered to the consignee, Omar Abdullah Al Faleh.وبعد ذلك، انتقلت السفينة إلى ميناء الدمام بالمملكة العربية السعودية، حيث سُلّم ما مجموعه 242 19 كيسا من الفحم إلى المرسل إليه عمر عبد الله الفالح.
On 7 March 2019, 24,000 bags of charcoal were trans-shipped on the vessel Nordspring from Umm Qasr, Iraq, to Jabel Ali, Dubai.وفي 7 آذار/مارس 2019، أعيد شحن 000 24 كيس من الفحم عن طريق السفينة Nordspring من أم قصر بالعراق إلى جبل علي في دبي.
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The trans-shipment of charcoal through Khawr al-Zubayr port mirrored the use of Kish Free Zone and Qeshm Free Zone ports in the Islamic Republic of Iran for the trans-shipment of Somali charcoal in 2018.وجاءت عملية إعادة شحن الفحم عن طريق ميناء خور الزبير على شاكلة استخدام ميناءي المنطقة الحرة كيش والمنطقة الحرة قشم في جمهورية إيران الإسلامية لإعادة شحن الفحم الصومالي في عام 2018().
Trans-shipment of charcoal through the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2018إعادة شحن الفحم عن طريق جمهورية إيران الإسلامية في عام 2018
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From 24 February to 1 March 2019, the Panel visited Tehran, Kish and Qeshm in the Islamic Republic of Iran to investigate the trans-shipment of Somali charcoal through that country in 2018.في الفترة من 24 شباط/فبراير إلى 1 آذار/مارس 2019، زار فريق الخبراء طهران وكيش وقشم في جمهورية إيران الإسلامية للتحقيق في إعادة شحن الفحم الصومالي عبر البلد في عام 2018.
According to Iranian authorities, internal investigations into violations of the Somali charcoal ban revealed that the Iranian companies responsible for rebagging and re-exporting the charcoal had been unaware of the illicit origin of the cargo.ووفقًا للسلطات الإيرانية، فقد كشفت تحقيقات داخلية بشأن انتهاكات الحظر المفروض على الفحم الصومالي أن الشركات الإيرانية المسؤولة عن إعادة تعبئة الفحم وإعادة تصديره لم تكن على علم بالمنشأ غير المشروع للشحنة.
The Panel reviewed copies of the falsified certificates of origin from Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana used to import the charcoal.واستعرض الفريق نسخا من شهادات المنشأ المزورة من جزر القمر وكوت ديفوار وغانا التي استخدمت في استيراد الفحم.
The forged documents were highly similar in appearance to previous examples observed by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (S/2018/1002, annex 7.5).وكانت الوثائق المزورة متشابهة إلى حد كبير في المظهر مع أمثلة سابقة عاينها فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا (S/2018/1002، المرفق 7-5).
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The Panel held meetings with the representatives of private sector entities based in the Islamic Republic of Iran who were identified as facilitating the trans-shipment of Somali charcoal from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Arab Emirates.وعقد فريق الخبراء اجتماعات مع ممثلي كيانات تابعة للقطاع الخاص يوجد مقرها في جمهورية إيران الإسلامية وحُددت بكونها تيسر إعادة شحن الفحم الصومالي من جمهورية إيران الإسلامية إلى الإمارات العربية المتحدة.
The interviewees confirmed that the Somali charcoal had been removed from its original bags and repackaged into white bags labelled “Product of Iran” while in the Kish and Qeshm free zones.وأكد الأشخاص الذين أجريت معهم المقابلات أن الفحم الصومالي قد أفرغ من أكياسه الأصلية وأعيدت تعبئته في أكياس بيضاء تحمل الوسم ”منتج إيران“ أثناء وجوده في المنطقتين الحرتين كيش وقشم().
Most notably, a customs clearing agent in Kish told the Panel that a known charcoal trafficker had contacted him in early February 2019, requesting assistance in the trans-shipment of Somali charcoal.وعلى وجه الخصوص، أخبر أحد وكلاء التخليص الجمركي في كيش الفريق أن أحد المتاجرين بالفحم المعروفين اتصل به في أوائل شباط/فبراير 2019 ليطلب المساعدة في إعادة شحن الفحم الصومالي.
The agent claimed he had refused the request owing to the ongoing investigations by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.وادعى هذا الوكيل أنه رفض الطلب بسبب التحقيقات التي كانت تجريها حكومة جمهورية إيران الإٍسلامية().
C.جيم -
Criminal networksالشبكات الإجرامية
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The illicit trade of charcoal from Somalia remains underpinned by criminal networks based in Kismayo and Dubai.لا تزال الشبكات الإجرامية التي مقرها كيسمايو ودبي تشكل ركيزة الاتجار غير المشروع بالفحم الصومالي.
In Kismayo, the business consortium All Star Group is responsible for producing and transporting charcoal from the interior to points of export in Somalia.وفي كيسمايو، يتولى اتحاد الشركات All Star Group() المسؤولية عن إنتاج ونقل الفحم من المناطق الداخلية إلى نقاط التصدير في الصومال.
In Dubai, All Star Group representatives facilitate the trade through companies based in the United Arab Emirates, most notably, Zuri Coals.وفي دبي، يقوم ممثلو هذه المجموعة بتيسير التجارة من خلال شركات تتخذ من الإمارات العربية المتحدة مقراً لها، وأبرزها شركة Zuri Coals.
Those companies have also established ties to local shipping agents in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to enable the trans-shipment of Somali charcoal throughout the region.كما أقامت هذه الشركات علاقات مع وكلاء شحن محليين في كل من الإمارات العربية المتحدة والعراق والكويت والمملكة العربية السعودية للتمكين من إعادة شحن الفحم الصومالي في مختلف أنحاء المنطقة.
D.دال -
Implementation of the banتنفيذ الحظر
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On 28 November 2018, the United Arab Emirates informed the Panel that it had imposed a suspension of charcoal imports with certificates of origin from the Islamic Republic of Iran.في 28 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018، أبلغت الإمارات العربية المتحدة الفريق بأنها فرضت تعليقاً على واردات الفحم التي تحمل شهادات منشأ من جمهورية إيران الإسلامية().
On 28 August 2018, Iranian authorities declared a moratorium on the import of charcoal originating from Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.وفي 28 آب/أغسطس 2018، أعلنت السلطات الإيرانية وقف استيراد الفحم القادم من جزر القمر وغانا وكوت ديفوار.
On 8 March 2018, Oman confiscated 37,000 bags of charcoal from the Al Azhar 3, which had presented false documentation to Omani authorities at the port of Duqm.وفي 8 آذار/مارس 2018، صادرت عمان 000 37 كيس من الفحم من مركب الأزهر 3، الذي قدّم وثائق مزورة إلى السلطات العمانية في ميناء الدقم().
Oman has since issued a moratorium on the import of charcoal originating in Member States in Africa.وقد أصدرت عُمان منذ ذلك الحين قرارًا بوقف استيراد الفحم القادم من دول أعضاء في أفريقيا().
In addition, on 15 September 2019, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of Kuwait announced a ban on all charcoal imports from Somalia.وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، في 15 أيلول/سبتمبر 2019، أعلنت وزارة التجارة والصناعة الكويتية فرض حظر على جميع واردات الفحم من الصومال().
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In addition to the above actions taken by Member States, the Panel has found that the naming of entities and individuals involved in charcoal trade in previous Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reports has had an impact on the ability of charcoal traffickers to conduct international transactions.وبالإضافة إلى الإجراءات المذكورة أعلاه التي اتخذتها الدول الأعضاء، تبين للفريق أن ذكر أسماء الكيانات والأفراد المتورطين في تجارة الفحم في التقارير السابقة لفريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا قد أثر على قدرة المتاجرين بالفحم على إجراء معاملات دولية().
The application of “World-Check” and other “know-your-customer” tools has resulted in individuals associated with the illicit trade unable to open new bank accounts or to make transfers over $10,000.وأسفر تطبيق أداة ”World Check“ وغيرها من أدوات ”اعرف عميلك“ عن منع أفراد مرتبطين بالتجارة غير المشروعة من فتح حسابات مصرفية جديدة أو إجراء تحويلات تزيد قيمتها عن 000 10 دولار.
Update on the dhows Al Sahil and Haruniتحديث بشأن المركبين الشراعيين الساحل وهاروني
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On 30 April 2017, Kuwaiti authorities, in cooperation with the Combined Maritime Forces, detained two dhows, Al Sahil and Haruni, at Al Doha port, Kuwait, under suspicion of having violated the Somali charcoal ban.في 30 نيسان/أبريل 2017، قامت السلطات الكويتية، بالتعاون مع القوات البحرية المشتركة، باحتجاز اثنين من المراكب الشراعية، هما الساحل وهاروني، في ميناء الدوحة بالكويت، للاشتباه في انتهاكهما للحظر المفروض على الفحم الصومالي.
Following an examination of the Djiboutian certificates of origin, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea determined that they had been falsified and that the charcoal had originated in Somalia (see S/2017/924, annex 12.2.3).وبعد فحص شهادات المنشأ الجيبوتية، انتهى فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا إلى أن الشهادات مزورة وأن الفحم منشؤه الصومال (انظر S/2017/924، المرفق 12-2-3).
On 13 August 2017, Kuwaiti authorities informed the Monitoring Group that the charcoal cargoes of Al Sahil and Haruni had been confiscated by Kuwaiti customs and that the captains were to be prosecuted under domestic law.وفي 13 آب/أغسطس 2017، أبلغت السلطات الكويتية فريق الرصد أن الجمارك الكويتية قد صادرت شحنات الفحم على مركبي الساحل وهاروني، وأن القبطانين سيُحاكمان بموجب القانون الوطني.
185.185 -
The Panel of Experts reviewed Kuwaiti court documentation, dated 20 May 2019, indicating that the captain of the Sahil had been cleared on charges related to the smuggling of Somali charcoal and of falsifying shipping documentation.واستعرض فريق الخبراء وثائق المحاكم الكويتية، المؤرخة 20 أيار/مايو 2019، التي تشير إلى أن قبطان مركب الساحل قد تمت تبرئته من تهم تتعلق بتهريب الفحم الصومالي وتزوير وثائق الشحن.
The Panel also reviewed a copy of a letter dated 3 May 2017 from the Embassy of Djibouti in Kuwait to the prosecutor’s office attesting that the origin of the Sahil shipment was Djibouti, a claim inconsistent with the evidence collected by both the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea and the Combined Maritime Forces.واستعرض الفريق أيضًا نسخة من رسالة مؤرخة 3 أيار/مايو 2017 من سفارة جيبوتي في الكويت إلى مكتب المدعي العام تفيد بأن منشأ شحنة مركب الساحل هو جيبوتي، وهو ادعاء يتعارض مع الأدلة التي جمعها كل من فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا والقوات البحرية المشتركة.
This case underlines the challenges involved in implementing the charcoal ban, despite the best efforts of Member States.وتبرز هذه الحالة التحديات التي ينطوي عليها تنفيذ الحظر المفروض على الفحم، رغم بذل الدول الأعضاء قصارى جهودها.
VII.سابعا -
State and non-State cooperationالتعاون من جانب الدول والجهات من غير الدول
186.186 -
The Panel of Experts is grateful to the Governments of Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates for hosting the Panel or otherwise assisting with its investigations.يعرب فريق الخبراء عن امتنانه لحكومات الإمارات العربية المتحدة وإيران (جمهورية - الإسلامية) وإيطاليا وتركيا ومصر لاستضافتها الفريق أو للمساعدة التي قدمتها بطريقة أخرى في تحقيقاته.
187.187 -
The Panel would like to acknowledge the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation for its assistance with investigations into the construction and use of improvised explosive devices by Al-Shabaab.ويود فريق الخبراء أن يثني على المركز التحليلي للأجهزة المتفجرة الإرهابية التابع لمكتب التحقيقات الاتحادي للولايات المتحدة على المساعدة التي قدمها في إطار التحقيقات في صنع واستخدام الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع على أيدي حركة الشباب.
188.188 -
The non-governmental organization C4ADS greatly assisted the Panel of Experts with multiple investigations, and in particular with mobile telephone network analysis.وقد قدمت المنظمة غير الحكومية C4ADS مساعدة كبيرة لفريق الخبراء في إجراء تحقيقات متعددة، لا سيما فيما يتعلق بتحليل شبكات الهواتف المحمولة.
189.189 -
The Panel of Experts would lastly like to acknowledge the contributions to its work of Bancroft Global Development, EUNAVFOR, FAO, IATA, ICAO, INTERPOL, One Earth Future Foundation, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Vulcan Inc.ويود الفريق أن ينوه في النهاية بالإسهامات المقدمة لعمله من جانب كل من منظمة بانكروفت للتنمية العالمية، والقوة البحرية للاتحاد الأوروبي، ومنظمة الأغذية والزراعة، واتحاد النقل الجوي الدولي، ومنظمة الطيران المدني الدولي، والإنتربول، ومؤسسة مستقبل لأرض واحدة، ومكتب الأمم المتحدة المعني بالمخدرات والجريمة، وشركة Vulcan Inc.
Non-cooperationعدم التعاون
190.190 -
The inaugural mandate of the Panel of Experts on Somalia was affected by the obstruction of the Panel’s work by the Federal Government of Somalia.تأثرت ولاية فريق الخبراء المعني بالصومال في بدايتها بعرقلة حكومة الصومال الاتحادية لعمله.
From March 2019 onward, the Panel was unable to travel to Somalia following instructions conveyed by the Permanent Mission of Somalia in New York, despite significant diplomatic efforts by the Chair of the Committee pursuant to Security Council resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia.ففي الفترة من آذار/مارس 2019 فصاعدا، لم يتمكن الفريق من السفر إلى الصومال إثر تعليمات وردت من البعثة الدائمة للصومال في نيويورك، على الرغم من الجهود الدبلوماسية الكبيرة التي بذلها رئيس اللجنة العاملة بموجب قرار مجلس الأمن 751 (1992) بشأن الصومال.
The inability to travel to Somalia adversely affected the Panel’s work.وكان لعدم القدرة على السفر إلى الصومال تأثير سلبي على عمل الفريق.
In particular, the Federal Government prevented the Panel from accessing military storage facilities in Somalia, and thereby limited its ability to verify Federal Government compliance with the terms of the partial lifting of the arms embargo.فعلى وجه الخصوص، منعت الحكومة الاتحادية الفريق من الوصول إلى مرافق التخزين العسكرية في الصومال، وبالتالي حدت من قدرته على التحقق من امتثال الحكومة الاتحادية لشروط الرفع الجزئي للحظر المفروض على الأسلحة.
In addition, a lack of access to the country hindered the Panel’s ability to interview victims of violations of international humanitarian law and to conduct investigations into the obstruction and diversion of humanitarian assistance.وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، أدى تعذر دخول البلد إلى إعاقة قدرة الفريق على إجراء مقابلات مع ضحايا انتهاكات القانون الدولي الإنساني وعلى إجراء تحقيقات بشأن عرقلة المساعدات الإنسانية وتحويل وجهتها.
VIII.ثامنا -
Recommendationsالتوصيات
A.ألف -
Threats to peace, security and stabilityالأخطار التي تهدد السلام والأمن والاستقرار
191.191 -
The Panel of Experts recommends that the Security Council:يوصي فريق الخبراء مجلسَ الأمن بأن:
(a)(أ)
Call upon Member States to undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the production, sale, supply, purchase or transfer of chemical precursors to Somalia that may be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, in particular, ammonium nitrate, potassium nitrate and sodium chlorate;يهيب بالدول الأعضاء أن تتخذ التدابير المناسبة لتعزيز توخي اليقظة من جانب رعاياها والأشخاص الخاضعين لولايتها والشركات المنشأة على أراضيها أو الخاضعة لولايتها، الذين لهم نشاط في إنتاج أو بيع أو توريد أو شراء أو نقل سلائف كيميائية إلى الصومال يمكن استخدامها في تصنيع الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع، لا سيما نترات الأمونيوم ونترات البوتاسيوم وكلورات الصوديوم؛
(b)(ب)
Decide that, in order to inhibit Al-Shabaab from obtaining concentrated nitric acid or sulfonitric acid, Member States should undertake appropriate measures to exercise vigilance, keep records of transactions and share information with the Federal Government of Somalia and the Committee regarding suspicious purchases of or enquiries regarding these chemicals by individuals or entities in Somalia;يقرر أن تتخذ الدول الأعضاء، من أجل منع حركة الشباب من الحصول على حمض النيتريك المركز أو حمض السلفونيتريك، التدابير المناسبة لتوخي اليقظة والاحتفاظ بسجلات المعاملات وتزويد حكومة الصومال الاتحادية واللجنة بمعلومات عن عمليات الشراء المشبوهة لهذه المواد الكيميائية أو الاستفسارات المشبوهة عنها التي ترد من الأفراد أو الكيانات في الصومال؛
(c)(ج)
Encourage Member States to undertake appropriate measures to ensure that their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the production, sale, supply, purchase or transfer of commercial explosives to Somalia provide adequate financial and technical assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states to establish appropriate safeguards for the storage and distribution of the material;يشجع الدول الأعضاء على اتخاذ التدابير الملائمة للتأكد من قيام مواطنيها والأشخاص الخاضعين لولايتها والشركات المنشأة على أراضيها أو الخاضعة لولايتها الذين يشاركون في إنتاج المتفجرات التجارية وفي بيعها وتوريدها وشرائها ونقلها إلى الصومال بتقديم المساعدة المالية والتقنية الكافية إلى حكومة الصومال الاتحادية والولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد من أجل وضع ضمانات مناسبة لتخزين تلك المواد وتوزيعها؛
(d)(د)
Call upon the Federal Government of Somalia to strengthen international cooperation, in particular with Member States in the region, to prevent and counter the financing of terrorism by ensuring the effective exchange of relevant financial intelligence, including data collected by the Federal Government Financial Reporting Center, through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms;يدعو حكومة الصومال الاتحادية إلى تعزيز التعاون الدولي، لا سيما مع الدول الأعضاء في المنطقة، لمنع ومكافحة تمويل الإرهاب من خلال كفالة التبادل الفعال للمعلومات الاستخبارية المالية ذات الصلة، بما في ذلك البيانات التي يجمعها مركز الإبلاغ المالي التابع للحكومة الاتحادية، عن طريق آليات ثنائية ومتعددة الأطراف؛
(e)(ه)
Decide that the Federal Government of Somalia shall submit a confidential annual update to the Committee, apprising it of the progress of the Financial Reporting Center and including, where appropriate, an aggregate summary of suspicious activity reports submitted by domestic financial institutions, investigations undertaken by the Financial Reporting Center and specific actions taken to counter the financing of terrorism.يقرر أن تقدم حكومة الصومال الاتحادية تحديثًا سنويًا سريًا إلى اللجنة، لإطلاعها على التقدم الذي يحرزه مركز الإبلاغ المالي، متضمنا، عند الاقتضاء، موجزا تجميعيا لتقارير الأنشطة المشبوهة المقدمة من المؤسسات المالية المحلية، والتحقيقات التي يجريها مركز الإبلاغ المالي، والإجراءات المحددة المتخذة لمكافحة تمويل الإرهاب.
B.باء -
Arms embargoحظر توريد الأسلحة
192.192 -
The Panel of Experts recommends that the Security Council:يوصي فريق الخبراء مجلسَ الأمن بأن:
(a)(أ)
Decide to modify the provisions set out in paragraph 2 of Council resolution 2142 (2014) and paragraph 11 (a) of Council resolution 2111 (2013) by removing the need to provide notifications relating to the delivery of advice, assistance or training for the development of the Somali national security forces and the Somali security sector institutions, including the building of infrastructure and the provision of salaries and stipends;يقرر تعديل الأحكام الواردة في الفقرة 2 من قرار المجلس 2142 (2014) والفقرة 11 (أ) من قرار المجلس 2111 (2013) عن طريق إلغاء الحاجة إلى تقديم إخطارات بشأن تقديم المشورة أو المساعدة أو التدريب لتطوير قوات الأمن الوطني الصومالية ومؤسسات قطاع الأمن الصومالية، بما في ذلك تشييد البنية التحتية وتوفير المرتبات والأجور؛
(b)(ب)
Include an annex to its next resolution that explicitly sets forth which categories of military equipment are subject to Committee notification;يدرج مرفقاً لقراره المقبل، يحدد فيه صراحة أي فئات من المعدات العسكرية يلزم إخطار اللجنة بها؛
(c)(ج)
Decide that shipments to Somalia of commercial explosives, such as ammonium nitrate/fuel oil, electric detonators and detonating cord used in the mining and construction industry, are subject to notification for the Committee’s information;يقرر أن شحنات المتفجرات التجارية المتجهة إلى الصومال، مثل نترات الأمونيوم/زيت الوقود، والمفجرات الكهربائية، وسلك التفجير المستخدمة في صناعة التعدين والبناء، يلزم إخطار اللجنة بها لغرض العلم؛
(d)(د)
Decide that the Federal Government of Somalia will submit to the Council its two periodic reports, in accordance with paragraph 9 of Council resolution 2182 (2014), by 15 February 2020 and 15 August 2020, respectively, in order to allow the Panel sufficient time to consider the reports prior to the submission of its midterm update and final report on Somalia;يقرر أن تقدم حكومة الصومال الاتحادية إلى مجلس الأمن تقريريها الدوريين، وفقًا للفقرة 9 من قرار المجلس 2182 (2014)، بحلول 15 شباط/فبراير 2020 و 15 آب/أغسطس 2020، على التوالي، لإتاحة الوقت الكافي للفريق من أجل النظر في التقريرين قبل تقديم تقريره عن المستجدات لمنتصف المدة وتقريره النهائي عن الصومال؛
(e)(ه)
Decide that future reports of the joint verification team established pursuant to paragraph 7 of Council resolution 2182 (2014) will cross-reference, where possible, the serial numbers of weapons documented by the joint verification team with available Federal Government of Somalia records detailing the distribution of arms to the security forces.يقرر أن تشمل التقارير المستقبلية لفريق التحقق المشترك، المنشأ عملاً بالفقرة 7 من القرار 2182 (2014)، حيثما أمكن، إحالات مرجعية تقارن الأرقام التسلسلية للأسلحة التي يوثقها فريق التحقق المشترك بسجلات حكومة الصومال الاتحادية المتاحة التي تفصّل توزيع الأسلحة على قوات الأمن.
193.193 -
The Panel of Experts recommends that the Chair write to the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of AMISOM, encouraging AMISOM forces to document and register all military equipment captured as part of offensive operations, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2182 (2014), and to establish a practicable procedure for sharing those findings with the Panel.ويوصي فريق الخبراء رئيس اللجنة بأن يكتب إلى الممثل الخاص لرئيس مفوضية الاتحاد الأفريقي إلى الصومال ورئيس بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال، لتشجيع قوات البعثة على توثيق وتسجيل جميع المعدات العسكرية التي يتم الاستيلاء عليها أثناء العمليات الهجومية، وفقاً لقرار مجلس الأمن 2182 (2014)، ولوضع إجراء عملي لإطلاع فريق الخبراء على هذه النتائج.
C.جيم -
Charcoal banالحظر المفروض على الفحم
194.194 -
The Panel of Experts recommends that the Security Council express its intention to conduct a review of the charcoal ban in 2020 with a view to assessing its continued appropriateness.يوصي فريق الخبراء مجلسَ الأمن بأن يعرب عن اعتزامه إجراء استعراض للحظر المفروض على الفحم في عام 2020 بغية تقييم مدى استمرار ملاءمته.
D.دال -
Violations of international humanitarian lawانتهاكات القانون الدولي الإنساني
195.195 -
The Panel of Experts recommends that the Security Council:يوصي فريق الخبراء مجلسَ الأمن بأن:
(a)(أ)
Encourage the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states to enhance civilian oversight over their security forces and investigate and prosecute senior political and military leaders with command responsibility for grave breaches of international humanitarian law;يشجع حكومة الصومال الاتحادية والولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد على تعزيز الرقابة المدنية على قوات الأمن التابعة لها، والتحقيق مع كبار القادة السياسيين والعسكريين الذين كانت لهم مسؤوليات قيادية عن الانتهاكات الجسيمة للقانون الدولي الإنساني ومحاكمتهم؛
(b)(ب)
Remind all Member States that their military forces operating in Somalia must strictly adhere to international humanitarian law, including customary laws related to the conduct of hostilities, and promptly investigate and prosecute personnel who commit grave breaches of international humanitarian law;يذكر جميع الدول الأعضاء بوجوب أن تلتزم قواتها العسكرية العاملة في الصومال التزاما صارما بالقانون الدولي الإنساني، بما في ذلك القوانين العرفية المتعلقة بسير الأعمال القتالية، وأن تحقق على وجه السرعة مع الأفراد الذين يرتكبون انتهاكات جسيمة للقانون الدولي الإنساني وتحاكمهم؛
(c)(ج)
Encourage AMISOM to continue to implement the recommendations formulated within the framework of the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, and to strengthen the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell in order to decrease civilian casualties when conducting military operations;يشجع بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال على مواصلة تنفيذ التوصيات التي وضعت في إطار سياسة بذل العناية الواجبة في مراعاة حقوق الإنسان فيما يتعلق بدعم الأمم المتحدة المقدم إلى قوات الأمن غير التابعة لها، وتعزيز الخلية المعنية بحصر الخسائر في صفوف المدنيين وتحليلها والاستجابة لها، من أجل تقليل عدد الضحايا المدنيين عند تنفيذ العمليات العسكرية؛
and conduct prompt investigations into incidents involving killings of civilians and provide appropriate compensation. S/2019/858وإجراء تحقيقات على وجه السرعة في الحوادث التي تنطوي على قتل مدنيين وتقديم تعويض مناسب.
S/2019/858 /4 19-16960 19-16960 /4
Annex 1.1: Extent of Al-Shabaab’s territorial controlAnnex 1.1: Extent of Al-Shabaab’s territorial control
Figure 1: Map showing Al-Shabaab-administered areas, areas of significant Al-Shabaab military presence, and Al-Shabaab’s taxation catchment.Figure 1: Map showing Al-Shabaab-administered areas, areas of significant Al-Shabaab military presence, and Al-Shabaab’s taxation catchment.
Annex 1.2: Al-Shabaab’s use of IEDsAnnex 1.2: Al-Shabaab’s use of IEDs
11
Eleven out of the fifty Laboratory analyses from IED samples received from a Member State confirm the use of HME.Eleven out of the fifty Laboratory analyses from IED samples received from a Member State confirm the use of HME.
Nine out of the eleven incidents occurred after July 2018.Nine out of the eleven incidents occurred after July 2018.
During the mandate, the Panel has established that Al-Shabaab is manufacturing home-made explosives (HME).During the mandate, the Panel has established that Al-Shabaab is manufacturing home-made explosives (HME).
The first confirmed incident of Al-Shabaab using HME in Somalia was on 20 July 2017, when the Somali Police Force Criminal Investigative Division interdicted a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at a checkpoint at Elasha Biyaha, on the outskirts of Mogadishu (see figures 1 and 2, below).The first confirmed incident of Al-Shabaab using HME in Somalia was on 20 July 2017, when the Somali Police Force Criminal Investigative Division interdicted a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at a checkpoint at Elasha Biyaha, on the outskirts of Mogadishu (see figures 1 and 2, below).
A laboratory analysis of sample from the VBIED confirmed the presence of nitroglycerin, potassium nitrate and a component consistent with charcoal.A laboratory analysis of sample from the VBIED confirmed the presence of nitroglycerin, potassium nitrate and a component consistent with charcoal.
According to laboratory analyses provided by the FBI’s Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) and additional analysis by UNMAS Somalia, the trend of Al-Shabaab producing HME by mixing nitroglycerin (a high-explosive) with potassium nitrate (an oxidizer) and charcoal (a fuel) increased from mid-2018.1According to laboratory analyses provided by the FBI’s Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) and additional analysis by UNMAS Somalia, the trend of Al-Shabaab producing HME by mixing nitroglycerin (a high-explosive) with potassium nitrate (an oxidizer) and charcoal (a fuel) increased from mid-2018.1
Figure 1: Dashboard of the VBIED recovered on 20 July 2017 in Elasha Biyaha.Figure 1: Dashboard of the VBIED recovered on 20 July 2017 in Elasha Biyaha.
Figure 2: Sample of explosive material from a VBIED seized at Elasha Biyaha on 20 July 2017, photographed by the SEMG on 21 July 2018.Figure 2: Sample of explosive material from a VBIED seized at Elasha Biyaha on 20 July 2017, photographed by the SEMG on 21 July 2018.
Between July 2018 and July 2019, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incidents across Somalia increased by approximately 32 per cent compared to the same period the previous year.Between July 2018 and July 2019, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incidents across Somalia increased by approximately 32 per cent compared to the same period the previous year.
There was also a 36 per cent increase in IED incidents in Benadir region, which includes Mogadishu, between July 2018 and July 2019, compared to the same period the previous year (see figures 3 and 4, below).There was also a 36 per cent increase in IED incidents in Benadir region, which includes Mogadishu, between July 2018 and July 2019, compared to the same period the previous year (see figures 3 and 4, below).
Figure 3: IED incidents in Somalia, July 2016 to July 2019.Figure 3: IED incidents in Somalia, July 2016 to July 2019.
Source: UNMAS Somalia.Source: UNMAS Somalia.
Figure 4: IED incidents in Benadir region July 2016 to July 2019.Figure 4: IED incidents in Benadir region July 2016 to July 2019.
Source: UNMAS SomaliaSource: UNMAS Somalia
2 A 14 May 2019 VBIED detonated at the gate of a district police headquarters in Mogadishu, killing at least three people.2 A 14 May 2019 VBIED detonated at the gate of a district police headquarters in Mogadishu, killing at least three people.
3 Interview with EOD specialist 12 August 2019.3 Interview with EOD specialist 12 August 2019.
4 Letter from fertilizer supplier on 8 August 2019.4 Letter from fertilizer supplier on 8 August 2019.
Since May 2019, improved security measures in Benadir district, including additional Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) checkpoints, has led to an increase of interdictions of Al-Shabaab’s vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).Since May 2019, improved security measures in Benadir district, including additional Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) checkpoints, has led to an increase of interdictions of Al-Shabaab’s vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).
From 14 May to 2 September 2019, one VBIED out of nine reached its intended target in in Benadir.2 Nevertheless, interdictions often still result in civilian casualties;From 14 May to 2 September 2019, one VBIED out of nine reached its intended target in in Benadir.2 Nevertheless, interdictions often still result in civilian casualties;
for instance, on 22 July 2019 a VBIED intercepted at an FGS checkpoint in Mogadishu detonated, killing 23 people and injuring 32 others.for instance, on 22 July 2019 a VBIED intercepted at an FGS checkpoint in Mogadishu detonated, killing 23 people and injuring 32 others.
Supply of IED components to SomaliaSupply of IED components to Somalia
Potassium nitrate fertilizerPotassium nitrate fertilizer
Potassium nitrate fertilizer may be used for effective IED construction if the content of potassium surpasses 40 per cent, which is not commonly found in agricultural fertilizers in Somalia.3Potassium nitrate fertilizer may be used for effective IED construction if the content of potassium surpasses 40 per cent, which is not commonly found in agricultural fertilizers in Somalia.3
In July and August 2019, the Panel of Experts documented two brands of potassium nitrate fertilizer available at local markets in Kismayo and Mogadishu (see figures 6-9, below).In July and August 2019, the Panel of Experts documented two brands of potassium nitrate fertilizer available at local markets in Kismayo and Mogadishu (see figures 6-9, below).
The percentage of potassium contained in the documented fertilizers were 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively.4 According to a 2019 UNMAS Somalia report, potassium nitrateThe percentage of potassium contained in the documented fertilizers were 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively.4 According to a 2019 UNMAS Somalia report, potassium nitrate
fertilizer has also been documented in Middle Juba, an Al-Shabaab stronghold.fertilizer has also been documented in Middle Juba, an Al-Shabaab stronghold.
However, the concentration of the potassium nitrate was not specified.However, the concentration of the potassium nitrate was not specified.
According to UN Comtrade data, during 2017 and 2018 approximately 60 tons of potassium nitrate of unspecified concentration were exported to Somalia from Kenya.5 Moreover, in its 2017 report, the SEMG presented evidence of at least one company which exports potassium nitrate fertilizer of above 40 per cent in bulk to Yemen;According to UN Comtrade data, during 2017 and 2018 approximately 60 tons of potassium nitrate of unspecified concentration were exported to Somalia from Kenya.5 Moreover, in its 2017 report, the SEMG presented evidence of at least one company which exports potassium nitrate fertilizer of above 40 per cent in bulk to Yemen;
Yemen is a known supply route for illicit weapons and IED components to Somalia.6Yemen is a known supply route for illicit weapons and IED components to Somalia.6
Diammonium phosphate and urea fertilizersDiammonium phosphate and urea fertilizers
5 Available from https://comtrade.un.org/Data/, HS code 283421.5 Available from https://comtrade.un.org/Data/, HS code 283421.
The Panel wrote to the Government of Kenya on 22 August 2019 but is yet to receive a reply.The Panel wrote to the Government of Kenya on 22 August 2019 but is yet to receive a reply.
6 See S/2017/924, para 25.6 See S/2017/924, para 25.
7 UNMAS Somalia report, January 2017.7 UNMAS Somalia report, January 2017.
8 Five major suppliers of fertilizers in Kismayo informed the Panel that urea and fertilizers containing potassium nitrate are sold to farmers in in Bu’aale, Jilib and Jamame, which are Al-Shabaab-controlled areas.8 Five major suppliers of fertilizers in Kismayo informed the Panel that urea and fertilizers containing potassium nitrate are sold to farmers in in Bu’aale, Jilib and Jamame, which are Al-Shabaab-controlled areas.
9 In Nigeria, large shipments of urea are subject to military escort, due to concern regarding diversion to the militant group Boko Haram.9 In Nigeria, large shipments of urea are subject to military escort, due to concern regarding diversion to the militant group Boko Haram.
Interviews with researchers from business intelligence site Argusmedia on 16 August and 19 August 2019.Interviews with researchers from business intelligence site Argusmedia on 16 August and 19 August 2019.
10 In February 2015, following the siege of the ISIL stronghold of Kobane, Syria, a Conflict Armament Research (CAR) team documented quantities of urea in the town.10 In February 2015, following the siege of the ISIL stronghold of Kobane, Syria, a Conflict Armament Research (CAR) team documented quantities of urea in the town.
CAR found evidence that ISIL had used urea mixed with other chemical precursors to make improvised explosive devices which it used to attack Kurdish YPG forces.CAR found evidence that ISIL had used urea mixed with other chemical precursors to make improvised explosive devices which it used to attack Kurdish YPG forces.
See Conflict Armament Research, “Tracing the Supply of Components Used in Islamic State IEDs”, February 2016.See Conflict Armament Research, “Tracing the Supply of Components Used in Islamic State IEDs”, February 2016.
Available at https://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Tracing_The_Supply_of_Components_Used_in_Islamic_State_IEDs.pdf.Available at https://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Tracing_The_Supply_of_Components_Used_in_Islamic_State_IEDs.pdf.
11 Email from EOD analyst, 16 August 2019.11 Email from EOD analyst, 16 August 2019.
UNMAS Somalia, “Explosive Hazard Awareness Report”, January 2017 suggested that the use of urea nitrate as an HME in Somalia is possible, but unconfirmed.UNMAS Somalia, “Explosive Hazard Awareness Report”, January 2017 suggested that the use of urea nitrate as an HME in Somalia is possible, but unconfirmed.
The bulk of documented fertilizers in Somalia consist of either urea or diammonium phosphate (DAP).The bulk of documented fertilizers in Somalia consist of either urea or diammonium phosphate (DAP).
DAP, which contains approximately 18 per cent nitrogen and 46 per cent phosphate, cannot be used in the production of HME.7DAP, which contains approximately 18 per cent nitrogen and 46 per cent phosphate, cannot be used in the production of HME.7
In July 2019, the Panel documented the sale of urea-based fertilizers in Kismayo, which is also sold in bulk to areas under Al-Shabaab-control in Middle Juba.8 Urea, which contains 46 per cent nitrogen, cannot be used to construct HME without being exposed to concentrated nitric acid, which produces urea nitrate explosive.9 On 5 April 2019, FGS security forces searching an underground site near Elasha Biyaha, a suburb of Mogadishu, recovered components and chemical substances used by Al-Shabaab to manufacture IEDs.In July 2019, the Panel documented the sale of urea-based fertilizers in Kismayo, which is also sold in bulk to areas under Al-Shabaab-control in Middle Juba.8 Urea, which contains 46 per cent nitrogen, cannot be used to construct HME without being exposed to concentrated nitric acid, which produces urea nitrate explosive.9 On 5 April 2019, FGS security forces searching an underground site near Elasha Biyaha, a suburb of Mogadishu, recovered components and chemical substances used by Al-Shabaab to manufacture IEDs.
Among the items seized were empty bottles of nitric acid.10 However, the compound urea nitrate has not appeared in any of TEDAC’s post-blast laboratory analyses since 2012.11Among the items seized were empty bottles of nitric acid.10 However, the compound urea nitrate has not appeared in any of TEDAC’s post-blast laboratory analyses since 2012.11
Figure 5: Nitric acid bottles recovered by Somali National forces in a raid in Elasha Bihaya on 5 April 2019.Figure 5: Nitric acid bottles recovered by Somali National forces in a raid in Elasha Bihaya on 5 April 2019.
Nitric acidNitric acid
12 Sulfonitric acid is a mixture of sulfuric and nitric acid.12 Sulfonitric acid is a mixture of sulfuric and nitric acid.
13 Email from EOD specialist on 16 August 2019;13 Email from EOD specialist on 16 August 2019;
interviews with Mogadishu based researchers, August and September 2019.interviews with Mogadishu based researchers, August and September 2019.
14 According to UNMAS Somalia, it is unlikely that Al-Shabaab has procured nitroglycerin from explosive remnants of war;14 According to UNMAS Somalia, it is unlikely that Al-Shabaab has procured nitroglycerin from explosive remnants of war;
UNMAS Somalia report, April 2019.UNMAS Somalia report, April 2019.
In an interview with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on 15 April 2019, it was suggested that significant amounts of ice would be required to produce nitroglycerin in Somalia.In an interview with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on 15 April 2019, it was suggested that significant amounts of ice would be required to produce nitroglycerin in Somalia.
15 In 2013 and 2014, the SEMG documented at least four cases in which C-DETs were recovered during seizures and following IED attacks in Somalia.15 In 2013 and 2014, the SEMG documented at least four cases in which C-DETs were recovered during seizures and following IED attacks in Somalia.
See S/2014/726, annex 6.6.See S/2014/726, annex 6.6.
UN Comtrade data indicates that from 2017 to 2018 approximately 44 tons of nitric/sulfonitric acid were exported to Somalia from Kenya and the UAE.12 Nitric acid is commonly used in the production of plastics, dyes, and explosives.UN Comtrade data indicates that from 2017 to 2018 approximately 44 tons of nitric/sulfonitric acid were exported to Somalia from Kenya and the UAE.12 Nitric acid is commonly used in the production of plastics, dyes, and explosives.
According to information received by the Panel, there is no industrial demand for concentrated nitric acid in Somalia.13 The Panel is continuing to investigate the prevalence and origins of nitric acid found within Somalia.According to information received by the Panel, there is no industrial demand for concentrated nitric acid in Somalia.13 The Panel is continuing to investigate the prevalence and origins of nitric acid found within Somalia.
NitroglycerinNitroglycerin
According to EOD specialists, nitric acid can be mixed with sulfuric acid and glycerine to produce nitroglycerin, a powerful and unstable explosive.According to EOD specialists, nitric acid can be mixed with sulfuric acid and glycerine to produce nitroglycerin, a powerful and unstable explosive.
While laboratory analyses have consistently revealed the presence of nitroglycerin in Al-Shabaab IEDs, it is not yet clear whether Al-Shabaab is producing nitroglycerin domestically or is procuring the material from elsewhere.14While laboratory analyses have consistently revealed the presence of nitroglycerin in Al-Shabaab IEDs, it is not yet clear whether Al-Shabaab is producing nitroglycerin domestically or is procuring the material from elsewhere.14
C-DET detonatorsC-DET detonators
Electric detonators manufactured by C-DET Explosive Industries continue to be used in various IED attacks across Somalia since their initial documentation in 2013.15 In AprilElectric detonators manufactured by C-DET Explosive Industries continue to be used in various IED attacks across Somalia since their initial documentation in 2013.15 In April
16 C-DETs were found among seizures in Belet Weyne in May 2017, and in Leego in January 2017.16 C-DETs were found among seizures in Belet Weyne in May 2017, and in Leego in January 2017.
See S/2017/924, annex 1.2 (strictly confidential).See S/2017/924, annex 1.2 (strictly confidential).
17 Photographic evidence provided via email from an analyst on Somalia, 7 August 2017.17 Photographic evidence provided via email from an analyst on Somalia, 7 August 2017.
The analyst had received the evidence from a reliable source in Galkayo.The analyst had received the evidence from a reliable source in Galkayo.
2017, C-DET electric detonators were among the IED components discovered by Puntland security forces in Bosaso, Puntland.2017, C-DET electric detonators were among the IED components discovered by Puntland security forces in Bosaso, Puntland.
On 20 July 2017, C-DETs were recovered from the scene of a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) attack in Elasha Biyaha.16 In 2017, the SEMG documented evidence of at least one arms market in Galkayo where C-DET detonators are available for $67 each.17 On 19 May 2019, the M Oriental Queen consignment (see annex 1.11) also contained a delivery of 500 C-DET electric detonators, which were intended for commercial use in Puntland.On 20 July 2017, C-DETs were recovered from the scene of a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) attack in Elasha Biyaha.16 In 2017, the SEMG documented evidence of at least one arms market in Galkayo where C-DET detonators are available for $67 each.17 On 19 May 2019, the M Oriental Queen consignment (see annex 1.11) also contained a delivery of 500 C-DET electric detonators, which were intended for commercial use in Puntland.
Figure 6: Fertilizer containing 5 per cent potassium, documented in Kismayo, July 2019.Figure 6: Fertilizer containing 5 per cent potassium, documented in Kismayo, July 2019.
Figure 7: Fertilizer containing 10 per cent potassium, documented in Kismayo, July 2019.Figure 7: Fertilizer containing 10 per cent potassium, documented in Kismayo, July 2019.
Figure 8: Fertilizer containing 5 per cent potassium, documented in Mogadishu, August 2019.Figure 8: Fertilizer containing 5 per cent potassium, documented in Mogadishu, August 2019.
Figure 9: Urea fertilizer documented in Kismayo in July 2019.Figure 9: Urea fertilizer documented in Kismayo in July 2019.
Annex 1.3: Sahafi Hotel attackAnnex 1.3: Sahafi Hotel attack
Figure 1: On 9 November 2018, Al-Shabaab detonated three VBIEDs outside the Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu.Figure 1: On 9 November 2018, Al-Shabaab detonated three VBIEDs outside the Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu.
Source: Bancroft Global Development.Source: Bancroft Global Development.
Figure 2: Five deceased attackers dressed in Somali security forces uniforms.Figure 2: Five deceased attackers dressed in Somali security forces uniforms.
The Panel received reports, including from EOD specialist, that some of the victims of the blast had been treated for unusual burns and respiratory problems not seen in the aftermath of previous VBIED attacks in Mogadishu.The Panel received reports, including from EOD specialist, that some of the victims of the blast had been treated for unusual burns and respiratory problems not seen in the aftermath of previous VBIED attacks in Mogadishu.
This may indicate that Al-Shabaab addedThis may indicate that Al-Shabaab added
18 See S/2018/1002 annex 2.1 (strictly confidential).18 See S/2018/1002 annex 2.1 (strictly confidential).
19 Consignment from the People’s Republic of China delivered in July 2017 (notified 2 February 2018).19 Consignment from the People’s Republic of China delivered in July 2017 (notified 2 February 2018).
20 See S/2018/1002 paras 47-49.20 See S/2018/1002 paras 47-49.
Both hand grenades bore the factory marking 349, corresponding to a factory in St. Petersburg.Both hand grenades bore the factory marking 349, corresponding to a factory in St. Petersburg.
The grenades captured by Ugandan forces were manufactured in 1980, while those captured from the Sahafi hotel attack were manufactured in 1979.The grenades captured by Ugandan forces were manufactured in 1980, while those captured from the Sahafi hotel attack were manufactured in 1979.
elements such as aluminium powder or paste to the explosive mixtures to intensify the heat from the blast.18elements such as aluminium powder or paste to the explosive mixtures to intensify the heat from the blast.18
Additionally, an AK-pattern assault rifle recovered from one of the Sahafi Hotel attackers had markings consistent with materiel imported by the FGS in July 2017.19 At least two unexploded hand grenades captured from the gunmen also bore markings almost identical to those on several hand grenades seized from Al-Shabaab in Bulo Mareer in Lower Shabelle, by the Uganda People’s Defence Force in March 2018.20 Photographs of these weapons are available in annex 2.6.Additionally, an AK-pattern assault rifle recovered from one of the Sahafi Hotel attackers had markings consistent with materiel imported by the FGS in July 2017.19 At least two unexploded hand grenades captured from the gunmen also bore markings almost identical to those on several hand grenades seized from Al-Shabaab in Bulo Mareer in Lower Shabelle, by the Uganda People’s Defence Force in March 2018.20 Photographs of these weapons are available in annex 2.6.
Annex 1.4: Al-Shabaab financing (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*Annex 1.4: Al-Shabaab financing (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*
Annex 1.5: Al-Shabaab’s justice systemAnnex 1.5: Al-Shabaab’s justice system
Figure 1: Al-Shabaab decree of a death sentence, listing two witnesses (names redacted), dated 2 February 2017 (5/5/1438 of the Islamic calendar).Figure 1: Al-Shabaab decree of a death sentence, listing two witnesses (names redacted), dated 2 February 2017 (5/5/1438 of the Islamic calendar).
Figure 2: Summons to an Al-Shabaab court, dated 14 October 2018 (6/2/1440 of the Islamic calendar).Figure 2: Summons to an Al-Shabaab court, dated 14 October 2018 (6/2/1440 of the Islamic calendar).
Figure 3: Case involving the arrest of a man for the possession of an AK-pattern rifle and magazine, dated 8 July 2017 (13/10/1438 in the Islamic calendar).Figure 3: Case involving the arrest of a man for the possession of an AK-pattern rifle and magazine, dated 8 July 2017 (13/10/1438 in the Islamic calendar).
Figure 4: Divorce settlement in Gof Gaduud, Bay region, dated 23 July 2017, in which the mother is awarded child support for a daughter of $200 (4,500,000 Somali shillings).Figure 4: Divorce settlement in Gof Gaduud, Bay region, dated 23 July 2017, in which the mother is awarded child support for a daughter of $200 (4,500,000 Somali shillings).
Figure 5: Al-Shabaab dispute resolution involving the sale of a camel, dated 1 January 2018 (13/4/1439 in the Islamic calendar).Figure 5: Al-Shabaab dispute resolution involving the sale of a camel, dated 1 January 2018 (13/4/1439 in the Islamic calendar).
Figure 6: Case involving a stolen camel in Gof Gaduud, Bay region, dated 8 July 2017 (13/10/1438 in the Islamic calendar).Figure 6: Case involving a stolen camel in Gof Gaduud, Bay region, dated 8 July 2017 (13/10/1438 in the Islamic calendar).
Annex 1.6: DusitD2 attack in NairobiAnnex 1.6: DusitD2 attack in Nairobi
On 15 January 2019, Al-Shabaab militants attacked a commercial business complex in Nairobi containing the DusitD2 Hotel.On 15 January 2019, Al-Shabaab militants attacked a commercial business complex in Nairobi containing the DusitD2 Hotel.
The attack began at 15:28 local time (12:28 UTC+3), with a detonation of a suicide bomber, Mahir Riziki.The attack began at 15:28 local time (12:28 UTC+3), with a detonation of a suicide bomber, Mahir Riziki.
Four gunmen – Ali Salim Gichunge, Osman Ibrahim Gedi, Siyat Omar Abdi, and an unknown individual – then proceeded to attack the compound using AK-pattern rifles and grenades, targeting people within the DusitD2 hotel and surrounding shops.Four gunmen – Ali Salim Gichunge, Osman Ibrahim Gedi, Siyat Omar Abdi, and an unknown individual – then proceeded to attack the compound using AK-pattern rifles and grenades, targeting people within the DusitD2 hotel and surrounding shops.
21 Al-Shabaab statement available at https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/shabaab-media-unit-presents-detailed-report-on-nairobi-attack-suggests-that-attack-bears-message-to-jerusalem.html (subscription required).21 Al-Shabaab statement available at https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/shabaab-media-unit-presents-detailed-report-on-nairobi-attack-suggests-that-attack-bears-message-to-jerusalem.html (subscription required).
The attack resulted in 21 civilian deaths, as well as the four gunmen.The attack resulted in 21 civilian deaths, as well as the four gunmen.
Al-Shabaab dubbed the operation Al-Qudsu Lan Tuhawwad (“Jerusalem will never be Judaized”) and stated that it had targeted “western and Zionist interests worldwide and in support of our Muslim families in Palestine”21 (see figure 1, below).Al-Shabaab dubbed the operation Al-Qudsu Lan Tuhawwad (“Jerusalem will never be Judaized”) and stated that it had targeted “western and Zionist interests worldwide and in support of our Muslim families in Palestine”21 (see figure 1, below).
This rhetoric was atypical for Al-Shabaab, which typically justifies its attacks based on the presence of foreign troops in Somalia.This rhetoric was atypical for Al-Shabaab, which typically justifies its attacks based on the presence of foreign troops in Somalia.
The DusitD2 attack was the most significant operation carried out by Al-Shabaab in a regional Member State since the Garissa University College massacre of April 2015 (see S/2015/801, annex 4.2).The DusitD2 attack was the most significant operation carried out by Al-Shabaab in a regional Member State since the Garissa University College massacre of April 2015 (see S/2015/801, annex 4.2).
The DusitD2 attack was carried out on a significant date, coinciding with the third anniverary of Al-Shabaab’s overrunning of a Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) base in El Adde, Gedo region.The DusitD2 attack was carried out on a significant date, coinciding with the third anniverary of Al-Shabaab’s overrunning of a Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) base in El Adde, Gedo region.
In 2018, Kenyan police had disrupted a similar attempt when they intercepted a VBIED destined for Nairobi near Merti, Isiolo County (see S/2018/1002, annex 2.3);In 2018, Kenyan police had disrupted a similar attempt when they intercepted a VBIED destined for Nairobi near Merti, Isiolo County (see S/2018/1002, annex 2.3);
the operation had likely been originally been planned to coincide with the second anniversary of the El Adde attack.the operation had likely been originally been planned to coincide with the second anniversary of the El Adde attack.
The Panel’s investigations have revealed links between the organization of the two operations, including a common financier based in Mandera, Kenya (see annex 1.6.1(strictly confidential)) and the identical origin of a Type 56-2 assault rifle used by one of the DusitD2 gunmen (see “Type 56-2 rifle”, below).The Panel’s investigations have revealed links between the organization of the two operations, including a common financier based in Mandera, Kenya (see annex 1.6.1(strictly confidential)) and the identical origin of a Type 56-2 assault rifle used by one of the DusitD2 gunmen (see “Type 56-2 rifle”, below).
It is likely that Al-Shabaab learned lessons from the failure of the Merti plot and adapted their tactics in order to carry out the successful DusitD2 operation (see “Comparison with the 2018 failed Merti VBIED plot”, below).It is likely that Al-Shabaab learned lessons from the failure of the Merti plot and adapted their tactics in order to carry out the successful DusitD2 operation (see “Comparison with the 2018 failed Merti VBIED plot”, below).
Figure 1: Decreased Al-Shabaab attacker shown wearing a headband with the word “Jerusalem” (القدس) in Arabic.Figure 1: Decreased Al-Shabaab attacker shown wearing a headband with the word “Jerusalem” (القدس) in Arabic.
Condensed timeline of the plotCondensed timeline of the plot
2015:2015:
Cell leader Ali Salim Gichunge travels to Somalia.Cell leader Ali Salim Gichunge travels to Somalia.
March 2018:March 2018:
Facilitators in Jilib, Somalia, organize a fake ID for Siyat Omar Abdi.Facilitators in Jilib, Somalia, organize a fake ID for Siyat Omar Abdi.
c.c.
April 2018:April 2018:
Gichunge and his wife Violet Wanjiru establish a safehouse at Guango Estate, on the northern outskirts of Nairobi.Gichunge and his wife Violet Wanjiru establish a safehouse at Guango Estate, on the northern outskirts of Nairobi.
15 Dec. 2018:15 Dec. 2018:
Unknown attacker travels to Eastleigh, Nairobi from Dadaab refugee camp.Unknown attacker travels to Eastleigh, Nairobi from Dadaab refugee camp.
2 Jan. 2019:2 Jan. 2019:
Osman Gedi Ibrahim travels to Roysambu area of Nairobi from Danaba, north-east Kenya.Osman Gedi Ibrahim travels to Roysambu area of Nairobi from Danaba, north-east Kenya.
5 Jan. 2019:5 Jan. 2019:
Siyat Omar Abdi travels to Nairobi, Eastleigh from Dadaab refugee camp.Siyat Omar Abdi travels to Nairobi, Eastleigh from Dadaab refugee camp.
10 Jan. 2019:10 Jan. 2019:
Osman Gedi Ibrahim moves to the safehouse on the outskirts of Nairobi.Osman Gedi Ibrahim moves to the safehouse on the outskirts of Nairobi.
11 Jan. 2019:11 Jan. 2019:
Suicide bomber Mahir Khalid Riziki travels to the Nairobi safehouse from Somalia through El Wak, north-east Kenya.Suicide bomber Mahir Khalid Riziki travels to the Nairobi safehouse from Somalia through El Wak, north-east Kenya.
13 Jan. 2019:13 Jan. 2019:
Siyat Omar Abdi and the Unknown Attacker move to the safehouse.Siyat Omar Abdi and the Unknown Attacker move to the safehouse.
14 Jan. 2019:14 Jan. 2019:
Entire cell assembles at the safehouse on the day prior to the attack.Entire cell assembles at the safehouse on the day prior to the attack.
22 Confidential communications seen by the Panel of Experts, Nairobi, July 2019.22 Confidential communications seen by the Panel of Experts, Nairobi, July 2019.
This was Riziki’s first and only visit to DusitD2, likely indicating that he required specific instructions from Gichunge regarding the layout of the complex.This was Riziki’s first and only visit to DusitD2, likely indicating that he required specific instructions from Gichunge regarding the layout of the complex.
23 CCTV footage seen by the Panel of Experts indicated that the delay between the detonation of the suicide bomber and the arrival of the four gunmen was due to the latter’s purchase of credit for their mobile phones, likely to enable them to stream footage and contact others in the likely event of a prolonged siege once security forces arrived.23 CCTV footage seen by the Panel of Experts indicated that the delay between the detonation of the suicide bomber and the arrival of the four gunmen was due to the latter’s purchase of credit for their mobile phones, likely to enable them to stream footage and contact others in the likely event of a prolonged siege once security forces arrived.
15 Jan. 2019:15 Jan. 2019:
Day of the attackDay of the attack
15:14 (UTC+3):15:14 (UTC+3):
Suicide bomber Mahir Riziki arrives at the DusitD2 complex.Suicide bomber Mahir Riziki arrives at the DusitD2 complex.
Between 15:14 and 15:25 he exchanges six calls with Ali Salim Gichunge averaging 30 seconds each.22Between 15:14 and 15:25 he exchanges six calls with Ali Salim Gichunge averaging 30 seconds each.22
15:21:15:21:
The four suicide gunmen Ali Salim Gichunge, Siyat Abdi Omar, Osman Gedi Ibrahim and the unidentified Somali attacker arrive in a Toyota Ractis, registration KCN340E.The four suicide gunmen Ali Salim Gichunge, Siyat Abdi Omar, Osman Gedi Ibrahim and the unidentified Somali attacker arrive in a Toyota Ractis, registration KCN340E.
They change into black outfits.They change into black outfits.
15:28:15:28:
Mahir Riziki detonates himself outside Secret Garden restaurant.Mahir Riziki detonates himself outside Secret Garden restaurant.
15:32:15:32:
The four gunmen walk into the Dusit complex and begin throwing grenades and firing indiscriminately.23The four gunmen walk into the Dusit complex and begin throwing grenades and firing indiscriminately.23
c.c.
15:37:15:37:
Kenyan security forces arrive at the scene.Kenyan security forces arrive at the scene.
16 Jan., 08:00:16 Jan., 08:00:
The four gunmen have been neutralized and the complex cleared, 16 hours after the commencement of the attack.The four gunmen have been neutralized and the complex cleared, 16 hours after the commencement of the attack.
Figure 2: CCTV footage of Ali Salim Gichunge and Siyat Omar Abdi entering the DusitD2 complex.Figure 2: CCTV footage of Ali Salim Gichunge and Siyat Omar Abdi entering the DusitD2 complex.
The safehouseThe safehouse
24 The falsified document identified Siyat Omar Abdi as a student at Arabia Boys Secondary School, located in Mandera, 2 km from the Kenya-Somalia border.24 The falsified document identified Siyat Omar Abdi as a student at Arabia Boys Secondary School, located in Mandera, 2 km from the Kenya-Somalia border.
The school was attacked by Al-Shabaab in October 2018, resulting in the deaths of two non-Muslim teachers.The school was attacked by Al-Shabaab in October 2018, resulting in the deaths of two non-Muslim teachers.
Lynet Igadwah, “Al-Shabaab kills 2 teachers in Mandera school attack”, Business Daily, 10 October 2018.Lynet Igadwah, “Al-Shabaab kills 2 teachers in Mandera school attack”, Business Daily, 10 October 2018.
Available at https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/counties/Al-Shabaab-kills-2-teachers-in-Mandera-school-attack/4003142-4800422-kxtqsvz/index.html.Available at https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/counties/Al-Shabaab-kills-2-teachers-in-Mandera-school-attack/4003142-4800422-kxtqsvz/index.html.
A bungalow in Guango Estate, Muchatha, on the outskirts of Nairobi – a middle-class Kenyan estate where rentals are approximately KES 40,000 ($400) per month – served as the safehouse for the attack.A bungalow in Guango Estate, Muchatha, on the outskirts of Nairobi – a middle-class Kenyan estate where rentals are approximately KES 40,000 ($400) per month – served as the safehouse for the attack.
Cell leader Ali Salim Gichunge and his wife Violet Wanjiru established the safehouse approximately nine months prior to the attack.Cell leader Ali Salim Gichunge and his wife Violet Wanjiru established the safehouse approximately nine months prior to the attack.
Mobile phone tower data analyzed by the Panel showed that other members of the cell stayed at the bungalow sporadically in the lead up to the attack, with all of the attackers coming together at the house the night prior.Mobile phone tower data analyzed by the Panel showed that other members of the cell stayed at the bungalow sporadically in the lead up to the attack, with all of the attackers coming together at the house the night prior.
Police recovered phones, a laptop, flash disks, SIM cards, and an Internet router from the safehouse.Police recovered phones, a laptop, flash disks, SIM cards, and an Internet router from the safehouse.
Evidence extracted from these devices revealed communications between Ali Salim Gichunge and a cell coordinator based the Al-Shabaab ‘capital’ of Jilib, in Middle Juba region.Evidence extracted from these devices revealed communications between Ali Salim Gichunge and a cell coordinator based the Al-Shabaab ‘capital’ of Jilib, in Middle Juba region.
Electronic communications also revealed that the Al-Shabaab coordinator in Jilib had arranged for the manufacture of a falsified secondary school identity card for one of the non-Kenyan attackers, Dadaab refugee camp resident Siyat Omar Abdi.24Electronic communications also revealed that the Al-Shabaab coordinator in Jilib had arranged for the manufacture of a falsified secondary school identity card for one of the non-Kenyan attackers, Dadaab refugee camp resident Siyat Omar Abdi.24
Figure 3: Falsified school ID arranged for Siyat Omar Abdi by an Al-Shabaab cell coordinator in Jilib.Figure 3: Falsified school ID arranged for Siyat Omar Abdi by an Al-Shabaab cell coordinator in Jilib.
Extractions from the devices of the DusitD2 attackers also revealed the existence of a broader Al-Shabaab network in East Africa, details of which are available in annex 1.7 (strictly confidential).Extractions from the devices of the DusitD2 attackers also revealed the existence of a broader Al-Shabaab network in East Africa, details of which are available in annex 1.7 (strictly confidential).
The attacking teamThe attacking team
In mid-December, the unknown attacker of Somali origin traveled from Dadaab, and was hidden in the predomininately Somali neighbourhood Eastleigh, Nairobi.In mid-December, the unknown attacker of Somali origin traveled from Dadaab, and was hidden in the predomininately Somali neighbourhood Eastleigh, Nairobi.
In early January 2019, three additional members of the cell made their way to Nairobi from different locations and following two different routes, two utilizing the A2 highway from Moyale and the third the A3 highway from Garissa.In early January 2019, three additional members of the cell made their way to Nairobi from different locations and following two different routes, two utilizing the A2 highway from Moyale and the third the A3 highway from Garissa.
The suicide bomber, Mahir Riziki, departed for Nairobi on 11 January 2019, four days prior to the attack.The suicide bomber, Mahir Riziki, departed for Nairobi on 11 January 2019, four days prior to the attack.
As with plots of a similar nature, the members of the attacking team came together as late as possible in order to avoid being compromised by the security forces;As with plots of a similar nature, the members of the attacking team came together as late as possible in order to avoid being compromised by the security forces;
the full team met together for the first time on 14 January 2019, and stayed together at the safehouse that evening.the full team met together for the first time on 14 January 2019, and stayed together at the safehouse that evening.
Ali Salim Gichunge and with his wife Violet Wanjiru were based in the safehouse throughout the preparations for the attack.Ali Salim Gichunge and with his wife Violet Wanjiru were based in the safehouse throughout the preparations for the attack.
Figure 4: Movements of the Al-Shabaab cell in the lead up to the 15 January 2019 attack.Figure 4: Movements of the Al-Shabaab cell in the lead up to the 15 January 2019 attack.
25 Confidential report seen by the Panel of Experts, Nairobi, June 2019.25 Confidential report seen by the Panel of Experts, Nairobi, June 2019.
26 Ibid.26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.27 Ibid.
Mahir Khalid RizikiMahir Khalid Riziki
Mahir Khalid Riziki, born on 5 February 1993, was the longest serving member of Al-Shabaab in the attack group and was designated as the suicide bomber.Mahir Khalid Riziki, born on 5 February 1993, was the longest serving member of Al-Shabaab in the attack group and was designated as the suicide bomber.
Aged 25 at the time of the attack, Riziki was born raised in the Majengo area of Mombasa.25 Ramadhan Hamisi Kufungwa, a well-known Kenyan Al-Shabaab recruiter now located in Somalia, recruited Riziki at Musa Mosque in early 2014.26 Musa Mosque has long been associated with radicalization, recruitment for Al-Shabaab, and religious violence.27Aged 25 at the time of the attack, Riziki was born raised in the Majengo area of Mombasa.25 Ramadhan Hamisi Kufungwa, a well-known Kenyan Al-Shabaab recruiter now located in Somalia, recruited Riziki at Musa Mosque in early 2014.26 Musa Mosque has long been associated with radicalization, recruitment for Al-Shabaab, and religious violence.27
In 2014, Riziki formed part of an assassination cell tasked by Al-Shabaab to assassinate security personnel in the coast region.In 2014, Riziki formed part of an assassination cell tasked by Al-Shabaab to assassinate security personnel in the coast region.
In October 2014, Riziki was involved in the killing of a police officer at Royal Court Hotel in Mombasa.28 He fled to Tanzania in November 2014 after being placed on Kenya’s most wanted list with a KSH 2,000,000 ($20,000) bounty on his head.In October 2014, Riziki was involved in the killing of a police officer at Royal Court Hotel in Mombasa.28 He fled to Tanzania in November 2014 after being placed on Kenya’s most wanted list with a KSH 2,000,000 ($20,000) bounty on his head.
In early 2015, Riziki contacted family members in Mombasa to inform them that he had relocated to Somalia where he was undergoing training by Al-Shabaab.29In early 2015, Riziki contacted family members in Mombasa to inform them that he had relocated to Somalia where he was undergoing training by Al-Shabaab.29
28 The team to which Mahir Riziki belonged was headed by Ismael Mohamed Shosi, also known as Ismael Mmanga, a former resident of Bondeni, Mombasa County.28 The team to which Mahir Riziki belonged was headed by Ismael Mohamed Shosi, also known as Ismael Mmanga, a former resident of Bondeni, Mombasa County.
Shosi was killed by security agencies on 27 September 2016 at his hideout in Mwandoni after he resisted arrest.Shosi was killed by security agencies on 27 September 2016 at his hideout in Mwandoni after he resisted arrest.
Ibid.Ibid.
29 Ibid.29 Ibid.
30 Communications data analyzed by the Panel of Experts.30 Communications data analyzed by the Panel of Experts.
Riziki crossed the border from Somalia to Kenya through El Wak on 11 January 2019.Riziki crossed the border from Somalia to Kenya through El Wak on 11 January 2019.
He activated a Kenyan phone registered in the name of “Hibo Ahmed” that same morning, immediately placing a call to Somalia.He activated a Kenyan phone registered in the name of “Hibo Ahmed” that same morning, immediately placing a call to Somalia.
At 18:21, Riziki placed his first call to Ali Salim Gichunge, arriving at the safehouse in the outskirts of Nairobi later in the evening.At 18:21, Riziki placed his first call to Ali Salim Gichunge, arriving at the safehouse in the outskirts of Nairobi later in the evening.
Except for his Somali contact and Gichunge, Riziki placed calls to only one other number from the time he entered Kenya until his death four days later, thereby limiting his exposure to Kenyan security forces.Except for his Somali contact and Gichunge, Riziki placed calls to only one other number from the time he entered Kenya until his death four days later, thereby limiting his exposure to Kenyan security forces.
On the day of the attack, Riziki departed the safehouse via taxi at approximately 14:15.On the day of the attack, Riziki departed the safehouse via taxi at approximately 14:15.
Between 12:54 and the time of his death, he exchanged 11 phone calls with Gichunge, including a final 91-second call at 15:25.30 At 15:28, while standing outside to Secret Garden restaurant within the DusitD2 complex, Riziki detonated himself.Between 12:54 and the time of his death, he exchanged 11 phone calls with Gichunge, including a final 91-second call at 15:25.30 At 15:28, while standing outside to Secret Garden restaurant within the DusitD2 complex, Riziki detonated himself.
Figure 5: CCTV footage of the moment Mahir Riziki detonates himself outside Secret Garden restaurant at 15:28.Figure 5: CCTV footage of the moment Mahir Riziki detonates himself outside Secret Garden restaurant at 15:28.
Ali Salim GichungeAli Salim Gichunge
The cell leader, Ali Salim Gichunge, was born in 1992 in Isiolo.The cell leader, Ali Salim Gichunge, was born in 1992 in Isiolo.
In 2015, his mother reported that he had travelled to Somalia.In 2015, his mother reported that he had travelled to Somalia.
His sister indicated that he also travelled to Somalia in 2017 through Lamu.31 Based on analysis of his mobile phone data, Gichunge acted as the coordinator and organizer while Gedi, the other Kenyan national in the attack group, served as Gichunge’s lieutenant.His sister indicated that he also travelled to Somalia in 2017 through Lamu.31 Based on analysis of his mobile phone data, Gichunge acted as the coordinator and organizer while Gedi, the other Kenyan national in the attack group, served as Gichunge’s lieutenant.
Gichunge was highly conscious of the security of communications;Gichunge was highly conscious of the security of communications;
for instance, he never contacted Somalia by phone – only using Facebook – turned his phone off when he travelled to meet associates, and spoke to Riziki only on a dedicated phone line.for instance, he never contacted Somalia by phone – only using Facebook – turned his phone off when he travelled to meet associates, and spoke to Riziki only on a dedicated phone line.
Ali Salim Gichunge was an ideal recruit for Al-Shabaab;Ali Salim Gichunge was an ideal recruit for Al-Shabaab;
he was the son of a retired military officer, embracing of Western culture, and did not fit the profile of an extremist.he was the son of a retired military officer, embracing of Western culture, and did not fit the profile of an extremist.
31 Confidential report seen by the Panel of Experts, Nairobi, July 2019.31 Confidential report seen by the Panel of Experts, Nairobi, July 2019.
32 The license was registered in the Tanzanian Revenue Authority database.32 The license was registered in the Tanzanian Revenue Authority database.
33 Interview with Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, May 2019.33 Interview with Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, May 2019.
Osman Ibrahim GediOsman Ibrahim Gedi
Osman Ibrahim Gedi was a Kenyan national born in 1992.Osman Ibrahim Gedi was a Kenyan national born in 1992.
On 2 January 2019, he registered a new Kenyan mobile phone in Danaba, in north-east Kenya, in the name of “Abdikadir Mohamud Sabdow”.On 2 January 2019, he registered a new Kenyan mobile phone in Danaba, in north-east Kenya, in the name of “Abdikadir Mohamud Sabdow”.
He arrived in Nairobi early on 4 January, and Gichunge and Gedi travelled together to the safehouse on the evening of 10 January 2019.He arrived in Nairobi early on 4 January, and Gichunge and Gedi travelled together to the safehouse on the evening of 10 January 2019.
Gedi visited the Dusit complex twice in the week prior to the attack.Gedi visited the Dusit complex twice in the week prior to the attack.
Analysis of Gedi’s mobile phone communications did not show any contacts with Somalia.Analysis of Gedi’s mobile phone communications did not show any contacts with Somalia.
Kenyan investigators recovered a Tanzanian driver’s license from Gedi’s body.Kenyan investigators recovered a Tanzanian driver’s license from Gedi’s body.
Investigations by the Panel indicated that the license was genuine and had been registered in Moshi, Tanzania.32 However, the biographical details provided in the application proved to be false, and the fingerprint used to obtain the license did not match Gedi’s.33Investigations by the Panel indicated that the license was genuine and had been registered in Moshi, Tanzania.32 However, the biographical details provided in the application proved to be false, and the fingerprint used to obtain the license did not match Gedi’s.33
Figure 6: Tanzanian license issued to Osman Ibrahim Gedi under the name “Abduli Salim Ally”.Figure 6: Tanzanian license issued to Osman Ibrahim Gedi under the name “Abduli Salim Ally”.
Siyat Omar AbdiSiyat Omar Abdi
Siyat Omar Abdi was born in 1992 in Dagahaley, one of the Dadaab refugee camps.Siyat Omar Abdi was born in 1992 in Dagahaley, one of the Dadaab refugee camps.
Abdi activated a new Kenyan phone on 4 January 2019 in preparation for the attack and travelled to Nairobi from Dagahaley the next day.Abdi activated a new Kenyan phone on 4 January 2019 in preparation for the attack and travelled to Nairobi from Dagahaley the next day.
The phone immediately placed a call to Somalia after its activation, and Abdi continued to contact numbers in Somalia until 14 January 2019, when the phone was last used.The phone immediately placed a call to Somalia after its activation, and Abdi continued to contact numbers in Somalia until 14 January 2019, when the phone was last used.
On 13 January 2019, Abdi moved to the Gichunges’ safehouse on the outskirts of Nairobi, where he stayed until the attack.34On 13 January 2019, Abdi moved to the Gichunges’ safehouse on the outskirts of Nairobi, where he stayed until the attack.34
The Panel obtained a Dadaab camp identification and ration card number attributed to Abdi through his fingerprint;The Panel obtained a Dadaab camp identification and ration card number attributed to Abdi through his fingerprint;
however, World Food Programme and UNHCR officials in Dadaab stated that there was no record of Abdi in their databases.however, World Food Programme and UNHCR officials in Dadaab stated that there was no record of Abdi in their databases.
34 Communications data analyzed by the Panel of Experts.34 Communications data analyzed by the Panel of Experts.
35 Ibid.35 Ibid.
Unknown gunman of Somali originUnknown gunman of Somali origin
An unknown member of the attacking team, presumed to be of Somali origin, activated a new Kenyan mobile phone in Dagahaley, Dadaab refugee camp, on 15 December 2018.An unknown member of the attacking team, presumed to be of Somali origin, activated a new Kenyan mobile phone in Dagahaley, Dadaab refugee camp, on 15 December 2018.
On 17 December 2018 he travelled from Dagahaley to Eastleigh, a predominantly Somali neighbourhood in Nairobi.On 17 December 2018 he travelled from Dagahaley to Eastleigh, a predominantly Somali neighbourhood in Nairobi.
The journey lasted eight hours, which due to the duration suggested that it was undertaken in a private vehicle rather than with public transportation.The journey lasted eight hours, which due to the duration suggested that it was undertaken in a private vehicle rather than with public transportation.
He was hidden in Eastleigh Nairobi until 12 January 2019, when he was in contact with Gedi and subsequently moved to the Nairobi safehouse on 13 January.35 He spoke no English or Kiswahili, which likelyHe was hidden in Eastleigh Nairobi until 12 January 2019, when he was in contact with Gedi and subsequently moved to the Nairobi safehouse on 13 January.35 He spoke no English or Kiswahili, which likely
was the rationale for concealing him in Eastleigh for a month, where he was unlikely to arouse suspicion.was the rationale for concealing him in Eastleigh for a month, where he was unlikely to arouse suspicion.
Violet Wanjiru, also known as Kemunto and KhadijaViolet Wanjiru, also known as Kemunto and Khadija
Violet Wanjiru was married to the cell leader Ali Salim Gichunge in 2016.Violet Wanjiru was married to the cell leader Ali Salim Gichunge in 2016.
Wanjiru primary role was in assisting Gichunge with the management of the safehouse.Wanjiru primary role was in assisting Gichunge with the management of the safehouse.
Wanjiru was unaware of the suicidal nature of the impending attack, and she believed that Gichunge would later flee to Somalia to join her.Wanjiru was unaware of the suicidal nature of the impending attack, and she believed that Gichunge would later flee to Somalia to join her.
Wanjiru’s inside knowledge of the Al-Shabaab cell meant it was vital to Al-Shabaab that she not be arrested.Wanjiru’s inside knowledge of the Al-Shabaab cell meant it was vital to Al-Shabaab that she not be arrested.
She moved from the Nairobi safehouse on 11 January 2019 and travelled through Wajir and El Wak to Mandera along the B9 highway, arriving in Mandera on the evening of the same day.She moved from the Nairobi safehouse on 11 January 2019 and travelled through Wajir and El Wak to Mandera along the B9 highway, arriving in Mandera on the evening of the same day.
She remained in Mandera until 14 January, and then crossed into Somalia.She remained in Mandera until 14 January, and then crossed into Somalia.
Throughout this journey she was aided by Yusuf Ali Adan, a Mandera-based Al-Shabaab operative, with whom she communicated on a newly activated phone line.Throughout this journey she was aided by Yusuf Ali Adan, a Mandera-based Al-Shabaab operative, with whom she communicated on a newly activated phone line.
Wanjiru was housed in the border region in a safehouse under Al-Shabaab control for a number of weeks before being moved further into Al-Shabaab territory and into isolation to observe Iddah, a period of waiting following the death of a husband.Wanjiru was housed in the border region in a safehouse under Al-Shabaab control for a number of weeks before being moved further into Al-Shabaab territory and into isolation to observe Iddah, a period of waiting following the death of a husband.
As of this writing she remains in Somalia, with her exact whereabouts unknown.As of this writing she remains in Somalia, with her exact whereabouts unknown.
Figure 7: Violet Wanjiru’s escape route to Somalia.Figure 7: Violet Wanjiru’s escape route to Somalia.
Figure 8: The DusitD2 operation.Figure 8: The DusitD2 operation.
36 A detailed account of the failed Merti VBIED plot is presented in annex 2.3 of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group’s 2018 report (S/2018/1002).36 A detailed account of the failed Merti VBIED plot is presented in annex 2.3 of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group’s 2018 report (S/2018/1002).
Comparison with the 2018 failed Merti VBIED plotComparison with the 2018 failed Merti VBIED plot
On 15 February 2018, Kenyan police on a routine patrol in Merti Division, Isiolo County, witnessed a vehicle stopped by the side of the road.36 When police approached the vehicle, an occupant shot at the officers, who then returned fire, killing Mbarak Abdi Huka a.k.a. “Sa’ad”.On 15 February 2018, Kenyan police on a routine patrol in Merti Division, Isiolo County, witnessed a vehicle stopped by the side of the road.36 When police approached the vehicle, an occupant shot at the officers, who then returned fire, killing Mbarak Abdi Huka a.k.a. “Sa’ad”.
Four individuals attempted to flee the scene and two were arrested, Abdimajit Hasan Adan and Mohammed Osman Nanne;Four individuals attempted to flee the scene and two were arrested, Abdimajit Hasan Adan and Mohammed Osman Nanne;
two others escaped capture.two others escaped capture.
The vehicle, a 2003 Mitsubishi Airtrek, had been converted into a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) containing approximately 100 kg of explosives.The vehicle, a 2003 Mitsubishi Airtrek, had been converted into a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) containing approximately 100 kg of explosives.
Also discovered in the vehicle were 5 Type 56-2 AK-pattern assault rifles, 36 magazines of ammunition, 36 unprimed F1 grenades and their firing pins, 3 knives, and an Al- Shabaab flag.Also discovered in the vehicle were 5 Type 56-2 AK-pattern assault rifles, 36 magazines of ammunition, 36 unprimed F1 grenades and their firing pins, 3 knives, and an Al- Shabaab flag.
The operation appeared to have been patterned after the modus operandi of Al-Shabaab complex attacks in Somalia, whereby a VBIED would have been used to breach the perimeter of an unknown target, followed by a wave of ‘suicide gunmen’.The operation appeared to have been patterned after the modus operandi of Al-Shabaab complex attacks in Somalia, whereby a VBIED would have been used to breach the perimeter of an unknown target, followed by a wave of ‘suicide gunmen’.
In this case, the number of rifles recovered from the vehicle most likely point to the possibility of five suicide gunmen.In this case, the number of rifles recovered from the vehicle most likely point to the possibility of five suicide gunmen.
The Merti plot was orchestrated by an Al-Shabaab operative based in Jilib, known only as “Dere” (“tall”), who personally conveyed instructions to Abdimajit Hasan Adan and Mohammed Osman Nanne.The Merti plot was orchestrated by an Al-Shabaab operative based in Jilib, known only as “Dere” (“tall”), who personally conveyed instructions to Abdimajit Hasan Adan and Mohammed Osman Nanne.
“Dere” also either personally provided cash to the two operatives or arranged for large instalments of up to $9,000 to be sent to them from Somalia via hawala transfer.“Dere” also either personally provided cash to the two operatives or arranged for large instalments of up to $9,000 to be sent to them from Somalia via hawala transfer.
The Merti attack had likely been intended to take place in Nairobi on 15 January 2018, to coincide with the second anniversary of Al-Shabaab’s killing of 150 soldiers at a KDF base in El Adde, Gedo region.The Merti attack had likely been intended to take place in Nairobi on 15 January 2018, to coincide with the second anniversary of Al-Shabaab’s killing of 150 soldiers at a KDF base in El Adde, Gedo region.
However, the Al-Shabaab operatives experienced a number of delays in the execution of the plot, including a mechanical failure that forced them to abandon an initial VBIED and construct a second device.However, the Al-Shabaab operatives experienced a number of delays in the execution of the plot, including a mechanical failure that forced them to abandon an initial VBIED and construct a second device.
There are two indications that the Merti and DusitD2 plots involved a cross-over in Al-Shabaab planning networks.There are two indications that the Merti and DusitD2 plots involved a cross-over in Al-Shabaab planning networks.
First, a financier of the DusitD2 plot based in Mandera, Kenya, had previously transferred funds to Abdimajit Hasan Adan (see annex 1.6.1 (strictly confidential));First, a financier of the DusitD2 plot based in Mandera, Kenya, had previously transferred funds to Abdimajit Hasan Adan (see annex 1.6.1 (strictly confidential));
in addition, a Type 56-2 assault rifle used by one of the DusitD2 gunmen originated in the same arms consignment delivered to the FGS in 2013 as four rifles recovered from the Merti plotters (see “Type 56-2 rifle”, below).in addition, a Type 56-2 assault rifle used by one of the DusitD2 gunmen originated in the same arms consignment delivered to the FGS in 2013 as four rifles recovered from the Merti plotters (see “Type 56-2 rifle”, below).
It is likely that the DusitD2 cell adapted their behaviour in response to the shortcomings of the Merti operation.It is likely that the DusitD2 cell adapted their behaviour in response to the shortcomings of the Merti operation.
Adaptations in the DusitD2 operationAdaptations in the DusitD2 operation
The DusitD2 operation appeared to have been refined in response to the failure of the Merti plot in 2018 in several significant ways.The DusitD2 operation appeared to have been refined in response to the failure of the Merti plot in 2018 in several significant ways.
First, rather than constructing a VBIED, the DusitD2 attackers employed a person-borne improvised explosive device (PBIED).First, rather than constructing a VBIED, the DusitD2 attackers employed a person-borne improvised explosive device (PBIED).
The PBIED was easier to conceal and did not risk the mechanical risks inherent with a vehicle loaded with explosives undertaking the 800 km journey from the Kenya-Somalia border to Nairobi.The PBIED was easier to conceal and did not risk the mechanical risks inherent with a vehicle loaded with explosives undertaking the 800 km journey from the Kenya-Somalia border to Nairobi.
Instead of using the same route as the Merti VBIED, the DusitD2 attackers altered their route from northern Kenya to Nairobi, bypassing the area where the Merti VBIED had been intercepted by Kenyan police (see figure 9, below).Instead of using the same route as the Merti VBIED, the DusitD2 attackers altered their route from northern Kenya to Nairobi, bypassing the area where the Merti VBIED had been intercepted by Kenyan police (see figure 9, below).
Second, the Al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia used a financial intermediary based in Mandera, Kenya, to transfer funds to the operations cell in Nairobi.Second, the Al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia used a financial intermediary based in Mandera, Kenya, to transfer funds to the operations cell in Nairobi.
The transfers were completed through cash and M-PESA mobile money, which has a transfer limit of KES 70,000 ($700).The transfers were completed through cash and M-PESA mobile money, which has a transfer limit of KES 70,000 ($700).
The operatives likely chose this method of transfer because it is not closely monitored by the Kenyan security forces like hawala money transfers (see annex 1.6.1 (strictly confidential)).The operatives likely chose this method of transfer because it is not closely monitored by the Kenyan security forces like hawala money transfers (see annex 1.6.1 (strictly confidential)).
37 Up to one day prior to the DusitD2 attack, the Al-Shabaab cell was continuing to scout possible alternative targets.37 Up to one day prior to the DusitD2 attack, the Al-Shabaab cell was continuing to scout possible alternative targets.
38 Additionally, due to the possibility of his presence compromising the operation, Gichunge used a dedicated mobile phone line to contact Mahir Riziki, who was already known to the Kenyan security services.38 Additionally, due to the possibility of his presence compromising the operation, Gichunge used a dedicated mobile phone line to contact Mahir Riziki, who was already known to the Kenyan security services.
Finally, the leader of the DusitD2 cell, Kenyan national Salim Ali Gichunge, was given wide autonomy with respect to the target and the plan of attack.37 Unlike the cell leader of the Merti plot, Gichunge did not communicate directly with individuals based in Somalia, reducing the likelihood of detection.38Finally, the leader of the DusitD2 cell, Kenyan national Salim Ali Gichunge, was given wide autonomy with respect to the target and the plan of attack.37 Unlike the cell leader of the Merti plot, Gichunge did not communicate directly with individuals based in Somalia, reducing the likelihood of detection.38
Figure 9: GPS track of the Merti VBIED vehicle (number plate KBM200D), which was intercepted by Kenyan police stopped at the roadside on 15 February 2018.Figure 9: GPS track of the Merti VBIED vehicle (number plate KBM200D), which was intercepted by Kenyan police stopped at the roadside on 15 February 2018.
The DusitD2 plotters took a different route to Nairobi.The DusitD2 plotters took a different route to Nairobi.
Type 56-2 rifleType 56-2 rifle
39 The consignment was notified to the Committee on 29 July 2013.39 The consignment was notified to the Committee on 29 July 2013.
A Type 56-2 rifle recovered from one of the deceased attackers, bearing serial number 412222, provides further indication of a link between the DusitD2 and Merti plots.A Type 56-2 rifle recovered from one of the deceased attackers, bearing serial number 412222, provides further indication of a link between the DusitD2 and Merti plots.
The serial number and factory marking likely indicates that the weapon originated in a consignment of 3,500 Type 56-2 rifles purchased by the FGS from the Government of Ethiopia in July 2013, following the partial lifting of the arms embargo.39 In 2013, the Government of Ethiopia provided the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) with a partial list of 2,500 serial numbers of weapons included in the consignment.The serial number and factory marking likely indicates that the weapon originated in a consignment of 3,500 Type 56-2 rifles purchased by the FGS from the Government of Ethiopia in July 2013, following the partial lifting of the arms embargo.39 In 2013, the Government of Ethiopia provided the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) with a partial list of 2,500 serial numbers of weapons included in the consignment.
While the serial number 412222 does not itself appear in this partial list obtained by the SEMG, 13 other Type 56-2 rifles with serial numbers beginning with the sequence “4122” are present, indicating that the rifle’ serial number was likely contained amongst the 1,000 not provided by Ethiopia.While the serial number 412222 does not itself appear in this partial list obtained by the SEMG, 13 other Type 56-2 rifles with serial numbers beginning with the sequence “4122” are present, indicating that the rifle’ serial number was likely contained amongst the 1,000 not provided by Ethiopia.
The Al-Shabaab operatives arrested by Kenyan police in connection with the Merti plot were found in possession of four Type 56-2 rifles that had also formed part of the 2013 consignment (see S/2018/1002, annex 2.3).The Al-Shabaab operatives arrested by Kenyan police in connection with the Merti plot were found in possession of four Type 56-2 rifles that had also formed part of the 2013 consignment (see S/2018/1002, annex 2.3).
Figures 10 and 11: One of the Type 56-2 rifle recovered from the Merti plotters in February 2018 (left) and a Type 56-2 (serial number 412222) used in the DusitD2 attack (right).Figures 10 and 11: One of the Type 56-2 rifle recovered from the Merti plotters in February 2018 (left) and a Type 56-2 (serial number 412222) used in the DusitD2 attack (right).
Annex 1.6.1 (strictly confidential) provides additional details on the financing of the DusitD2 operation.Annex 1.6.1 (strictly confidential) provides additional details on the financing of the DusitD2 operation.
Annex 1.6.1: Financing of the DusitD2 attack (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*Annex 1.6.1: Financing of the DusitD2 attack (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*
Annex 1.7: Additional Al-Shabaab regional operations (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*Annex 1.7: Additional Al-Shabaab regional operations (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*
Annex 1.8: Kenya-Somalia border incidentsAnnex 1.8: Kenya-Somalia border incidents
From June to July 2019, cross-border attacks by Al-Shabaab into Kenya increased in frequency, possibly due to heightened diplomatic tensions between the two countries, which Al-Shabaab may be seeking to exploit.From June to July 2019, cross-border attacks by Al-Shabaab into Kenya increased in frequency, possibly due to heightened diplomatic tensions between the two countries, which Al-Shabaab may be seeking to exploit.
This increased frequency of incidents followed a statement released by Al-Shabaab through its Shahada propaganda agency in June 2019, in which the group claimed to have mobilized “an army of fighters” from within the Muslim population of Kenya.40 It refers to the closing of the Kenya-Somalia border in Lamu County by the Kenyan Authorities in early June.41 The full statement reads:This increased frequency of incidents followed a statement released by Al-Shabaab through its Shahada propaganda agency in June 2019, in which the group claimed to have mobilized “an army of fighters” from within the Muslim population of Kenya.40 It refers to the closing of the Kenya-Somalia border in Lamu County by the Kenyan Authorities in early June.41 The full statement reads:
Observers also see that the closure of the Kenyan-Somali border will not work to reduce the frequency of attacks, as the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement has succeeded in establishing an army of fighters from the Kenyan population itself, who believe in the same objectives as the Movement and fight for issues they believe to be just, at a time of persistent grievances and assaults by the Kenyan government on the rights of Muslims in the country, and the corruption rampant in the joints of the Kenyan government, in marginalizing Muslims and depriving them of their rights.42Observers also see that the closure of the Kenyan-Somali border will not work to reduce the frequency of attacks, as the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement has succeeded in establishing an army of fighters from the Kenyan population itself, who believe in the same objectives as the Movement and fight for issues they believe to be just, at a time of persistent grievances and assaults by the Kenyan government on the rights of Muslims in the country, and the corruption rampant in the joints of the Kenyan government, in marginalizing Muslims and depriving them of their rights.42
The geographical scope of these attacks ranged from the northern-most border point with Somalia, at Mandera, to the southern border in Lamu, a distance spanning almost 700 kilometres.The geographical scope of these attacks ranged from the northern-most border point with Somalia, at Mandera, to the southern border in Lamu, a distance spanning almost 700 kilometres.
Table 1: Al-Shabaab cross-border incidents, April-May and June-July 2019Table 1: Al-Shabaab cross-border incidents, April-May and June-July 2019
Type of Incident June/July 2019Type of Incident June/July 2019
April/May 2019April/May 2019
June/July 2019June/July 2019
IEDIED
33
1919
FirefightFirefight
00
33
Movement of Al-Shabaab fighters/weaponsMovement of Al-Shabaab fighters/weapons
66
22
Kidnap or attempted kidnapKidnap or attempted kidnap
22
44
Attack on telecommunications infrastructureAttack on telecommunications infrastructure
11
22
TotalTotal
1212
3030
40 Al-Shabaab statement available from https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/shabaab-claims-two-car-bombings-in-mogadishu-killing-31-boasts-multiple-attacks-in-kenya-in-2-days.html (subscription required).40 Al-Shabaab statement available from https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/shabaab-claims-two-car-bombings-in-mogadishu-killing-31-boasts-multiple-attacks-in-kenya-in-2-days.html (subscription required).
41 Ibid.41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.42 Ibid.
In April and May 2019, the Panel recorded four separate incidents of Al-Shabaab movements along the Kenya-Somalia border in preparation for the offensive.In April and May 2019, the Panel recorded four separate incidents of Al-Shabaab movements along the Kenya-Somalia border in preparation for the offensive.
For example, on 21 April 2019 in Hulugho, Garissa County, a group of approximately 30 armed individuals gathered east of Elkambere.For example, on 21 April 2019 in Hulugho, Garissa County, a group of approximately 30 armed individuals gathered east of Elkambere.
The group had eight vehicles (three cars, twoThe group had eight vehicles (three cars, two
43 Confidential international agency security reports, April and May 2019.43 Confidential international agency security reports, April and May 2019.
Reports also stated that on 23 April 2019 in Wajir County, a group of Al-Shabaab fighters armed with rifles and rocket-propelled grenades were seen between Khorof Harar and Kotulo.Reports also stated that on 23 April 2019 in Wajir County, a group of Al-Shabaab fighters armed with rifles and rocket-propelled grenades were seen between Khorof Harar and Kotulo.
They were also carrying bags suspected to contain IED materials and ammunition.They were also carrying bags suspected to contain IED materials and ammunition.
battlewagons, and three motorbikes) and were armed with assorted weapons and carrying bags suspected to contain IED materials.43battlewagons, and three motorbikes) and were armed with assorted weapons and carrying bags suspected to contain IED materials.43
Figure 1: Map showing approximate location of cross-border attacks, June-July 2019.Figure 1: Map showing approximate location of cross-border attacks, June-July 2019.
Annex 1.9: ISIL financing in PuntlandAnnex 1.9: ISIL financing in Puntland
Conflict with Al-Shabaab in Bari regionConflict with Al-Shabaab in Bari region
44 Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somalia's Al-Shabab Declares War on Pro-Islamic State Group”, Voice of America, 21 December 2018.44 Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somalia's Al-Shabab Declares War on Pro-Islamic State Group”, Voice of America, 21 December 2018.
Available from https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-al-shabab-declares-war-on-pro-islamic-state-group/4711075.html.Available from https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-al-shabab-declares-war-on-pro-islamic-state-group/4711075.html.
In December 2018, fighting broke out between the ISIL faction and Al-Shabaab in the Bari region for the first time since early 2016.In December 2018, fighting broke out between the ISIL faction and Al-Shabaab in the Bari region for the first time since early 2016.
The most intense clashes took place on 16 December 2018 at B’ir Mirale, a critical water source located in the river valley southwest of Qandala occupied by ISIL militants (see figure 2, below).The most intense clashes took place on 16 December 2018 at B’ir Mirale, a critical water source located in the river valley southwest of Qandala occupied by ISIL militants (see figure 2, below).
According to the ISIL-affiliated Amaq News Agency, which also released a video (see figure 1, below) purportedly showing the bodies of Al-Shabaab fighters, 14 Al-Shabaab militants were killed during the fighting.According to the ISIL-affiliated Amaq News Agency, which also released a video (see figure 1, below) purportedly showing the bodies of Al-Shabaab fighters, 14 Al-Shabaab militants were killed during the fighting.
On 21 December, Al-Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Ali Rage vowed to “uproot” members of the ISIL faction.44On 21 December, Al-Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Ali Rage vowed to “uproot” members of the ISIL faction.44
During the week of 28 January 2019, Al-Shabaab launched an operation that captured B’ir Mirale, as well as the town of Shebaab, to the southeast (see figure 2, below, for a map of key strongholds for the ISIL faction in Bari region).During the week of 28 January 2019, Al-Shabaab launched an operation that captured B’ir Mirale, as well as the town of Shebaab, to the southeast (see figure 2, below, for a map of key strongholds for the ISIL faction in Bari region).
ISIL-aligned militants reportedly withdrew further into the surrounding mountains.ISIL-aligned militants reportedly withdrew further into the surrounding mountains.
Figure 1: Still from an 18 December 2018 video posted by Amaq News Agency purporting to show fighting between the ISIL faction and Al-Shabaab at B’ir Mirale.Figure 1: Still from an 18 December 2018 video posted by Amaq News Agency purporting to show fighting between the ISIL faction and Al-Shabaab at B’ir Mirale.
Intense conflict between the ISIL faction and Al-Shabaab had been ongoing since November 2018, when both groups appear to have begun competing over ‘taxation’ revenues from businesses in Mogadishu and Puntland, resulting in the killings of as many as 11 employees of Hormuud Telecom Inc. in Mogadishu over the course of the month.Intense conflict between the ISIL faction and Al-Shabaab had been ongoing since November 2018, when both groups appear to have begun competing over ‘taxation’ revenues from businesses in Mogadishu and Puntland, resulting in the killings of as many as 11 employees of Hormuud Telecom Inc. in Mogadishu over the course of the month.
Figure 2: Approximate locations of ISIL faction strongholds in Puntland’s Bari region.45Figure 2: Approximate locations of ISIL faction strongholds in Puntland’s Bari region.45
45 Harti Deeq, also known as Buqu, was the site of a US airstrike on 3 November 2017 that reportedly killed around 20 militants.45 Harti Deeq, also known as Buqu, was the site of a US airstrike on 3 November 2017 that reportedly killed around 20 militants.
See S/2018/1002, para. 94.See S/2018/1002, para. 94.
46 Amal Group is also the parent company of Amal Bank, Puntland’s largest bank.46 Amal Group is also the parent company of Amal Bank, Puntland’s largest bank.
47 Information provided by two current and two former Puntland intelligence officials, a commander in the Puntland security forces, and a Puntland businessman, in October and November 2018.47 Information provided by two current and two former Puntland intelligence officials, a commander in the Puntland security forces, and a Puntland businessman, in October and November 2018.
48 Interviews with two Puntland intelligence officials in Bosaso, 26 November 2018, and a former intelligence official, 15 November 2019.48 Interviews with two Puntland intelligence officials in Bosaso, 26 November 2018, and a former intelligence official, 15 November 2019.
Analysis of mobile phone records confirmed that one of the Amtel employees exchanged two phone calls with the arresting officer in the Puntland security forces on 10 and 11 October 2019.Analysis of mobile phone records confirmed that one of the Amtel employees exchanged two phone calls with the arresting officer in the Puntland security forces on 10 and 11 October 2019.
49 Mobile phone data for one of the Amtel employees demonstrated that he was located in or near the ISIL-controlled town of Shebaab (see figure 2, above) from 6-9 October 2018, during which period he made two phone calls to the CEO of Amal Bank.49 Mobile phone data for one of the Amtel employees demonstrated that he was located in or near the ISIL-controlled town of Shebaab (see figure 2, above) from 6-9 October 2018, during which period he made two phone calls to the CEO of Amal Bank.
Extortion of Amtel by the ISIL factionExtortion of Amtel by the ISIL faction
The Puntland-based Amtel telecommuting company, a member of the conglomerate Amal Group,46 was successfully pressured by the ISIL faction into paying extortion money totalling several hundred thousand dollars.The Puntland-based Amtel telecommuting company, a member of the conglomerate Amal Group,46 was successfully pressured by the ISIL faction into paying extortion money totalling several hundred thousand dollars.
They money was delivered by two company representatives to Dhasaan, an ISIL-controlled town in eastern Bari region (see figure 2, above) on 8 October 2018.47 Upon their return on 10 October, the two Amtel employees were temporarily detained by Puntland security forces in the town of Balidhidhin, before senior officials in the Puntland administration reportedly ordered their release.48They money was delivered by two company representatives to Dhasaan, an ISIL-controlled town in eastern Bari region (see figure 2, above) on 8 October 2018.47 Upon their return on 10 October, the two Amtel employees were temporarily detained by Puntland security forces in the town of Balidhidhin, before senior officials in the Puntland administration reportedly ordered their release.48
The Panel of Experts has reviewed evidence corroborating these events, including photographs of the two Amtel employees taken during their detention in Balidhidhin, a photograph of their vehicle, and mobile phone records.49 Furthermore, in September 2018The Panel of Experts has reviewed evidence corroborating these events, including photographs of the two Amtel employees taken during their detention in Balidhidhin, a photograph of their vehicle, and mobile phone records.49 Furthermore, in September 2018
Amal Bank’s headquarters in Mogadishu had been targeted by an IED and one of its managers had been killed by unknown gunmen, events consistent with extortion practices by militant groups in Somalia.Amal Bank’s headquarters in Mogadishu had been targeted by an IED and one of its managers had been killed by unknown gunmen, events consistent with extortion practices by militant groups in Somalia.
According to the Chairman of Amal Bank, the two Amal Group employees had been surveyors seeking to establish mobile phone towers in Bari region for the telecommunications company Amtel, a subsidiary of Amal Group.50 The Chairman of Amal Bank acknowledged that Amal had received extortion demands from the ISIL faction, but denied having made any payments to the group or even having had contact with it.51 Another senior employee of Amal Bank informed the Panel that the two Amtel employees had contacted members of the ISIL faction while in Bari region, but only for the purpose of gaining access to conduct their survey.52According to the Chairman of Amal Bank, the two Amal Group employees had been surveyors seeking to establish mobile phone towers in Bari region for the telecommunications company Amtel, a subsidiary of Amal Group.50 The Chairman of Amal Bank acknowledged that Amal had received extortion demands from the ISIL faction, but denied having made any payments to the group or even having had contact with it.51 Another senior employee of Amal Bank informed the Panel that the two Amtel employees had contacted members of the ISIL faction while in Bari region, but only for the purpose of gaining access to conduct their survey.52
Additional cases of extortion by the ISIL factionAdditional cases of extortion by the ISIL faction
50 Phone interview with the Chairman of Amal Bank, 6 November 2018.50 Phone interview with the Chairman of Amal Bank, 6 November 2018.
51 Ibid.51 Ibid.
52 Interview with senior Amal Bank employee in Bosaso, 27 November 2018.52 Interview with senior Amal Bank employee in Bosaso, 27 November 2018.
53 Interviews with two intelligence officials in Bosaso, 26 November 2018.53 Interviews with two intelligence officials in Bosaso, 26 November 2018.
See also Harun Maruf, “In Somalia, Businesses Face ‘Taxation’ by Militants”, Voice of America, 3 December 2018.See also Harun Maruf, “In Somalia, Businesses Face ‘Taxation’ by Militants”, Voice of America, 3 December 2018.
Available at https://www.voanews.com/africa/somalia-businesses-face-taxation-militants.Available at https://www.voanews.com/africa/somalia-businesses-face-taxation-militants.
54 Interviews with two intelligence officials and a businessman in Bosaso, 26 and 27 November 2018.54 Interviews with two intelligence officials and a businessman in Bosaso, 26 and 27 November 2018.
55 Information provided by a former Puntland intelligence officer, 6 August 2019.55 Information provided by a former Puntland intelligence officer, 6 August 2019.
56 Analysis of call records also showed multiple calls by the ISIL-affiliated phone number to southern Somalia, Yemen, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.56 Analysis of call records also showed multiple calls by the ISIL-affiliated phone number to southern Somalia, Yemen, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The Panel of Experts is aware of several additional instances where the ISIL faction has used violence or the threat thereof in an attempt to extort revenues.The Panel of Experts is aware of several additional instances where the ISIL faction has used violence or the threat thereof in an attempt to extort revenues.
On 7 August 2018, for instance, the Deputy Manager of Golis Telecom in Bosaso, Abdullahi Ali Omar, was shot dead reportedly in order to pressure the company into paying ISIL ‘taxation’.53 On 22 November 2018, Ahmed Ali Nur “Dalaqo”, the owner of Saabir General Trading Company, was shot dead in Bosaso reportedly because he had refused to accede to the ISIL faction’s extortion demands.54On 7 August 2018, for instance, the Deputy Manager of Golis Telecom in Bosaso, Abdullahi Ali Omar, was shot dead reportedly in order to pressure the company into paying ISIL ‘taxation’.53 On 22 November 2018, Ahmed Ali Nur “Dalaqo”, the owner of Saabir General Trading Company, was shot dead in Bosaso reportedly because he had refused to accede to the ISIL faction’s extortion demands.54
The Panel also received electronic evidence of an ISIL extortion attempt.The Panel also received electronic evidence of an ISIL extortion attempt.
In a text message sent to employees of a major money transfer company, the militant group warned employees not to report for work after 14 July 2019 (11/11/1440 of the Islamic calendar) if the company had failed to pay its ‘taxation’ to ISIL (see figure 3, below).In a text message sent to employees of a major money transfer company, the militant group warned employees not to report for work after 14 July 2019 (11/11/1440 of the Islamic calendar) if the company had failed to pay its ‘taxation’ to ISIL (see figure 3, below).
According to a Puntland security source, the same phone number had been used in September 2018 to threaten an employee of a telecoms company, who shortly afterwards fled to Hargeisa.55 Analysis of mobile phone records confirmed that the ISIL-affiliated number had placed a total of 10 calls between 10 September and 29 November 2019 to the telecoms employee, with mobile tower data indicating the caller’s location to be proximate to the ISIL stronghold of Shebaab.56According to a Puntland security source, the same phone number had been used in September 2018 to threaten an employee of a telecoms company, who shortly afterwards fled to Hargeisa.55 Analysis of mobile phone records confirmed that the ISIL-affiliated number had placed a total of 10 calls between 10 September and 29 November 2019 to the telecoms employee, with mobile tower data indicating the caller’s location to be proximate to the ISIL stronghold of Shebaab.56
Figure 3: Extortion message from the ISIL faction warning Puntland employees of a money transfer company not to report for work.Figure 3: Extortion message from the ISIL faction warning Puntland employees of a money transfer company not to report for work.
Annex 1.10: ISIL plot to attack the Vatican (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*Annex 1.10: ISIL plot to attack the Vatican (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*
Annex 1.11: MV Oriental Queen shipmentAnnex 1.11: MV Oriental Queen shipment
On 17 May 2019, 180 tons of explosive material, including 165 tons of Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO), was delivered to Puntland, Somalia for commercial use.On 17 May 2019, 180 tons of explosive material, including 165 tons of Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO), was delivered to Puntland, Somalia for commercial use.
The explosives were intended to support the construction of Garacad port and associated road networks.The explosives were intended to support the construction of Garacad port and associated road networks.
However, the Panel determined that the shipment represented a potential threat to peace and security in Somalia.However, the Panel determined that the shipment represented a potential threat to peace and security in Somalia.
The Panel has assessed guidelines provided by Madser and Kapeks in Turkey, the manufacturer and shipper of the explosives, as well as measures implemented by TTN, the construction company involved in the project, and Puntland authorities.The Panel has assessed guidelines provided by Madser and Kapeks in Turkey, the manufacturer and shipper of the explosives, as well as measures implemented by TTN, the construction company involved in the project, and Puntland authorities.
The Panel has consulted the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) for the temporary storage of explosive material.The Panel has consulted the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) for the temporary storage of explosive material.
Despite the efforts of the Puntland authorities to implement mitigation measures for the transportation and storage of the commercial explosives, concerns remain regarding future deliveries of similar amounts of commercial explosives.Despite the efforts of the Puntland authorities to implement mitigation measures for the transportation and storage of the commercial explosives, concerns remain regarding future deliveries of similar amounts of commercial explosives.
Due to the conditions on the ground in Puntland, as well as financial limitations, the implementation of some of the IATG standards for temporary storage remain challenging.Due to the conditions on the ground in Puntland, as well as financial limitations, the implementation of some of the IATG standards for temporary storage remain challenging.
Furthermore, given the Panel’s restricted access to travel to Somalia, the Panel’s monitoring of the implementation of the mitigation measures is limited.Furthermore, given the Panel’s restricted access to travel to Somalia, the Panel’s monitoring of the implementation of the mitigation measures is limited.
57 Interviews with Kapeks and Madser in Ankara, Turkey on 23 and 24 May 2019.57 Interviews with Kapeks and Madser in Ankara, Turkey on 23 and 24 May 2019.
Kapeks and MadserKapeks and Madser
In May 2019, the Panel travelled to Ankara, Turkey to meet with representatives from Madser, which had shipped the explosives to Somalia, as well as the manufacturers of the ANFO, Kapeks.In May 2019, the Panel travelled to Ankara, Turkey to meet with representatives from Madser, which had shipped the explosives to Somalia, as well as the manufacturers of the ANFO, Kapeks.
Both entities provided the Panel with information on recommended safety guidelines, which included;Both entities provided the Panel with information on recommended safety guidelines, which included;
5757
(a)(a)
Removal of the ANFO from shipping containers;Removal of the ANFO from shipping containers;
(a)(a)
Storage of ANFO in a ventilated and dry facility;Storage of ANFO in a ventilated and dry facility;
(b)(b)
Separate storage for detonators and detonator cords, and other primers/initiators in cool and dry conditions (see figure 2, below);Separate storage for detonators and detonator cords, and other primers/initiators in cool and dry conditions (see figure 2, below);
(c)(c)
No buildings within a 270 m radius of the storage facility;No buildings within a 270 m radius of the storage facility;
(d)(d)
24-hour security, CCTV, and limited access to explosive material.24-hour security, CCTV, and limited access to explosive material.
They also provided sample logbooks for ANFO, detonators, and detonator cord, recording how much material is present, used, and remaining at the end of each day.They also provided sample logbooks for ANFO, detonators, and detonator cord, recording how much material is present, used, and remaining at the end of each day.
IATG guidelines for temporary storage of 200 tons of explosives:IATG guidelines for temporary storage of 200 tons of explosives:
(a)(a)
Material should be divided into 50 storage containers;Material should be divided into 50 storage containers;
(b)(b)
Each container should not contain more than 40 tons of explosives;Each container should not contain more than 40 tons of explosives;
(c)(c)
The storage facility should be 400 m from residential housing and 270 m from major roads;The storage facility should be 400 m from residential housing and 270 m from major roads;
(d)(d)
The facility should ideally be protected by razor wire fencing, armed guards and patrol.The facility should ideally be protected by razor wire fencing, armed guards and patrol.
Figure 1: Example of ANFO logbook recommended by Madser.Figure 1: Example of ANFO logbook recommended by Madser.
Figure 2: C-DET material data safety sheet specifying that detonators must be stowed separately in a dedicated storage facility.Figure 2: C-DET material data safety sheet specifying that detonators must be stowed separately in a dedicated storage facility.
Implementation of measures by the Puntland administrationImplementation of measures by the Puntland administration
58 As of this writing, the Panel had yet to receive any further details.58 As of this writing, the Panel had yet to receive any further details.
59 Wadaagsan is a Bosaso based company involved in the port development.59 Wadaagsan is a Bosaso based company involved in the port development.
See http://garacadseaport.com/.See http://garacadseaport.com/.
In June 2019, Puntland authorities provided a report to the Panel outlining the mitigation measures it had implemented for the safe storage of the explosive material.In June 2019, Puntland authorities provided a report to the Panel outlining the mitigation measures it had implemented for the safe storage of the explosive material.
Puntland authorities also informed the Panel that they would apply international ammunition technical guidelines (IATG) for temporary storage.Puntland authorities also informed the Panel that they would apply international ammunition technical guidelines (IATG) for temporary storage.
The authorities added that further details, including progress reports would be shared in the future.58The authorities added that further details, including progress reports would be shared in the future.58
Figure 3: Garacad, Mudug region, the location of the planned port project;Figure 3: Garacad, Mudug region, the location of the planned port project;
and Jariiban, the storage site for the explosives.and Jariiban, the storage site for the explosives.
The measures outlined by Puntland authorities and TTN include;The measures outlined by Puntland authorities and TTN include;
(a)(a)
100 soldiers to provide escort for transportation of explosives between Bosaso and Jariiban;100 soldiers to provide escort for transportation of explosives between Bosaso and Jariiban;
(b)(b)
30 soldiers with two vehicles to provide 24-hour security at the facility in Jariiban.30 soldiers with two vehicles to provide 24-hour security at the facility in Jariiban.
(an additional salary is provided by TTN/Wadaagsan company to the soldiers);(an additional salary is provided by TTN/Wadaagsan company to the soldiers);
5959
(c)(c)
150 soldiers to provide additional security at the construction site;150 soldiers to provide additional security at the construction site;
(d)(d)
Organized and limited access to explosives, including inventory management by three mining experts;Organized and limited access to explosives, including inventory management by three mining experts;
(e)(e)
CCTV to be installed;CCTV to be installed;
(f)(f)
Each container will have three locks with keys held separately by the three mining experts.Each container will have three locks with keys held separately by the three mining experts.
Figure 4: Explosives utilization report from Puntland dated 9 July 2019.Figure 4: Explosives utilization report from Puntland dated 9 July 2019.
Figure 5: Cargo manifest of the MV Oriental Queen.Figure 5: Cargo manifest of the MV Oriental Queen.
Annex 1.12: Biometric registration of the SNAAnnex 1.12: Biometric registration of the SNA
The Panel has conducted case studies on the biometric registration of three SNA units –Sector 60 (Baidoa), Sector 12 April (Mogadishu) and General Gordon Military base (Mogadishu), by comparing SNA registration documents obtained by the SEMG with a payroll of those biometrically registered as of February 2019.The Panel has conducted case studies on the biometric registration of three SNA units –Sector 60 (Baidoa), Sector 12 April (Mogadishu) and General Gordon Military base (Mogadishu), by comparing SNA registration documents obtained by the SEMG with a payroll of those biometrically registered as of February 2019.
Analysis of these case studies shows that fewer than half of the soldiers in these three units (315 of 672) were captured during the biometric registration process.Analysis of these case studies shows that fewer than half of the soldiers in these three units (315 of 672) were captured during the biometric registration process.
Sector 60 (Baidoa)Sector 60 (Baidoa)
In March 2018, the SNA Deputy Commander of Sector 60, headquartered in Baidoa, provided the SEMG with logbooks detailing the distribution of weapons, including serial numbers, to 277 SNA soldiers.In March 2018, the SNA Deputy Commander of Sector 60, headquartered in Baidoa, provided the SEMG with logbooks detailing the distribution of weapons, including serial numbers, to 277 SNA soldiers.
Of the total 277 Sector 60 soldiers issued with weapons, only 53 – fewer than one-fifth – appeared on the SNA registration roll as of February 2019.Of the total 277 Sector 60 soldiers issued with weapons, only 53 – fewer than one-fifth – appeared on the SNA registration roll as of February 2019.
It would therefore appear that four-fifths of the Sector 60 soldiers noted in the logbook are no longer considered members of the SNA;It would therefore appear that four-fifths of the Sector 60 soldiers noted in the logbook are no longer considered members of the SNA;
whether due to defection, death, injury, or another rationale, has not yet been possible to determine due to the lack of FGS assistance to the Panel.whether due to defection, death, injury, or another rationale, has not yet been possible to determine due to the lack of FGS assistance to the Panel.
Figure 1: Sample of the list of soldiers (names redacted) registered within Sector 60 in March 2018.Figure 1: Sample of the list of soldiers (names redacted) registered within Sector 60 in March 2018.
Sector 12 April (Mogadishu)Sector 12 April (Mogadishu)
On 7 August 2018, the SEMG was provided with samples of SNA payroll documentation, dated August 2017, which included the names and identification numbers of 384 soldiers from various units from SNA Sector 12 April, headquartered in Mogadishu, including Birjex, Danab, and the 2nd and 4th brigades.60 The Panel identified 262 soldiers – around two-thirds of the total – whose names and ID numbers appeared on the biometric payroll document dated February 2019.On 7 August 2018, the SEMG was provided with samples of SNA payroll documentation, dated August 2017, which included the names and identification numbers of 384 soldiers from various units from SNA Sector 12 April, headquartered in Mogadishu, including Birjex, Danab, and the 2nd and 4th brigades.60 The Panel identified 262 soldiers – around two-thirds of the total – whose names and ID numbers appeared on the biometric payroll document dated February 2019.
Figure 2: Sector 12 April SNA registration in 2017 compared with those biometrically registered as of February 2019.Figure 2: Sector 12 April SNA registration in 2017 compared with those biometrically registered as of February 2019.
UnitUnit
Soldiers registered in the 2017 payroll documentSoldiers registered in the 2017 payroll document
Soldiers registered in the February 2019 biometric payroll documentSoldiers registered in the February 2019 biometric payroll document
Percentage matchingPercentage matching
Unknown unitUnknown unit
2323
1818
78%78%
BirjexBirjex
6262
1616
26%26%
DanabDanab
118118
8080
68%68%
4th Brigade4th Brigade
6060
4444
73%73%
Air ForceAir Force
7070
5959
84%84%
2nd Brigade2nd Brigade
1616
1414
87%87%
Music bandMusic band
1717
1414
82%82%
Training UnitTraining Unit
1818
1717
94%94%
TOTALTOTAL
384384
262262
68%68%
The analysis also highlights a large disparity between the biometric capturing of officers versus enlisted men:The analysis also highlights a large disparity between the biometric capturing of officers versus enlisted men:
(a)(a)
The total number of officers (from Sergeant to Brigadier) included in the 2017 document is 171, 156 of whom appear in the 2019 payroll document, representing a match rate of 91 per cent.The total number of officers (from Sergeant to Brigadier) included in the 2017 document is 171, 156 of whom appear in the 2019 payroll document, representing a match rate of 91 per cent.
60 Document on file with the Secretariat.60 Document on file with the Secretariat.
(b)(b)
213 Sector 12 April soldiers with the rank of private are listed in the 2017 document, 106 of whom appear in the 2019 document, representing a match rate of less than 50 per cent.213 Sector 12 April soldiers with the rank of private are listed in the 2017 document, 106 of whom appear in the 2019 document, representing a match rate of less than 50 per cent.
General Gordon military base (Mogadishu)General Gordon military base (Mogadishu)
In a letter dated 17 May 2018, the FGS National Security Adviser supplied a list of 17 soldiers who had been registered as trainees within the General Gordon military base (see S/2018/1002, para. 26 to 28).In a letter dated 17 May 2018, the FGS National Security Adviser supplied a list of 17 soldiers who had been registered as trainees within the General Gordon military base (see S/2018/1002, para. 26 to 28).
The Panel no matches between the soldiers registered on this list and the biometric payroll document dated February 2019.The Panel no matches between the soldiers registered on this list and the biometric payroll document dated February 2019.
Figure 3: List of trainees at the Gen. Gordon Military base (names redacted).Figure 3: List of trainees at the Gen. Gordon Military base (names redacted).
Annex 1.13: Collection of air navigation feesAnnex 1.13: Collection of air navigation fees
Figure 1: 12 December 2017 letter from SCAMA informing IATA that Jubba Airways Limited had “settled all the invoices pertaining to Air Navigation Charges”.Figure 1: 12 December 2017 letter from SCAMA informing IATA that Jubba Airways Limited had “settled all the invoices pertaining to Air Navigation Charges”.
Figure 2: ICAO internal accounts for December 2017 showing Jubba Airways air navigation debt at approximately $5.8 million.Figure 2: ICAO internal accounts for December 2017 showing Jubba Airways air navigation debt at approximately $5.8 million.
Figure 3: ICAO internal accounts for January 2018 showing Jubba Airways removed from accounts owing.Figure 3: ICAO internal accounts for January 2018 showing Jubba Airways removed from accounts owing.
Figure 4: Airlines with the greatest outstanding debt owing to IATA as of 31 July 2019.Figure 4: Airlines with the greatest outstanding debt owing to IATA as of 31 July 2019.
Amount owed by Jubba Airways stands at $402,955.Amount owed by Jubba Airways stands at $402,955.
Figure 5: The 27 June 2019 contract between IATA, ICAO, and the FGS Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation designated SCAMA’s account at the Central Bank of Somalia (#1040) to receive air navigation charges.Figure 5: The 27 June 2019 contract between IATA, ICAO, and the FGS Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation designated SCAMA’s account at the Central Bank of Somalia (#1040) to receive air navigation charges.
Annex 1.14: Maritime piracyAnnex 1.14: Maritime piracy
Figure 1: Link chart showing Mohamed Dahir Wehliye’s connections to piracy attacks in 2017 and 2019.Figure 1: Link chart showing Mohamed Dahir Wehliye’s connections to piracy attacks in 2017 and 2019.
Annex 2.1: Notifications of consignments of weapons and ammunition by the FGSAnnex 2.1: Notifications of consignments of weapons and ammunition by the FGS
Paragraphs 3 to 7 of resolution 2142 (2014) establish the notification requirements established pursuant to the partial lifting of the arms embargo in resolution 2093 (2013).1 The Federal Government of Somalia has primary responsibility for informing the Committee at least five days in advance of deliveries – advance delivery notification (ADN) – of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training to its security forces (para. 3).Paragraphs 3 to 7 of resolution 2142 (2014) establish the notification requirements established pursuant to the partial lifting of the arms embargo in resolution 2093 (2013).1 The Federal Government of Somalia has primary responsibility for informing the Committee at least five days in advance of deliveries – advance delivery notification (ADN) – of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training to its security forces (para.
Member States or organizations delivering assistance, in consultation with the Federal Government, may instead provide the advance delivery notification (para. 4).3). Member States or organizations delivering assistance, in consultation with the Federal Government, may instead provide the advance delivery notification (para.
No later than 30 days after the delivery of arms or ammunition, the Federal Government must submit to the Committee a written confirmation – post-delivery confirmation (PDC) – of the completion of the delivery (para. 6).4). No later than 30 days after the delivery of arms or ammunition, the Federal Government must submit to the Committee a written confirmation – post-delivery confirmation (PDC) – of the completion of the delivery (para. 6).
Since August 2018, the Committee has received seven notifications of shipments of weapons and ammunition, five of which were in line with Security Council requirements:Since August 2018, the Committee has received seven notifications of shipments of weapons and ammunition, five of which were in line with Security Council requirements:
(a)(a)
A shipment of 2,000 assault rifles was notified on 2 August 2018 by the FGS as a donation from the Republic of Djibouti.A shipment of 2,000 assault rifles was notified on 2 August 2018 by the FGS as a donation from the Republic of Djibouti.
This consignment was expected to be delivered on 10 August 2019.This consignment was expected to be delivered on 10 August 2019.
However, at the time of writing, the Panel had not received any confirmation of the delivery.2However, at the time of writing, the Panel had not received any confirmation of the delivery.2
(b)(b)
A donation of 1,000 assault rifles from the Republic of Djibouti was notified on 27 September 2018 by the FGS.A donation of 1,000 assault rifles from the Republic of Djibouti was notified on 27 September 2018 by the FGS.
This shipment was expected to be delivered before 30 September 2018, but the Panel had not received any confirmation of its delivery at the time of writing.3This shipment was expected to be delivered before 30 September 2018, but the Panel had not received any confirmation of its delivery at the time of writing.3
(c)(c)
A donation of 12 heavy machine guns was notified by the United States of America on 12 December 2018 to equip the Danab special forces and was delivered on 13 August 2019.A donation of 12 heavy machine guns was notified by the United States of America on 12 December 2018 to equip the Danab special forces and was delivered on 13 August 2019.
The PDC was properly and timely issued, less than 30 days after the delivery.4The PDC was properly and timely issued, less than 30 days after the delivery.4
(d)(d)
A donation of 1,000 assault rifles from the Republic of Djibouti was notified on 25 January 2019.A donation of 1,000 assault rifles from the Republic of Djibouti was notified on 25 January 2019.
This shipment was due to be delivered on 26 January 2019, but neither the Committee nor the Panel had received confirmation of its delivery at the time of writing.5This shipment was due to be delivered on 26 January 2019, but neither the Committee nor the Panel had received confirmation of its delivery at the time of writing.5
(e)(e)
A PDC related to a donation to the Danab special forces of 300 assault rifles, 50 pistols, and 20 light machine guns from the United States was sent by the FGS on 19 March 2019, without any ADN.A PDC related to a donation to the Danab special forces of 300 assault rifles, 50 pistols, and 20 light machine guns from the United States was sent by the FGS on 19 March 2019, without any ADN.
According to the FGS, the absence of an ADN was caused by “miscommunication”.According to the FGS, the absence of an ADN was caused by “miscommunication”.
The shipment was delivered on 12 March 2019.The shipment was delivered on 12 March 2019.
1 Paragraph 38 of resolution 2093 (2013) had previously established a requirement for advance delivery notification, which was then revised in paragraphs 3 to 5 of resolution 2142 (2014).1 Paragraph 38 of resolution 2093 (2013) had previously established a requirement for advance delivery notification, which was then revised in paragraphs 3 to 5 of resolution 2142 (2014).
2 Official correspondence was also sent to the Republic of Djibouti on 29 August 2019 to confirm whether this consignment have been delivered to the FGS.2 Official correspondence was also sent to the Republic of Djibouti on 29 August 2019 to confirm whether this consignment have been delivered to the FGS.
3 Ibid.3 Ibid.
4 PDC dated 26 August 2019.4 PDC dated 26 August 2019.
5 Official correspondence was also sent to the Republic of Djibouti on 29 August 2019 to confirm whether this consignment was delivered to the FGS.5 Official correspondence was also sent to the Republic of Djibouti on 29 August 2019 to confirm whether this consignment was delivered to the FGS.
(f)(f)
A donation of weapons and ammunition6 was notified by the Republic of Turkey on 23 July 2019 to equip the 3rd, 4th and 5th light infantry battalions of the SNA.7 The shipment was planned to be delivered no sooner that 2 August 2019.A donation of weapons and ammunition6 was notified by the Republic of Turkey on 23 July 2019 to equip the 3rd, 4th and 5th light infantry battalions of the SNA.7 The shipment was planned to be delivered no sooner that 2 August 2019.
At the time of writing, this shipment has not yet been delivered.8At the time of writing, this shipment has not yet been delivered.8
(g)(g)
A PDC related to a donation to the Danab special forces of four 12.7-mm machine guns (DShKs) was sent by the FGS on 26 August 2019.A PDC related to a donation to the Danab special forces of four 12.7-mm machine guns (DShKs) was sent by the FGS on 26 August 2019.
However, according to the information from the US Mission to Somalia, this consignment was initially received by Danab on 23 July 2018, and then brought to Halane for marking in August 2018.However, according to the information from the US Mission to Somalia, this consignment was initially received by Danab on 23 July 2018, and then brought to Halane for marking in August 2018.
Consequently, the PDC was sent to the Committee over a year late.Consequently, the PDC was sent to the Committee over a year late.
In addition to the above, on 6 June 2019 the MV Gulf Angel docked in Mogadishu port to deliver 33 containers of non-lethal military equipment (uniforms and outfits) from the Republic of Turkey for the SNA, as well as the Somali Coastguard and Navy.In addition to the above, on 6 June 2019 the MV Gulf Angel docked in Mogadishu port to deliver 33 containers of non-lethal military equipment (uniforms and outfits) from the Republic of Turkey for the SNA, as well as the Somali Coastguard and Navy.
An advance delivery notification had been sent by the FGS on 28 May 2019 in accordance with Security Council requirements, and in full coordination with Turkey, who sent two notes verbales dated 31 May 2019, and amended on 6 June, to notify the Committee of the shipment.An advance delivery notification had been sent by the FGS on 28 May 2019 in accordance with Security Council requirements, and in full coordination with Turkey, who sent two notes verbales dated 31 May 2019, and amended on 6 June, to notify the Committee of the shipment.
The notes verbales submitted by the Permanent Mission of Turkey included a notification for an additional container of 550 G3 assault rifles and 9 MG3 light machine guns to be used for training purposes within the TURKSOM military base in Mogadishu, which was correctly submitted under paragraph 14 of resolution 2444 (2018) given that this training was aimed at the security forces of the FGS.The notes verbales submitted by the Permanent Mission of Turkey included a notification for an additional container of 550 G3 assault rifles and 9 MG3 light machine guns to be used for training purposes within the TURKSOM military base in Mogadishu, which was correctly submitted under paragraph 14 of resolution 2444 (2018) given that this training was aimed at the security forces of the FGS.
Annexes 2.2 and 2.3 (strictly confidential) provide updated tables on consignments of weapons and ammunition delivered to the FGS since the partial lifting of the arms embargo in 2013, consisting of approximately 21,000 weapons and 75 million rounds of ammunition.Annexes 2.2 and 2.3 (strictly confidential) provide updated tables on consignments of weapons and ammunition delivered to the FGS since the partial lifting of the arms embargo in 2013, consisting of approximately 21,000 weapons and 75 million rounds of ammunition.
6 1,569 assault rifles, 102 light machine guns, 36 RPG-7 rocket launchers, 350,000 rounds of assault rifle ammunition, 244,800 of light machine gun ammunition, 16,200 rounds of heavy machine gun ammunition, and 216 RPG-7 rockets.6 1,569 assault rifles, 102 light machine guns, 36 RPG-7 rocket launchers, 350,000 rounds of assault rifle ammunition, 244,800 of light machine gun ammunition, 16,200 rounds of heavy machine gun ammunition, and 216 RPG-7 rockets.
7 Notification received on 24 July 2019.3 Ibid.7 Notification received on 24 July 2019.3 Ibid.
8 Email from the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations, 4 September 2019.8 Email from the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations, 4 September 2019.
Annex 2.2: Consignments of weapons and ammunition notified to the Committee since the partial lifting of the arms embargo (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*Annex 2.2: Consignments of weapons and ammunition notified to the Committee since the partial lifting of the arms embargo (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*
Annex 2.3: Weapons and ammunition delivered since the partial lifting of the arms embargo (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*Annex 2.3: Weapons and ammunition delivered since the partial lifting of the arms embargo (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*
Annex 2.4: Weapons and ammunition managementAnnex 2.4: Weapons and ammunition management
Weapons markingWeapons marking
According to the FGS, a total of 20,240 weapons have been marked since the implementation of the weapons marking programme in 2014.9 As noted by the SEMG in its reports, marked weapons are, for the most part, properly registered in logbooks stored at Halane Central Armoury.According to the FGS, a total of 20,240 weapons have been marked since the implementation of the weapons marking programme in 2014.9 As noted by the SEMG in its reports, marked weapons are, for the most part, properly registered in logbooks stored at Halane Central Armoury.
According to the Secretary-General’s technical assessment team, the FGS is now seeking international support for the roll-out of the mobile marking programme at the sector level.10According to the Secretary-General’s technical assessment team, the FGS is now seeking international support for the roll-out of the mobile marking programme at the sector level.10
Record-keepingRecord-keeping
While record-keeping at Halane Central Armoury is generally adequate, gaps remain with respect to the distribution of weapons and ammunition from Halane to the receiving units.While record-keeping at Halane Central Armoury is generally adequate, gaps remain with respect to the distribution of weapons and ammunition from Halane to the receiving units.
The SEMG noted in 2018 that distribution logs managed at Halane Central Armoury in Mogadishu lacked precision and consistency to the extent that it was not possible to accurately determine where, when, why, how or to whom most weapons and ammunition had been allocated (see S/2018/1002).The SEMG noted in 2018 that distribution logs managed at Halane Central Armoury in Mogadishu lacked precision and consistency to the extent that it was not possible to accurately determine where, when, why, how or to whom most weapons and ammunition had been allocated (see S/2018/1002).
Similarly, the Secretary-General’s assessment mission noted that a national weapons registration system, which would enable the accurate tracking of domestic transfers of military materiel, remains a gap in the WAM system.Similarly, the Secretary-General’s assessment mission noted that a national weapons registration system, which would enable the accurate tracking of domestic transfers of military materiel, remains a gap in the WAM system.
Stockpile managementStockpile management
Despite the construction of a second storehouse to separate weapons from ammunition at Halane Central Armoury in late 2018, the facility remains non-compliant with the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and continues to present a significant threat to the heavily populated international airport complex.Despite the construction of a second storehouse to separate weapons from ammunition at Halane Central Armoury in late 2018, the facility remains non-compliant with the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and continues to present a significant threat to the heavily populated international airport complex.
The persistent danger of an uncontrolled detonation of FGS ammunitions dumps is underlined by ongoing mortar attacks on the airport complex by Al-Shabaab.The persistent danger of an uncontrolled detonation of FGS ammunitions dumps is underlined by ongoing mortar attacks on the airport complex by Al-Shabaab.
These attacks highlight the urgency of constructing a central armoury facility at a safe distance from populated areas, in line with international standards.These attacks highlight the urgency of constructing a central armoury facility at a safe distance from populated areas, in line with international standards.
WAM at the FMS levelWAM at the FMS level
9 Ibid.9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.10 Ibid.
11 Email from the Chief of Staff of the SWS Presidency, 8 August 2019.11 Email from the Chief of Staff of the SWS Presidency, 8 August 2019.
12 Ibid.12 Ibid.
In order to assess the safe and effective management, storage, and security of weapons and ammunition stockpiles belonging to the FMS, as underlined in paragraph 16 of resolution 2444 (2018), in June 2019 the Panel sent an official correspondence to the administrations of Galmudug, HirShabelle, Jubbaland, Puntland, and SWS, requesting information on each FMS’ WAM procedures as well as weapons and ammunitions supplied by the FGS since the partial lifting of the arms embargo.In order to assess the safe and effective management, storage, and security of weapons and ammunition stockpiles belonging to the FMS, as underlined in paragraph 16 of resolution 2444 (2018), in June 2019 the Panel sent an official correspondence to the administrations of Galmudug, HirShabelle, Jubbaland, Puntland, and SWS, requesting information on each FMS’ WAM procedures as well as weapons and ammunitions supplied by the FGS since the partial lifting of the arms embargo.
At the time of writing, only the SWS administration had provided the Panel with a response, in which it stated that the administration had received no records concerning WAM upon assuming office in December 2018.11 The SWS administration was in the process of establishing a Regional Security Office (RSO) which is planned to internally coordinate WAM procedures.12 According to the Chief ofAt the time of writing, only the SWS administration had provided the Panel with a response, in which it stated that the administration had received no records concerning WAM upon assuming office in December 2018.11 The SWS administration was in the process of establishing a Regional Security Office (RSO) which is planned to internally coordinate WAM procedures.12 According to the Chief of
Staff of the Presidency, SWS has requested supplies of weapons from the FGS but had not received a response.13Staff of the Presidency, SWS has requested supplies of weapons from the FGS but had not received a response.13
13 Ibid.13 Ibid.
Annex 2.5: FGS-marked weapons found in possession of arms dealers in MogadishuAnnex 2.5: FGS-marked weapons found in possession of arms dealers in Mogadishu
From January to August 2019 the Panel documented 38 weapons in the possession of arms dealers in Mogadishu and in Baidoa with characteristics consistent with those imported by the FGS.From January to August 2019 the Panel documented 38 weapons in the possession of arms dealers in Mogadishu and in Baidoa with characteristics consistent with those imported by the FGS.
In Mogadishu, the Panel found 13 weapons in the possession of arms dealers including seven AK-pattern rifles and six 9-mm (KM 5, Bakara market, Hodan and Daynile districts).In Mogadishu, the Panel found 13 weapons in the possession of arms dealers including seven AK-pattern rifles and six 9-mm (KM 5, Bakara market, Hodan and Daynile districts).
Based on their serial numbers, the Panel was able to trace some of the weapons to consignments delivered to the FGS in September 2014, June 2017, July 2017 and June 2018.Based on their serial numbers, the Panel was able to trace some of the weapons to consignments delivered to the FGS in September 2014, June 2017, July 2017 and June 2018.
Twenty-five AK-pattern rifles documented in Baidoa are displayed in annex 2.5.3 (strictly confidential).Twenty-five AK-pattern rifles documented in Baidoa are displayed in annex 2.5.3 (strictly confidential).
Table 1: 13 weapons with apparent or erased FGS markings found in the possession of arms dealers in Mogadishu, January-July 2019.Table 1: 13 weapons with apparent or erased FGS markings found in the possession of arms dealers in Mogadishu, January-July 2019.
14 Delivery from the People’s Republic of China.14 Delivery from the People’s Republic of China.
15 Delivery from the Republic of Djibouti.15 Delivery from the Republic of Djibouti.
DateDate
LocationLocation
ModelModel
Serial no.Serial no.
FGS markingFGS marking
ConsignmentConsignment
March 2019March 2019
Mogadishu, Hodan districtMogadishu, Hodan district
Type 56-2Type 56-2
40816224081622
SO XDS-2017SO XDS-2017
July 201714July 201714
March 2019March 2019
Mogadishu, Hodan districtMogadishu, Hodan district
Type 56-2Type 56-2
40749334074933
SO XDS-2017SO XDS-2017
July 2017July 2017
March 2019March 2019
Mogadishu, Hodan districtMogadishu, Hodan district
Tokarev 54-1 (9 -mm pistol)Tokarev 54-1 (9 -mm pistol)
4900201649002016
SOGC-344/2016SOGC-344/2016
N/AN/A
March 2019March 2019
Mogadishu, Daynile districtMogadishu, Daynile district
Type 56-2Type 56-2
41225564122556
SO XDS-2017SO XDS-2017
July 2017July 2017
March 2019March 2019
Mogadishu, Daynile districtMogadishu, Daynile district
Type 56-1Type 56-1
6006068760060687
SO CBS-2018SO CBS-2018
N/AN/A
March 2019March 2019
Mogadishu, Daynile districtMogadishu, Daynile district
Type 56-2Type 56-2
40684264068426
SO XDS-2017SO XDS-2017
July 2017July 2017
July 2019July 2019
Mogadishu, Daynile districtMogadishu, Daynile district
Norinco CF98-9 (9-mm pistol)Norinco CF98-9 (9-mm pistol)
15-CN 03093015-CN 030930
SO-NISA-2018SO-NISA-2018
June 201815June 201815
July 2019July 2019
Mogadishu, Daynile districtMogadishu, Daynile district
Norinco NP-42 (9-mm pistol)Norinco NP-42 (9-mm pistol)
UnclearUnclear
SO-CBS-0066-16SO-CBS-0066-16
N/AN/A
July 2019July 2019
Mogadishu, Bakara MarketMogadishu, Bakara Market
Norinco Makarow (9-mm pistol)Norinco Makarow (9-mm pistol)
E03056E03056
SOGC-1139/3056SOGC-1139/3056
N/AN/A
July 2019July 2019
Mogadishu, Bakara Market,Mogadishu, Bakara Market,
Type 56-1Type 56-1
600 13577600 13577
SO XDS-2017SO XDS-2017
June 2017June 2017
July 2019July 2019
Mogadishu, Bakara Market,Mogadishu, Bakara Market,
Type 56-2Type 56-2
4111031941110319
SO XDS-2018SO XDS-2018
July 2017July 2017
July 2019July 2019
Mogadishu, Daynile districtMogadishu, Daynile district
Norinco Makarow (9-mm pistol)Norinco Makarow (9-mm pistol)
D1 1243D1 1243
Erased markingErased marking
N/AN/A
August 2019August 2019
Mogadishu, Bakara MarketMogadishu, Bakara Market
Norinco Makarow (9-mm pistol)Norinco Makarow (9-mm pistol)
22 130822 1308
SO XDS-2015SO XDS-2015
N/AN/A
From January to March 2019 weapons bearing apparent FGS markings constituted 12 per cent of the total number of weapons observed by the Panel’s local sources in Baidoa and Mogadishu over the period of investigation.16From January to March 2019 weapons bearing apparent FGS markings constituted 12 per cent of the total number of weapons observed by the Panel’s local sources in Baidoa and Mogadishu over the period of investigation.16
From July to August 2019 in Mogadishu only, data collectors informed the Panel that the number of FGS-marked weapons being sold by arms dealers decreased significantly between March and July 2019.From July to August 2019 in Mogadishu only, data collectors informed the Panel that the number of FGS-marked weapons being sold by arms dealers decreased significantly between March and July 2019.
One possible explanation for this decrease could be the substantively lower number of weapons delivered to the FGS during this mandate compared to the last one.One possible explanation for this decrease could be the substantively lower number of weapons delivered to the FGS during this mandate compared to the last one.
As of September 2019, 941 weapons had been delivered, to Danab and the TURKSOM training base, compared with 7,262 delivered between September 2017 and September 2018 (see annex 2.3 (strictly confidential)).As of September 2019, 941 weapons had been delivered, to Danab and the TURKSOM training base, compared with 7,262 delivered between September 2017 and September 2018 (see annex 2.3 (strictly confidential)).
Conversely, this decrease could be a result of better management of weapons and ammunition procedure by the SNA, and specifically the implementation of the standard operating procedures for weapons and ammunition management at Halane Central Armoury issued by the Office of theConversely, this decrease could be a result of better management of weapons and ammunition procedure by the SNA, and specifically the implementation of the standard operating procedures for weapons and ammunition management at Halane Central Armoury issued by the Office of the
National Security Adviser in May 2018.National Security Adviser in May 2018.
Testimonies received from three arms dealers in Mogadishu confirmed that weapons bearing FGS markings had largely been purchased from low-ranking members of the Somali security forces, as well as from junior and senior officers and FGS officials.Testimonies received from three arms dealers in Mogadishu confirmed that weapons bearing FGS markings had largely been purchased from low-ranking members of the Somali security forces, as well as from junior and senior officers and FGS officials.
These testimonies were consistent with findings presented in the SEMG’s 2018 final report (see S/2018/1002, paras. 24-25).These testimonies were consistent with findings presented in the SEMG’s 2018 final report (see S/2018/1002, paras. 24-25).
16 Between January and March 2019, local data collectors witnessed 25 of 159 weapons in Baidoa arms markets and 13 of 163 weapons in Mogadishu arms markets that bore apparent FGS markings.16 Between January and March 2019, local data collectors witnessed 25 of 159 weapons in Baidoa arms markets and 13 of 163 weapons in Mogadishu arms markets that bore apparent FGS markings.
Due to practical limitations, the local data collectors were only able to photograph and obtain the serial numbers of weapons displayed in the tables.Due to practical limitations, the local data collectors were only able to photograph and obtain the serial numbers of weapons displayed in the tables.
Based on data gathered by data collectors and local sources the prices of black-market weapons have remained stable from 2018, at between $1,300 and $1,400 for an AK-pattern assault rifle and between $600 to $700 for a 9-mm pistol.Based on data gathered by data collectors and local sources the prices of black-market weapons have remained stable from 2018, at between $1,300 and $1,400 for an AK-pattern assault rifle and between $600 to $700 for a 9-mm pistol.
One pistol found in the possession of an arms dealer in Mogadishu in July 2019 shows evidence of an attempt to remove apparent FGS markings.One pistol found in the possession of an arms dealer in Mogadishu in July 2019 shows evidence of an attempt to remove apparent FGS markings.
This is first time this practice has been observed by the SEMG or the Panel of Experts (see figures 5 and 6, below).This is first time this practice has been observed by the SEMG or the Panel of Experts (see figures 5 and 6, below).
Sample weapons found in the possession of arms dealersSample weapons found in the possession of arms dealers
Figure 1: Type 56-2 rifle documented in March 2019 in Mogadishu, Hodan district, serial number 4081622.Figure 1: Type 56-2 rifle documented in March 2019 in Mogadishu, Hodan district, serial number 4081622.
Figure 2: Norinco Tokarev 54-1 pistol documented in March 2019 Mogadishu, Hodan district, serial number 49002016.Figure 2: Norinco Tokarev 54-1 pistol documented in March 2019 Mogadishu, Hodan district, serial number 49002016.
Figure 3: Type 56-22 documented in March 2019, Mogadishu, Daynile district, serial number 4122556.Figure 3: Type 56-22 documented in March 2019, Mogadishu, Daynile district, serial number 4122556.
Figure 4: Norinco CF98-9 pistol documented in July 2019 in Mogadishu, Daynile district with unclear serial number but with NISA markings.Figure 4: Norinco CF98-9 pistol documented in July 2019 in Mogadishu, Daynile district with unclear serial number but with NISA markings.
Figures 5 and 6: Norinco model 59 (Makarov) pistol found in the procession of an arms dealer in Mogadishu in July 2019, showing evidence of an attempt to remove apparent FGS markings, the first occasion this practice has been observed by the Panel.Figures 5 and 6: Norinco model 59 (Makarov) pistol found in the procession of an arms dealer in Mogadishu in July 2019, showing evidence of an attempt to remove apparent FGS markings, the first occasion this practice has been observed by the Panel.
Annex 2.5.1: FGS ammunition found in possession of arms dealers in MogadishuAnnex 2.5.1: FGS ammunition found in possession of arms dealers in Mogadishu
In March 2019, the Panel’s sources documented two Type-69 HEAT rocket-propelled grenades in Daynile district of Mogadishu, with characteristics consistent with materiel imported by the Federal Government on 13 January 2018 from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.In March 2019, the Panel’s sources documented two Type-69 HEAT rocket-propelled grenades in Daynile district of Mogadishu, with characteristics consistent with materiel imported by the Federal Government on 13 January 2018 from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Figure 1: Type-69 HEAT rocket-propelled grenades, documented in Mogadishu, March 2019.Figure 1: Type-69 HEAT rocket-propelled grenades, documented in Mogadishu, March 2019.
Figure 2: Type-69 HEAT rocket-propelled grenades and associated igniters.Figure 2: Type-69 HEAT rocket-propelled grenades and associated igniters.
In March 2019, the Panel’s sources also documented small calibre ammunition that, according to the arms dealers, had been sold by FGS security personnel (either SNA soldiers or NISA officers).In March 2019, the Panel’s sources also documented small calibre ammunition that, according to the arms dealers, had been sold by FGS security personnel (either SNA soldiers or NISA officers).
The Panel was however unable to conclusively trace this ammunition to specific consignments delivered to the FGS.The Panel was however unable to conclusively trace this ammunition to specific consignments delivered to the FGS.
The ammunition was also not possible to trace by referencing records from Halane Central Armoury, given that it was not SNA practice in 2017 and 2018 to indicate the lot number in ammunition logbooks in Halane.17The ammunition was also not possible to trace by referencing records from Halane Central Armoury, given that it was not SNA practice in 2017 and 2018 to indicate the lot number in ammunition logbooks in Halane.17
17 According to the standard operating procedures for weapons and ammunition management at Halane Central Armoury from the Office of the National Security Adviser, provided the SEMG on 17 May 2018, the logbooks pertaining to ammunition delivered to Halane would thenceforth indicate the lot number.17 According to the standard operating procedures for weapons and ammunition management at Halane Central Armoury from the Office of the National Security Adviser, provided the SEMG on 17 May 2018, the logbooks pertaining to ammunition delivered to Halane would thenceforth indicate the lot number.
LocationLocation
ModelModel
Headstamp markingHeadstamp marking
ObservationsObservations
Mogadishu, KM 5Mogadishu, KM 5
Tracing 7.62x39Tracing 7.62x39
Egypt, factory 27, 1983Egypt, factory 27, 1983
Reportedly supplied by SNA soldiers;Reportedly supplied by SNA soldiers;
Possible shipment: 20 July 2016 from Egypt (which included 12,000 7.62x39-mm tracing ammunition).Possible shipment: 20 July 2016 from Egypt (which included 12,000 7.62x39-mm tracing ammunition).
LocationLocation
ModelModel
Headstamp markingHeadstamp marking
ObservationsObservations
Mogadishu, KM 5Mogadishu, KM 5
7.62 x 397.62 x 39
PRC, factory 61, 1975PRC, factory 61, 1975
Reportedly supplied by SNA soldiers;Reportedly supplied by SNA soldiers;
Same ammunition (same factory and year) documented by the SEMG on 11 July 2018 in the SNA Sector 60 armoury in Baidoa.Same ammunition (same factory and year) documented by the SEMG on 11 July 2018 in the SNA Sector 60 armoury in Baidoa.
LocationLocation
ModelModel
Headstamp markingHeadstamp marking
ObservationsObservations
Mogadishu, KM 5Mogadishu, KM 5
7.62x547.62x54
Romania, SADU factory, 2011Romania, SADU factory, 2011
Reportedly supplied by SNA soldiers;Reportedly supplied by SNA soldiers;
More than 21 million rounds of this type of ammunition was delivered to the FGS since 2013.More than 21 million rounds of this type of ammunition was delivered to the FGS since 2013.
LocationLocation
ModelModel
Headstamp markingHeadstamp marking
ObservationsObservations
Mogadishu, KM 5Mogadishu, KM 5
7.62x25 Tokarev7.62x25 Tokarev
Russia, factory 3, 1944Russia, factory 3, 1944
Reportedly supplied by a NISA officer;Reportedly supplied by a NISA officer;
Same ammunition documented by the SEMG in Halane on 26 April and 29 August 2017 from a shipment notified by Egypt in 2014 (See S/2017/924, annex 8.1).Same ammunition documented by the SEMG in Halane on 26 April and 29 August 2017 from a shipment notified by Egypt in 2014 (See S/2017/924, annex 8.1).
Annex 2.5.2: FGS-marked weapons found in possession of arms dealers in Baidoa (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*Annex 2.5.2: FGS-marked weapons found in possession of arms dealers in Baidoa (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*
Annex 2.6: Weapons and ammunition in the possession of Al-ShabaabAnnex 2.6: Weapons and ammunition in the possession of Al-Shabaab
Since July 2018, the Panel of Experts has traced the origins of a number of arms, ammunition, and other materiel used by Al-Shabaab in a range of attacks within Somalia and Kenya.Since July 2018, the Panel of Experts has traced the origins of a number of arms, ammunition, and other materiel used by Al-Shabaab in a range of attacks within Somalia and Kenya.
The following materiel documented by the Panel has characteristics consistent with materiel used by or delivered to the FGS or AMISOM forces.The following materiel documented by the Panel has characteristics consistent with materiel used by or delivered to the FGS or AMISOM forces.
81-mm mortars81-mm mortars
Since July 2018, Al-Shabaab has conducted three attacks in Mogadishu using 81-mm mortars:Since July 2018, Al-Shabaab has conducted three attacks in Mogadishu using 81-mm mortars:
(a)(a)
On 1 July 2018, five to seven mortar rounds landed near the airport’s Jazeera gate;On 1 July 2018, five to seven mortar rounds landed near the airport’s Jazeera gate;
(b)(b)
On 1 January 2019, seven mortar rounds aimed at the UN compound within the Mogadishu International Airport complex;On 1 January 2019, seven mortar rounds aimed at the UN compound within the Mogadishu International Airport complex;
(c)(c)
On 2 March 2019, at least two mortar rounds hit Villa Somalia, the official residence and workplace of the President of Somalia.On 2 March 2019, at least two mortar rounds hit Villa Somalia, the official residence and workplace of the President of Somalia.
In correspondence with the SEMG in August 2018, and to the Panel on 18 March 2019, the United Kingdom confirmed that the cartridges of the 81-mm mortar rounds documented in the attacks had been manufactured by the Royal Ordnance Factory, now part of BAE systems plc, in 1975 and 1976.In correspondence with the SEMG in August 2018, and to the Panel on 18 March 2019, the United Kingdom confirmed that the cartridges of the 81-mm mortar rounds documented in the attacks had been manufactured by the Royal Ordnance Factory, now part of BAE systems plc, in 1975 and 1976.
However, BAE was unable to provide records to assist with the Panel’s investigation given the antiquated nature of the materiel.However, BAE was unable to provide records to assist with the Panel’s investigation given the antiquated nature of the materiel.
According to the Defence publication IHS Jane’s, Kenya is the only troop contributing country in AMISOM equipped with 81-mm mortars.According to the Defence publication IHS Jane’s, Kenya is the only troop contributing country in AMISOM equipped with 81-mm mortars.
Furthermore, the SEMG reported on the capture by Al-Shabaab of 81-mm mortars following an attack on 27 January 2017 against a KDF forward operating base at Kulbiyow, on the Kenya-Somalia border (see S/2017/924, para. 21).Furthermore, the SEMG reported on the capture by Al-Shabaab of 81-mm mortars following an attack on 27 January 2017 against a KDF forward operating base at Kulbiyow, on the Kenya-Somalia border (see S/2017/924, para. 21).
The Panel therefore requested the assistance of the Kenyan Government on 18 March 2019 in providing additional information on 81-mm mortar tubes and rounds that may have been seized by Al-Shabaab during attacks perpetrated against the KDF in Somalia.The Panel therefore requested the assistance of the Kenyan Government on 18 March 2019 in providing additional information on 81-mm mortar tubes and rounds that may have been seized by Al-Shabaab during attacks perpetrated against the KDF in Somalia.
At the time of writing, the Panel had not received a response.At the time of writing, the Panel had not received a response.
Figures 1-4, below, display photographs of mortars casings recovered from the scenes of two attacks.Figures 1-4, below, display photographs of mortars casings recovered from the scenes of two attacks.
Figure 1: Base stamp from a primary propelling cartridge of one of the recovered fin assemblies from the 1 July 2018 attack on the airport’s Jazeera gate.Figure 1: Base stamp from a primary propelling cartridge of one of the recovered fin assemblies from the 1 July 2018 attack on the airport’s Jazeera gate.
Figures 2, 3 and 4: Photographs of a mortar casing from the 2 March 2019 attack on Villa Somalia.Figures 2, 3 and 4: Photographs of a mortar casing from the 2 March 2019 attack on Villa Somalia.
Pistol Luger K100 Grand PowerPistol Luger K100 Grand Power
On 27 January 2019, a police officer was killed by an Al-Shabaab operative in Yaqshid District, Mogadishu.On 27 January 2019, a police officer was killed by an Al-Shabaab operative in Yaqshid District, Mogadishu.
The pistol used for this attack is a 9-mm Luger pistol K100 manufactured by Grand Power LLD based in Slovakia, serial number K050020.The pistol used for this attack is a 9-mm Luger pistol K100 manufactured by Grand Power LLD based in Slovakia, serial number K050020.
The Panel traced this pistol as part of the consignment of 510 pistols delivered by the UAE to the FGS in September 2014.18The Panel traced this pistol as part of the consignment of 510 pistols delivered by the UAE to the FGS in September 2014.18
Figure 5: 9-mm Luger Grand Power K 100 pistol bearing serial K050020.Figure 5: 9-mm Luger Grand Power K 100 pistol bearing serial K050020.
9-mm Norinco CF 98-9 pistol9-mm Norinco CF 98-9 pistol
18 Advance delivery notification from the UAE dated 5 September 2014.18 Advance delivery notification from the UAE dated 5 September 2014.
This consignment was reportedly to be delivered to the FGS on 13 September 2014, but no post-delivery confirmation was sent to the Committee.This consignment was reportedly to be delivered to the FGS on 13 September 2014, but no post-delivery confirmation was sent to the Committee.
On 16 August 2019 at 15:00 UTC+3, four Al-Shabaab operatives attacked an official from the FGS Ministry of Education in Bakara Market.On 16 August 2019 at 15:00 UTC+3, four Al-Shabaab operatives attacked an official from the FGS Ministry of Education in Bakara Market.
The official survived the attack, but the four Al-Shabaab operatives were killed.The official survived the attack, but the four Al-Shabaab operatives were killed.
One pistol retrieved from the scene hadOne pistol retrieved from the scene had
characteristics consistent with Norinco 9-mm CF 98-9 pistols delivered to the FGS in June 2018.19characteristics consistent with Norinco 9-mm CF 98-9 pistols delivered to the FGS in June 2018.19
Figure 6: 9-mm Norinco pistol bearing serial number 15-CN 006321 recovered from the scene of an attempted Al-Shabaab assassination on 16 August 2019.Figure 6: 9-mm Norinco pistol bearing serial number 15-CN 006321 recovered from the scene of an attempted Al-Shabaab assassination on 16 August 2019.
9-mm Luger ammunition9-mm Luger ammunition
Luger 9-mm bullet casings were recovered from the scene of an Al-Shabaab assassination of an alleged NISA informant, whose identity is unknown, on 28 July 2019 in Mogadishu’s Kahda district.20Luger 9-mm bullet casings were recovered from the scene of an Al-Shabaab assassination of an alleged NISA informant, whose identity is unknown, on 28 July 2019 in Mogadishu’s Kahda district.20
Figure 7: Cases of 9mm bullets with headstamps showing “ZVS 9mm Luger”.Figure 7: Cases of 9mm bullets with headstamps showing “ZVS 9mm Luger”.
According to the notifications on file with the Panel, at least 190,000 rounds of 9-mm Luger was delivered to the FGS in 2014 and 2015.21 The SEMG documented this type of ammunition during an inspection of Halane Central Armoury on 26 April 2017.According to the notifications on file with the Panel, at least 190,000 rounds of 9-mm Luger was delivered to the FGS in 2014 and 2015.21 The SEMG documented this type of ammunition during an inspection of Halane Central Armoury on 26 April 2017.
According to the Panel’s sources and to a confidential report seen by the Panel in August 2019, 9-mm Luger ammunition is readily available in Mogadish arms markets.According to the Panel’s sources and to a confidential report seen by the Panel in August 2019, 9-mm Luger ammunition is readily available in Mogadish arms markets.
19 Post-delivery confirmation dated 18 July 2018.19 Post-delivery confirmation dated 18 July 2018.
20 Confidential report from a private company operating in Mogadishu, August 2019.20 Confidential report from a private company operating in Mogadishu, August 2019.
21 Advance delivery notifications from the UAE dated 5 September 2014 and 7 May 2015.21 Advance delivery notifications from the UAE dated 5 September 2014 and 7 May 2015.
Figure 8: 9-mm Luger ammunition photographed by the SEMG at Halane Central Armoury, 26 April 2017.Figure 8: 9-mm Luger ammunition photographed by the SEMG at Halane Central Armoury, 26 April 2017.
Sahafi Hotel attackSahafi Hotel attack
On 9 November 2018, Al-Shabaab detonated three VBIEDs outside the Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu.22 At least 50 people were killed and 100 injured in the attack, making it the deadliest since the 14 October 2017 attack, which killed almost 600.On 9 November 2018, Al-Shabaab detonated three VBIEDs outside the Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu.22 At least 50 people were killed and 100 injured in the attack, making it the deadliest since the 14 October 2017 attack, which killed almost 600.
An AK-pattern assault rifle recovered from one of the gunmen had markings consistent with materiel imported by the FGS in July 2017.23 At least two unexploded hand grenades also captured from the gunmen bore markings almost identical to those on several hand grenades seized from Al-Shabaab in Bulo Mareer by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces in March 2018.24An AK-pattern assault rifle recovered from one of the gunmen had markings consistent with materiel imported by the FGS in July 2017.23 At least two unexploded hand grenades also captured from the gunmen bore markings almost identical to those on several hand grenades seized from Al-Shabaab in Bulo Mareer by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces in March 2018.24
22 Al-Shabaab had previously attacked the hotel on 1 November 2015, killing at least 24 civilians and injuring 30 others.22 Al-Shabaab had previously attacked the hotel on 1 November 2015, killing at least 24 civilians and injuring 30 others.
23 Consignment from the People’s Republic of China delivered in July 2017 (notified 2 February 2018).23 Consignment from the People’s Republic of China delivered in July 2017 (notified 2 February 2018).
24 See S/2018/1002 paras 47-49.24 See S/2018/1002 paras 47-49.
Both hand grenades bear the factory marking 349, corresponding to a factory in St. Petersburg.Both hand grenades bear the factory marking 349, corresponding to a factory in St. Petersburg.
The grenades captured by Ugandan forces had been manufactured in 1980, while those captured from the Sahafi hotel attack had been manufactured in 1979.The grenades captured by Ugandan forces had been manufactured in 1980, while those captured from the Sahafi hotel attack had been manufactured in 1979.
Figure 9: AK-pattern assault rifle recovered from one of the Sahafi Hotel gunmen had markings consistent with materiel imported by the FGS in July 2017.Figure 9: AK-pattern assault rifle recovered from one of the Sahafi Hotel gunmen had markings consistent with materiel imported by the FGS in July 2017.
Figures 10 and 11: Unexploded hand grenades captured from gunmen at Sahafi Hotel (l).Figures 10 and 11: Unexploded hand grenades captured from gunmen at Sahafi Hotel (l).
Markings of the hand grenade are almost identical to a hand grenade pin seized from Al-Shabaab in Bulo Mareer by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces in March 2018 (r).Markings of the hand grenade are almost identical to a hand grenade pin seized from Al-Shabaab in Bulo Mareer by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces in March 2018 (r).
DusitD2 attackDusitD2 attack
A Type 56-2 rifle was recovered from one of the deceased gunmen who carried out an attack at the DusitD2 complex in Nairobi on 15 January 2019, bearing serial number 412222.A Type 56-2 rifle was recovered from one of the deceased gunmen who carried out an attack at the DusitD2 complex in Nairobi on 15 January 2019, bearing serial number 412222.
The serial number and factory marking likely indicates that the weapon originated in a consignment of 3,500 Type 56-2 rifles purchased by the FGS from the Government of Ethiopia in July 2013, following the partial lifting of the arms embargo.25 Additional details on this rifle are provided in annex 1.6.The serial number and factory marking likely indicates that the weapon originated in a consignment of 3,500 Type 56-2 rifles purchased by the FGS from the Government of Ethiopia in July 2013, following the partial lifting of the arms embargo.25 Additional details on this rifle are provided in annex 1.6.
25 The consignment was notified to the Committee on 29 July 2013.25 The consignment was notified to the Committee on 29 July 2013.
Figure 12: Type 56-2 (serial number 412222) used in the DusitD2 attack in Nairobi on 15 January 2019.Figure 12: Type 56-2 (serial number 412222) used in the DusitD2 attack in Nairobi on 15 January 2019.
SNA armoured vehicle seized by Al-ShabaabSNA armoured vehicle seized by Al-Shabaab
On 26 January 2019, Al-Shabaab-affiliated media released photographs of an armoured vehicle allegedly seized from the SNA by Al-Shabaab in Lower Shabelle.26 The vehicle is consistent with those delivered to the FGS in August 2017, namely Tiger Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC).27On 26 January 2019, Al-Shabaab-affiliated media released photographs of an armoured vehicle allegedly seized from the SNA by Al-Shabaab in Lower Shabelle.26 The vehicle is consistent with those delivered to the FGS in August 2017, namely Tiger Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC).27
26 See Som Tribune “Al Shabaab Releases Pictures of Captured Somalia Army APC”, 27 January 2019, available from https://www.somtribune.com/2019/01/27/al-shabaab-releases-pictures-of-captured-somalia-army-apc.26 See Som Tribune “Al Shabaab Releases Pictures of Captured Somalia Army APC”, 27 January 2019, available from https://www.somtribune.com/2019/01/27/al-shabaab-releases-pictures-of-captured-somalia-army-apc.
27 Post-delivery confirmation dated 2 February 2018 of a shipment of military equipment donated by the People’s Republic of China and delivered to the FGS in July 2017.27 Post-delivery confirmation dated 2 February 2018 of a shipment of military equipment donated by the People’s Republic of China and delivered to the FGS in July 2017.
Figure 13: APC in the possession of Al-Shabaab.Figure 13: APC in the possession of Al-Shabaab.
Figures 14 and 15: SNA markings on the APC (left) and SNA number plate (right).Figures 14 and 15: SNA markings on the APC (left) and SNA number plate (right).
Annex 2.6.1: El Salini and Moqokiri attacks on the SNAAnnex 2.6.1: El Salini and Moqokiri attacks on the SNA
On 22 September 2019, Al-Shabaab conducted a complex attack on the El Salini (Ceel Saliini) SNA base, located approximately 30 km west of Mogadishu in Marka district, which the group claimed resulted in the deaths of 23 SNA soldiers.28 Photographs subsequently released by Al-Shabaab-affiliated media outlets depicted the seizure of military vehicles, Type 85 anti-aircraft machine guns, and ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns with characteristics consistent with materiel imported or owned by the FGS.29On 22 September 2019, Al-Shabaab conducted a complex attack on the El Salini (Ceel Saliini) SNA base, located approximately 30 km west of Mogadishu in Marka district, which the group claimed resulted in the deaths of 23 SNA soldiers.28 Photographs subsequently released by Al-Shabaab-affiliated media outlets depicted the seizure of military vehicles, Type 85 anti-aircraft machine guns, and ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns with characteristics consistent with materiel imported or owned by the FGS.29
Figure 1: Two military vehicles with characteristics consistent with ACM 80 (FIAT 6613) trucks notified to the Committee by Italy in February 2015 (r);Figure 1: Two military vehicles with characteristics consistent with ACM 80 (FIAT 6613) trucks notified to the Committee by Italy in February 2015 (r);
and two Toyota Landcruiser single cabin vehicles equipped with a mounted 12.7-mm machine-gun DShK, matching characteristics of vehicles delivered to the FGS by Egypt in July 2016 (l).and two Toyota Landcruiser single cabin vehicles equipped with a mounted 12.7-mm machine-gun DShK, matching characteristics of vehicles delivered to the FGS by Egypt in July 2016 (l).
Figure 2: Wooden crate reportedly captured by Al-Shabaab at El Salini, bearing the number Y072-7A-061.Figure 2: Wooden crate reportedly captured by Al-Shabaab at El Salini, bearing the number Y072-7A-061.
28 Reuters, “Somalia’s al Shabaab raid military base, loot weapons”, 22 September 2019.28 Reuters, “Somalia’s al Shabaab raid military base, loot weapons”, 22 September 2019.
Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-violence/somalias-al-shabaab-raid-military-base-loot-weapons-idUSKBN1W70CG.Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-violence/somalias-al-shabaab-raid-military-base-loot-weapons-idUSKBN1W70CG.
29 Amiirnuur, “Sawirro: Al-Shabaab Oo baahiyay Sawirrada Dagaalkii Ceel Saliini (Al-Shabaab releases photos of El Salini battle)”, 23 September 2019.29 Amiirnuur, “Sawirro: Al-Shabaab Oo baahiyay Sawirrada Dagaalkii Ceel Saliini (Al-Shabaab releases photos of El Salini battle)”, 23 September 2019.
Available at http://www.amiirnuur.com/?p=6281.Available at http://www.amiirnuur.com/?p=6281.
Figures 3, 4, and 5: Wooden crates and packing list from a consignment of Type 85 anti-aircraft machine guns delivered by the People’s Republic of China to the FGS on 17 August 2017 and photographed in Halane Central Armoury by the SEMG on 29 August 2017.Figures 3, 4, and 5: Wooden crates and packing list from a consignment of Type 85 anti-aircraft machine guns delivered by the People’s Republic of China to the FGS on 17 August 2017 and photographed in Halane Central Armoury by the SEMG on 29 August 2017.
The crate identification number depicted in Figure 2, above, is consistent with the sequence of identification numbers from this consignment.The crate identification number depicted in Figure 2, above, is consistent with the sequence of identification numbers from this consignment.
Figure 6: Tanker seized by Al-Shabaab with characteristics consistent with 20 5M925 fuel/water tankers notified to the Committee in March 2016 by the United States.Figure 6: Tanker seized by Al-Shabaab with characteristics consistent with 20 5M925 fuel/water tankers notified to the Committee in March 2016 by the United States.
According to the photographs analyzed by the Panel, Al-Shabaab also captured an anti- ZU-23-2 aircraft autocannon, with an effective firing range of two and a half kilometres.According to the photographs analyzed by the Panel, Al-Shabaab also captured an anti- ZU-23-2 aircraft autocannon, with an effective firing range of two and a half kilometres.
According to the Defence publication IHS Jane’s, the SNA is equipped with 88 ZU-23-2s.30 The Panel has no knowledge of how many of these ZU-23-2 are currently serviceable.According to the Defence publication IHS Jane’s, the SNA is equipped with 88 ZU-23-2s.30 The Panel has no knowledge of how many of these ZU-23-2 are currently serviceable.
Figure 7: An ACM80 mounted with an anti-aircraft twin-barreled autocannon with characteristics consistent with the ZU-23-2s operated by the SNA.Figure 7: An ACM80 mounted with an anti-aircraft twin-barreled autocannon with characteristics consistent with the ZU-23-2s operated by the SNA.
30 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa, “Somalia – Army”, 30 October 2018 (subscription required).30 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa, “Somalia – Army”, 30 October 2018 (subscription required).
Moqokori attackMoqokori attack
On 6 June 2019, Al-Shabaab-affiliated media released photographs allegedly related to an attack carried out against the Moqokori SNA military base, in Hiran district, that had taken place on 1 June 2018.31On 6 June 2019, Al-Shabaab-affiliated media released photographs allegedly related to an attack carried out against the Moqokori SNA military base, in Hiran district, that had taken place on 1 June 2018.31
Photographs released on Al-Shabaab media clearly show wooden munition crates that the Panel of Experts traced to assault rifle and heavy machine gun ammunition distributed to the SNA and also documented by the SEMG in July 2018 the SNA Sector 60 armoury in Baidoa.Photographs released on Al-Shabaab media clearly show wooden munition crates that the Panel of Experts traced to assault rifle and heavy machine gun ammunition distributed to the SNA and also documented by the SEMG in July 2018 the SNA Sector 60 armoury in Baidoa.
Figure 8: Ammunition crates reportedly seized by Al-Shabaab during the Maqokori attack bearing identification number Y072-4A 94/2174.Figure 8: Ammunition crates reportedly seized by Al-Shabaab during the Maqokori attack bearing identification number Y072-4A 94/2174.
Figure 9: 11 crates of 7.62 x 39-mm ammunition documented by the SEMG on 11 July 2018 in the SNA Sector 60 armoury, Baidoa, bearing the identification number YO72-4A - XX/2174.Figure 9: 11 crates of 7.62 x 39-mm ammunition documented by the SEMG on 11 July 2018 in the SNA Sector 60 armoury, Baidoa, bearing the identification number YO72-4A - XX/2174.
31 Caroog News, “Daawo sawirrada: alshabaab oo soo bandhigtay hubkii ugu badnaa ee ay dagaal kaga qabsatay ciidamada dawladda soomaaliya”, 6 June 2019.31 Caroog News, “Daawo sawirrada: alshabaab oo soo bandhigtay hubkii ugu badnaa ee ay dagaal kaga qabsatay ciidamada dawladda soomaaliya”, 6 June 2019.
Available at http://www.caroog.net/daawo-sawirrada-alshabaab-oo-soo-bandhigtay-hubkii-ugu-badnaa-ee-ay-dagaal-kaga-qabsatay-ciidamada-dawladda-soomaaliya/.Available at http://www.caroog.net/daawo-sawirrada-alshabaab-oo-soo-bandhigtay-hubkii-ugu-badnaa-ee-ay-dagaal-kaga-qabsatay-ciidamada-dawladda-soomaaliya/.
Figure 10: Ammunition crates reportedly seized by Al-Shabaab during the Maqokori attack, bearing lot numbers 2017-9631.Figure 10: Ammunition crates reportedly seized by Al-Shabaab during the Maqokori attack, bearing lot numbers 2017-9631.
Figure 11: Wooden crate of 12.7 x 108-mm ammunition documented by the SEMG on 11 July 2018 in the Sector 60 armoury, Baidoa, bearing lot number 1-2017-9631.Figure 11: Wooden crate of 12.7 x 108-mm ammunition documented by the SEMG on 11 July 2018 in the Sector 60 armoury, Baidoa, bearing lot number 1-2017-9631.
Figure 12: Wooden crates of 12.7 x 108-mm ammunition bearing the same lot numbers 1-2017-9631 and 2-2017-9631, documented in Halane central armoury by the SEMG on 29 August 2017.Figure 12: Wooden crates of 12.7 x 108-mm ammunition bearing the same lot numbers 1-2017-9631 and 2-2017-9631, documented in Halane central armoury by the SEMG on 29 August 2017.
This ammunition was delivered to the FGS by the People’s Republic of China on 17 August 2017.This ammunition was delivered to the FGS by the People’s Republic of China on 17 August 2017.
Annex 2.7: FGS report pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018)Annex 2.7: FGS report pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018)
The periodic report pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018) was received from the FGS on 15 March 2019, in accordance with the mandated deadline.The periodic report pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018) was received from the FGS on 15 March 2019, in accordance with the mandated deadline.
However, the report lacked elements of the mandatory reporting originally stipulated by paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014), particularly as regards the structure, composition, strength and disposition of FGS security forces, including the status of regional and militia forces.However, the report lacked elements of the mandatory reporting originally stipulated by paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014), particularly as regards the structure, composition, strength and disposition of FGS security forces, including the status of regional and militia forces.
The Panel found some discrepancies regarding the numbers displayed in the structure of the Somali security forces, notably for the Somali Police (see “Somali Police Force (SPF)”, below) and the regional forces.The Panel found some discrepancies regarding the numbers displayed in the structure of the Somali security forces, notably for the Somali Police (see “Somali Police Force (SPF)”, below) and the regional forces.
Additionally, the report failed to provide the strength of the various SNA units.Additionally, the report failed to provide the strength of the various SNA units.
The Panel also noted that the numbering of the SNA units is continually changing, making it difficult to obtain a reliable operational picture of the SNA from one report to the next.The Panel also noted that the numbering of the SNA units is continually changing, making it difficult to obtain a reliable operational picture of the SNA from one report to the next.
The report also failed to provide details on the weapons and ammunition distributed to units within the last six months, as requested in paragraph 24 of resolution 2444 (2018).The report also failed to provide details on the weapons and ammunition distributed to units within the last six months, as requested in paragraph 24 of resolution 2444 (2018).
Nevertheless, the report announced several measures that would constitute progress regarding the accountability of the Somali national security forces, including the finalization of the biometric registration of the SNA and the promulgation of a Presidential decree dated 26 September 2018, formalizing the distribution of weapons to all Somali security institutions.Nevertheless, the report announced several measures that would constitute progress regarding the accountability of the Somali national security forces, including the finalization of the biometric registration of the SNA and the promulgation of a Presidential decree dated 26 September 2018, formalizing the distribution of weapons to all Somali security institutions.
The Panel has obtained a copy of this decree, which aims to establish proper mechanisms and good practices regarding the distribution of weapons and ammunition, notably the registration of all weapons, regular inspections of armouries, and the submission by the FMSs and security agencies to the National Security Council of their needs and their “action plans”.The Panel has obtained a copy of this decree, which aims to establish proper mechanisms and good practices regarding the distribution of weapons and ammunition, notably the registration of all weapons, regular inspections of armouries, and the submission by the FMSs and security agencies to the National Security Council of their needs and their “action plans”.
However, the Panel has not yet obtained the “Arms and Ammunitions Control Procedure” which was reportedly attached to this decree.However, the Panel has not yet obtained the “Arms and Ammunitions Control Procedure” which was reportedly attached to this decree.
Somali Police Force (SPF)Somali Police Force (SPF)
The Panel has noted inconsistencies in the 15 March 2019 FGS report with respect to the strength of SPF divisions.The Panel has noted inconsistencies in the 15 March 2019 FGS report with respect to the strength of SPF divisions.
For instance, Table II.III provides the strength of the entire SPF, across five regions;For instance, Table II.III provides the strength of the entire SPF, across five regions;
while the individual entries add up to a total of 7,157 officers, the total provided in the table is 13,874 (see figure 1, below).while the individual entries add up to a total of 7,157 officers, the total provided in the table is 13,874 (see figure 1, below).
Figure 1: Strength of the Somali Police Force as provided on page 3 of the FGS report pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018).Figure 1: Strength of the Somali Police Force as provided on page 3 of the FGS report pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018).
In a second table outlining the strength of the SPF as of 15 March 2019, the total number of personnel is given as 14,769 (see figure 2, below).In a second table outlining the strength of the SPF as of 15 March 2019, the total number of personnel is given as 14,769 (see figure 2, below).
Most notably, the strength of the Benadir Division is reported to be 12,032, contrasting with the first table’s figure of 4,500.Most notably, the strength of the Benadir Division is reported to be 12,032, contrasting with the first table’s figure of 4,500.
The reported strengths of the other SPF divisions are also inconsistent – although the discrepancies are far less significant – from the first table to the second.The reported strengths of the other SPF divisions are also inconsistent – although the discrepancies are far less significant – from the first table to the second.
Figure 2: Strength of the Somali Police Force as provided in Annex 03-A of the FGS report pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018).Figure 2: Strength of the Somali Police Force as provided in Annex 03-A of the FGS report pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018).
Joint Verification Team (JVT)Joint Verification Team (JVT)
32 Resolution 2182 (2014), paragraph 7.32 Resolution 2182 (2014), paragraph 7.
See S/2015/801, annex 7.5 and paras. 110-111 for background on the establishment of the JVT.See S/2015/801, annex 7.5 and paras. 110-111 for background on the establishment of the JVT.
The Joint Verification Team (JVT) was mandated under resolution 2182 (2014) to conduct routine inspections of Government security forces’ stockpiles, inventory records, and the supply chain of weapons, and provide its findings to the Committee.32 Between October 2018 and February 2019, the JVT reported documenting 381 weapons over the course of 16 site visits to 15 of the 17 Benadir district police stations as well as the SPF headquarters.The Joint Verification Team (JVT) was mandated under resolution 2182 (2014) to conduct routine inspections of Government security forces’ stockpiles, inventory records, and the supply chain of weapons, and provide its findings to the Committee.32 Between October 2018 and February 2019, the JVT reported documenting 381 weapons over the course of 16 site visits to 15 of the 17 Benadir district police stations as well as the SPF headquarters.
According to the SPF’s own records, obtained by the JVT, the SPF in Benadir region are in possession of 3,929 functioning weapons, corresponding to a total of either 4,500 or 12,032 officers, depending on which FGS accounting is accurate (see figures 1 and 2, above).According to the SPF’s own records, obtained by the JVT, the SPF in Benadir region are in possession of 3,929 functioning weapons, corresponding to a total of either 4,500 or 12,032 officers, depending on which FGS accounting is accurate (see figures 1 and 2, above).
Since the JVT report did not cross-reference the serial numbers of the weaponsSince the JVT report did not cross-reference the serial numbers of the weapons
they documented with the SPF distribution records, it was not possible for the Panel to assess the SPF’s arms management procedures.they documented with the SPF distribution records, it was not possible for the Panel to assess the SPF’s arms management procedures.
Annex 2.8: Supply of weapons and ammunition by MetECAnnex 2.8: Supply of weapons and ammunition by MetEC
During a meeting with executives from the Ethiopian State-owned Metals and Engineering Corporation (MetEC) on 4 April 2019 in Addis Ababa, the Panel of Experts was permitted to view hundreds of pages of documentation detailing arms and ammunition sales to the FGS and every regional administration in Somalia over the course of the preceding decade.During a meeting with executives from the Ethiopian State-owned Metals and Engineering Corporation (MetEC) on 4 April 2019 in Addis Ababa, the Panel of Experts was permitted to view hundreds of pages of documentation detailing arms and ammunition sales to the FGS and every regional administration in Somalia over the course of the preceding decade.
The Panel photographed two pages of this documentation, at random, which provided a small snapshot of sales dating from 2013 to 2015 to the FGS, Somaliland, Jubbaland, South-West State, and the Dollow district administration (see figures 1 and 2, below).The Panel photographed two pages of this documentation, at random, which provided a small snapshot of sales dating from 2013 to 2015 to the FGS, Somaliland, Jubbaland, South-West State, and the Dollow district administration (see figures 1 and 2, below).
These two documents detail sales of weapons and ammunition totalling approximately $3.1 million and comprising 4,600 AK-pattern rifles, over 2 million rounds of AK-pattern ammunition, over 600,000 rounds of PKM ammunition, and over 70,000 rounds of 12.7-mm ammunition, amongst others (see table 1, below).These two documents detail sales of weapons and ammunition totalling approximately $3.1 million and comprising 4,600 AK-pattern rifles, over 2 million rounds of AK-pattern ammunition, over 600,000 rounds of PKM ammunition, and over 70,000 rounds of 12.7-mm ammunition, amongst others (see table 1, below).
Approximately $2.0 million of this materiel was destined for the FGS, with the remainder supplied to regional or district administrations.Approximately $2.0 million of this materiel was destined for the FGS, with the remainder supplied to regional or district administrations.
The material supplied to the FGS appear to have formed part of consignments correctly notified to the Committee in 2013 and 2015,33 although the Panel observed some discrepancies, including NP-17 pistols that do not appear to have been notified (see figure 1, below).The material supplied to the FGS appear to have formed part of consignments correctly notified to the Committee in 2013 and 2015,33 although the Panel observed some discrepancies, including NP-17 pistols that do not appear to have been notified (see figure 1, below).
By contrast, no weapons or ammunition supplied to regional or district administrations were notified to the Sanctions Committee.By contrast, no weapons or ammunition supplied to regional or district administrations were notified to the Sanctions Committee.
MetEC executives informed the Panel they did not believe that the provision of arms to regional administrations had constituted a violation of the arms embargo.34MetEC executives informed the Panel they did not believe that the provision of arms to regional administrations had constituted a violation of the arms embargo.34
In one sale consisting of PKM light machine guns, PKM ammunition, and NP-17 pistols to the Jubbaland administration in 2013, the MetEC document indicates that that materiel was supplied “by request of MOND”, referring to the Ethiopian Ministry of National Defense (see figure 2, below).In one sale consisting of PKM light machine guns, PKM ammunition, and NP-17 pistols to the Jubbaland administration in 2013, the MetEC document indicates that that materiel was supplied “by request of MOND”, referring to the Ethiopian Ministry of National Defense (see figure 2, below).
The Panel also obtained an end user certificate, supplied by the Somaliland administration to MetEC dated 28 September 2014 (see figure 3, below).The Panel also obtained an end user certificate, supplied by the Somaliland administration to MetEC dated 28 September 2014 (see figure 3, below).
When shown this document, MetEC officials informed the Panel that the company’s policy had been to consider Somaliland and Puntland as “sovereign states”.35When shown this document, MetEC officials informed the Panel that the company’s policy had been to consider Somaliland and Puntland as “sovereign states”.35
Table 1: Sample of arms and ammunition supplied by MetEC, 2013-2015.Table 1: Sample of arms and ammunition supplied by MetEC, 2013-2015.
ItemItem
TypeType
QuantityQuantity
Sale valueSale value
AK-pattern rifleAK-pattern rifle
7.62 x 39-mm7.62 x 39-mm
WeaponWeapon
4,6004,600
$1,104,000$1,104,000
AmmunitionAmmunition
2,243,8002,243,800
$673,140$673,140
MagazineMagazine
3,3003,300
$39,600$39,600
Heavy Machine GunHeavy Machine Gun
12.7-mm12.7-mm
WeaponWeapon
7272
$165,522$165,522
AmmunitionAmmunition
71,13071,130
$248,975$248,975
Light Machine Gun PKM 7.62-mmLight Machine Gun PKM 7.62-mm
WeaponWeapon
280280
$297,085$297,085
AmmunitionAmmunition
609,000609,000
$200,970$200,970
NP-17 9-mm pistolNP-17 9-mm pistol
WeaponWeapon
152152
$37,360$37,360
AmmunitionAmmunition
3,9123,912
$7,295$7,295
33 Notifications received 29 July 2013 and 24 February 2015.33 Notifications received 29 July 2013 and 24 February 2015.
No pistols or pistol ammunition were notified as part of these consignments.No pistols or pistol ammunition were notified as part of these consignments.
34 Interviews with two MetEC executives in Addis Ababa, 4 April 2019.34 Interviews with two MetEC executives in Addis Ababa, 4 April 2019.
35 Ibid.35 Ibid.
MagazineMagazine
262262
$7,624$7,624
Heavy Machine GunHeavy Machine Gun
14.5-mm14.5-mm
WeaponWeapon
55
$85,000$85,000
AmmunitionAmmunition
6,0006,000
$27,000$27,000
Rocket-Propelled GrenadeRocket-Propelled Grenade
RPG launcherRPG launcher
4040
$79,800$79,800
RPG roundRPG round
700700
$142,555$142,555
Total sale valueTotal sale value
$3,115,925$3,115,925
Figure 1: Arms and ammunition sales by MetEC to the FGS, Somaliland, Jubbaland, and Dollow district administration, 2013-2015.Figure 1: Arms and ammunition sales by MetEC to the FGS, Somaliland, Jubbaland, and Dollow district administration, 2013-2015.
Figure 2: Arms and ammunition sales by MetEC to the FGS, Jubbaland, Somaliland, and South-West State, 2013-2015.Figure 2: Arms and ammunition sales by MetEC to the FGS, Jubbaland, Somaliland, and South-West State, 2013-2015.
Figure 3: End user certificate dated 28 September 2014, provided by the Somaliland administration to MetEC.Figure 3: End user certificate dated 28 September 2014, provided by the Somaliland administration to MetEC.
Annex 2.9: UAE military base in BerberaAnnex 2.9: UAE military base in Berbera
Figure 1: Berbera airport and military base under construction, 21 September 2018.Figure 1: Berbera airport and military base under construction, 21 September 2018.
Figure 2: Berbera airport and military base under construction, 8 August 2019, highlighting the completion of the runway and a hangar/barracks facility.Figure 2: Berbera airport and military base under construction, 8 August 2019, highlighting the completion of the runway and a hangar/barracks facility.
Annex 2.10: April 2019 illicit arms shipment into Puntland (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*Annex 2.10: April 2019 illicit arms shipment into Puntland (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*
Annex 2.11: Yemen-Puntland arms smuggling networks (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*Annex 2.11: Yemen-Puntland arms smuggling networks (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*
Annex 3: The PSF and the Puntland Military CourtsAnnex 3: The PSF and the Puntland Military Courts
The Puntland Security Force (PSF) functions as Puntland’s primary counter-terrorism unit, comprising of approximately 600 soldiers who are mentored and supported by the United States of America.1 The Puntland Anti-Terrorism Act, 2011 gives the PSF full authority to “investigate and combat terrorist activities”.2 The PSF reports directly to the President of Puntland, with limited parliamentary oversight.The Puntland Security Force (PSF) functions as Puntland’s primary counter-terrorism unit, comprising of approximately 600 soldiers who are mentored and supported by the United States of America.1 The Puntland Anti-Terrorism Act, 2011 gives the PSF full authority to “investigate and combat terrorist activities”.2 The PSF reports directly to the President of Puntland, with limited parliamentary oversight.
The PSF also manages detention centres in Bosaso,3 while detainees who are charged with terrorism offences are tried before Puntland Military Courts.The PSF also manages detention centres in Bosaso,3 while detainees who are charged with terrorism offences are tried before Puntland Military Courts.
During its mandate, the Panel has received multiple allegations that detainees in PSF custody were subject to torture during detention.During its mandate, the Panel has received multiple allegations that detainees in PSF custody were subject to torture during detention.
The Panel also found that a number of detainees’ confessions were obtained under duress and without legal representation, which were subsequently used for convictions before Puntland Military Courts.The Panel also found that a number of detainees’ confessions were obtained under duress and without legal representation, which were subsequently used for convictions before Puntland Military Courts.
The Panel also found evidence of children convicted by Puntland Military Courts on terrorism charges and accusations of the Military Courts suppressing claims of the PSF’s involvement in torture.The Panel also found evidence of children convicted by Puntland Military Courts on terrorism charges and accusations of the Military Courts suppressing claims of the PSF’s involvement in torture.
Accusations of torture at PSF detention centre in BosasoAccusations of torture at PSF detention centre in Bosaso
From May to July 2019, the Panel interviewed former PSF detainees and their relatives, who stated that they had been exposed to systematic forms of torture and inhumane treatment by PSF officials while in detention at the PSF base in Bosaso.4 The interviewees stated that they were held at the PSF detention centre in Bosaso in February 2017 on terrorism charges.5 According to the detainees, they were blindfolded, naked, tied, and subjected to mock drownings.6 Other detainees stated that the were subjected to electrocution, burned with cigarettes on their genitals, and deprived of sleep and food.7 They also stated that they were kept in solitary confinement in steel containers without toilet facilities or windows.8 The Panel also received reports that detainees were forced to confess for alleged crimes under duress, whereby they were required to sign a declaration of confession and forced to provide a video-recorded confession.9 Interviewees stated that the entire process was conducted under duress with no legal representation present.From May to July 2019, the Panel interviewed former PSF detainees and their relatives, who stated that they had been exposed to systematic forms of torture and inhumane treatment by PSF officials while in detention at the PSF base in Bosaso.4 The interviewees stated that they were held at the PSF detention centre in Bosaso in February 2017 on terrorism charges.5 According to the detainees, they were blindfolded, naked, tied, and subjected to mock drownings.6 Other detainees stated that the were subjected to electrocution, burned with cigarettes on their genitals, and deprived of sleep and food.7 They also stated that they were kept in solitary confinement in steel containers without toilet facilities or windows.8 The Panel also received reports that detainees were forced to confess for alleged crimes under duress, whereby they were required to sign a declaration of confession and forced to provide a video-recorded confession.9 Interviewees stated that the entire process was conducted under duress with no legal representation present.
1 The PSF’s Director is Muhamud Abdullahi Osman “Diano”.1 The PSF’s Director is Muhamud Abdullahi Osman “Diano”.
Members of the “Diano” family hold significant influence within the PSF.Members of the “Diano” family hold significant influence within the PSF.
Ahmed Abdullahi Osman Diano, a brother of the PSF director, is in charge of the PSF sector based in Galkayo.Ahmed Abdullahi Osman Diano, a brother of the PSF director, is in charge of the PSF sector based in Galkayo.
Their mother, Hali Abdullahi, is the head of projects and logistic support to the PSF.Their mother, Hali Abdullahi, is the head of projects and logistic support to the PSF.
2 Article 5 (Security Agencies), (1) and (4), Puntland Anti-Terrorism Act, 2011.2 Article 5 (Security Agencies), (1) and (4), Puntland Anti-Terrorism Act, 2011.
3 The PSF detention centre is under the command of three officers: Abdigani Jamac Muse (“Fandoul”), Dadir Said Sheikh Muhamud, and Ahmed Dhakoo.3 The PSF detention centre is under the command of three officers: Abdigani Jamac Muse (“Fandoul”), Dadir Said Sheikh Muhamud, and Ahmed Dhakoo.
4 Interviews with victims’ relatives on 28 May 2019.4 Interviews with victims’ relatives on 28 May 2019.
Phone interviews with former detainees from Bosaso on 13 July 2018 and 22 July 2018.Phone interviews with former detainees from Bosaso on 13 July 2018 and 22 July 2018.
5 Ibid.5 Ibid.
6 Phone interviews with former detainees from Bosaso, 25 May 2018.6 Phone interviews with former detainees from Bosaso, 25 May 2018.
7 Phone interviews with former detainees from Bosaso, 30 June 2019.7 Phone interviews with former detainees from Bosaso, 30 June 2019.
8 Ibid.8 Ibid.
9 The video recording of confessions in detention centers contradicts international human rights and humanitarian law fair trial standards in Article 14 of the ICCPR;9 The video recording of confessions in detention centers contradicts international human rights and humanitarian law fair trial standards in Article 14 of the ICCPR;
article 3 (d) of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949.article 3 (d) of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Previous reports by local and international human rights organizations also referred to the systematic abuse of detainees at the PSF base in Bosaso.10 Additionally, on 6 June 2017, the SEMG interviewed two suspected members of Al-Shabaab in Bosaso Central Prison, who provided accounts of torture consistent with the Panel’s investigations during the current mandate.Previous reports by local and international human rights organizations also referred to the systematic abuse of detainees at the PSF base in Bosaso.10 Additionally, on 6 June 2017, the SEMG interviewed two suspected members of Al-Shabaab in Bosaso Central Prison, who provided accounts of torture consistent with the Panel’s investigations during the current mandate.
One of the suspects informed the SEMG that while at the PSF base he was regularly beaten, tied, and subject to mock drownings until he confessed to be a member of Al-Shabaab.One of the suspects informed the SEMG that while at the PSF base he was regularly beaten, tied, and subject to mock drownings until he confessed to be a member of Al-Shabaab.
Another detainee, a 16-year-old child, informed the SEMG that he was regularly assaulted by PSF officers during interrogation at the PSF base in Bosaso.Another detainee, a 16-year-old child, informed the SEMG that he was regularly assaulted by PSF officers during interrogation at the PSF base in Bosaso.
Both suspects were executed by Puntland authorities on 30 June 2017.11Both suspects were executed by Puntland authorities on 30 June 2017.11
Romah and halaleenRomah and halaleen
Detainees who confess to terrorism-related charges at the PSF detention centres are transferred to Bosaso Central Prison before facing trial before Puntland military courts, a period known as “romah”.Detainees who confess to terrorism-related charges at the PSF detention centres are transferred to Bosaso Central Prison before facing trial before Puntland military courts, a period known as “romah”.
While remanded in prison, detainees, including children, wear yellow uniforms, while convicted prisoners wear red uniforms.While remanded in prison, detainees, including children, wear yellow uniforms, while convicted prisoners wear red uniforms.
The Puntland Military Courts convict and often execute personnel involved in high-profile terrorism cases.12 However, detainees accused of involvement in lower profile terrorism cases may be released before trial following the intervention of influential clans.The Puntland Military Courts convict and often execute personnel involved in high-profile terrorism cases.12 However, detainees accused of involvement in lower profile terrorism cases may be released before trial following the intervention of influential clans.
These detainees may also avail of the opportunity to purchase their release.13 This process is carried out by brokers who facilitate payments to a network of PSF officers, prison personnel and military court judges to secure the release of the individual;These detainees may also avail of the opportunity to purchase their release.13 This process is carried out by brokers who facilitate payments to a network of PSF officers, prison personnel and military court judges to secure the release of the individual;
a practice known as “halaleen”.14 The Panel carried out a series of interviews with detainees and their families, who informed the group that they had paid $5,000 to secure their releases.15 Other interviewees stated that they paid $50,000 to release a child from Bosaso Central Prison in February 2017.16 If detainees are unable to pay for their release, they will normally be subject to long-term prison sentences or execution following trial.17a practice known as “halaleen”.14 The Panel carried out a series of interviews with detainees and their families, who informed the group that they had paid $5,000 to secure their releases.15 Other interviewees stated that they paid $50,000 to release a child from Bosaso Central Prison in February 2017.16 If detainees are unable to pay for their release, they will normally be subject to long-term prison sentences or execution following trial.17
10 See also Human Rights Watch “It’s Like We’re Always in a Prison: Abuses against boys accused of national security offenses in Somalia”, February 2018.10 See also Human Rights Watch “It’s Like We’re Always in a Prison: Abuses against boys accused of national security offenses in Somalia”, February 2018.
Available atAvailable at
https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/02/21/its-were-always-prison/abuses-against-boys-accused-national-security-offenses.https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/02/21/its-were-always-prison/abuses-against-boys-accused-national-security-offenses.
Also, on 25 February 2017, Maxamed Yuusuf Cali, from the office of Human Right Defenders in Puntland wrote a letter to Puntland authorities referencing “allegations of torture conducted by law enforcement agencies in Puntland”.Also, on 25 February 2017, Maxamed Yuusuf Cali, from the office of Human Right Defenders in Puntland wrote a letter to Puntland authorities referencing “allegations of torture conducted by law enforcement agencies in Puntland”.
11 “Al Shabaab militants executed in Somalia’s Puntland for bomb plots, killings”, Reuters, 30 June 2017.11 “Al Shabaab militants executed in Somalia’s Puntland for bomb plots, killings”, Reuters, 30 June 2017.
Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security/al-shabaab-militants-executed-in-somalias-puntland-for-bomb-plots-killings-idUSKBN19L2AO.Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security/al-shabaab-militants-executed-in-somalias-puntland-for-bomb-plots-killings-idUSKBN19L2AO.
See also S/2017/924, annex 1.4.See also S/2017/924, annex 1.4.
12 See BBC News Somali, “Maxkamad xukun adag ku riday rag lagu eedeeyay dilka madixii DP World ee dekadda Boosaaso” (Court hands down heavy sentences on men accused of killing DP World Bosaso port manager), 29 July 2019.12 See BBC News Somali, “Maxkamad xukun adag ku riday rag lagu eedeeyay dilka madixii DP World ee dekadda Boosaaso” (Court hands down heavy sentences on men accused of killing DP World Bosaso port manager), 29 July 2019.
Available at https://www.bbc.com/somali/war-49150788;Available at https://www.bbc.com/somali/war-49150788;
and Garowe Online, “Madaxii Amniyaatka Al-Shabaab ee Muqdisho oo dil lagu xukumay” (Head of Amniyat is sentenced to death), 29 July 2019.and Garowe Online, “Madaxii Amniyaatka Al-Shabaab ee Muqdisho oo dil lagu xukumay” (Head of Amniyat is sentenced to death), 29 July 2019.
Available fromAvailable from
https://www.garoweonline.com/so/news/madaxii-amniyaatka-al-shabaab-ee-muqdisho-oo-dil-lagu-xukumay.https://www.garoweonline.com/so/news/madaxii-amniyaatka-al-shabaab-ee-muqdisho-oo-dil-lagu-xukumay.
13 Interviews with families of detainees on 30 June 2019 and clan representatives on 25 May 2018.13 Interviews with families of detainees on 30 June 2019 and clan representatives on 25 May 2018.
14 Halaleen: “making release from detention legitimate or legal”.14 Halaleen: “making release from detention legitimate or legal”.
15 Interviews with families of detainees on 30 June 2019.15 Interviews with families of detainees on 30 June 2019.
At the time, the Panel was told that 80 detainees were remanded at Bosaso Central Prison awaiting trial.At the time, the Panel was told that 80 detainees were remanded at Bosaso Central Prison awaiting trial.
16 Interviews with families of detainees and clan representatives on 30 June 2019 and 25 May 2018.16 Interviews with families of detainees and clan representatives on 30 June 2019 and 25 May 2018.
17 Detainees who originate from minority clans are often unable to secure their release through payment.17 Detainees who originate from minority clans are often unable to secure their release through payment.
Military CourtsMilitary Courts
The Puntland Military Courts do not fall under the authority of the Puntland civil judiciary.The Puntland Military Courts do not fall under the authority of the Puntland civil judiciary.
Military personnel are directly appointed by the President of Puntland to serve as judges and are not required to have formal legal training.Military personnel are directly appointed by the President of Puntland to serve as judges and are not required to have formal legal training.
The Puntland Military Court directly appoints their own lawyers to represent the accused in court.The Puntland Military Court directly appoints their own lawyers to represent the accused in court.
However, legal proceedings before military courts are often based on confessions obtained from detainees under duress, who were not afforded the right to legal representation during their detention.18However, legal proceedings before military courts are often based on confessions obtained from detainees under duress, who were not afforded the right to legal representation during their detention.18
The PSF holds significant influence over the Puntland Military Courts under the Puntland Anti-Terrorism Act, 2011.19 The Panel received multiple reports that the Military Courts would fine individuals $1,500 if they criticized the PSF in the court.20The PSF holds significant influence over the Puntland Military Courts under the Puntland Anti-Terrorism Act, 2011.19 The Panel received multiple reports that the Military Courts would fine individuals $1,500 if they criticized the PSF in the court.20
On 25 February 2017, the Military Court found seven children guilty of “offending the military institution” for stating that they had been raped and tortured in PSF custody.On 25 February 2017, the Military Court found seven children guilty of “offending the military institution” for stating that they had been raped and tortured in PSF custody.
Their defense lawyer was also jailed in Bosaso Prison for accusing the PSF of torture.Their defense lawyer was also jailed in Bosaso Prison for accusing the PSF of torture.
Additional legal representatives were also detained when the authorities found that they had revealed accusations regarding PSF torture to international organizations.Additional legal representatives were also detained when the authorities found that they had revealed accusations regarding PSF torture to international organizations.
Conviction of children by Puntland military courtsConviction of children by Puntland military courts
During this mandate, the Panel also noted the previous arrest of four children by PSF on terrorism-related charges.21 As of September 2019, the four children are located at Bosaso Central Prison.During this mandate, the Panel also noted the previous arrest of four children by PSF on terrorism-related charges.21 As of September 2019, the four children are located at Bosaso Central Prison.
One of the children, aged 17 years, was arrested on 1 September 2017 by the PSF in Galkayo, and was convicted by the Puntland Military Courts on 25 April 2018.One of the children, aged 17 years, was arrested on 1 September 2017 by the PSF in Galkayo, and was convicted by the Puntland Military Courts on 25 April 2018.
The other three children, all aged 16 years, were convicted of being members of Al-Shabaab and sentenced by the Military Court of the First Instance in Bosaso on 11 August 2018.The other three children, all aged 16 years, were convicted of being members of Al-Shabaab and sentenced by the Military Court of the First Instance in Bosaso on 11 August 2018.
18 Telephone interview with a lawyer in Bosaso, 29 June 2019.18 Telephone interview with a lawyer in Bosaso, 29 June 2019.
See also Human Rights Watch “It’s Like We’re Always in a Prison: Abuses against boys accused of national security offenses in Somalia”, February 2018.See also Human Rights Watch “It’s Like We’re Always in a Prison: Abuses against boys accused of national security offenses in Somalia”, February 2018.
Available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/02/21/its-were-always-prison/abuses-against-boys-accused-national-security-offenses.Available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/02/21/its-were-always-prison/abuses-against-boys-accused-national-security-offenses.
19 See Article 5 of the Puntland Anti-Terrorism Act, 2011.19 See Article 5 of the Puntland Anti-Terrorism Act, 2011.
20 Telephone interview with a lawyer in Bosaso, 29 June 2019.20 Telephone interview with a lawyer in Bosaso, 29 June 2019.
21 Email communication from UN agencies in Garowe, 9 August 2019.21 Email communication from UN agencies in Garowe, 9 August 2019.
Annex 4: Violations of the charcoal banAnnex 4: Violations of the charcoal ban
Production, transport and stockpilesProduction, transport and stockpiles
Figures 1 and 2: Satellite imagery of Kismayo showing examples of the increase in charcoal stockpiles from 14 October 2018 to 20 August 2019.Figures 1 and 2: Satellite imagery of Kismayo showing examples of the increase in charcoal stockpiles from 14 October 2018 to 20 August 2019.
Illicit export, import and trans-shipmentIllicit export, import and trans-shipment
Figure 3: On 10 August 2018 the MV Best departed Kismayo destined for Iraq carrying 190,000 bags of charcoal with falsified certificates of origin stating the consignment originated in Ghana.Figure 3: On 10 August 2018 the MV Best departed Kismayo destined for Iraq carrying 190,000 bags of charcoal with falsified certificates of origin stating the consignment originated in Ghana.
The exporter was Blue Whale Shipping and Cargo Co.The exporter was Blue Whale Shipping and Cargo Co.
Figure 4: Blue Whale Shipping and Cargo Co. was also identified as the company responsible for trans-shipping Somali charcoal through the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2018 using false certificates of origin stating the charcoal originated from Ghana.Figure 4: Blue Whale Shipping and Cargo Co. was also identified as the company responsible for trans-shipping Somali charcoal through the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2018 using false certificates of origin stating the charcoal originated from Ghana.
Figure 5: In October 2018, the MV Best arrived at Khawr al-Zubayr port, Iraq carrying 190,000 bags of Somali charcoal.Figure 5: In October 2018, the MV Best arrived at Khawr al-Zubayr port, Iraq carrying 190,000 bags of Somali charcoal.
The charcoal was stored at a warehouse in Basra, Iraq.The charcoal was stored at a warehouse in Basra, Iraq.
Figure 6: In early 2019, the charcoal was re-packaged at the warehouse as a product of Iraq, originating with a company, Dar Alahbab Co.Figure 6: In early 2019, the charcoal was re-packaged at the warehouse as a product of Iraq, originating with a company, Dar Alahbab Co.
Figure 7: On 26 January 2019, the vessel Northern Dedication loaded approximately 29,000 bags of the re-bagged charcoal and departed Umm Qasr, Iraq.Figure 7: On 26 January 2019, the vessel Northern Dedication loaded approximately 29,000 bags of the re-bagged charcoal and departed Umm Qasr, Iraq.
The vessel unloaded 9,610 bags of charcoal at Shuwaikh port, Kuwait to a consignee identified as Frontline Logistics Co.The vessel unloaded 9,610 bags of charcoal at Shuwaikh port, Kuwait to a consignee identified as Frontline Logistics Co.
Figure 8: The vessel continued to Dammam port, Saudi Arabia, where 19,242 bags of charcoal were delivered to the consignee, Omar Abdullah Al Faleh.Figure 8: The vessel continued to Dammam port, Saudi Arabia, where 19,242 bags of charcoal were delivered to the consignee, Omar Abdullah Al Faleh.
Figure 9: The trans-shipment of Somali charcoal from Iraq to neighbouring states continued throughout 2019.Figure 9: The trans-shipment of Somali charcoal from Iraq to neighbouring states continued throughout 2019.
For instance, on 7 March 2019, 24,000 bags of the Somali charcoal were trans-shipped via the vessel Nordspring from Umm Qasr, Iraq to Jebel Ali, Dubai, UAE.For instance, on 7 March 2019, 24,000 bags of the Somali charcoal were trans-shipped via the vessel Nordspring from Umm Qasr, Iraq to Jebel Ali, Dubai, UAE.
Figures 10 and 11: Re-bagged Somali charcoal unloading at Shuwaikh port, Kuwait in January 2019, delivered to a consignee identified as Frontline Logistics Co.Figures 10 and 11: Re-bagged Somali charcoal unloading at Shuwaikh port, Kuwait in January 2019, delivered to a consignee identified as Frontline Logistics Co.
False certificates of originFalse certificates of origin
Figure 12: The original charcoal shipment from Somalia to Iraq utilized falsified certificates of origin from Ghana (see figure, 3 above).Figure 12: The original charcoal shipment from Somalia to Iraq utilized falsified certificates of origin from Ghana (see figure, 3 above).
Trans-shipments from Iraq to neighbouring Member States employed falsified certificates of origin stating the charcoal was from Iraq.Trans-shipments from Iraq to neighbouring Member States employed falsified certificates of origin stating the charcoal was from Iraq.
Figure 13: Example of falsified certificates of origin from Iraq.Figure 13: Example of falsified certificates of origin from Iraq.
Criminal networksCriminal networks
In its 2018 report, the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) identified the All Star Group as the principal network involved in charcoal trafficking.In its 2018 report, the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) identified the All Star Group as the principal network involved in charcoal trafficking.
During this mandate, the majority of these actors, including additional individuals also identified below, were active in the illicit charcoal trade by supporting charcoal production in Somalia and facilitating the trans-shipment of charcoal through Iraq.During this mandate, the majority of these actors, including additional individuals also identified below, were active in the illicit charcoal trade by supporting charcoal production in Somalia and facilitating the trans-shipment of charcoal through Iraq.
All Star Group representatives facilitated the trans-shipment of charcoal through Iraq using a UAE-based company, Zuri Coals.All Star Group representatives facilitated the trans-shipment of charcoal through Iraq using a UAE-based company, Zuri Coals.
Zuri Coals, and two associated companies based in Dubai, UAE, also established ties with local agents in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE as detailed below.Zuri Coals, and two associated companies based in Dubai, UAE, also established ties with local agents in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE as detailed below.
All Star Group representatives based in Dubai, UAE:1All Star Group representatives based in Dubai, UAE:1
(a)(a)
Abdisalan Salad Hussein.Abdisalan Salad Hussein.
(b)(b)
Mahad Said Mohamed.Mahad Said Mohamed.
(c)(c)
Basheer Khalif Moosa (Djibouti).Basheer Khalif Moosa (Djibouti).
(d)(d)
Suleyman Adna Farah.Suleyman Adna Farah.
(e)(e)
Hassan Mohamed Ahmed “Masry”.Hassan Mohamed Ahmed “Masry”.
(f)(f)
Norodin Za’aim.Norodin Za’aim.
(g)(g)
Salah Yusuf Yare.Salah Yusuf Yare.
(h)(h)
Deq GariyowDeq Gariyow
(i)(i)
Ahmed Ali Haji.Ahmed Ali Haji.
(j)(j)
Abdishakur Salad Elay.Abdishakur Salad Elay.
(k)(k)
Abdi Salah.Abdi Salah.
(l)(l)
Mohamud Ali Osman “Oonof”.Mohamud Ali Osman “Oonof”.
(m)(m)
Ahmed Mohamed Barre.Ahmed Mohamed Barre.
(n)(n)
Abdirahman Mohamed Warsame “Dhaqalayste”, “BBC”.Abdirahman Mohamed Warsame “Dhaqalayste”, “BBC”.
All Star Group representatives based in Kismayo, Somalia:2All Star Group representatives based in Kismayo, Somalia:2
(a)(a)
Ali Ahmed Naaji.Ali Ahmed Naaji.
(b)(b)
Abdishakur Salad Elay.Abdishakur Salad Elay.
(c)(c)
Hassan Mohamed Yusuf “Awlibaax”.Hassan Mohamed Yusuf “Awlibaax”.
(d)(d)
Farah Jama Awil “Degdeg”.Farah Jama Awil “Degdeg”.
(e)(e)
Muhammad Abdullahi.Muhammad Abdullahi.
(f)(f)
Jama “Dhuxul”.Jama “Dhuxul”.
1 See also S/2018/1002, annex 7.6.1 See also S/2018/1002, annex 7.6.
Additional names in the current report were provided by a Member State and investigations by the Panel.Additional names in the current report were provided by a Member State and investigations by the Panel.
2 See also S/2018/1002, annex 7.6.2 See also S/2018/1002, annex 7.6.
Additional names provided in confidential report by Member State and investigations by the Panel.Additional names provided in confidential report by Member State and investigations by the Panel.
(g)(g)
Ahmed Sahal.Ahmed Sahal.
(h)(h)
Saeed Mahamud “Dheere”.Saeed Mahamud “Dheere”.
Charcoal Facilitation Companies based in UAE:Charcoal Facilitation Companies based in UAE:
(a)(a)
Zuri Coals FZE, PO Box 21158, Ajman, UAE.Zuri Coals FZE, PO Box 21158, Ajman, UAE.
(Zuri coals also operates under a number of aliases including falsified documentation pertaining to Blue Whale Shipping and Cargo Co. Community Number 5, PO Box 1075, Tema, Ghana).(Zuri coals also operates under a number of aliases including falsified documentation pertaining to Blue Whale Shipping and Cargo Co. Community Number 5, PO Box 1075, Tema, Ghana).
Local agents utilized by illicit charcoal networks:Local agents utilized by illicit charcoal networks:
(a)(a)
Al Zaim Coals Trading FZE, Ajman Free Zone, UAE.Al Zaim Coals Trading FZE, Ajman Free Zone, UAE.
(b)(b)
Bayta Akhdar Trading, Basra, Iraq.Bayta Akhdar Trading, Basra, Iraq.
(c)(c)
Dar Al Ahbab Co. Po Box 61006, Al-sakhra Intersection, Palestine Street, Baghdad, Iraq.Dar Al Ahbab Co. Po Box 61006, Al-sakhra Intersection, Palestine Street, Baghdad, Iraq.
(d)(d)
Frontline Logistics Co. PO Box 314, Farwaniya, 81014, Kuwait.Frontline Logistics Co. PO Box 314, Farwaniya, 81014, Kuwait.
(e)(e)
Omar Abdullah Al Faleh For Trading, PO Box 11421, Abu Baker Al Siddeeq Road, Mansoura, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.Omar Abdullah Al Faleh For Trading, PO Box 11421, Abu Baker Al Siddeeq Road, Mansoura, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
Implementation of the banImplementation of the ban
Figure 14 and 15: On 28 August 2018, Iranian authorities declared a moratorium on the import of charcoal originating from Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana.Figure 14 and 15: On 28 August 2018, Iranian authorities declared a moratorium on the import of charcoal originating from Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana.
Figure 16: A letter dated 3 May 2017 from the Djiboutian Embassy in Kuwait to the prosecutor’s office attesting the origin of the Al Sahil shipment to be Djibouti, a claim inconsistent with the evidence collected by the SEMG and the Combined Maritime Forces.Figure 16: A letter dated 3 May 2017 from the Djiboutian Embassy in Kuwait to the prosecutor’s office attesting the origin of the Al Sahil shipment to be Djibouti, a claim inconsistent with the evidence collected by the SEMG and the Combined Maritime Forces.
11
See, most recently, S/2018/1002, annexes 2.2 and 4.2 (strictly confidential).انظر أحدث هذه التقارير بالوثيقة S/2018/1002، المرفقين 2-2 و 4-2 (السريين للغاية).
22
Harun Maruf, “Mogadishu mayor targeted by female bomber”, Voice of America, 9 August 2019.Harun Maruf, “Mogadishu mayor targeted by female bomber”, Voice of America, 9 August 2019.
Available at www.voanews.com/africa/mogadishu-mayor-targeted-female-bomber.يمكن الاطلاع عليه عن طريق هذا الرابط: www.voanews.com/africa/mogadishu-mayor-targeted-female-bomber.
33
A laboratory analysis of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device seized at Elasha Biyaha on 20 July 2017 confirmed the presence of nitroglycerin, potassium nitrate and a component consistent with charcoal.أكد التحليل المختبري لجهاز متفجر يدوي الصنع محمول على مركبة مضبوط في إلاشا بياها في20 تموز/يوليه 2017 وجود مادتي النتروغليسرين ونترات البوتاسيوم، وعنصر يتسق في صفاته مع الفحم.
44
Oxidizers, when combined with an appropriate ratio of fuel, provide a chemical source of oxygen for an improvised explosive device (see S/2018/1002, paras. 66–69).توفر المؤكسدات، عند تركيبها مع نسبة مناسبة من الوقود، مصدرا كيميائيا للأكسجين لصنع الأجهزة المتفجرة يدويا (انظر S/2018/1002، الفقرات 66 إلى 69).
55
The most common military-grade explosives used in improvised explosive device attacks in Somalia are 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT) and cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX).الأكثر شيوعا بين المتفجرات المطوّرة في مصانع عسكرية والمستخدمة في الهجمات بالأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع في الصومال هما ثلاثي النيتروتولوين (TNT) - 2 و 4 و 6 وثلاثي نترامين السيكلو ثلاثي الميثيلين (RDX).
66
There were 491 improvised explosive device-related incidents in Somalia in 2018, compared with 402 in 2017 and 295 in 2016.وقع 491 حادثا متصلا بالأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع في الصومال خلال عام 2018، مقابل 402 في عام 2017 و 295 في عام 2016.
As of the time of writing, 544 improvised explosive device-related incidents are projected to occur by the end of 2019.وحتى وقت كتابة هذا التقرير، يُتوقع أن يبلغ عدد الحوادث المتصلة بالأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع 544 بحلول نهاية عام 2019.
77
UNMAS Somalia statistics, 2016–2019.إحصاءات دائرة الإجراءات المتعلقة بالألغام عن الصومال، للفترة 2016-2019.
88
From July 2018 to July 2019, Al-Shabaab carried out 137 improvised explosive device attacks in Benadir, compared with 101 incidents over the same period the previous year.في الفترة من تموز/يوليه 2018 إلى تموز/يوليه 2019، نفذت حركة الشباب 137 هجوما بالأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع في بنادر، مقابل 101حادث خلال الفترة نفسها من السنة السابقة.
99
UNMAS Somalia Significant Activity Report, 22 July 2019.UNMAS Somalia Significant Activity Report, 22 July 2019.
1010
Interviews with explosive ordnance disposal experts in Nairobi and Mogadishu, December 2018 to August 2019.مقابلات مع خبراء في إبطال الذخيرة المتفجرة في نيروبي ومقديشو، كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018 إلى آب/أغسطس 2019.
1111
The inquiries focused on the transport of ammonium and potassium nitrate fertilizer, potassium chlorate, sodium chlorate, nitroglycerin, glycerine, acetone, magnesium, nitric acid, aluminium paste or powder, detonators, detonating cord and ammonium nitrate/fuel oil.ركزت التحقيقات على نقل الأمونيوم وسماد نترات البوتاسيوم، وكلورات البوتاسيوم، وكلورات الصوديوم، والنتروغليسرين، والغليسرين، والأسيتون، والمغنسيوم، وحمض النتريك، ومعجون أو مسحوق الألومنيوم، والمفجرات، وسلك التفجير، ونترات الأمونيوم/زيت الوقود.
1212
Interview with an analyst from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 15 August 2019, and interview with a business intelligence researcher, 20 August 2019.مقابلة مع محلل تابع لمكتب التحقيقات الاتحادي، في 15 آب/أغسطس 2019، ومقابلة مع باحث في مجال تحليل المعلومات المتعلقة بالأعمال، في 20 آب/أغسطس 2019.
1313
Interview with an explosive ordnance disposal specialist, 12 August 2019.مقابلة مع متخصص في إبطال الذخيرة المتفجرة، في 12 آب/أغسطس 2019.
1414
Royal Australian Navy (@Australian_Navy), “The frigate #HMASBallarat conducted a boarding of a dhow in the Arabian Sea”, 28 June 2019, available at https://twitter.com/Australian_Navy/ status/1144492250098888705.Royal Australian Navy (@Australian_Navy), “The frigate #HMASBallarat conducted a boarding of a dhow in the Arabian Sea”, 28 June 2019, على الرابط https://twitter.com/Australian_Navy/status/1144492250098888705.
1515
The Panel sent correspondence to the Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations on 2 July 2019 requesting further information and an opportunity to inspect the seizure, but has not yet received a response.أرسل الفريق رسالة إلى البعثة الدائمة لأستراليا لدى الأمم المتحدة في 2 تموز/يوليه 2019 لطلب المزيد من المعلومات وفرصة لفحص المواد المضبوطة، لكنه لم يتلق بعد أي رد.
1616
Al-Shabaab had previously attacked the Sahafi Hotel on 1 November 2015, killing at least 24 civilians and injuring 30 others.سبق أن هاجمت حركة الشباب فندق الصحفي في 1 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2015، فقتلت 24 مدنيا على الأقل وأصابت 30 آخرين.
1717
For information on previous instances of Somali security forces uniforms used by Al-Shabaab in attacks in Somalia, see S/2018/1002, paras. 29–33.للحصول على معلومات عن حالات سابقة استخدمت فيها حركة الشباب الزي الرسمي لقوات الأمن الصومالية لشن هجمات في الصومال، انظر S/2018/1002، الفقرات 29 إلى 33.
1818
Consignment from China delivered in July 2017 (notified 2 February 2018).شحنة من الصين تم تسليمها في تموز/يوليه 2017 (تاريخ الإخطار 2 شباط/فبراير 2018).
1919
See also S/2018/1002, paras. 47–49.انظر أيضا S/2018/1002، الفقرات 47 إلى 49.
Both hand grenades bear the factory marking 349, corresponding to a factory in St. Petersburg, Russian Federation.تحمل كلتا القنبلتين اليدويتين علامة المصنع 349، التي تشير إلى مصنع في سانت بطرسبرغ في الاتحاد الروسي.
The grenades captured by Ugandan forces were manufactured in 1980, while those captured in the Sahafi Hotel attack were manufactured in 1979.وقد صُنعت القنابل التي استولت عليها القوات الأوغندية في عام 1980، بينما صُنعت القنابل التي عثر عليها في الهجوم على فندق الصحفي في عام 1979.
2020
On 25 June 2019, United States Africa Command announced they had conducted targeted airstrikes in Qunyo Barrow, previously identified by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea as the centre of Al-Shabaab’s finance department (S/2018/1002, annex 2.4).في 25 حزيران/يونيه 2019، أعلنت قيادة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في أفريقيا أنها شنت ضربات جوية استهدافية في قونيو بارو، التي سبق أن حددها فريق الرصد على أنها مركز إدارة الشؤون المالية لحركة الشباب (S/2018/1002، المرفق 2-4).
See United States Africa Command, “U.S. airstrike targets al-Shabaab in support of the Federal Government of Somalia”, press release, 27 June 2019. Available at www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/ 31992/u-s-airstrike-targets-al-shabaab-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia.انظر United States Africa Command, “U.S. airstrike targets al-Shabaab in support of the Federal Government of Somalia”, press release, 27 June 2019، على الرابط التالي www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/31992/u-s-airstrike-targets-al-shabaab-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia.
2121
Interviews with five businesses based in Mogadishu, July and August 2019.مقابلات مع خمس مؤسسات للأعمال التجارية في مقديشو، في تموز/يوليه وآب/أغسطس 2019.
2222
Interview with an international trading company that exports dried food from the Gulf Cooperation Council region to Mogadishu, in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 26 June 2019.مقابلة مع شركة تجارية دولية تستورد الأغذية المجففة من منطقة مجلس التعاون الخليجي إلى مقديشو، أجريت في دبي، في 26 حزيران/يونيه 2019.
2323
Interviews with five businesses based in Mogadishu, July and August 2019.مقابلات مع خمس مؤسسات للأعمال التجارية في مقديشو، في تموز/يوليه وآب/أغسطس 2019.
See also S/2019/570, para. 39.انظر أيضا S/2019/570، الفقرة 39.
2424
Interviews with five businesses based in Mogadishu, July and August 2019.مقابلات مع خمس مؤسسات للأعمال التجارية في مقديشو، في تموز/يوليه وآب/أغسطس 2019.
2525
Interview with an international trading company that exports dried food from the Gulf Cooperation Council region to Mogadishu, in Dubai, 26 June 2019.مقابلة مع شركة تجارية دولية تصدر الأغذية الجافة من منطقة مجلس التعاون الخليجي إلى مقديشو، أجريت في دبي، في 26 حزيران/يونيه 2019.
2626
Ibid.المرجع نفسه.
2727
From January to April 2019, the Panel carried out four telephone interviews with individuals based in Mogadishu who engaged Al-Shabaab to find resolutions to land ownership issues.في الفترة من كانون الثاني/يناير إلى نيسان/أبريل 2019، أجرى الفريق أربع مقابلات هاتفية مع أفراد يقيمون في مقديشو استعانوا بحركة الشباب في إيجاد حلول لقضايا متعلقة بملكية أراضٍ.
2828
International Crisis Group, “Women and Al-Shabaab’s insurgency”, Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 145, 27 June 2019.International Crisis Group, “Women and Al-Shabaab’s insurgency”, Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 145, 27 June 2019.
Available at www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b145-women-and-al-shabaabs-insurgency.على الرابط www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b145-women-and-al-shabaabs-insurgency.
2929
In 2014, Riziki was a member of an assassination cell tasked by Al-Shabaab to kill security personnel in the coastal region, and in October 2014 he was involved in the killing of a police officer at the Royal Court Hotel in Mombasa.في عام 2014، كان الرزيقي عضواً في خلية اغتيال كلفتها حركة الشباب بقتل أفراد أمن في المنطقة الساحلية، وفي تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2014، شارك في قتل أحد ضباط الشرطة في فندق رويال كورت في مومباسا.
Confidential police report seen by the Panel of Experts, March 2019.تقرير سري للشرطة اطلع عليه فريق الخبراء، آذار/مارس 2019.
3030
The consignment was notified to the Committee on 29 July 2013.أُبلِغت اللجنة بشأن الشحنة في 29 تموز/يوليه 2013.
3131
Identified by international security agencies through their Internet Protocol addresses.تعرفت عليهما أجهزة أمن دولية عن طريق عناوين بروتوكول الإنترنت.
3232
Interview with international security source, June 2019.مقابلة مع مصدر للأمن الدولي، حزيران/يونيه 2019.
3333
On 27 February 2018, the United States Department of State announced the sanctioning of Mahad Moalim as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.في 27 شباط/فبراير 2018، أعلنت وزارة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة معاقبة مهد معلم بوصفه إرهابيا عالميا مصنفا تصنيفا خاصا.
3434
Mohamed Ahmed Qahiye was reportedly the mastermind of the 8 February 2017 attack on the International Village Hotel in Bosaso (see S/2017/924, annex 2.4).وردت تقارير تفيد بأن محمد أحمد كاهيي هو العقل المدبر للهجوم الذي شن على فندق إنترناشونال فيليج في بوصاصو في 8 شباط/فبراير 2017 (انظر S/2017/924، المرفق 2-4).
3535
In final report of 2017 of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (see S/2017/924, annex 2.2), Abdihakim Dhuqub was described as a senior ISIL leader and former member of the Al-Shabaab insurgency in Puntland’s Golis Mountains.في التقرير النهائي لفريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا لعام 2017 (S/2017/924، المرفق 2-2)، وُصف عبد الحكيم ذوقوب بأنه أحد كبار قادة تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية وعضو سابق في تمرد حركة الشباب في جبال غوليس في بونتلاند.
3636
Information provided by current and former senior Puntland intelligence officials, as well as an internal intelligence report of the Puntland Security Force.المعلومات مستقاة من مسؤولي استخبارات كبار حاليين وسابقين في بونتلاند، ومن تقرير استخباراتي داخلي لقوة أمن بونتلاند.
On 8 August 2019, the Panel received information from an eyewitness who claimed to have located Qahiye, as well as a second former ISIL fighter, in the Bole neighbourhood of Addis Ababa.وفي 8 آب/أغسطس 2019، تلقى الفريق معلومات من شاهد عيان ادعى معرفة مكان كاهيي ومن مقاتل سابق ثان في تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية، تفيد بأنه موجود في حي بولي في أديس أبابا.
See also Harun Maruf, “Under pressure, IS militants in Somalia look to Ethiopia”, Voice of America, 19 August 2019, available at www.voanews.com/africa/under-pressure-militants-somalia-look-ethiopia, and Salem Solomon, “Ethiopian military captures suspected IS members”, Voice of America, 12 September 2019, available at www.voanews.com/africa/ethiopian-military-captures-suspected-members.انظر أيضا Harun Maruf, “Under pressure, IS militants in Somalia look to Ethiopia”, Voice of America, 19 August 2019, على الرابط www.voanews.com/africa/under-pressure-militants-somalia-look-ethiopia, و Salem Solomon, “Ethiopian military captures suspected IS members”, Voice of America, 12 September 2019, على الرابط www.voanews.com/africa/ethiopian-military-captures-suspected-members.
3737
United States Africa Command, “U.S. confirms airstrike against ISIS-Somalia’s Abdulhakim Dhuqub”, press release, 15 April 2019. Available at www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/ 31765/u-s-confirms-airstrike-against-isis-somalias-abdulhakim-dhuqub.United States Africa Command, “U.S. confirms airstrike against ISIS-Somalia’s Abdulhakim Dhuqub”, press release, 15 April 2019، على الرابط: www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/31765/u-s-confirms-airstrike-against-isis-somalias-abdulhakim-dhuqub
3838
Profile of Omar Moshin Ibrahim provided to the Panel by Italian authorities in June 2019.ملف بيانات عمر محسن إبراهيم الذي قدمته السلطات الإيطالية إلى الفريق في حزيران/يونيه 2019.
3939
Ibid.المرجع نفسه.
4040
Meetings with Somaliland security agencies and political officials in Hargeisa, 11 and 13 February 2019.اجتماعات مع الأجهزة الأمنية ومسؤولين سياسيين في صوماليلاند، عقدت في هرجيسا، في 11 و 13 شباط/ فبراير 2019.
The Panel of Experts sent correspondence to Somaliland on 14 June 2019 requesting copies of these strategy documents but did not receive a response.ووجه فريق الخبراء رسالة إلى مسؤولي صوماليلاند في 14 حزيران/يونيه 2019 يطلب فيها نسخا من هذه الوثائق المتصلة بالاستراتيجية، ولكنه لم يتلق أي رد.
4141
Dossier on Abdullahi Mohamud Yusuf provided to the Panel of Experts in February 2019.قُدم ملف عبد الله يوسف إلى فريق الخبراء في شباط/فبراير 2019.
4242
Profile of Omar Moshin Ibrahim provided to the Panel by Italian authorities in June 2019.ملف بيانات عمر محسن إبراهيم الذي قدمته السلطات الإيطالية إلى فريق الخبراء في حزيران/يونيه 2019.
4343
Ibid.المرجع نفسه.
4444
Interviews with Somaliland security official, 11 February 2019, and a member of a Western security agency, 30 July 2019.مقابلات أجريت مع مسؤول أمني في صوماليلاند، في 11 شباط/فبراير 2019، ومع عضو في وكالة أمن غربية، في 30 تموز/يوليه 2019.
4545
Interview with South-West State Members of Parliament and members of the South-West State electoral committee in Nairobi, 12 February 2019.مقابلة مع أعضاء في برلمان ولاية جنوب الغرب وأعضاء في اللجنة الانتخابية للولاية، أجريت في نيروبي، في 12 شباط/ فبراير 2019.
4646
Ibid.المرجع نفسه.
4747
Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somalia Government blocks ex-militant from seeking political office, Voice of America, 5 October 2018.Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somalia Government blocks ex-militant from seeking political office, Voice of America, 5 October 2018.
Available at www.voanews.com/a/somalia-government-blocks-ex-militant-seeking-political-office/4601493.html.على الرابط www.voanews.com/a/somalia-government-blocks-ex-militant-seeking-political-office/4601493.html
4848
Ibid.المرجع نفسه.
4949
Interview with United Nations official in Nairobi, 10 December 2018.مقابلة مع موظف في الأمم المتحدة أجريت في نيروبي، في 10 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018.
5050
AMISOM denied any involvement in the arrest of Mukhtar Robow.أنكرت بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في الصومال أي مشاركة لها في القبض على مختار روبوو.
The Panel carried out interviews by telephone with several South-West State parliamentarians and local citizens who reported the involvement of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces in the arrest.وأجرى فريق الخبراء مقابلات عن طريق الهاتف مع عدد من البرلمانيين والمواطنين المحليين في ولاية جنوب الغرب أفادوا بمشاركة القوات الدفاع الوطنية الإثيوبية في القبض عليه.
However, the Panel has yet to interview Mukhtar Robow due to his ongoing detention in Mogadishu.بيد أن الفريق لم يجرِ بعد مقابلة مع مختار روبوو بسبب استمرار احتجازه في مقديشو.
5151
Interview with four South-West State Members of Parliament in Nairobi, 12 February 2019.مقابلة مع أربعة من أعضاء البرلمان في ولاية جنوب الغرب أجريت في نيروبي، في 12 شباط/فبراير 2019.
5252
Interview with an Ethiopian security official in Addis Ababa, 3 April 2019.مقابلة مع مسؤول أمني إثيوبي أجريت في أديس أبابا، في 3 نيسان/أبريل 2019.
In the aftermath of the South-West State elections, on 18 January 2019 Al-Shabaab ambushed an Ethiopian National Defence Forces convoy travelling near Baidoa.وفي أعقاب انتخابات ولاية جنوب الغرب، في 18 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019، نصبت حركة الشباب كمينًا لقافلة تابعة لقوات الدفاع الوطنية الإثيوبية أثناء سيرها بالقرب من بيدوا.
Al-Shabaab claimed to have killed 60 soldiers, although this figure could not be independently verified.وزعمت حركة الشباب أنها قتلت 60 جنديا، على الرغم من أن هذا الرقم لا يمكن التحقق منه بصورة مستقلة.
5353
In a video released in December 2018, Colonel Abdirahman threatened to “shoot people in the ass” and stated to the interviewer that “the law even allows us to kill you”.في مقطع فيديو نشر في كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018، هدد العقيد عبد الرحمن ”بإطلاق النار على مؤخرات الناس“ وقال للقائم بالمقابلة إن ”القانون يتيح لنا حتى قتلكم“.
See Harun Maruf (@HarunMaruf), “Video: Gen Mahad Abdirahman Aden the former Baidoa police chief”, 24 August 2019 (video in Somali), available at https://twitter.com/harunmaruf/status/ 1165333569977425925?s=12.انظر Harun Maruf (@HarunMaruf), “Video: Gen Mahad Abdirahman Aden the former Baidoa police chief”, 24 August 2019 (فيديو باللغة الصومالية)، متاح على الرابط: https://twitter.com/harunmaruf/status/1165333569977425925?s=12.
5454
Letter from the Office of the President of South-West State, 5 January 2019.رسالة موجهة من مكتب رئيس ولاية جنوب غرب الصومال في 5 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019.
5555
Assessment report of the South-West State fact-finding committee on the demonstrations in Baidoa, 13–15 December 2018.تقرير التقييم المقدم من لجنة تقصي الحقائق التابعة لولاية جنوب الغرب عن التظاهرات في بيدوا، 13-15 كانون الأول/ ديسمبر 2018.
5656
Interviews with individuals and members of South-West State political parties in Nairobi, 28 March 2019;مقابلات مع أفراد وأعضاء في أحزاب سياسية في ولاية جنوب الغرب أجريت في نيروبي، في 28 آذار/مارس 2019؛
confidential report on killings of civilians in Baidoa provided by Somali civil society actors, 28 March 2019.وتقرير سري عن عمليات قتل المدنيين في بيدوا مقدم من جهات فاعلة في المجتمع المدني الصومالي في 28 آذار/مارس 2019.
5757
Interview with multiple South-West State Members of Parliament in Nairobi between December 2018 and March 2019, and interview with two South-West State presidential candidates in Nairobi in March 2019.مقابلات مع العديد من أعضاء برلمان ولاية جنوب غرب الصومال أجريت في نيروبي في الفترة بين كانون الأول/ ديسمبر 2018 وآذار/مارس 2019. ومقابلة مع اثنين من المرشحين الرئاسيين لولاية جنوب غرب الصومال أجريت في نيروبي في آذار/مارس 2019.
5858
Ibid.المرجع نفسه.
5959
Interviews with two South-West State presidential candidates and several South-West State Members of Parliament in Nairobi, 12 March 2019.مقابلات مع اثنين من المرشحين الرئاسيين لولاية جنوب الغرب ومع عدد من أعضاء برلمان الولاية أجريت في نيروبي، في آذار/مارس 2019.
6060
Details of these transfers are on file with the Secretariat.ترد تفاصيل هذه التحويلات في ملف لدى الأمانة العامة.
6161
Accounts of widespread bribery of Ministers of Parliament and other irregularities during the Puntland election were provided to the Panel by two presidential candidates, a former Puntland intelligence officer and members of civil society in January and February 2019.شهادات حول تقديم رشاوى على نطاق واسع إلى أعضاء في البرلمان ومخالفات أخرى ارتكبت خلال انتخابات بونتلاند، قدمها إلى فريق الخبراء اثنان من المرشحين الرئاسيين وضابط سابق في استخبارات بونتلاند وأعضاء من المجتمع المدني في كانون الثاني/يناير وشباط/فبراير 2019.
6262
Garowe Online, “Somalia is not headed to the right direction, says Senator”, 26 April 2019.Garowe Online, “Somalia is not headed to the right direction, says Senator”, 26 April 2019.
Available at www.garoweonline.com/en/news/puntland/somalia-is-not-headed-to-the-right-direction-says-senator.على الرابط: www.garoweonline.com/en/news/puntland/somalia-is-not-headed-to-the-right-direction-says-senator.
6363
Jubbaland forces parked their vehicles on the Kismayo Airport runway to prevent the aircraft from landing.أوقفت قوات ولاية جوبالاند مركباتها في مدرج مطار كيسمايو لمنع الطائرة من الهبوط.
6464
Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe” received 56 votes out of a total of 74.حصل أحمد محمد إسلام ”مذوبيه“ على 56 صوتا من أصل ما مجموعه 74 صوتا.
6565
A third presidential candidate, Abdinasir Seerar, also subsequently declared himself President of Jubbaland.وقت لاحق، أعلن مرشح رئاسي ثالث، عبد الناصر سرار، نفسه رئيسا لجوبالاند أيضا.
6666
Interviews with senior AMISOM officials in Addis Ababa, 2 April 2019.مقابلات شخصية مع مسؤولين كبار ببعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في أديس أبابا في 2 نيسان/أبريل 2019.
6767
AMISOM, “AMISOM commanders reach a consensus on military operations”, press release, 16 February 2019. Available at http://amisom-au.org/2019/02/amisom-commanders-reach-a-consensus-on-military-operations/.AMISOM, “AMISOM commanders reach a consensus on military operations”, press release, 16 February 2019، على الرابط: http://amisom-au.org/2019/02/amisom-commanders-reach-a-consensus-on-military-operations/.
6868
The vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices were plated with armour, similar to those used by Al-Shabaab on 19 January 2019 in Bar Sanguni, Lower Juba.كانت المركبات المفخخة مطلية بدروع مثل تلك التي استخدمتها حركة الشباب في 19 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019 في بار سانغوني، جوبا السفلى.
6969
Al-Shabaab has warned residents of Barire not to return to the area.حذرت حركة الشباب سكان باريري من العودة إلى المنطقة.
Interview with source in Mogadishu, 13 August 2019, and a confidential security report, August 2019.مقابلة شخصية مع مصدر في مقديشو، 13 آب/ أغسطس 2019، وتقرير أمني سري، آب/أغسطس 2019.
7070
Federal Government of Somalia periodic report to the Security Council submitted pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2444 (2018), 19 March 2019.التقرير الدوري المقدم من حكومة الصومال الاتحادية إلى مجلس الأمن عملا بالفقرة 21 من القرار 2444 (2018)، 19 آذار/مارس 2019.
7171
Letter from IATA to the Panel of Experts, 8 August 2019.رسالة موجهة من اتحاد النقل الجوي الدولي إلى فريق الخبراء، 8 آب/أغسطس 2019.
According to IATA, no financial records dated prior to August 2008 are available.ووفقا لما ذكره الاتحاد، لا توجد سجلات مالية متاحة قبل آب/أغسطس 2008.
7272
From 29 to 31 May 2019 the Panel conducted a series of interviews with senior ICAO representatives in Montreal.في الفترة من 29 إلى 31 أيار/مايو 2019، أجرى الفريق سلسلة مقابلات مع ممثلين كبار للإيكاو في مونتريال.
During a review of investigations carried out by ICAO into the matter, an ICAO representative who approved the transfer of $350,000 later quipped that “the money is for their Mercedes”.وخلال استعراض للتحقيقات التي أجرتها الإيكاو في هذه المسألة، قال ممثل للمنظمة، وافق على تحويل مبلغ 000 350 دولار، متندراً في وقت لاحق ”هذه الأموال لشراء سيار(ا)تهم المرسيدس“.
7373
Interviews with ICAO staff in Montreal, 29–31 May 2019.مقابلات مع موظفي الإيكاو في مونتريال، 29-31 أيار/مايو 2019.
7474
Ibid.المرجع نفسه.
7575
Ibid.المرجع نفسه.
7676
ICAO, “Financial audit of Som/03/016 and Som/95/901 (Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia)”, 6 April 2011.ICAO, “Financial audit of Som/03/016 and Som/95/901 (Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia)”, 6 April 2011.
7777
“Open items report summary – as of 31 July 2019”, provided by IATA to the Panel of Experts on 8 August 2019.“Open items report summary – as of 31 July 2019”, provided by IATA to the Panel of Experts on 8 August 2019.
7878
Ibid.المرجع نفسه.
7979
Letter from Yusuf Abdi Abdulle, Director General of the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorological Authority, to the ICAO project coordinator in Mogadishu, 12 December 2017.رسالة موجهة من يوسف عبدي عبدالله، المدير العام لهيئة الطيران المدني والأرصاد الجوية الصومالية، إلي منسق مشاريع الإيكاو في مقديشو، 12 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2017.
8080
Interview with the Federal Government of Somalia Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation, Mohamed Abdullahi Salat, 12 September 2019.مقابلة مع وزير النقل والطيران المدني بالحكومة الاتحادية، محمد عبد الله صلات، 12 أيلول/سبتمبر 2019.
8181
Interview with Jubba Airways Chief Executive Officer Said Nur Qailie in Nairobi, 23 August 2019.مقابلة مع الرئيس التنفيذي لخطوط جوبا الجوية في نيروبي، نور قايلي، 23 آب/أغسطس 2019.
8282
In its past reporting, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea highlighted the use of dedicated Federal Government ministry accounts to bypass the Treasury Single Account, thereby avoiding oversight of revenues by Federal Government fiscal authorities (see, for example, S/2015/801, annex 3.3).في التقارير السابقة، سلط فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا الضوء على استخدام حسابات مخصصة لوزارات الحكومة الاتحادية من أجل تجاوز الحساب الوحيد للخزانة العامة، وبالتالي تجنب رقابة السلطات المالية للحكومة الاتحادية على الإيرادات (انظر، على سبيل المثال، S/2015/801، المرفق 3-3).
8383
Interview with Mohamed Abdullahi Salat, 12 September 2019.مقابلة مع محمد عبد الله صلات، 12 أيلول/سبتمبر 2019.
8484
Email from ICAO representative, 24 September 2019.رسالة بريد إلكتروني من ممثل الإيكاو، 24 أيلول/سبتمبر 2019.
8585
Kenya contends that the maritime border should extend parallel to the line of latitude (located between 1 and 2 degrees south) from its land border with Somalia.تزعم كينيا أن الحدود البحرية ينبغي أن تمتد بموازاة خط العرض (الواقع بين درجتي 1 و 2 جنوبا) من حدودها البرية مع الصومال.
The Federal Government’s position is that the maritime border of Somalia should extend from the coast in a south-east direction, as an extension of the Somalia land border.ويتمثل موقف الحكومة الاتحادية في ضرورة أن تمتد الحدود البحرية للصومال من الساحل في اتجاه الجنوب الشرقي، كامتداد للحدود البرية للصومال.
8686
In an audio message released on 19 September 2019, Al-Shabaab leader Ahmad Umar urged Somalis to confront Kenya over its attempts to annex “large swathes of land before attempting to occupy our ocean”.في رسالة صوتية نُشرت في 19 أيلول/سبتمبر 2019، حث زعيم حركة الشباب أحمد عمر الصوماليين على مواجهة كينيا بشأن محاولاتها ضم ”مساحات شاسعة من الأرض قبل محاولة احتلال محيطنا“.
8787
Interview with EUNAVFOR personnel in Nairobi, 30 April 2019.مقابلة مع أفراد من القوة البحرية للاتحاد الأوروبي في نيروبي، في 30 نيسان/أبريل 2019.
8888
Information received from INTERPOL, Maritime Security Sub-Directorate, June 2019.معلومات واردة من الإدارة الفرعية للأمن البحري التابعة للإنتربول، في حزيران/يونيه 2019.
8989
S/2019/616.S/2019/616.
9090
Ibid.المرجع نفسه.
9191
In its final report of 2018, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea documented 48 weapons in the possession of arms dealers with markings consistent with materiel imported by the Federal Government (S/2018/1002, paras. 24–25).وثّق فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا، في تقريره النهائي لعام 2018، ما عدده 48 قطعة سلاح في حوزة تجار أسلحة وعليها علامات متوافقة مع العتاد الذي استوردته الحكومة الاتحادية (S/2018/1002، الفقرتان 24 و 25).
9292
On the basis of data gathered by local sources, the prices of black-market weapons have remained stable since 2018, at between $1,300 and $1,400 for an AK-pattern assault rifle and between $600 to $700 for a 9-mm pistol.استنادا إلى بيانات جمعت من مصادر محلية، ظلت أسعار الأسلحة في السوق السوداء مستقرة منذ عام 2018، متراوحة بين 300 1 دولار و 400 1 دولار للبندقية الهجومية من طراز كالاشنيكوف، وبين 600 دولار و 700 دولار للمسدس عيار 9 ملم.
9393
The respective Committee notifications were received on 3 March 2015, 2 October 2017 and 2 February 2018.وردت الإخطارات المتعلقة بها إلى اللجنة في 3 آذار/مارس 2015 و 2 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2017 و 2 شباط/فبراير 2018، على التوالي.
9494
According to the Somali National Army Deputy Commander of sector 60, the weapons detailed in the logbook had been distributed to soldiers in November and December 2017.وفقا لما أفاد به نائب قائد القطاع 60 في الجيش الوطني الصومالي، فإن الأسلحة المفصلة بياناتها في دفتر السجل قد وزعت على جنود في تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر وكانون الأول/ديسمبر 2017.
9595
Based on cross-referencing the Somali National Army identification numbers of the 17 sector 60 soldiers with the February 2019 Somali National Army payroll obtained by the Panel of Experts.استنادا إلى مقارنة أرقام التعريف الخاصة بالـ 17 جنديا من جنود القطاع 60 في الجيش الوطني الصومالي بكشف مرتبات الجيش الوطني الصومالي لشهر شباط/فبراير 2019 التي حصل عليها فريق الخبراء.
9696
Interviews with two Metals and Engineering Corporation executives in Addis Ababa, 4 April 2019.مقابلتان مع مديرَين تنفيذيَّين في مؤسسة المعادن والهندسة، في أديس أبابا، في 4 نيسان/أبريل 2019.
9797
Interviews with Ministry for Foreign Affairs officials in New York, 16 May 2019, and Addis Ababa, 4 September 2019.مقابلتان مع مسؤولي وزارة الخارجية في نيويورك، في 16 أيار/مايو 2019، وفي أديس أبابا، في 4 أيلول/سبتمبر 2019.
9898
Katharine Houreld, “Ethiopia charges METEC head with additional corruption case”, Reuters, 15 January 2019.Katharine Houreld, “Ethiopia charges METEC head with additional corruption case”, Reuters, 15 January 2019.
Available at https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN1P90KO-OZATP.متاح على https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN1P90KO-OZATP.
9999
Interviews with Metals and Engineering Corporation executives, 4 April 2019.مقابلات مع مديرِين تنفيذيِّين في مؤسسة المعادن والهندسة، في 4 نيسان/أبريل 2019.
100100
In addition, in paragraph 27 of resolution 2444 (2018), the Security Council urged increased cooperation by the Federal Government, the federal member states and AMISOM to document and register all captured military equipment.كذلك، حث مجلس الأمن في الفقرة 27 من قراره 2444 (2018) على زيادة التعاون من جانب الحكومة الاتحادية والولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد وبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في توثيق وتسجيل جميع المعدات العسكرية التي يتم الاستيلاء عليها.
The Panel did not receive any reports on that subject from the Federal Government or the federal member states during the reporting period.ولم يتلق الفريق أي تقارير عن ذلك الموضوع من الحكومة الاتحادية أو الولايات الأعضاء في الاتحاد، خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير.
101101
On 9 May 2018, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea received photographs of weapons and ammunition seized by an AMISOM contingent of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces in Bulo Mareer, Lower Shabelle region.في 9 أيار/مايو 2018، تلقى فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا صور أسلحة وذخيرة استولت عليها وحدة تابعة لقوات الدفاع الشعبية الأوغندية في بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي، في بولو مارير، الواقعة في منطقة شبيلي السفلى.
Those photographs proved valuable for the Group’s investigations into the procurement of weapons by Al-Shabaab (S/2018/1002, paras. 47–49).وثبت أن تلك الصور مفيدة لتحقيقات الفريق في قيام حركة الشباب بشراء أسلحة (انظر S/2018/1002، الفقرات من 47 إلى 49).
102102
Ahmed “Jaraale’s” involvement as the primary importer of the illicit consignment was reported by two security sources in Puntland and confirmed in an interview with a senior Puntland administration official on 25 April 2019.أفاد مصدران أمنيان في بونتلاند بتورط أحمد ”جرالي“، بصفته المستورد الرئيسي للشحنة غير المشروعة، وأُكِّد هذا التورط في مقابلة مع أحد كبار المسؤولين في إدارة بونتلاند، في 25 نيسان/أبريل 2019.
It was corroborated through analysis of “Jaraale’s” phone records.وتم تأكيد ذلك من خلال تحليل السجلات الهاتفية لـ ”جرالي“ (Jaraale).
103103
Interview with a senior Puntland administration official, 25 April 2019.مقابلة مع أحد كبار المسؤولين في إدارة بونتلاند، في 25 نيسان/أبريل 2019.
Two Puntland-based security sources also informed the Panel that the arms seized by the Puntland authorities comprised only a small part of the total shipment, which also included heavier weapons, as well as ammunition.وأبلغ مصدران أمنيان في بونتلاند الفريق أيضا بأن الأسلحة التي صادرتها سلطات بونتلاند لا تشكل سوى جزء صغير من الشحنة الإجمالية، التي شملت أيضا أسلحة ثقيلة، وكذلك ذخيرة.
104104
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and World Food Programme, “Monitoring food security in countries with conflict situations”, No. 6 (Rome, August 2019).Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and World Food Programme, “Monitoring food security in countries with conflict situations”, No. 6 (Rome, August 2019).
Available at www.fao.org/3/ca5938en/CA5938EN.pdf.متاح على الرابط التالي: http://www.fao.org/3/ca5938en/CA5938EN.pdf.
105105
By contrast, in a 2018 report, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported 34 attacks against humanitarian workers, most of whom were local workers (S/2018/1002, para. 168).المقابل، أفاد فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا في تقريره لعام 2018 بوقوع 34 هجوما على العاملين في المجال الإنساني، كان معظمهم من العمال المحليين (S/2018/1002، الفقرة 168).
106106
The aid workers were taken to the town of El Adde, Gedo region, and released on 21 November 2018, after they each paid a fine of $3,000 and an additional $1,500 for the vehicle (emails from a United Nations staff member in Mogadishu, 23 and 24 July 2019 and a United Nations staff member in Kismayo, 24 July 2019).اقتيد العاملان في مجال تقديم المعونة إلى مدينة العدي، في منطقة غدو، وأفرج عنهما في 21 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2018 بعد أن دفع كل منهما غرامة قدرها 000 3 دولار ومبلغا إضافيا قدره 500 1 دولار للمركبة (بريد إلكتروني وارد من أحد موظفي الأمم المتحدة في مقديشو، 23 و 24 تموز/يوليه 2019، ومن أحد موظفي الأمم المتحدة في كيسمايو، في 24 تموز/يوليه 2019).
107107
They remained in captivity in the El Adde area until they were released on 14 March 2019 after a fine of $3,000 each was paid.ظلوا في الأسر في منطقة العدي، إلى أن أطلق سراحهم في 14 آذار/مارس 2019 بعد دفع غرامة بقيمة 000 3 دولار عن كل واحد.
United Nations confidential human rights report, 28 February–2 March 2019.تقرير سري للأمم المتحدة عن حقوق الإنسان، 28 شباط/فبراير - 2 آذار/مارس 2019.
108108
AMISOM media monitoring, 15 May 2019;رصد وسائط الإعلام في بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي، 15 أيار/مايو 2019؛
and email from a United Nations staff member in Mogadishu, 18 June 2019.وبريد إلكتروني من أحد موظفي الأمم المتحدة في مقديشو، 18 حزيران/يونيه 2019.
109109
Interview with international security source, August 2019.مقابلة مع مصدر أمني دولي، آب/أغسطس 2019.
110110
Incidents reported in the present section are primarily sourced from United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia Human Rights and Protection Group reports and reports of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2019/393 and S/2019/661).الحوادث المبلغ عتها في هذا الفرع مستمدة في المقام الأول من تقارير الفريق المعني بحقوق الإنسان والحماية التابع لبعثة الأمم المتحدة لتقديم المساعدة إلى الصومال، بالإضافة إلى تقريرين للأمين العام عن الصومال (S/2019/393 و S/2019/661).
111111
From 14 December 2018 to 21 July 2019, 1,079 civilian casualties were recorded by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia Human Rights and Protection Group; 791 casualties (73 per cent) were attributed to Al-Shabaab (S/2019/393, para. 55, and S/2019/661, para. 46).في الفترة من 14 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2018 إلى 21 تموز/يوليه 2019، سجل الفريق المعني بحقوق الإنسان والحماية التابع لبعثة الأمم المتحدة لتقديم المساعدة إلى الصومال 079 1 إصابة في صفوف المدنيين، نُسبت 791 إصابة منها (73 في المائة) إلى حركة الشباب (S/2019/393، الفقرة 55 و S/2019/661، الفقرة 46).
112112
United Nations confidential human rights report, 2 January 2019.تقرير سري للأمم المتحدة عن حقوق الإنسان، 2 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019.
113113
See also Hiraal Institute, “Al-Shabaab’s Military Machine” (Mogadishu, December 2018). Available at https://hiraalinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/The-Al-Shabab-Military.pdf.انظر أيضا Hiraal Institute, “Al-Shabaab’s Military Machine”, (Mogadishu, December 2018)، على الرابط التالي: https://hiraalinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/The-Al-Shabab-Military.pdf.
114114
Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somalia military executes 6 militants without trial”, Voice of America, 1 January 2019.Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somalia military executes 6 militants without trial”, Voice of America,
Available at www.voanews.com/a/somalia-military-executes-6-militants-without-trial/4724579.html.1 January 2019، على الرابط التالي: www.voanews.com/a/somalia-military-executes-6-militants-without-trial/4724579.html.
115115
Article 3 (d) of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 prohibits prosecution without judicial guarantees.تحظر المادة 3 (د) في اتفاقيات جنيف الأربع الصادرة في 12 آب/أغسطس 1949 المقاضاة بدون ضمانات قضائية.
116116
United Nations confidential human rights reports, 28 August 2018 and 7–9 March 2019;تقريران سريان للأمم المتحدة عن حقوق الإنسان، 28 آب/أغسطس 2018 و 7-9 آذار/مارس 2019؛
emails from United Nations staff members in Somalia, 18 June 2019 and 28 August 2019;وبريد إلكتروني وارد من موظفين للأمم المتحدة في الصومال، 18 حزيران/يونيه 2019، و 28 آب/أغسطس 2019؛
telephone interviews, 23 July 2019.ومقابلات هاتفية، 23 تموز/يوليه 2019.
117117
Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 4 (Security agencies), of the Puntland Anti-Terrorism Act of 2011 provides the Puntland Security Force with full responsibility over investigation and follow-up of terrorist activities, as well as expansive powers to combat, seize and investigate acts of terrorism, prevent any person engaged in acts of terrorism and control their criminal property.تخول الفقرتان 1 و 4 من المادة 5 (أجهزة الأمن) من قانون مكافحة الإرهاب في بونتلاند لعام 2011، قوة أمن بونتلاند المسؤولية الكاملة عن التحقيق في الأنشطة الإرهابية ومتابعتها بالإضافة إلى صلاحيات واسعة لمكافحة الأعمال الإرهابية وضبطها والتحقيق فيها ومنع أي شخص ينخرط في أعمال إرهابية والاستحواذ على ممتلكاته الجنائية.
118118
Telephone interviews with individuals with knowledge of the situation based in Bosaso, 30 June and 23 July 2019.مقابلات هاتفية مع أفراد على إطلاع على الحالة موجودين في بوصاصو، 30 حزيران/يونيه و 23 تموز/يوليه 2019.
119119
See Amnesty International, “Urgent action: five children executed, two others at risk”, 28 April 2017, available at www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr52/6112/2017/en/;انظر Amnesty International, “Urgent action: five children executed, two others at risk”, 28 April 2017, على الرابط التالي: www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr52/6112/2017/en/;
and Human Rights Watch, It’s Like We’re Always in a Prison: Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses in Somalia (February 2018), available at www.hrw.org/report/2018/02/21/its-were-always-prison/abuses-against-boys-accused-national-security-offenses.و Human Rights Watch, It’s Like We’re Always in a Prison: Abuses Against Boys Accused of National Security Offenses in Somalia (February 2018), على الرابط التالي: www.hrw.org/report/2018/02/21/its-were-always-prison/abuses-against-boys-accused-national-security-offenses.
120120
Presidential decree No. 0285/2007, 31 May 2007.المرسوم الرئاسي رقم 0285/2007، 31 أيار/مايو 2007.
121121
Emails from the prisoners’ lawyers in Somaliland, 22 January 2019.بريد إلكتروني من محامي السجناء في صوماليلاند، 22 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019.
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Letter revoking prisoner amnesty by Somaliland President, Dahir Riyale Kahin, 2 November 2008.خطاب إلغاء أمر عفو من رئيس صوماليلاند، ضاهر ريالي كاهن، 2 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2008.
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Interviews with lawyers and individuals with knowledge of the cases, Hargeisa, 12 and 13 February 2019.مقابلات أجريت مع محامين وأفراد على إطلاع على القضايا، هرجيسا، 12 و 13شباط/فبراير 2019.
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This represents an increase in civilian deaths caused by AMISOM forces compared with the previous reporting period.يشير ذلك إلى زيادة في عدد القتلى المدنيين الذين أسقطتهم قوات البعثة مقارنة بالفترة المشمولة بالتقرير السابق.
See S/2018/1002, para. 159.انظر S/2018/1002، الفقرة 159.
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Abdirisak M Tuuryare, “Bodies, blood, bullets: AU soldiers kill civilians in Mogadishu”, Mareeg Media, 6 November 2018, available at www.mareeg.com/bodies-blood-bullets-au-soldiers-kill-civilians-in-mogadishu/;Abdirisak M Tuuryare, “Bodies, blood, bullets: AU soldiers kill civilians in Mogadishu”, Mareeg Media, 6 November 2018، على الرابط التالي: www.mareeg.com/bodies-blood-bullets-au-soldiers-kill-civilians-in-mogadishu/؛
and the Defense Post, “Locals accuse Burundi AMISOM troops of killing 4 Somalia civilians”, 6 November 2018, available at www.thedefensepost.com/2018/11/ 06/burundi-amisom-troops-kill-4-mogadishu-civilians-somalia.و the Defense Post, “Locals accuse Burundi AMISOM troops of killing 4 Somalia civilians”, 6 November 2018، على الرابط التالي: www.thedefensepost.com/2018/11/06/burundi-amisom-troops-kill-4-mogadishu-civilians-somalia.
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AMISOM, “AMISOM concerned with media allegations on civilian deaths in Balaad”, press release, 7 November 2018. Available at http://amisom-au.org/2018/11/amisom-concerned-with-media-allegations-on-civilian-deaths-in-balaad/press-statement-amisom-concerned-with-media-allegations-on-civillian-deaths-in-balaad/.AMISOM, “AMISOM concerned with media allegations on civilian deaths in Balaad”, press release, 7 November 2018، على الرابط التالي: http://amisom-au.org/2018/11/amisom-concerned-with-media-allegations-on-civilian-deaths-in-balaad/press-statement-amisom-concerned-with-media-allegations-on-civillian-deaths-in-balaad/.
127127
Email correspondence with AMISOM force spokesperson and AMISOM Protection, Human Rights and Gender Unit, 4 April 2019.مراسلات إلكترونية مع المتحدث الرسمي باسم قوة بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي والوحدة المعنية بالحماية وحقوق الإنسان والشؤون الجنسانية التابعة للبعثة، 4 نيسان/أبريل 2019.
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Interview with United Nations staff member based in Mogadishu, 13 April 2019.مقابلة مع واحد من موظفي الأمم المتحدة يقع مقر عمله في مقديشيو، 13 نيسان/أبريل 2019.
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Email correspondence with AMISOM staff in Baidoa, 14 April 2019.مراسلة إلكترونية مع موظفي بعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في بيدوا، 14 نيسان/أبريل 2019.
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Kenya signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008.وقّعت كينيا الاتفاقية المتعلقة بالذخائر العنقودية في 3 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2008.
The Panel sent correspondence to China on 28 May 2019 and to Kenya on 29 August 2019 in an attempt to trace the origin of the cluster munition but did not receive responses.ووجه فريق الخبراء رسالة إلى الصين في 28 أيار/مايو 2019 وإلى كينيا في 29 آب/أغسطس 2019 في محاولة منه لتعقب مصدر الذخيرة العنقودية، لكنه لم يتلق أي رد.
The Commander of the Kenyan Air Force, when shown a photograph in a meeting with the Panel on 19 September 2019, stated that he was not familiar with the munition.وصرح قائد القوات الجوية الكينية، عندما عُرضت عليه صورة في اجتماع مع الفريق في 19 أيلول/ سبتمبر 2019، أن الذخيرة المعنية ليست مألوفة لديه.
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Interviews with a relative of the victims, 26 and 27 July 2019.مقابلتان مع أحد أقرباء الضحيتين، في 26 و 27 تموز/يوليه 2019.
The deaths of two civilians in the attack were also confirmed in a United Nations confidential human rights report, 25 July 2018.تأكد مقتل مدنيَّيْن في هذا الهجوم أيضاً في تقرير سري للأمم المتحدة عن حقوق الإنسان في 25 تموز/يوليه 2018.
See also Hiiraan Online, “KDF killed Hormuud telecom workers and destroyed communication in Gedo region, Somalia”, 26 July 2018.انظر أيضا: Hiiraan Online, “KDF killed Hormuud telecom workers and destroyed communication in Gedo region, Somalia”, 26 July 2018.
Available at www.hiiraan.com/news4/2018/July/159237/kdf_متاح على الرابط التالي: www.hiiraan.com/news4/2018/July/159237/kdf_killed_hormuud_telecom_workers_and
killed_hormuud_telecom_workers_and_destroyed_communication_in_gedo_region_somalia.aspx._destroyed_communication_in_gedo_region_somalia.aspx.
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United Nations confidential human rights report, 16 January 2019.تقرير سري للأمم المتحدة عن حقوق الإنسان، 16 كانون الثاني/يناير 2019.
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United Nations confidential human rights report, 28–30 March 2019.تقرير سري للأمم المتحدة عن حقوق الإنسان، 28-30 آذار/مارس 2019.
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United Nations confidential human rights report, 26 August 2019.تقرير سري للأمم المتحدة عن حقوق الإنسان، 26 آب/أغسطس 2019.
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Meeting between the Kenya Defence Forces leadership and the Panel of Experts in Nairobi, 19 September 2019.اجتماع بين قيادة قوات الدفاع الكينية وفريق الخبراء في نيروبي، 19 أيلول/سبتمبر 2019.
The Panel also sent official correspondence to the Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations on 29 August 2019, but as of the time of writing had not received a response.ووجه الفريق أيضاً مراسلة رسمية إلى البعثة الدائمة لكينيا لدى الأمم المتحدة في 29 آب/أغسطس 2019، لكنه لم يتلق أي رد، حتى وقت كتابة هذا التقرير.
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According to United States Africa Command press releases, available at www.africom.mil/media-room/press-releases.وفقا لما جاء في النشرات الصحفية لقيادة الولايات المتحدة في أفريقيا، المتاحة على الرابط التالي: www.africom.mil/media-room/press-releases.
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Amnesty International, “USA/Somalia: Shroud of secrecy around civilian deaths masks possible war crimes”, 20 March 2019.Amnesty International, “USA/Somalia: Shroud of secrecy around civilian deaths masks possible war crimes”, 20 March 2019.
Available at www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/03/usa-somalia-shroud-of-secrecy-around-civilian-deaths-masks-possible-war-crimes/.متاح على الرابط التالي www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/03/usa-somalia-shroud-of-secrecy-around-civilian-deaths-masks-possible-war-crimes/.
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United States Africa Command, “U.S. Africa Command commander-directed review reveals civilian casualties”, press release, 5 April 2019.United States Africa Command, “U.S. Africa Command commander-directed review reveals civilian casualties”, press release, 5 April 2019.
Available at www.africom.mil/media-room/على الرابط التالي www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/
pressrelease/31697/u-s-africa-command-commander-directed-review-reveals-civilian-casualties.31697/u-s-africa-command-commander-directed-review-reveals-civilian-casualties.
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Of these, 83 cases were attributed to unknown armed actors, 34 to Al-Shabaab and 33 to clan militias;نُسبت من هذه الحالات 83 حالة إلى عناصر مسلحة مجهولة، و 34 حالة إلى حركة الشباب، و 33 حالة إلى ميليشيات العشائر؛
other cases were attributed to regional forces, namely to Jubbaland armed forces (26 cases), Galmudug forces (9 cases), Puntland forces (2 cases), South-West State forces (9 cases) and the paramilitary Liyu Police force (6 cases).ونسبت حالات أخرى إلى القوات الإقليمية، أي إلى القوات المسلحة في جوبالاند (26 حالة)، وقوات غلمدغ (9 حالات)، وقوات بونتلاند (حالتان)، وقوات ولاية جنوب الغرب (9 حالات)، وقوة شرطة ليو شبه العسكرية (6 حالات).
The United Nations also verified cases of the rape and gang rape of 48 individuals: 3 women, 44 girls and 1 boy by members of the Somali National Army;وتحققت الأمم المتحدة أيضاً من حالات اغتصاب واغتصاب جماعي تعرض لها 48 فردا: 3 نساء و 44 فتاة وصبي واحد، ارتكبها أفراد من الجيش الوطني الصومالي؛
and incidents against 5 women and 12 girls by officers of the Somali Police Force (see S/2019/280).وحوادث ارتكبها أفراد من قوة الشرطة الصومالية ضد 5 نساء و 12 فتاة (انظر S/2019/280).
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During the months of May, June and July 2019, multiple incidents of sexual- and gender-based violence were committed against girls and elderly women by regional armed actors in Puntland, Middle Shabelle, Bay, Somaliland and Jubbaland.خلال أشهر أيار/مايو وحزيران/يونيه وتموز/يوليه 2019، ارتكبت جهات فاعلة مسلحة إقليمية حوادث عنف جنسي وجنساني متعددة ضد فتيات ونساء مسنات في بونتلاند، وشبيلي الوسطى، وباي، وصوماليلاند، وجوبالاند.
141141
S/2019/280, paras. 72–73.S/2019/280، الفقرتان 72 و 73.
142142
Statement by the Office of the Attorney General of the Federal Government.بيان من مكتب المدعي العام في الحكومة الاتحادية.
The dhows were identified as MV Azmaad, MV Dwood and MV Yasin Shah.تم تحديد هوية المراكب الشراعية على أنها السفينة البحرية ”أزماد“، والسفينة البحرية ”داوود“، والسفينة البحرية ”ياسين شاه“.
143143
Interviews with industry sources, Dubai, 25 June 2019.مقابلات مع مصادر في القطاع، دبي، 25 حزيران/يونيه 2019.
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In 2018, Al-Shabaab was estimated to generate at least $7.5 million from the checkpoint taxation of charcoal in Middle and Lower Juba (S/2018/1002, para. 171).في عام 2018، جنت حركة الشباب ما يقدر بمبلغ لا يقل عن 7.5 مليون دولار من الضرائب المفروضة على الفحم في نقط التفتيش في جوبا الوسطى وجوبا السفلى (S/2018/1002، الفقرة 171).
At one checkpoint in Bay region alone, the Group estimated that Al-Shabaab generated approximately $10 million per year by taxing transiting vehicles and goods (S/2018/1002, para. 87).ففي نقطة تفتيش واحدة في منطقة باي وحدها، أشارت تقديرات فريق الرصد إلى أن الجماعة حققت حوالي 10 ملايين دولار سنويا عن طريق فرض ضرائب على المركبات والبضائع العابرة (S/2018/1002، الفقرة 87).
No charcoal was reported to have transited through this checkpoint during the current reporting period.وأُفيد بأنه لم تمر أي شحنة فحم عبر نقطة التفتيش هذه خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير الحالي.
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Interview with a source within the illicit trade, 14 August 2019.مقابلة مع مصدر من داخل أوساط التجارة غير المشروعة، 14 آب/أغسطس 2019.
A review of satellite imagery by a geographical information system analyst estimated the stockpiles in Buur Gaabo and Kismayo at 400,000–800,000 bags as at 16 September 2019.وأظهر استعراض أحد محللي نظام المعلومات الجغرافية للصور الساتلية أن المخزونات في بور غابو وكيسمايو تقدر بحوالي 000 400 إلى 000 800 كيس في 16 أيلول/سبتمبر 2019.
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As of August 2019, the wholesale price of charcoal in Kismayo was $6 per bag, compared with $11–$12 per bag in 2018.في آب/أغسطس 2019، كان سعر الفحم بالجملة في كيسمايو يبلغ 6 دولارات للكيس، مقارنة بسعر 11-12 دولارا للكيس في عام 2018.
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S/2018/1002, annex 2.4.S/2018/1002، المرفق 2-4.
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The Panel documented five incidents during the present reporting period involving Al-Shabaab attacking charcoal transporters.وثق فريق الخبراء خمسة حوادث خلال الفترة المشمولة بهذا التقرير هاجمت فيها حركة الشباب ناقلي الفحم.
For example, on 18 March 2019, Al-Shabaab burned a vehicle carrying charcoal travelling to Kismayo from Lower Shabelle.فعلى سبيل المثال، في 18 آذار/مارس 2019، أحرقت حركة الشباب مركبة محملة بالفحم متجهة إلى كيسمايو من شبيلي السفلى.
No reports of Al-Shabaab attacks on charcoal traders were recorded by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea in 2018.ولم يسجل فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا أي تقارير عن هجمات نفذتها حركة الشباب على تجار الفحم في عام 2018.
149149
Interview with Federal Government Minister in Nairobi, 14 March 2019;مقابلة مع وزير الحكومة الاتحادية في نيروبي، 14 آذار/مارس 2019؛
and interview with Jubbaland official in Nairobi, 27 February 2019.ومقابلة مع مسؤول من إدارة جوبالاند في نيروبي، 27 شباط/فبراير 2019.
A 2018 report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea documented transfer receipts indicating $500,000 per month being sent from All Star Group representatives in Dubai to the manager of the port of Kismayo as taxation on charcoal exports (S/2018/1002, annex 7.2 (strictly confidential)).ووثق تقرير لفريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا لعام 2018 إيصالات تشير إلى تحويلات شهرية بمبلغ 000 500 دولار أرسلت من ممثلي شركة All Star Group في دبي إلى مدير ميناء كيسمايو على أنها ضرائب مفروضة على صادرات الفحم (S/2018/1002، المرفق 7-2 (سري للغاية)).
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Blue Whale Shipping and Cargo Co. was identified as the exporter utilizing falsified Ghanaian documentation in both instances.حُددت شركة Blue Whale Shipping and Cargo على أنها الجهة المُصدّرة باستخدام وثائق غانية مزورة في كلتا الحالتين.
151151
Interviews with private sector entities in Kish and Qeshm, 24 February to 1 March 2019.مقابلات مع كيانات تابعة للقطاع الخاص في كيش وقشم، في الفترة من 24 شباط/فبراير إلى 1 آذار/مارس 2019.
The “Product of Iran” bags were also imported from the United Arab Emirates by the same charcoal traders.وجرى استيراد أكياس فحم تحمل الوسم ”منتج إيران“ أيضاً من الإمارات العربية المتحدة بواسطة نفس تجار الفحم.
Iranian authorities informed the Panel that goods imported into the Kish and Qeshm free zones could be re-exported as products of the Islamic Republic of Iran if the value added was equal or greater to 2.5 per cent.كما أبلغت السلطات الإيرانية الفريق بأن البضائع المستوردة إلى المنطقتين الحرتين كيش وقشم قد يتم إعادة تصديرها كمنتجات تابعة لجمهورية إيران الإسلامية إذا كانت القيمة المضافة تساوي أو تزيد عن 2.5 في المائة.
Interviews in Tehran, Kish and Qeshm, 24 to 28 February 2019.مقابلات في طهران وكيش وقشم، في الفترة من 24 إلى 28 شباط/فبراير 2019.
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Interviews with private sector entities in Kish and Qeshm from 24 February to 1 March 2019.مقابلات مع كيانات تابعة للقطاع الخاص في كيش وقشم، في الفترة من 24 شباط/فبراير إلى 1 آذار/مارس 2019.
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S/2018/1002, annex 7.6.S/2018/1002، المرفق 7-6.
154154
S/2018/1002, paras. 175–177, annexes 7.4 and 7.5.S/2018/1002، الفقرات 175 إلى 177، والمرفقان 7-4 و 7-5.
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See S/2018/1002, annex 7.7.انظر: S/2018/1002، المرفق 7-7.
156156
Official visit by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to Oman in April 2019.زيارة رسمية قام بها مكتب الأمم المتحدة المعني بالمخدرات والجريمة إلى عُمان في نيسان/أبريل 2019.
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Arab Times, “Kuwait slaps ban on Somalian coal due to terror financing”, 15 September 2019.Arab Times, “Kuwait slaps ban on Somalian coal due to terror financing”, 15 September 2019.
Available at www.arabtimesonline.com/news/kuwait-slaps-ban-on-somalian-coal-due-to-terror-financing/.متاح على الرابط: www.arabtimesonline.com/news/kuwait-slaps-ban-on-somalian-coal-due-to-terror-financing/.
158158
Interviews with industry sources in Dubai, 25 June 2019.مقابلات مع مصادر في القطاع المعني في دبي، 25 حزيران/يونيه 2019.